







English Records of Maratha History  
 MS Poona Residency Correspondence

General Editor—Sir Jadunath Sarkar

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## GENERAL CONTENTS

	PAGES
Portrait of Sir John Kennaway .. ..	<i>Frontispiece</i>
Foreword by Sir Jadunath Sarkar .. ..	i-iv
Introduction by the Editor .. ..	v-xix
Contents of letters alphabetically arranged .. ..	xxi-xxxiii
Chronology of important events .. ..	xxxv
Correspondence .. ..	1-684
<i>Section 1</i> —English Relations with Tipu, 1787-1789 ..	1
<i>Section 2</i> —Formation of the Triple Alliance, 1790 ..	53
<i>Section 3</i> —Tipu captures Travancore lines— British reaction to this aggression ..	113
<i>Section 4</i> —First stage of the war: Campaign of General Medows (August, 1790— January, 1791) .. ..	195
<i>Section 5</i> —Second stage of the war: Cornwallis commands in person (February— April, 1791) .. ..	291
<i>Section 6</i> —Third stage of the war: Cornwallis advances to Seringapatam and then retires to Bangalore (April-June, 1791) .	391
<i>Section 7</i> —Fourth stage of the war: Cornwallis renews campaign (July-December, 1791).	445
<i>Section 8</i> —Last stage of the war: Final attack on Seringapatam and submission of Tipu Sultan (January-February, 1792) ..	545
<i>Section 9</i> —After the war: Disputes and settlement (1792-93) .. ..	583
<i>Section 10</i> —Letters of General Francois Raymond ..	673
Index .. ..	685-694







SIR JOHN KENNAWAY, BARONET.  
RESIDENT, HYDERABAD. 1788-1794.

## FOREWORD.

A writer in the *Cambridge History of India* has remarked of Lord Cornwallis that "the Governor-General recovered in India not a little of the military reputation he had lost in America". If so, it was only among his contemporaries, for posterity has strangely neglected this great proconsul's work in India except in one point only, namely the warmly debated Permanent Settlement of the land revenue. Cornwallis has suffered comparative oblivion because his Indian career fell between two epochs which excited the passions and fixed public attention in Britain in an unusual degree. Immediately before him was the regime of Warren Hastings with its long-drawn and historic conflicts in the Court of Directors, the House of Commons and the tribunal of the Peers. Only five years lay between his departure from India and the Governor-Generalship of Marquis Wellesley with its series of dazzling conquests and revolutionary changes in the political map of India, on which a huge mass of printed State-papers, reports and pamphlets has been long available to the public.

The present volume represents an attempt to redress this wrong by marshalling contemporary official records, in the main unpublished. Here have been collected,—in what may seem lavish profusion to the general reader—all the despatches, private official correspondence and manuscript news-letters (translated from the Persian), relating to the Third Mysore War, the events leading up to it and its immediate after effects, from 1787 to 1794. The diplomatic side of it,—hitherto almost unknown, except in a few letters printed in Ross's *Cornwallis Correspondence*,—has been illustrated in this volume as fully as the military operations. And even for the military side the student is here offered the complete series of despatches illustrating the operations in every nook and corner of the far-flung theatre of this war, and representing the contemporary official version of the very actors in the scene.\*

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\* Ross admits, "As Lord Cornwallis did not personally take any part in the campaign of 1790, his despatches contain no details of the operations." (*Cornwallis Correspondence*, 2nd edition, i. 479.)



Cornwallis's war against Mysore removed the most serious danger to the peace of India and freed the rulers of British India from their greatest anxiety for nearly a decade. It rendered possible the rapidity, completeness and small cost of Wellesley's sensational triumph over the same foe seven years later. But hitherto it could be studied only in Colonel Mark Wilks's history of Mysore, written in 1810-14, with remarkable lucidity and charm of style, but lacking the basis of exhaustive original sources and the details necessary for a specialised study. Dirom's *Narrative* (published in 1794) professedly treats of the very last phase of the war, the campaign from June 1791 to February 1792, and totally ignores the diplomacy which so vitally affected the military issue; this author also admits that "his *Narrative* is still imperfect and that in the operations of the several armies, all the interesting circumstances which occurred, cannot have come to his knowledge". Similarly, Edward Moor's *Narrative of the Operations of Captain Little's Detachment* (1794), deals only with a "side show",—the work of the small British detachment that accompanied Parashuram Bhau Patwardhan. Here, too, the author depends solely on his own personal experiences and his book lacks "the communication of many valuable materials from his friends in India", which he was expecting but which unfortunately did not arrive. Two other sketches of the war were published at the time: one, *Narrative of the Operations of the British Army in India, from April to July 1791* (printed in 1792), and the other, R. Mackenzie's *Sketch of the War with Tippoo Sultan* (2 volumes, Calcutta, 1794). But both of them are so scarce as to be practically lost to us. Moreover, they give us memoirs and not State-papers as the present volume does.

The contemporary English records now first made available to the public, should be supplemented by an extremely valuable series of despatches written in the Marathi language and published by V. V. Khare in his *Aitihāsik Lekh Samgraha* (with 16½ letters printed in D. B. Parasnis's *Aitihāsik Kirkol Prakaranen*). Here we learn how thoughtful Marathas were deeply impressed by the rapid and accurate fire of Tipu's

artillery directed by French officers and realised that the days of their light horse and "Cossack tactics" were gone. The Nizam's share in the war is described in less than 14 pages of a lithographed octavo volume, the *Hadiqat-i-Alam*, written by his minister Meer Alam. Tipu's own version is given in 34 pages of his Court history, the *Nishan-i-Haidari*.

The French partizan leader Francois Raymond wrote no narrative or despatch on this war, in which he participated under the banners of Nizam Ali's son; a single letter from him refers to the affair of Gurramkonda and the terrible famine then raging. A feature that may interest European readers is the last section of this volume, where the General Editor has given all the extant letters of Raymond. Some sheets of his "Orders of march" during this campaign have been secured from the Pondicherry archives, but they relate only to the internal arrangements of his force, and hence have not been printed here.

Cornwallis's Mysore campaign has suffered eclipse from the greater brilliancy and finality of Wellesley's short war with Tipu. But it should not be forgotten that Cornwallis bearded a Tipu who was the most formidable Indian prince of his time, assisted by a large and efficient French corps, in the fullness of his resources and overflowing with confidence born of past victories over the English and the Marathas. Wellesley, on the other hand, killed a Tiger of Seringapatam whose claws had been cut and fangs extracted seven years before, a dazed and drooping chieftain with obscured vision and lost initiative, a mere shadow of the military genius whose strategy in 1790-92 had excited the admiration of his English antagonists.

Nor should we forget that Cornwallis's instruments and equipment were far inferior to those of Wellesley, who was served by a galaxy of military talent unequalled in any other period of Anglo-Indian history, even if we omit that supreme luminary, the future "great world conqueror's Conqueror". In Cornwallis's time the seat of the war had not been explored, the English intelligence service was as defective as their Commissariat. Nor had Cornwallis the imperious masterful

spirit which made Wellesley give short shrift to inefficient or lazy subordinates like the Madras Council ; he was much too polite a nobleman.

The war dealt with in this volume finely illustrates Cornwallis's genius as a strategist, his diplomatic foresight and suppleness, his infinite patience with exasperatingly slow evasive and deceitful allies,—reminding one, in this quality, of the great Marlborough,—and above all his nobility of heart and chivalry, best exemplified by his treatment of the fallen foe.

The records surviving in the Poona office have many gaps due to the ravages of time and neglect. These have, as far as possible, been filled up by Professor N. B. Ray with patient and unremunerated labour among the Imperial Records (then in Calcutta). The Index has been prepared by Mr. V. G. Dighe, M.A. To both of them our thanks are due.

Jadunath Sarkar,  
*General Editor.*

## INTRODUCTION.

This volume embodies the correspondence of the British Residents at Poona and Hyderabad with the Governor-General and many important letters written by one of these Residents to the other or to the Governors of Bombay and Madras, as well as despatches and news-letters from other persons, all connected with the Third Mysore War and ranging from 1787 to 1794. Hitherto Wilks's *Historical Sketches of the South of India* (published in 1810-1814) has been our chief source of information on that momentous event. The three volumes of Ross's *Cornwallis Correspondence* and the second volume of Forrest's *Selections* from his State-papers are valuable for the history of his administration and character, but shed scanty light on the course of his tremendous duel with the "Tiger of Seringapatam".

The letters in this volume, however, not merely corroborate and supplement the account of Wilks in many important points, they also unfold to us a most dramatic and interesting chapter of British Indian diplomatic history. Col. Wilks's work gives us a vivid narrative of the military operations of this war, while the present volume, in addition to despatches from many minor theatres of the war passed over by Wilks, gives us copiously the diplomacy of the Courts of Poona and Hyderabad and the problems that faced the British leaders throughout this long and anxious struggle.

Lord Cornwallis assumed charge of the Company's affairs in India in September 1786, and soon afterwards Tipu's restless activity, his war with the Marathas and its sudden and indecisive conclusion, his military preparations and his intrigues with the French, roused His Lordship to a lively apprehension of Tipu's power and designs. From the very outset he fixed on the idea of isolating Tipu by drawing the Nizam and the Peshwa into an alliance of mutual benefit against him; but almost ineradicable jealousies and irreconcilable interests separated these two Powers. The task of co-ordinating and reconciling the clashing interests of Cornwallis's coveted allies was placed in the hands

of two of the ablest British diplomatists, C. W. Malet and J. Kennaway, the Residents at Poona and Hyderabad respectively.

The letters disclose Malet's *pourparlers* with Nana Fadnis, his ready wit and ingenuity, his remarkably persuasive address, the sparkling exposition of his views which smoothed all differences between him and the Peshwa's regent and led finally to the signing of the treaty of alliance. Endowed with a subtle intellect, a keen power of analysis, and intimately acquainted with the Maratha character, Malet was supremely fitted to understand the shifts and devices, the twists and turns, of Nana's policy. With unerring judgment and singular precision, he fathomed the depth of Nana's motive in joining the war and wrote to the Governor-General saying, "The grand object of our allies is to reap as much benefit as possible from the war and to stimulate Tipu's and our exertions to the exhaustion of our mutual force, so that they (the Marathas and the Nizam) may become the arbiter of future negotiations". As the war proceeded, Malet watched with the closest circumspection the intrigues of the rival factions in the Poona Court, the reaction of English victory or defeat on the balance of the parties and on Nana's policy, and ably counteracted Tipu's intrigues. The vigour and weight of his representation often exercised a steadying influence on Nana's fluctuating policy (nos. 139 & 150) and even when he failed, he at least exposed the naked hypocrisy and wiles of the Maratha diplomatist. He played with Nana's agent Behro Pant as a cat plays with a mouse, and with the same feline delight embarrassed his victim (385). Here is a specimen. Malet writes to the Governor-General on October 31, 1791, "Behro pant acquainted me that the enemy had been long and busily employed in destroying every vestige of vegetation round Puttun and strengthening the place by new works, and mentioned these points in such a manner as to convince me. I replied that if Tipu dug up the forage round Puttun, it was probable that the loosening of the earth would make it more productive after the first fall of rain; but if not, the surrounding desert would be more destructive to him than to the allies; and as to multiplying

his defences, it was rather a proof of the desperateness of his situation". This completely silenced Behro and he changed the topic of discussion.

Malet's fine sense of humour, incidentally showing his grip over Maratha politics, often blazes forth in these letters. Thus, on the 19th November he writes to the Governor-General, "I find that notwithstanding my objections to the largest of the battering guns, the partiality for it is so great that they have not thought proper to exchange it, alleging, that though a little crooked, it carries very straight. May it in this be emblematic of their politics". It is this saving sense of humour that kept Nana's temper unruffled, unlike his compatriot at the Nizam's Court, whose blunt straightforwardness subjected him twice to indignity at the hand of the Nizam's ministry. If Malet's penetrating insight and firm grasp of Maratha politics enabled him to deal successfully with an astute diplomatist like Nana, his lofty sense of dignity, his sterling honesty and his single-minded devotion to the interests of his nation (83, 185), which stand out in striking contrast with the Poona emissary Behropan's coarse unscrupulousness, utter want of patriotism and mean desire for private profit (127, 176), raised aloft the honour of the British name.

Among the many actors on this political stage stand out the two heroes Cornwallis and Tipu with unique grandeur. In the possession of certain qualities such as indomitable will, dogged determination, singleness of purpose and supreme composure in adversity and crisis, the second was not a whit inferior to the other; but Cornwallis's inflexible candour and consistency, unruffled serenity of temper and judicious spirit of compromise, in contrast with the reckless lying (424, 491) imperious and overbearing temper and rash daring of Tipu, place him far above his Indian antagonist.

Cornwallis's notion of statesmanship lay in making the best of the situation around him and in realising what was possible under the circumstances. Tipu, on the other hand, would set no limit to his vaulting ambition and would pursue his cherished schemes regardless of consequences. The Englishman was

eminently practical, the other was primarily imaginative; but it must at the same time be admitted that in the audacity of conception, fertility of resource and an over-weening sense of royal majesty (37A) Tipu stood without a peer amongst his Indian contemporaries. His successive embassies to Poona and Hyderabad in the midst of the war, his liberal supply of money to Poona, his correspondence with the ladies of the Nizam's household (355), his insidious pan-Islamic appeal to the Nizam (344) for making a breach among the allies, show that he combined wonderful fertility of resource with an unmeasured power of scheming; but all his great qualities were marred by a want of balance in his character.

The letters not only give us occasional glimpses into the character of Tipu, but they also afford us an insight into Nana's character and diplomacy. A man of medium height, Nana's slender figure, sunken cheeks and wrinkled face, so prominently figuring in his portraits, tell of shattered health and ceaseless public care; but his dull and unimpressive exterior veiled an inordinate love of power, an unshakable courage and diplomatic ability of a very high order. His excellence in double-dealing and finesse (359 and 363) and dexterity in devising endless shifts and subterfuges, are well exemplified in these letters. But beneath these apparent uncertainties and fluctuations, Nana pursued with singular tenacity a well-defined and clear-cut policy, which is well described by Malet in several of these letters:—"It is the (Nana's) desire of seeing the two grand barriers to its views of universal power mutually exhaust their strength while withholding the exertion of its strength, and at the same time its wealth, power and resources kept in reserve to act as occasion may require and preserve an influence over the councils and operations of the principal competitors" (168). Nana's delays and halts, indecision and procrastination sprang from a well-thought out plan, and were not necessarily the vagaries of a self-willed dictator. They were not meant to fritter away his energies, but intended to serve the highest interests of the State. The veteran minister knew too well the strength and weakness of his State, but he failed to discern that the ample resources of the English, their genius

for organization, the strength and discipline of their troops, their keen public spirit and unexampled devotion to the interests of their nation would necessarily give them the palm, without the co-operation of any Native Power, in the struggle for leadership in India. His co-operation with the English turned the scale definitely in favour of the latter, and he awoke to see, when it was too late, that the leadership which he had so much coveted for himself was passing into the hands of his foreign ally (385).

A rapid glance at the origin and progress of the war enables us to understand the real nature of the policy pursued by the two Courts of Poona and Hyderabad towards their British ally.

Malet took up the reins of office on the 6th of March 1786. Hardly a year had elapsed when the prospect of a war in Europe darkened the political horizon of India. Tipu's ceaseless activity, his embassies to France and to Constantinople (9 and 12), the arrival of French troops for his service (10) and his undisguised military preparations (11 and 21) stirred the Governor-General to great activity. Cornwallis directed Malet as early as 1787 to propose an alliance with Nana to counteract Tipu's schemes. He postponed the demand of the Guntur Sarkar from the Nizam, in order that the latter might not be thrown into the arms of Tipu (47). The apprehension of war soon passed away, but the notice to prepare for it was not disregarded. In 1789 the disputes over the possession of Mount Dolly and Dharmapatam (37) between the English factors of Tellicherry and Tipu and the refuge afforded to the rebel Nairs in the English settlement at Tellicherry (37 A) embittered the relations between the two Powers. At the same time Tipu's military operations on the Malabar Coast (42), the report of his intended invasion of Travancore and blockade of Tellicherry (41), coupled with the ceaseless activity of Malet at Poona and Kennaway at Hyderabad, Meer Abul Qasim's embassy to Calcutta, and the increasing friendliness among the three Powers, roused reciprocal distrust and suspicion and precipitated the long-expected war. The actual outbreak of hostilities was however caused by Tipu's peremptory demands on the Raja



of Travancore, an ally of the English. The Raja's evasive reply provoked Tipu and on the 29th of December 1789 he flung himself upon the Travancore lines. His troops met with an unexpected repulse, but this attack upon an ally was considered by the Governor-General as equal to a declaration of war against the Company, (60) and hostilities soon commenced.

Malet who was ceaselessly weaving the web of alliance with the Marathas, now stirred himself to greater activity. He soothed Nana's feelings of wounded pride due to the rejection of his application for British assistance in his late war against Tipu. He worked up the Poona Minister's enthusiasm for war by dangling before him the sure prospect of territorial acquisition, and on the 7th of February 1790 succeeded in securing the official declaration of the Maratha Court "of its disposition to take part with Your Lordship's Government in hostilities against Tipu Sahib" (65). But the adjustment of many difficult and intricate points, e.g., the respective shares in the partition of Tipu's territories, the terms of mutual assistance combined with the intrigues of Tipu's agents and the introduction of Tipu's pagodas, to delay the execution of the treaty.

But while Nana was shilly-shallying, the war had commenced. On the 13th of April 1790 Tipu renewed his assault on the lines and stormed them ten days later. Colonel Hartley arrived at Ayakotta to assist the Raja. The impatient factors of Tellicherry commenced their operations on the Malabar Coast. General Medows set on foot the movement of his army. Captain Little with his detachment embarked at Jaygarh on the 26th May (112) to join Parashuram Bhau Patwardhan.

At length after endless and vexatious delay, the treaty was executed and exchanged on the 6th June (117); but Nana still waited and watched. Parashuram Bhau remained encamped on the Kistna for a long time, (June and July). Nana himself held conferences with Rasta, the champion of Tipu's cause, and received Tipu's vakils.

At last the successful operations of General Medows, the capture of Karur, Dharapuram, Aravakurichi (5th July) (144) and Coimbatore in quick succession, emboldened Bhau to cross the Kistna and commence hostilities by an invasion of

Tipu's territories in September (149). The employment of Tipu's army against General Medows left Parashuram Bhau free to push on his conquests. Many places, e.g., Saundati, Parasgarh and Betigeri, fell before him. These successes of General Medows and of Bhau presaged the speedy triumph of the allies. Diplomatic circles in Poona began to whisper that the Peshwa would personally take the field (155); but this favourable aspect of affairs was soon completely changed by Colonel Floyd's defeat at Satyamangalam (159). The narration of the circumstances under which Colonel Floyd effected his retreat evoked Nana's warm applause at Floyd's conduct (160). He also consented to the requisition of two more detachments from Bombay for the reduction of Dharwar, but he objected to the inspection of the artillery destined for the siege of Dharwar, and even when, after a fortnight's silence, the inspection of the guns was permitted on the 24th October, the guns could not be actually examined till the 12th November on account of the absence of the master of ordnance who had gone to a neighbouring river "for a religious ablutionary visit" (165 and 173). The rumour of the Peshwa's personally taking the field faded away, Rasta was harbouring Tipu's agents at Bagalkot with Nana's connivance (155). The Maratha promise of equipping a grand army after the Dassera was practically shelved, there was no stir or bustle of military preparation even at the end of October. What was more disconcerting was that Behropant proposed to Malet the division of Bhau's army and his abandoning the siege of Dharwar at a time when Colonel Frederick had reached Sangameshwar (letter of the 9th December, Nos. 183 and 185).

This inaction and apathy of the Poona Court from the middle of September to December synchronised with Tipu's aggressive operations in Coimbatore and in the Baramahal and Salem regions (167 and 175). To retrieve this situation the Governor-General announced his determination of personally taking the field (169 and 170).

With the arrival of Lord Cornwallis at Madras on the 13th of December 1790 and his assumption of the supreme command, the war entered upon a new phase. Nana now showed his

interest in the allied cause; by setting on foot the long deferred equipment of the grand army for effecting a junction with the Governor-General, and he transferred the command of the army from Mahadaji Behere to Haripant Phadke in response to Malet's representations; but Haripant's movements were exceedingly slow; he entered tents on the 10th December 1790; he started from Poona on January 1st, 1791 (193); in two weeks he had made a journey of 40 miles only (201); at the end of a full month, on January 31, he had gone as far as Pandharpur, a distance of 60 coss (212); on the 3rd February he had advanced to a distance of 100 coss from Poona (234). As he marched on, his plan of movement and operations changed with bewildering rapidity. Nana first proposed a junction with the Nizam's army at Bagalkot and thence their combined march to Adoni; but on Malet's representation the place of rendezvous was shifted from Adoni to Gooty (180); but the whole scheme of union between the Maratha and the Nizam's armies fell through on account of the Nizam's strong opposition (194).

About the middle of February 1791, Haripant determined upon a visit to the Nizam (223); but his tardy march and his halt at Gadwal for the celebration of Hooly and his visit to a shrine so delayed his progress that he reached Pangal only on the 14th March (251). His interview with the Nizam produced another alteration in his plan; he now hit upon the idea of sending his army under the command of his son Laksman Rao to Raydrug-Sera to effect a junction with Parashuram Bhau, himself remaining at Gooty and attending the Nizam on his march from Pangal (254). The cordiality between the Nizam and the Maratha Commander had increased to such an extent that Haripant repaired to Pangal for a second time (282). After leaving Pangal, he journeyed to Kurnool and busied himself in exacting contributions from its Nawab. At length the sense of his duty to his ally dawned on him and he sent his son Laksman Rao with a large detachment on 15th April to join Lord Cornwallis (289). It is these endless twists and turns in the policy of the Maratha chiefs that provoked later on an outburst of extreme vituperation from Malet and

he wrote to the Governor-General on the 30th July 1791 (Volume II *Poona Residency Records* p. 202),—"I have, My Lord, endeavoured to make as concise a sketch as possible of a very delicate negotiatory predicament with a Court whose views are conducted by men unchecked by principles, unawed by responsibility and who from their infancy are habituated to the promotion of their designs by all the versatility of Machiavellian art and all the perseverance of the most stoical apathy, by men, My Lord, with whom chicane is an ability, business amusement, intrigue recreation, and circumvention pleasure, who in their exercise of these qualities are actuated by an insatiable lust of power and of gain".

While Haripant was coquetting with various schemes during the four months from January to April 1791, Lord Cornwallis singlehanded was overpowering his opponent by terrific blows. Entering Tipu's territories by the pass of Mugly, he pitched his camp at Palmaner (222A) on the 21st of February, and commenced his drive towards Bangalore on the 24th (224). Kolar and Hosscotta fell before his assaults (236) and he pushed on to Bangalore, the second city in Tipu's dominions. The city or *pettah* was easily stormed, but the redoubtable fortress held out and was taken only by assault, on the night of the 21st March (267).

The arrival of the Marathas and the Nizam's cavalry at this favourable period would have enabled him to resumé his march towards Seringapattam; but, as we have seen, Haripant was flirting with various schemes and shirking the main issue. The Nizam's Commander, Raja Tejwant, was putting off his movements by flimsy pretexts. Cornwallis was therefore driven to the necessity of making a retrograde march to reinforce his troops by a junction with the Nizam's cavalry.

Since the outbreak of the war, the Nizam's attention had been directed towards the reduction of the fortresses of Cumbum and Kopbal; the former surrendered on the 16th November (180); the latter baffled the utmost exertions of Captain Andrew Read for a sufficiently long time and surrendered as late as the 17th April 1791 (295). The failure of General Medows' campaign in the south and the commencement of operations

in the north by Lord Cornwallis brought the Nizam to the forefront. The comparatively short distance between Pangal and the theatre of the renewed operations facilitated a brisk correspondence, and the Nizam's minister Azim-ul-umara promised whole-hearted and vigorous co-operation in the war. As early as the 4th of January 1791 the Nizam sent through the British Resident at his Court an assurance to the Governor-General saying that, "as soon as the necessary particulars can be ascertained of the time when and the route by which Your Lordship proposes a body of our forces shall penetrate into Tipu's country from the Carnatic, the army under Asad Ali Khan, Muhammad Ameen and Raja Baramal shall proceed to whatever place Your Lordship may appoint" (196). This firm assurance was belied by a most shameful procrastination. The temporizing and vacillating policy of the Nizam's Court was only equalled by the daring and scope of its cunning and covert hostility.

On the 10th of February the Hyderabad Minister assented to the junction of the cavalry of Raja Tejwant's army with Lord Cornwallis. An army was assembled at Jammalmudgu towards the beginning of February under Raja Tejwant. In the meanwhile the Governor-General had commenced his march, and a most urgent letter was sent on the 23rd of February to Tejwant to proceed with his army with the utmost promptitude (227A); but all the earnest solicitations and written remonstrances of Lieutenant Steuart failed to quicken his (Tejwant's) movement (231, 233). He broke ground on the 12th March and then began to move at a snail's pace. On the first day he marched only two miles (245), and then halted for five days, resuming his march on the 17th (249 and 252). After five days, he reached Vampalle on the 22nd March, after traversing a distance of only twenty-six miles and a half (263). Tejwant again halted for breath and wrote to the Governor-General to send a detachment of infantry to Chintamanipet (269) to facilitate his safe advance. In deference to his wishes, Cornwallis turned towards Chintamanipet and informed the Raja of his expected arrival there on the 7th or 8th April (278); but to his utter surprise when he reached Chintamanipet,

Tejwant lurked behind and refused to move forward to effect the promised junction (284). Thus the Raja's callous procrastination was matched by his cold perfidy. The Governor-General was evidently thrown into great perplexity, but luckily on the 13th April he at last effected his union with Tejwant at Hodally (291).

After effecting this junction, Cornwallis determined to dash forward to the siege of Seringapatam, in spite of the advanced state of the season. General Abercromby had already ascended the Coorg pass with an ample store of provisions and artillery, and Cornwallis could not throw away the opportunity of striking against Tipu's capital. As he proceeded, his march was impeded by clouds of horse that were let loose by the Mysore Sultan. To counteract these charges, that burst upon the English troops like thunderclouds, Cornwallis arranged an orderly disposition of the line of march and pointed out to Tejwant that detachments of bodies of horse should be sent out into the open country along the flanks of his army, and that their encamping with their followers close to the rear of the line of the infantry would cause the greatest injury and distress (311). The Raja violated these instructions, and the embarrassment caused to the line of march by the overcrowding of foragers and followers of every description, added to his half heartedness in supplying Captain Dallas with only a small quota of troops, instead of 3,000 men as desired by Lord Cornwallis, ruffled the habitual serenity of His Lordship's temper and provoked him to a sharp reprimand of Tejwant's conduct (312).

Regardless of these difficulties, Cornwallis headed his way towards the enemy's capital, and on the 15th May reached Arikera in the close vicinity of Seringapatam. Here Tipu made a stand and confronted Cornwallis with a powerful army; the fighting was obstinate, but the day was decided before "Tipu's cavalry came up". When a body of English infantry made a movement to push forward on a piece of broken ground to cut off a detachment of Tipu's troops, Raja Tejwant placed his cavalry directly in front and prevented the victory from being more complete (341). This success opened

Seringapatam to attack, but at this time terrible distress prevailed in the allied camp. Food had become scarce, *ragy* was selling at 11 seers per rupee, forage was equally dear, men and cattle were dying in numbers (326 and 328). This terrible state of things and the absence of any news of the Maratha army compelled Cornwallis to beat a retreat. Tipu's clever strategy and the cold indifference and perfidy of the two allies had foiled this campaign and rendered fruitless all the early victories won by the Governor-General.

This period of strenuous marching and campaigning in April and May on the part of Cornwallis was turned to account by the Marathas to the gratification of their schemes of conquest. The crowning victory won by the English under the walls of Bangalore broke the spell of Tipu's invincibility and led directly to the fall of Dharwar and Kopbal. Bhau was now free to spread devastation around Chitaldrug and to reduce important places like Mayakonda and Channagiri (321). The fall of Kopbal likewise allowed the Marathas to establish themselves in more than eighty villages dependent on it (306). Haripant forced his way from Kurnool to Gooty, captured the small fort of Chillumpully (near Gooty) and Sera (316), and then turned to meet Bhau *via* Raydrug and Sera. The two commanders met at Nagmangal (353) and then rolled with their vast army towards Seringapatam.

It was in the course of this movement that they sighted the English army and effected the grand union with it on the plains of Melcota, May 29, 1791. (325).

The arrival of the mighty Maratha army under two renowned Commanders at a time of crisis, exercised a decisive influence on the fortunes of the war (351). The Nizam's troops, now completely worn out, had become a source more of encumbrance than of help; insufficiency of food and clothing had thrown the English army into the greatest distress and utterly dispirited it. The mighty military machine which Lord Cornwallis had dragged far away from his base seemed about to break down. The appearance of two large Maratha armies at this juncture formed a turning point in the war. It revived the spirit of the English army and restored its confidence. The ample stores

and provisions brought by these allies were now opened to the English army, and it revived.

Cornwallis warmly congratulated the Maratha commanders, and then in consultation with them fixed upon a plan of operations. They decided to refit and organise their army during the interval of the rainy season when military operations would be brought to a stand still. In the meanwhile, they would coop Tipu up by holding a string of places from Raydrug and Sera to Hosur. The maintenance of communication with their respective bases was deemed essential for their security and the steady flow of supplies. Hence Parashuram Bhau moved to Sera, and Cornwallis attended by Haripant marched back to Bangalore (332 and 338); but it was agreed that after the rains, Lord Cornwallis, aided by a portion of Maratha cavalry, and General Abercromby seconded by the largest portion of the Maratha cavalry, would invest Seringapatam on both sides of the Caverry and "the officer who is to command in the Sera country will not allow his attention to be so much diverted by light and unimportant designs as not to be in readiness to take his share when called upon in the general plan of operations" (338).

Diplomacy now became very active to bring about a peace, a congress of the deputies of the allies met at Bangalore, but the negotiations proved abortive, August (361).

The failure of this peace effort released Cornwallis's energies for renewing military preparations on a grander scale. The army was re-equipped, arrangements for abundant supplies were made, the transit of grain to the very heart of Tipu's dominion was facilitated by the destruction of a string of impregnable fortresses. The fortress of Hosur fell on July 15, opening the granaries of the Baramahal and Salem countries, the fortress of Nandidrug was taken by assault on the 18th October, which facilitated free communication with the countries to the northward of Bangalore (381). Cornwallis had flattered himself with the hope of commencing operations towards the middle of October. Parashuram Bhau had promised to fall in at a short warning from the Governor-General. To repair the disgrace that Raja Tejwant's conduct had brought upon



the Nizam's arms, the Nizam had again promised the most vigorous co-operation as early as June (letter of the 29th June, No. 334). The marching tents of prince Secunder Jah were pitched as early as the 23rd August (360), and pressing solicitations were sent by the Governor-General to the Nizam's Court to expedite the march of his army so that the union between the two armies might be effected about the middle of October (369 and 372). But the Prince and the Minister could be induced to enter the tents only on the 6th October (376). Their march commenced on the 9th (378), but it was exasperatingly slow, their movement was held up by endless pretexts. On the 18th of January 1792 they had reached Bangalore after a period of three months and a quarter (382-4, 388), so that when Cornwallis, after the reduction of Savandrug and other hill forts between Bangalore and Seringapatam encamped at Magry in January, neither Bhau nor the Prince Secunder Jah had appeared with their quota. The victories of the Governor-General and the quick reduction of the strongest hill fortresses had awakened in the Poona Durbar an apprehension of the ascendancy of the English, and instead of employing Bhau's arms in forwarding the success of the English, his energies were now directed to extending the sphere of Maratha conquests. The more Malet began to press Bhau's advance to Magry, the more did Bhau recede towards the west.

This failure in Bhau's engagements again threw Cornwallis into the greatest difficulty. It seemed to nullify the success of the whole enterprise. As the Governor-General wrote to Malet, "As in consequence of the Bhaw's failure in his engagements, the plan of the campaign, the success of which must otherwise have been ensured by the capture of Saven-drug and other late acquisitions, may totally fail. The want of provisions may oblige us once more to return without reducing a place which I am convinced could not have made a long resistance, if the means which I had prepared at an immense expense to the Company could have been brought to act in full force against it" (409). At this moment of disappointment and dismay Cornwallis's courage rose to its height. He made a new disposition of his forces and altered

General Abercromby's plan (406, 408 and 418). The Governor-General's uneasiness was, however, partially relieved by the arrival of the Nizam's army under the Prince and the Minister on the 25th January after a period of three months and half since their march began\* (420). The grand army of Cornwallis reinforced by the Nizam's force rolled towards the capital and invested Seringapatam, but the dauntless Tipu would not submit without a blow. Cornwallis made a successful assault on the 6th February and Tipu opened negotiations for peace (434); the preliminary articles of peace were signed and exchanged between the confederate Powers on the 22nd February 1792, but Parashuram Bhau had not yet arrived upon the scene (442 and 443).

The victorious termination of the war involving the cession of no less than half the dominions of Tipu, with the half-hearted co-operation and more often the veiled hostility of the two allies, throws into relief the greatness of Cornwallis's achievement. He completely shattered the great Mysorean's power and left it utterly crippled. Tipu's name still remained a by-word of terror, but his real power was gone. It remained as hollow as a bubble, and as soon as the mailed fist of Wellesley pricked it, it burst. The extinction of Tipu's power was the necessary sequel to Cornwallis's treaty of Seringapatam.

P. E. Roberts in his *History of British India* (p. 234) writes, "Both were unwilling allies and rendered no useful aid, but at least they were prevented from joining Mysore". The *Cambridge History of India*, on the other hand, comments on their part in 1790 by saying "The Marathas and the Nizam were however giving useful aid, and the capture of Dharwar added greatly to the allies' security and power". This volume will clarify this obscure point by revealing in minute detail the tactics and strategy adopted by the allies during the war.

Nirod Bhushan Ray,  
Editor.

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\*Contrast their movement with that of Mir Allum. Mir Allum starting from Pangal on 18th July reached Bangalore on the 16th August to attend the peace Congress.



# Contents of Vol. 3.

Arranged in the alphabetical order of the writers.

No.	From	To	Date	Page
71	Abercromby, Robert, Governor of Bombay.	C. W. Malet	.. 25 February 1790 ..	76
76	" "	" "	.. 10 March 1790 ..	84
177	" "	.. Col. Frederick	.. 18 November 1790 ..	231
413	" "	.. Cornwallis, G. G.	.. 10 January 1792 ..	555
418	" "	" "	.. 15 January 1792 ..	562
420	" "	" "	.. 19 January 1792 ..	564
421	" "	" "	.. 20 January 1792 ..	564
428	" "	" "	.. 1 February 1792 ..	571
429	" "	" "	.. 3 February 1792 ..	572
432	" "	.. Bombay Board	.. 7 February 1792 ..	574
204	Ali Reza	.. Anand Rao Raste	.. 8 December 1790 ..	273
240	Azim-ul-Omra	.. Raja Tejawant	.. 7 March 1791 ..	335
264A	" "	" "	.. 22 March 1791 ..	362
492	" "	.. Cornwallis, G. G.	.. 21 March 1793 ..	637
206A	Balaji Janardan (Nana Fadnis).	The Nizam	.. 23 January 1791 ..	277
247	" "	.. Hari Pant Phadke	.. 13 March 1791 ..	342
21	Boddam, Robert Hart, Governor, Bombay.	C. W. Malet	.. 29 October 1787 ..	19
22	" "	" "	.. 8 November 1787 ..	20
28	" "	" "	.. 30 December 1787 ..	29
50	Bombay Council	" "	.. 23 September 1789 ..	48
448	Bombay, Government of—	R. Abercromby	.. March 1792 ..	585
79	Byron, Capt.	.. (?)	.. 17 March 1790 ..	87
47	Calcutta Council	.. C. W. Malet	.. 15 August 1787 ..	46
13	" "	" "	.. 7 September 1787 ..	11
25	" "	" "	.. 14 December 1787 ..	26
4	Campbell, Archibald Governor of Madras.	Tipu Sultan	.. 10 March 1787 ..	3
5	" "	.. C. W. Malet	.. 8 June 1787 ..	4
9	" "	" "	.. 22 July 1787 ..	7
10	" "	" "	.. 3 August 1787 ..	8
16	" "	" "	.. 28 September 1787 ..	14
17	" "	" "	.. 30 September 1787 ..	16
20	" "	" "	.. 16 October 1787 ..	18
23	" "	" "	.. 11 November 1787 ..	20

No.	From	To	Date	Page
27	Campbell, Archibald, Governor of Madras.	C. W. Malet	20 December 1787	28
33	" "	" "	1 February 1789	32
184	Carnegie, David	" "	9 December 1790	239
381	Cherry, G. F., Persian Translator.	Capt. Kennaway	21 October 1791	512
434	" "	C. W. Malet	8 February 1792	575
442	" "	" "	24 February 1792	580
450	" "	Golam Ali and Ali Reza	24 April 1792	586
451	" "	" "	13 May 1792	587
452	" "	" "	22 May 1792	588
455	" "	" "	10 June 1792	590
456	" "	" "	11 June 1792	592
456A	" "	" "	15 June 1792	592
460	" "	" "	5 July 1792	597
468	" "	" "	28 August 1792	605
472	" "	" "	September 1792	611
476	" "	" "	10 October 1792	613
478	" "	" "	22 October 1792	615
480	" "	" "	26 November 1792	617
484	" "	" "	2 January 1793	621
488	" "	" "	Received 10 December 1792.	626
490	" "	" "	11 March 1793	629
502	" "	" "	10 June 1793	651
505	" "	Meer Abdul Latif	27 June 1793	654
510	" "	C. W. Malet	9 October 1793	661
462	Coorg, Raja of,	Chief of Tellicherry	17 July 1792	598
6	Cornwallis, Earl, G. G.	C. W. Malet	6 June 1787	5
7	" "	" "	20 June 1787	7
11	" "	" "	29 August 1787	9
14	" "	" "	26 September 1787	12
15	" "	R. H. Boddam	26 September 1787	13
18	" "	C. W. Malet	15 October 1787	17
19	" "	R. H. Boddam	15 October 1787	19
24	" "	C. W. Malet	14 December 1787	21
44	" "	The Nizam	7 July 1789	42
60	" "	C. W. Malet	27 January 1790	54
62	" "	" "	1 February 1790	64
68	" "	" "	22 February 1790	73
72	" "	" "	28 February 1790	77
75	" "	" "	8 March 1790	84
84	" "	" "	29 March 1790	95
87	" "	Capt. Kennaway	8 April 1790	98

No.	From	To	Date	Page
89	Cornwallis, Earl, G. G.	Capt. Kennaway	12 April 1790	100
92	"	C. W. Malet	17 April 1790	105
94	"	"	26 April 1790	113
104	"	"	10 May 1790	125
113	"	Capt. Kennaway	31 May 1790	142
114	"	Col. Brathwaite	"	143
114A	"	Lieut.-Col. Cockerell	"	144
116	"	Capt. Kennaway	26 April 1790	146
119	"	C. W. Malet	7 June 1790	153
121	"	Capt. Kennaway	"	156
124	"	C. W. Malet	14 June 1790	159
126	"	William Medows	16 June 1790	161
126A	"	Capt. Kennaway	17 June 1790	162
132	"	"	3 July 1790	170
134	"	C. W. Malet	5 July 1790	174
134A	"	The Peshwa	"	177
150	"	C. W. Malet	20 September 1790	202
150A	"	Capt. Kennaway	20 September 1790	203
151	"	Major Palmer	22 September 1790	205
153	"	C. W. Malet	27 September 1790	206
159	"	"	11 October 1790	211
167	"	"	31 October 1790	221
169	"	"	7 November 1790	224
170	"	The Peshwa	8 November 1790	225
222A	"	Capt. Kennaway	21 February 1791	312
224	"	"	23 February 1791	316
227A	"	Lieut. Steuart	25 February 1791	320
227B	"	Raja Tejwant	23 February 1791	320
267	"	Lieut. Steuart	23 March 1791	364
273	"	"	31 March 1791	372
277	"	Capt. Kennaway	2 April 1791	374
278	"	Lieut. Steuart	3 April 1791	376
279	"	Uhthoff	4 April 1791	376
284	"	Capt. Kennaway	10 April 1791	382
291	"	"	14 April 1791	388
294	"	"	15 April 1791	391
307	"	"	3 May 1791	406
311	"	Raja Tejwant	8 May 1791	412
312	"	"	10 May 1791	413
320	"	"	27 May 1791	422
325	"	The Nizam	31 May 1791	425
328	"	Haripant	11 June 1791	428
341	"	Capt. Kennaway	10 July 1791	453

No.	From	To	Date	Page
345	Cornwallis, Earl G. G.	Capt. Kennaway	16 July 1791	461
346	" "	" "	18 July 1791	462
348	" "	Haripant	20 July 1791	465
350	" "	The Nizam	22 July 1791	467
354	" "	Capt. Kennaway	2 August 1791	473
357	" "	" "	12 August 1791	476
365	" "	" "	2 September 1791	492
367	" "	The Nizam	8 September 1791	494
369	" "	Capt. Kennaway	15 September 1791	498
372	" "	" "	21 September 1791	501
387	" "	" "	4 November 1791	521
402	" "	Robert Abercromby	30 December 1791	539
404	" "	" "	4 January 1792	545
406	" "	....	7 January 1792	546
	[Memorandum]			
408	" "	Robert Abercromby	8 January 1792	551
409	" "	C. W. Malet	8 January 1792	552
411	" "	Parashuram Bhau	9 January 1792	553
419	" "	Tipu Sultan	16 January 1792	563
422	" "	Robert Abercromby	20 January 1792	565
424	" "	Tipu Sultan	21 January 1792	567
425	" "	C. W. Malet	26 January 1792	568
426	" "	Robert Abercromby	27 January 1792	569
431	" "	" "	5 February 1792	573
436	" "	Tipu Sultan	11 February 1792	576
449	" "	C. W. Malet	28 March 1792	585
454	" "	Coorga Raja	5 June 1792	590
457	" "	The Peshwa	19 June 1792	595
458	" "	C. W. Malet	" "	596
463	" "	Tipu Sultan	17 July 1792	599
467	" "	Golam Ali and Ali Reza	23 August 1792	605
471	" "	" "	21 September 1792	610
475	" "	Tipu Sultan	21 September 1792	611
479	" "	" "	22 October 1792	617
481	" "	C. Oakeley	1 December 1792	619
489	" "	Tipu Sultan	10 February 1793	627
491	" "	" "	19 March 1793	632
495	" "	Azim-ul-Omra	18 April 1793	641
499	" "	Tipu Sultan	29 May 1793	646
504	" "	" "	26 June 1793	654
507	" "	C. W. Malet	11 August 1793	655
509	" "	Tipu Sultan	5 October 1793	658
511	" "	" "	9 October 1793	662
466	Doveton, Captain	G. F. Cherry	Received 14 August 1792	604

No.	From	To	Date	Page
95	Dow, Major	Robert Taylor	29 April 1790	115
97	" "	" "	30 April 1790	116
107	" "	" "	12 May 1790	130
183	Frederick Charles	Robert Abercromby	6 December 1790	238
464	Golam Ali and Ali Reza	Cornwallis, G. G.	Received 14 August 1792.	600
469	" "	" "	15 September 1792	608
487	" "	G. F. Cherry	Received 11 February 1793.	624
501	" "	" "	Received 6 June 1793	650
289	Hari Pant Phadke	Govind Rao Kale	13 April 1791	386
290	" "	Cornwallis, G. G.	13 April 1791	387
353	" "	C. W. Malet	Received 31 July 1791	472
152	Harris, George	John Chamier	23rd September 1790	206
98	Hartley, Lieut.-Colonel	Robert Abercromby	1 May 1790	116
35	Holland, John, Governor of Madras.	C. W. Malet	14 February 1789	35
38	" "	" "	21 April 1789	37
41	" "	" "	3 June 1789	39
45	" "	" "	22 July 1789	45
49	" "	" "	7 September 1789	47
496	Jackson W. C.	" "	3 May 1793	643
506	" "	" "	13 July 1793	655
512	" "	" "	6 November 1793	663
32	Kennaway, Capt. Sir John, Resident, Hyderabad.	" "	28 January 1789	32
34	" "	" "	6 February 1789	34
36	" "	" "	21 February 1789	36
189	" "	Cornwallis, G. G.	21 December 1790	251
194	" "	" "	1 January 1791	258
196	" "	" "	4 January 1791	262
199	" "	" "	11 January 1791	265
207	" "	" "	24 January 1791	280
209	" "	" "	28 January 1791	282
210	" "	" "	31 January 1791	284
213	" "	" "	3 February 1791	291
215	" "	" "	7 February 1791	294
216	" "	" "	10 February 1791	297
218	" "	" "	14 February 1791	301
220	" "	" "	17 February 1791	306
226	" "	" "	24 February 1791	317
232	" "	" "	4 March 1791	325
241	" "	" "	8 March 1791	336



No.	From	To	Date	Page
243	Kennaway, Capt. Sir, John Resident, Hyderabad.	Cornwallis, G. G.	10 March 1791	337
246	" "	" "	13 March 1791	341
251	" "	" "	15 March 1791	348
254	" "	" "	17 March 1791	352
258	" "	" "	20 March 1791	356
264	" "	" "	22 March 1791	361
266	" "	" "	23 March 1791	363
268	" "	" "	25 March 1791	364
270	" "	" "	29 March 1791	366
271	" "	C. W. Malet	31 March 1791	369
272	" "	Cornwallis, G. G.	31 March 1791	370
274	" "	" "	1 April 1791	372
276	" "	" "	2 April 1791	373
281	" "	C. W. Malet	4 April 1791	379
282	" "	" "	7 April 1791	380
286	" "	" "	11 April 1791	383
287	" "	Cornwallis, G. G.	" "	383
288	" "	" "	13 April 1791	385
296	" "	" "	17 April 1791	392
298	" "	" "	18 April 1791	394
299	" "	" "	21 April 1791	396
303	" "	" "	25 April 1791	400
306	" "	" "	2 May 1791 ..	405
309	" "	" "	5 May 1791	408
310	" "	" "	7 May 1791	411
313	" "	" "	10 May 1791	414
317	" "	" "	19 May 1791	418
322	" "	" "	28 May 1791	423
323	" "	C. W. Malet	30 May 1791	424
329	" "	Cornwallis, G. G.	12 June 1791	431
331	" "	" "	15 June 1791	434
334	" "	" "	29 June 1791	438
336	" "	C. W. Malet	30 June 1791	444
337	" "	Cornwallis, G. G.	2 July 1791	445
343	" "	" "	13 July 1791	458
347	" "	" "	17 July 1791	463
349	" "	C. W. Malet	21 July 1791	467
352	" "	Cornwallis, G. G.	30 July 1791	469
355	" "	" "	7 August 1791	474
358	" "	" "	14 August 1791	476
360	" "	" "	24 August 1791	480
362	" "	" "	28 August 1791	490
363	" "	C. W. Malet	29 August 1791	491

No.	From	To	Date	Page
368	Kennaway, Capt. Sir John Resident, Hyderabad.	Cornwallis, G. G.	11 September 1791	495
374	" "	" "	25 September 1791	504
376	" "	" "	6 October 1791	506
378	" "	" "	10 October 1791	510
382	" "	" "	26 October 1791	513
384	" "	" "	31 October 1791	515
388	" "	" "	5 November 1791	523
392	" "	" "	14 November 1791	528
396	" "	" "	23 November 1791	534
112	Little, Captain John	C. W. Malet	29 May 1790	141
120	" "	" "	7 June 1790	155
122	" "	" "	10 June 1790	158
128	" "	" "	21 June 1790	164
131	" "	" "	28 June 1790	169
133	" "	" "	3 July 1790	173
136	" "	" "	24 July 1790	183
138	" "	" "	26 July 1790	185
141	" "	" "	28 July 1790	190
142	" "	" "	1 August 1790	191
143	" "	" "	3 August 1790	191
400	" "	Cornwallis, G. G.	22 Dec. 1791	537
356	Little, Surgeon	C. W. Malet ?	9 August 1791	475
474	Lindsay, Captain J.	Sir C. Oakeley	28 September 1792	612
237	Macleod	Raghu Nair	1 March 1791	331
29	Malet, Sir Charles, Resident, Poona.	Cornwallis, G. G.	19 March 1788	29
31	" "	" "	21 January 1789	31
40	" "	" "	3 June 1789	39
43	" "	" "	26 June 1789	40
58	" "	" "	22 January 1790	53
61	" "	" "	29 January 1790	56
63	" "	" "	5 February 1790	64
65	" "	" "	8 February 1790	69
66	" "	" "	12 February 1790	70
69	" "	Cornwallis, G. G.	24 February 1790	74
70	" "	William Medows	24 February 1790	67
73	" "	Cornwallis, G. G.	1 March 1790	79
74	" "	" "	5 March 1790	82
77	" "	William Medows	12 March 1790	85
78	" "	Cornwallis, G. G.	15 March 1790	86
80	" "	" "	19 March 1790	87
81	" "	William Medows	24 March 1790	89
82	" "	Cornwallis, G. G.	26 March 1790	90

No.	From	To	Date	Page
83	Malet, Sir Charles, Resident, Poona.	Cornwallis, G. G.	28 March 1790	92
85	" "	Robert Abercromby	2 April 1790	96
88	" "	" "	11 April 1790	99
90	" "	Cornwallis, G. G.	13 April 1790	103
91	" "	William Medows	16 April 1790	105
93	" "	Cornwallis, G. G.	19 April 1790	108
94A	" "	Robert Abercromby	28 April 1790	114
100	" "	Cornwallis, G. G.	3 May 1790	121
102	" "	William Medows	7 May 1790	122
108	" "	Cornwallis, G. G.	14 May 1790	132
110	" "	" "	21 May 1790	138
115	" "	" "	31 May 1790	145
117	" "	" "	4 June 1790	147
118	" "	" "	7 June 1790	149
123	" "	" "	11 June 1790	158
125	" "	" "	14 June 1790	159
127	" "	" "	18 June 1790	164
129	" "	" "	28 June 1790	166
135	" "	" "	6 July 1790	178
137	" "	" "	24 July 1790	183
139	" "	" "	27 July 1790	186
144	" "	" "	3 August 1790	192
145	" "	" "	7 August 1790	193
146	" "	" "	15 August 1790	195
147	" "	" "	21 August 1790	198
148	" "	" "	28 August 1790	199
149	" "	" "	18 September 1790	200
154	" "	" "	28 September 1790	207
155	" "	" "	2 October 1790	208
156	" "	" "	5 October 1790	209
157	" "	Robert Abercromby	7 October 1790	209
158	" "	Cornwallis, G. G.	9 October 1790	211
160	" "	" "	12 October 1790	212
161	" "	" "	16 October 1790	214
162	" "	" "	19 October 1790	216
163	" "	" "	22 October 1790	216
165	" "	" "	25 October 1790	218
166	" "	" "	29 October 1790	219
168	" "	" "	6 November 1790	222
171	" "	John Chamier	8 November 1790	226
172	" "	Robert Abercromby	10 November 1790	227
173	" "	Cornwallis, G. G.	12 November 1790	228
174	" "	Robert Abercromby	14 November 1790	229
176	" "	Cornwallis, G. G.	19 November 1790	230

No.	From	To	Date	Page
178	Malet, Sir Charles, Resident, Poona.	Cornwallis, G. G.	26 November 1790	232
179	" "	" "	29 November 1790	234
180	" "	" "	2 December 1790	235
182	" "	" "	6 December 1790	236
185	" "	" "	9 December 1790	240
186	" "	" "	11 December 1790	244
187	" "	" "	17 December 1790	249
188	" "	" "	20 December 1790	251
190	" "	" "	24 December 1790	252
191	" "	" "	27 December 1790	254
193	" "	" "	31 December 1790	256
195	" "	" "	3 January 1791	261
201	" "	" "	14 January 1791	267
202	" "	" "	17 January 1791	271
205	" "	" "	21 January 1791	274
212	" "	" "	31 January 1791	287
214	" "	" "	4 February 1791	293
217	" "	" "	11 February 1791	300
219	" "	" "	14 February 1791	306
221	" "	" "	18 February 1791	309
223	" "	" "	21 February 1791	313
229	" "	" "	25 February 1791	322
230	" "	" "	28 February 1791	323
234	" "	" "	4 March 1791	330
239	" "	" "	7 March 1791	333
244	" "	" "	11 March 1791	339
250	" "	" "	14 March 1791	346
255	" "	" "	18 March 1791	353
261	" "	" "	21 March 1791	358
275	" "	" "	1 April 1791	372
280	" "	" "	4 April 1791	377
283	" "	" "	8 April 1791	381
285	" "	" "	11 April 1791	382
293	" "	" "	15 April 1791	389
297	" "	" "	18 April 1791	393
300	" "	" "	22 April 1791	396
302	" "	" "	25 April 1791	399
304	" "	" "	29 April 1791	402
305	" "	" "	2 May 1791	404
308	" "	" "	4 May 1791	407
315	" "	" "	13 May 1791	416
316	" "	" "	14 May 1791	416
318	" "	" "	20 May 1791	420
321	" "	" "	27 May 1791	423

No.	From	To	Date	Pages
324	Malet, (contd.)	Cornwallis, G.C.	30 May 1791	424
327	"	"	3 June 1791	428
330	"	"	13 June 1791	433
335	"	"	30 June 1791	443
339	"	"	8 July 1791	449
340	"	The Poona Durbar	9 July 1791	451
342	"	Cornwallis, G. C.	12 July 1791	456
344	"	"	15 July 1791	459
359	"	"	17 August 1791	478
364	"	"	31 August 1791	491
366	"	"	7 September 1791	493
370	"	"	17 September 1791	500
371	"	"	19 September 1791	501
373	"	"	24 September 1791	502
375	"	"	30 September 1791	505
379	"	"	12 October 1791	511
380	"	"	9 November 1791	512
385	"	"	31 October 1791	516
390	"	"	9 November 1791	527
393	"	"	18 November 1791	532
395	"	"	21 November 1791	533
397	"	"	25 November 1791	535
398	"	"	9 December 1791	536
399	"	"	19 December 1791	537
401	"	"	25 December 1791	539
403	"	"	30 December 1791	540
407	"	David Carnegie	8 January 1792	550
410	"	"	8 January 1792	553
412	"	"	19 January 1792	554
414	"	"	12 January 1792	556
415	"	Capt. Little	14 January 1792	556
416	"	David Carnegie	14 January 1792	557
427	"	Capt. Little	29 January 1792	570
430	"	Lt. Steuart	3 February 1792	573
435	"	George Dick	10 February 1792	576
438	"	Capt. Little	13 February 1792	578
439	"	George Dick	14 February 1792	578
440	"	J. S. Burges, Chairman, The Secret Committee, etc.	14 February 1792	579
441	"	Capt. Little	22 February 1792	580
443	"	"	4 March 1792	581
444	"	George Dick	17 March 1792	583
445	"	J. S. Burges	18 March 1792	583

No.	From	To	Date	Page
446	Malet, ( <i>contd.</i> )	George Dick	21 March 1792	51
447	"	Capt. Little	26 March 1792	51
453	"	Robert Abercromby	3 June 1792	51
459	"	"	21 June 1792	51
461	"	G. F. Cherry	10 July 1792	51
485	"	Charles Oakeley	30 January 1793	62
164	Maxwell, Lieut.-Col.	?	25 October 1790	21
30	Medows, General	C. W. Malet	19 January 1789	3
46	"	"	1 August 1789	4
175	"	?	17 November 1790	23
503	Mir Abdul Latif	G. F. Cherry	21 June 1793	65
192	Montgomery, Major	Capt. Kennaway	30 December 1790	25
524	Morampont, Monsr.— news-letters from.	De Fresne	19 January 1793	68
1	Hyderabad	?	31 October 1785	
2	"	?	28 November 1785	
8	Pondicherry	?	6 July 1787	
12	"	?	1 September 1787	
55	Travancore	?	? December 1789	5
59	?	C. W. Malet	22 January 1790	5
64	Tipu's Northern Frontier	"	1 February 1790	61
67	"	"	9 February 1790	7
67A	"	"	15 February 1790	7
106A	Cochin	?	10 May 1790	129
197	Hafiz Ferid-ud-din's Camp	?	8 January 1791	26
235	Nizam, the	Raja Tejwant	5 March 1791	331
477	Oakeley, Sir Charles	C. W. Malet	16 October 1792	614
482	"	"	2 December 1792	615
242	Palmer, Major William	"	8 March 1791	337
351	"	"	29 July 1791	468
140	Peshwa, the	William Medows	28 July 1790	189
52	Powney, George	Major Alexander Dow	20 December 1789	49
53	"	"	24 December 1789	50
54	"	"	29 December 1789	51
57	"	"	7 January 1790	52
518	Raymond, Monsr.	Count De Conway	1 December 1787	673
519	"	"	3 January 1792	674
520	"	"	13 July 1792	675
521	"	Col. De Fresne	1 October 1792	677
522	"	"	4 October 1792	678
523	"	"	17 October 1792	679
525	"	"	1 June 1793	681
526	"	William Kirkpatrick	April 1796	683

No.	From	To	Date	Pages
198	Read, Capt. Andrew ..	Capt. Kennaway ..	9 January 1791 ..	265
200	" ..	" ..	14 January 1791 ..	266
203	" ..	" ..	19 January 1791 ..	272
206	" ..	" ..	23 January 1791 ..	276
208	" ..	" ..	28 January 1791 ..	281
225	" ..	" ..	23 February 1791 ..	316
295	" ..	" ..	17 April 1791 ..	392
301	" ..	" ..	24 April 1791 ..	393
389	" ..	" ..	9 November 1791 ..	526
181	Riddel, Capt. ..	Col. Frederick ..	4 December 1790 ..	235
514	Shore, Sir John, G. G. ..	Capt. Kennaway ..	24 December 1793 ..	664
515	" ..	Tipu Sultan ..	24 December 1793 ..	666
517	" ..	" ..	10 February 1794 ..	669
222	Steuart, Lieutenant ..	Capt. Kennaway ..	19 February 1791 ..	311
228	" ..	" ..	25 February 1791 ..	321
231	" ..	" ..	2 March 1791 ..	324
233	" ..	" ..	4 March 1791 ..	328
233A	" ..	Cornwallis, G. G. ..	4 March 1791 ..	328
236	" ..	Capt. Kennaway ..	6 March 1791 ..	331
237	" ..	" ..	7 March 1791 ..	331
237(ii)	" ..	" ..	7 March 1791 ..	332
245	" ..	Cornwallis, G. G. ..	12 March 1791 ..	340
248	" ..	Capt. Kennaway ..	14 March 1791 ..	343
249	" ..	Cornwallis, G. G. ..	14 March 1791 ..	345
252	" ..	" ..	16 March 1791 ..	351
253	" ..	" ..	17 March 1791 ..	351
256	" ..	" ..	18 March 1791 ..	354
257	" ..	Capt. Kennaway ..	19 March 1791 ..	355
259	" ..	" ..	20 March 1791 ..	357
260	" ..	Cornwallis, G. G. ..	" ..	357
262	" ..	" ..	21 March 1791 ..	358
263	" ..	" ..	22 March 1791 ..	359
265	" ..	" ..	23 March 1791 ..	363
269	" ..	" ..	25 March 1791 ..	366
326	" ..	" ..	1 June 1791 ..	427
383	" ..	Edward Kay ..	28 October 1791 ..	515
386	" ..	Cornwallis, G. G. ..	4 November 1791 ..	520
388A	" ..	" ..	7 November 1791 ..	525
391	" ..	" ..	10 November 1791 ..	528
394	" ..	" ..	21 November 1791 ..	533
96	Taylor, Robert ..	Major Dow ..	29 April 1790 ..	115
99	" ..	" ..	2 May 1790 ..	120
101	" ..	The Court of Directors ..	4 May 1790 ..	122
103	" ..	Robert Abercromby ..	8 May 1790 ..	123

No.	From	To	Date	Page
105	Taylor Robert— <i>contd.</i>	Cochin	11 May 1790	127
106	"	Robert Abercromby	12 May 1790	127
109	"	"	17 May 1790	137
130	"	"	28 June 1790	167
462	"	G. F. Cherry	27 July 1792	598
233B	Tejwant, Raja	Cornwallis, G. G.	4 March 1791	329
314	"	"	10 May 1791	415
37	Tellicherry, Chief of,	Tipu Sultan	18 April 1789	36
39	Tellicherry, Factors	William Medows	25 April 1789	39
3	Tipu Sultan	Governor of Madras	8 February 1787	2
37A	"	Chief of Tellicherry	23 April 1789	36
111	"	William Medows	22 May 1790	140
238	"	Anand Rao Rasta	6 March 1791	333
292	"	Muhammad Amin Arab	15 April 1791	388
319	"	Patels of Coorg	26 May 1791	421
333	"	Earl Cornwallis, G. G.	24 June 1791	438
405	"	"	7 January 1792	546
423	"	"	Recd. 24 January 1792	566
433	"	"	8 February 1792	574
437	"	"	12 February 1792	577
470	"	"	15 September 1792	609
475	"	Golam Ali & Ali Reza	2 October 1792	613
483	"	Earl Cornwallis, G. G.	11 December 1792	620
486	"	"	Recd. 11 February 1793	623
493	"	Golam Ali & Ali Reza	4 April 1793	638
494	"	"	? 1793	639
497	"	Cornwallis, G. G.	7 May 1793	643
498	"	"	16 April 1793	644
500	"	"	Recd. 6 June 1793	649
508	"	"	Recd. 10 September 1793	656
513	"	"	13 December 1793	663
516	"	Sir John Shore	Recd. 30 January 1794	668
56	Travancore, Chief of,	Hutchinson	2 January 1790	52
86	Uhthoff J.	Earl Cornwallis, G. G.	7 April 1790	97
377	"	Capt. Kennaway	8 October 1791	510
26	Yvon L. A.	C. W. Malet	17 December 1787	27
42	"	Chief of Tellicherry	25 June 1789	40
48	"	"	3 September 1789	47
51	"	C. W. Malet	31 December 1789	48





## CHRONOLOGY.

- 1789 January 2 .. The Factors of Tellicherry re-occupy Dharmapatan.  
 December 29 .. Tipu attacks the Travancore lines.
- 1790 February 7 .. The Poona Court officially declares its willingness to side with the English against Tipu.  
 April 13 .. Tipu renews the attack on the Travancore lines.  
 „ 15 .. Tipu captures the lines.  
 „ 23 .. Col. Hartley from Tellicherry lands at Ayakotta.  
 May 5 .. Parashuram Bhau enters the tents.  
 „ 19 .. Laksman Rao Rasta enters the city of Poona.  
 „ 26 .. Gen. Medows commences his march from Trichinopoly.  
 June 6 .. The exchange of the treaty takes place at the Poona durbar.  
 „ 8 .. Tipu's agents are introduced to the Peshwa by Rasta.  
 „ 18 .. Capt. Little arrives at Tasgaon.  
 „ 25 .. Capt. Little arrives near Parashuram Bhau's camp.  
 July 5 .. Gen. Medows advances to Aravakurchi.  
 August 4 .. Tipu's vakils have their audience of leave.  
 „ 6 .. The ratified treaty is delivered in the durbar at Poona.  
 „ 14 .. Little's detachment crosses the Kistna.  
 September 13, 14 Encounter between Tipu and Col. Floyd.  
 „ 22 .. The fortress of Palcatcherry surrendered.  
 October 31 .. A body of 2,000 Tipu's men driven out of the town of Dharwar.  
 November 16 .. The fortress of Cumbum surrendered to Nizam's army.  
 „ 20 .. Frederick's detachments reach the offing of Jaygarh.  
 December 1 .. Mahadaji Pant Behere enters his tents.  
 „ 10 .. Hari Pant Phadke makes his entry into tents.  
 „ 13 .. Arrival of Lord Cornwallis at Madras.  
 „ 25 .. The battering trains from Poona reach the camp near Dharwar.  
 „ 28 .. Arrival of Col. Frederick at the camp near Dharwar.
- 1791 January 1 .. Hari Pant commences his march from Poona.  
 „ 3 .. The fort of Gadwal captured by the Nizam's troops.  
 „ 28 .. Departure of Lord Cornwallis from Madras and meeting with Gen. Medows.  
 „ 29 .. Arrival of Cornwallis in camp (10 coss from the fort Vellout.)  
 February 4 .. Cornwallis begins his march.  
 „ 19 .. Arrival of Lieut. Steuart in Tejwant's camp.  
 „ 23 .. Cornwallis encamped on the Mugly-ghat.  
 „ 24 .. Cornwallis departs from Palmaner for Bangalore.  
 „ 28 .. Surrender of the fort of Sidhout to a detachment under Muhammad Amin Arab.  
 „ 28 .. Capture of Kolar by Cornwallis.  
 March 12 .. Tejwant begins his march.  
 „ 21 .. The fortress of Bangalore taken by assault.  
 „ 29 .. Hari Pant and Kennaway introduced to each other by the Nizam in his durbar.

- 1791 April 6 .. Dharwar taken possession of by the Marathas.  
 „ 9 .. Major Sartorius takes leave of Bhau.  
 „ 13 .. Junction effected between Cornwallis and Tejiwant's army.  
 „ 17 .. Kopbal surrendered.  
 May 3 .. Cornwallis moves towards Seringapatam from Bangalore.  
 .. Bahadurbinda surrendered.  
 „ 15 .. Cornwallis's victory at Arikera over Tipu.  
 „ 27 .. Offer of a present of fruit by Tipu to Cornwallis declined.  
 „ 29 .. Meeting between the Maratha commanders and Cornwallis at Melkote.  
 June 12 .. Gandikot surrendered.  
 „ 26 .. Asad Ali Khan returns to Pangal.  
 July 15 .. The fortress of Hosur evacuated by Tipu's troops.  
 „ 18 .. Meer Alam's departure for Bangalore.  
 August 16 .. Arrival of Meer Alam in camp and his interview with Cornwallis.  
 September 5 .. Malet's visit to the Peshwa.  
 October 6 .. Entry of the Hyderabad Prince and Minister into marching tents.  
 „ 18 .. The fortress of Nandidrug taken by assault.  
 December 21 .. The fortress of Holehonore taken by storm by Bhau.  
 .. Capture of Savandrug by Cornwallis.  
 „ 23 .. Surrender of Bankapur to Parashuram Bhau.  
 „ 25 .. The lower fort of Gurramkonda recaptured by the Nizam's army.  
 „ 29 .. Bhau's and Capt. Little's victory over the army commanded by Ali Reza near Shimoga.  
 1792 January 4 .. Shimoga captured.  
 „ 18 .. Arrival of the Hyderabad Prince and Minister at Bangalore.  
 „ 26 .. Surrender of Holurdurg.  
 „ 30 .. Parashuram Bhau turns towards Seringapatam abandoning his designs on Bednur.  
 February 6 .. Cornwallis's assault on a strong position near Seringapatam and his victory.  
 „ 22 .. Preliminary articles of peace exchanged between the Powers.  
 „ 28 .. Gen. Medows shoots himself.

# THE ALLIES' WAR WITH TIPU SULTAN

## SECTION 1

*English Relations with Tipu, 1787-1789.*

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**No. 1—**The rebellious attitude of the troops at Seringapatam who want to imprison Tipu and place his brother on the throne.

FROM—HYDERABAD,

*Hyderabad, 31st October 1785.*

By letters received a few days ago from Adoni mentions that Tippoo on his return from Seringapatam received notice that the whole of his troops at Seringapatam were determined on his arrival to confine him, and put his brother on the throne, as they have for a long time been much disgusted at his cruelty, and it is said that Tippoo on receipt of this information immediately went back to Bangalore, where he has given orders not to permit of more than one person to go into the fort at a time, and not to suffer any of his troops to go out. It is said, Meer Coumeroudin Cawn on the receipt of this news left Ballarree, and set out with all expedition for Seringapatam in order to take the part of the brother—the Nizam has dispatched Hircarrahs for the truth of this report, but it is certain that there is a disturbance at Seringapatam, and that Tippoo has his doubts, by his stopping at Bangalore ; but the truth of this I hope to give in my next paper.

\* \* \* \* \*

## No. 2—Rivalry between Tipu and his brother for the throne.

FROM—HYDERABAD,

*Hyderabad, 28th November 1785.*

By letters received by the Nizam, a few days ago from Seringapatam, mentions that Tippoo is at his capital, but that there has been a great disturbance there caused by his brother, and Tippoo's cruelty to his people, and that the whole of his Chiefs seem much against him, and it is mentioned that he has had a considerable number of his head Bramins circumcised, for daring to take part with his brother against him, and that he has dispatched a great quantity of all sorts of war-like ammunition, to a town called Serror, about ninety coss to the south of Adoni, where he is assembling his troops from Seringapatam, and it is supposed that he will take the field again in a few days.

\* \* \* \* \*

## No. 3—Tipu complains of the protection given to the rebels by the Company's Poligars.

FROM—TIPU SULTAN,

TO—A. CAMPBELL, GOVERNOR OF MADRAS.

*8th February 1787.*

The Poona army being pursued by mine has crossed the Kistna and peace has taken place between us in the manner I wished. They have accordingly returned to their own country, and I propose going to my capital, in about a week hence, after I have quieted the disturbances raised by some Poligars in this quarter.

I herewith send you copies of arzees just received from my Aumil at Tripatore containing accounts of the depredations committed by the people of Chelnaik and Conganydurg, as also the arzees of the Killadar of Darrapoor and the Zemindar of Yedicotta informing me of the refractory conduct of the Poligars of Dindigul who have received protection with the Poligars of Tinnavelly, etc. Besides this, the people of Chelnaik have seized and carried away one thousand Pagodas deposited in the Gurry or Fort of Heroor near Cungureutto. For these reasons I now write to request you will send the most positive orders of the Poligars and Talookdars dependent upon you not to give shelter on any account to these people, and also to seize and send back Mottoo, a Sherocar, or head Peon who has fled from the authority of my Circar and taken refuge with the Poligars of Tinnavelly.

Meer Moyen-ud-deen Cawn my Fouzdar at Dindigul will shortly be sent in order to bring to order the Poligars under his authority, and

should any take refuge with those of the Payenghaut it will become necessary for him to go there after them. I therefore request you will send strict orders to the Poligars dependent upon you not to give shelter on any account to those of my Country.

Copy of an Arzee from the Aumil of Tripatore :—

The ryots of the district of Tripatore are reduced to the last extremity by the depredations of the people of Chelnaik and Conganydurg, and are flying everywhere for shelter against them, many have left their habitations and effects to the Peta of Tripator at the very time of the collections, which in that case it is impossible to make. These people have besides plundered the Petta of Heroor and carried away one thousand pagodas deposited in the Fort of that place and have since fled with it to the Payenghaut.

Arzee from the Killadar of Dharaporam :—

Veropa Chinaik and Palny Velayed Naiq and Aycody Conduum Naik with other Poligars have entered into combination together to oblige the Circar troops to quit Palny and establish Velayed Naik in the Command of that place, as also to place there Mottoo a Sherocar or head peon who has rebelled against the Circar and to wage war against the Zemindar of Hurrycota who is a wellwisher to the Circar. With this intention they have assembled their people together to take the above-mentioned places and they receive encouragement from the Polygars of Madura which makes it necessary for me to represent the circumstances.

Arzee from the Polygar of Yedicota :—

Veropatchy has given protection to the Polygar of Aycoody and Mootoo the Sherocar has assembled 1,000 Collerees and 400 people belonging to the Mungalaum and Peripetty districts and is assisted by several other Polygars to take Any Pollam from me first and afterwards to seize Pulni and Aycoody and in this they are protected by those of Madura.

**No. 4**—Campbell communicates to Tipu the punishment inflicted on one Timmaik for depredation on Tipu's territory in the course of Tipu's war with the Mahrattas and expresses his abhorrence of such proceedings.

FROM—A. CAMPBELL, GOVERNOR OF MADRAS,

TO—TIPU SULTAN.

*Fort St. George, 10th March 1787.*

I have received with much satisfaction the agreeable information you give me of a Peace being settled between you and the Mahrattas, and earnestly hope it may prove lasting and advantageous to both. The authority under which I act, as Governor of Fort St. George, as well as my own disposition, leads me to render a strict and honourable regard to the interest of all the nations in alliance of friendship with the English

Company. These principles induced me while you were engaged in the troubles of war, to give the most positive orders to the Officers Commanding on the frontiers of the Carnatic to unite their utmost endeavours with the people of His Highness the Nabob Walah Jah: to put a stop to the unwarrantable proceedings of one Timnaick, formerly belonging to Congoondy Country who I learnt had carried off, towards Vellore, a number of cattle, belonging to the people of your Circar. Timnaick was accordingly seized by Ismail Cawn, the renter of Vellore, to whom the Nabob Walah Jah gave immediate and positive orders to expel him from the frontiers of the Carnatic, and to restore the cattle he had stolen to their lawful owners; of which you must have certainly received information before now.

This act of justice unsolicited by you, and at the time when your army was engaged in war, must convince you of my abhorrence of such proceedings in any of the Polygars; and you may rest assured that my regard to the late treaty settled between the Company and you will always induce me to enforce the like orders to others depending upon the Carnatic to avoid every kind of interference with the people of your Circar and from giving shelter to those who may fly to them from your country on account of their contumacy.

Such being the conduct I have followed and mean strictly to pursue towards Polygars and Talookdars of the country as well as those under your authority who shall attempt to look for shelter in Tinnavelly or any other country belonging to the Nabob Walah Jah, it would be highly improper that any of your fouzders should enter the Payen Ghauts, as you must be convinced that their presence there would only injure the innocent inhabitants, and consequently be contrary to the friendship happily subsisting between you and the English, which I am convinced you are equally desirous with myself to preserve. I hope therefore when any such occurrences shall henceforth take place, you will write me on the subject because you may always depend on my friendship to redress them without delay.

I trust also that you will be equally careful in refusing countenance or protection to any of the Polygars, or people belonging to the Payen Ghaut who may seek refuge in your country to avoid the punishment due to their crimes in this.

**No. 5**—Report of French intrigues with Tipu and despatch of an embassy to France by Tipu.

FROM—ARCHIBALD CAMPBELL,

TO—C. W. MALET.

*Fort St. George, 8th June 1787.*

The hostile proposals of Tippoo during the negotiations do not surprise me, I believe they are a true picture of his heart and it behoves

us to keep a most watchful eye over his motions. For this purpose I trust much to your zeal in procuring every kind of intelligence respecting him which, by my letter of the 21st May, you would observe I am very desirous of obtaining. Intelligence which has lately come to my hand mentions that the French are endeavouring to form some agreement with Tippoo whereby they are to engage to furnish him with a large body of Europeans to occupy some of his seaports on the west coast in the event of his army being drawn to the internal parts or eastern boundaries of his country. But the late arrangement with the French in Europe and the pacific disposition of any other European Power prevent me from giving any great degree of credit to a report of this nature; though the restless spirit of the French with many boastings and vague promises of assistance may urge him on to become a troublesome neighbour if not well looked after. It is certain at least that he has sent ambassadors to the French King with valuable presents of jewels and the bonds of their general officers cancelled for supplies to their troops in the War as marks of his esteem for the French nation.

**No. 6**—Cornwallis communicates certain instructions on the subject of presenting arms to the Peshwa.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—C. W. MALET.

*Fort William, 6th June 1787.*

The Company's orders alluded to by Mr. Boddam relative to sparing arms to none of the country powers except the King of Travancore, apply we conceive to such quantities of arms as may be essentially serviceable in military operations; and as we see no real objection to sparing only one or two hundred stand of arms to the Mahrattas as a complimentary present to the Peshwa if he should continue to desire them, we shall authorize the Bombay Presidency to comply with your requisition for this number; but if you shall be of opinion that this attention to the wishes of the Durbar is likely to be perverted to a meaning which may injure us with other powers in the reports it may give rise to of open aid to the Mahrattas, you will of course decline compliance in such forms as you believe will not be offensive. At all events we wish you not to promise the arms until peace has been actually concluded between the Mahrattas and Tippoo and the Mahratta army has returned to Poona.

**No. 7**—Cornwallis directs Malet to propose an alliance with Nana on account of the reports of French intrigues with Tipu and to present elephants to the Peshwa.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—C. W. MALET.

*Fort William, 20th June 1787.*

Upon receiving this letter I desire that you will demand an audience of the minister to offer the congratulations of this Government to the



Peshwa upon that happy event which you will be careful to express in the most civil and friendly language.

It would be equally injudicious as vain in its effect to endeavour to obtain a knowledge of many particulars while the minister is inclined to maintain a reserve and perhaps it may also be prudent to be sparing of our protestations of friendship until you have some reasonable grounds to believe that they will be favourably received,—the time and manner must in a great measure be left to your own discretion. But should Nana give you encouragement, my wish is that you should convey to him with as little formality as possible, but in the most explicit terms, the system expressed in the letter from the Board dated 26th February and upon which we are determined to act in the case of such an interference of the French in the internal affairs of India as is described in that letter.

From the pacific intercourse subsisting between the two nations in Europe I do not believe that the French have at present any serious intention of adopting measures that might soon occasion hostilities between us in India. I have however received accounts from another quarter that several schemes have of late been agitated between them and Tipoo and particularly that the latter has applied to them for four thousand Europeans to remain constantly in his service and pay. I have no objection to your introducing this piece of intelligence on a proper occasion into a conversation with the minister. But you may at the same time assure him that he need not in consequence of it entertain any serious apprehension for the welfare of the Mahratta State. It will give you an opportunity of further explaining to him that our orders from home far from preventing an interference, would render it incumbent upon us to adopt the most vigorous measures in concert with the Mahrattas to counteract the dangerous and ambitious views which could only dictate a junction of troops or a close connection between the French and Tipoo. Disappointed or perhaps infuriated as the minister must have been by withdrawing the offer of assistance made by the former Government, he may no doubt express some apprehension of a similar variation in our Council. In answer it will be proper for you to explain the very material difference that exists between the two cases, explicitly

fortunate as to make most successful progress in both, and you may add that I have the most friendly disposition for the Peshwa and the Mahratta State and will ever pride myself in performing all public and private engagements with the strictest honour and good faith.

The presents of elephants are now on their road to Poona, but I was much disappointed at finding that the Peshwa's Vakeel had declined taking the largest elephant, which I had been at much pains to provide; Colonel Harper who procured it for me, assures me that it is one of the largest and handsomest elephants in Hindustan. The reason which the Vakeel gave for not accepting it was, that he was afraid it would not prove sufficiently quiet and manageable.

**No. 8**—Conway is appointed G. G. of the French Settlements in preference to La Fayette for the establishment of friendship with the English.

EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM PONDICHERRY.

6th July 1787.

“By the last advices from France of the 11th of February, we are assured that General Conway was appointed Governor General of all the French establishments and Commander-in-Chief of all our forces on this side of the Cape of Good Hope; he was to set out on the *Astra*, a frigate, in the beginning of March and to proceed to Mauritius where he is to establish 12,00,000 of paper money for the use of the two islands, Bourbon and the Isle of France, and give a new form to the militia of national troops of the said islands, so that we cannot expect him here before the month of September.

This General Conway served during a part of the last war in America, where he acquired great reputation; afterwards he commanded at the Cape of Good Hope.

The Marquis La Fayette, that you must have heard of, or perhaps known in America, solicited very warmly this command; but he was deemed too young and rather too forward or hot-headed to conduct himself properly with the English with whom we intended to live in the greatest peace and amity, for it is even said that there is a treaty of commerce on foot for India between the two nations. Mr. Defresne, Colonel of the Bourbon regiment, is appointed second in command and Mr. Cossigny our present Governor is to command at the island of Bourbon.”

**No. 9**—Intelligence of Tipu's embassy to France for forming an alliance with the French against the Mahrattas.

FROM—ARCHIBALD CAMPBELL,

TO—C. W. MALET.

Fort St. George, 22nd July 1787.

My letter of the 6th of June would inform you that the reports propagated by Monsieur Montigny were not altogether without

foundation. The intelligence I have acquired on the subject of the embassy from Tippoo to the French King has been various but seems to centre chiefly in their carrying very costly presents said to amount to 3,00,000 pounds sterling, besides the cancelled bonds which I formerly mentioned amounting to 19 lacks of rupees.

I learn by accounts from Pondicherry that Tippoo's Vackeels are still there ; but expected to embark immediately on a frigate ordered on purpose for them and Monsieur Moneron is to accompany them to France.

I am confident that these men have been charged with instructions to form a treaty with the French to support Tippoo in his designs of conquest against the Mahrattas and that as a lure to the French nation he has offered in return a very handsome sum of money with peculiar immunities in trade and even the aid of his whole force to attack the English on this Coast. But how far the policy of France under the present circumstances of being otherwise at profound peace with us in every quarter of the globe, will countenance the last part of this negotiation I am at a loss to conjecture ; but from every circumstance, I cannot for a moment suppose that the French will hazard a war with us on the score of Tippoo alone by furnishing him openly and avowedly with a force for the purpose of attacking our territories.

If the French should join Tippoo in his attempts against the Mahrattas, I am so fond of our old allies the Mahrattas and wish so much to see them enjoy every degree of respect and prosperity that in case of such an event I shall never be happy if we do not support them. I declare to you upon my honour that I love the Mahrattas so much that I shall have pleasure in taking the field for their support.

**No. 10**—Intelligence of the arrival of a ship from France with troops for Tipu's service.

FROM—ARCHIBALD CAMPBELL,

TO—C. W. MALET.

*Fort St. George, 3rd August 1787.*

When I learn anything new or important that affects the Politics of the Country you shall be informed. At present I have only to acquaint you that a ship is lately arrived at Pondicherry from old France with 200 F. H. U. Hussars on board for the service of Tippoo ; they were not landed at Pondicherry but sent round to the seaport on the Malabar Coast nearest to Seringapatam. At Pondicherry a considerable quantity of arms and other warlike stores were embarked on board the same ship to be landed along with the Hussars.

No. 11—On account of Tipu's military preparations Cornwallis directs Malet to point out to Nana the advantage of a close connection with the English.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—C. W. MALET.

*On the Ganges near Benares, 29th August 1787.*

I have received accounts that Tippoo is making great military preparations, and it is universally reported that they are intended against the Karnatic. Should this prove true, I trust you will point out to Nana how favourable this opportunity would be to regain their lost territory, and that if he chuses to form a connexion with us, the Mahrattas may expect the greatest advantages from our successs.

No. 12—Intelligence of correspondence between the Nizam and M.de Cossigny who wants to bring about an understanding between the Nizam and Tipu. Tipu's embassy to Constantinople.

#### INTELLIGENCE FROM PONDICHERRY.

*1st September 1787.*

Not many months ago the Soubah of the Deccan wrote to Monsieur de Cossigny with his own hand; after the usual compliments he thus proceeds :

I have heard with much surprise and concern that you are at present closely connected with my servant and enemy Tippoo Fatty Aly Cawn. What can this mean? You are not ignorant of my being the immediate representative of the Great King and this villain is only a vassal of mine, but notwithstanding this he has presumed to enter my country to destroy it; my reason now in writing you this, is to offer you my alliance and former friendship if you will accept it. Be assured you will become of more consequence than ever you were even in the time of Bussy; the English and myself are at present friends, but I set greater value upon you.

To the above Monsieur de Cossigny returned for answer:—

“What you say is true, you are undoubtedly the Representative of the King and Lord not only of the Mysore Country but also of Arcot and the Sircars, but it is always difficult to recover what is once lost; you relinquished your right to the Sircars of your own free will and what signifies your claim to Sovereignty in either the Mysore or Arcot Countries? Since however you seem willing to recover your losses, be assured that in the course of two or three years God will grant a favourable opportunity; you are still Soubah of the Deccan and yet

all your country is dependant upon others. We are at a loss to account for this inattention to your interests.

Shortly after the receipt of the above the Nizam wrote :

" I have well understood the contents of your last and am perfectly convinced of your friendship. Without your support and advice I see no remedy, I will in future abide by your directions in everything. I therefore request that on mature deliberation you will give me your opinion and state what part I ought to pursue."

This answer followed :

" Your Highness has done us too much honour, but since you order, 'tis our part to obey, as a necessary step to the accomplishment of all your plans and indeed for your present security and quiet, you must contrive to cultivate and cement an alliance with Tippoo Sultan ; *(he is a firm friend and a dangerous enemy)*. This point once gained you may look forward with a prosperous hope."

To which His Highness replied :

" I agree with you that what you advise is the best for my interest, but how am I to proceed? Must I degrade myself by courting my vassal? I see no resource but from your friendly exertions : I therefore give you full powers to act as mediators and to negotiate for me with Tippoo. I here bind myself to abide by whatever you may conclude for me. Monsieur Aumont carries this, and will more particularly explain my sentiments and wishes."

Upon Monsieur Aumont's arrival at Pondicherry, letters were instantly wrote to Tippoo and Ram Rou sent as their agent ; Monsieur de Cossigny has had the address to gain Tippoo over ; indeed it required no address, for it is a measure which he met half way ; it is so evidently for his interest to amuse the Soubah, until he brings all the grand projects to bear, which fill his mind, that no difficulty was opposed.

I have heard and I believe with truth, that Gulam Ally Khan, whom Tippoo sent as his Ambassador to Constantinople, was very ill received at that Court, but whether it really was so or was not so, is very little to the purpose, if Tippoo has management enough to impose a contrary belief on the World. Of this belief he will make his own use, and people will begin to consider his usurped title of King as derived from an authority held respectable among Mahomedans.

Everything seems arranged for the departure of Monsieur Aumont and the Parsee (one man remains at Pondicherry as the Soubah's Vackeel). The expected arrival of General Conway retards them a little ; Monsieur de Cossigny will sail soon after for the Islands, and goes, I believe, from thence to France, since he can best explain the late transactions.

**No. 13**—The Governor General sends instructions as to the way of presenting to Nana the proposal for an alliance.

FROM—CALCUTTA COUNCIL,

TO—C. W. MALET.

*Fort William, 7th September 1787.*

By some late advices we have received from Sir A. Campbell we had reason to apprehend an umbraged disposition on the part of Tipoo and that he was meditating hostilities against our settlements on the Coast of Coromandal, but subsequent and more authentic information has removed the apprehensions communicated to us. Notwithstanding this we are sensible of the propriety of adopting every precaution in our power either for preventing or defeating such an attempt, however remote it may be, and we are, therefore, anxious to know the result of the communications you were authorised to make by Lord Cornwallis's instructions of the 20th June.

The point upon which we wish as far as possible to obtain a certainty is, whether we can expect any effective assistance from the Poona Government in case Tipoo should, with or without the assistance of the French, invade the Carnatic. We do not mean that any formal proposition should be made to Nana on this subject as it would give him an advantage which we could not well counterbalance, but if after sounding his intentions in the manner directed by the Governor General you should find a disposition in him inimical to Tipoo and favourable to our wishes, you may be able to direct the conference in such a manner as will enable you to penetrate the Minister's views without giving him reason to believe that we are alarmed by any apprehensions of the event which we are solicitous to guard against.

When we consider the close reserve of the Poona Ministry, their confirmed habits of inaction and procrastination and the tenor of your address of the 27th June, we acknowledge that we are not induced to entertain sanguine expectation of any decisive declaration from them or of the conduct they would pursue in the event supposed. These considerations as well as others point out the necessity of the greatest attention to delicacy in your conversations with Nana or any other, relating to the subject of this letter. We rather, therefore, leave the conduct of it to your discretion of which we have had so many proofs than limit you to any precise mode or time for introducing it, agreeable to the precaution pointed out in Lord Cornwallis's instructions.

After all it is possible that your own observations may already have enabled you to form an opinion on the point we wish to ascertain and, if that should be the case and you should see no prospect of an inclination in the Poona Government to adopt the line of conduct we should wish them to pursue, it would be impolitic and unnecessary to introduce any

conversation leading to a further discovery of their sentiments. But if, on the contrary, Nana should appear to you disposed to enter into our views and afford you an opening for the purpose, you might then endeavour to ascertain how far he would be inclined to take a part in favour of our Government in case Tippoo should invade the Carnatic, and what returns he would expect.

We are not unaware of the difficulties of obtaining a knowledge of the minister's views in this respect without discovering an anxiety on our part for that purpose, a point particularly to be guarded against; for if Nana were to suppose that our object is to obtain the assistance of the Poona Government in the event of an invasion by Tippoo, he would naturally require from us some specific declaration of our intentions in case Tippoo should act hostilely toward his nation. As far as relates to a junction of the French and Tippoo hostile to the Mahratta state, you are empowered to make a free declaration; but we cannot authorize any expectations of our assistance in case Tippoo alone should renew the war with the Mahrattas and as we do not see upon what grounds a proposition to that effect could be satisfactorily obviated, if made by the Minister, nothing should be advanced that might lead him to make it.

The only case in which you should be explicit is upon the receipt of certain information that Tippoo has invaded the Carnatic, an event which our latest advices give us no reason to apprehend, but if this should actually take place, you will not hesitate to endeavour to engage the assistance of the Poona Government by urging in the strongest manner the territorial advantages they will be likely to obtain by attacking Tippoo on their side whilst he is engaged with us and the fair prospect such a confederacy holds out of curbing effectually the dangerous ambition of a powerful enemy.

**No. 14**—Finding war with Tipu almost certain, Cornwallis urges Malet to engage the Mahrattas in the war by promising military help.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—C. W. MALET.

*Lucknow, 26th September 1787.*

By a letter from Sir Archibald Campbell dated the 2nd instant which I received last night, I was sorry to learn that from a variety of information, he has reason to apprehend that Tippoo has resolved to invade the Carnatic. I have no ground to believe that the French Government in this Country is instructed from home, to engage openly in hostilities against us, and it will be extraordinary, if, without powerful assistance from them, Tippoo shall venture to attack wantonly such a

Power as ours. Should he however come to that resolution with or without ally, it will be incumbent upon us to do everything in our power to secure a speedy and happy termination to the war. I think it possible that before you receive this you will in consequence of my letter dated 29th of August and that of the Board dated 7th of September, have taken an opportunity to touch upon the subject to Nanna, and if he has been inclined to listen to the conversation, you will no doubt have stated very fully the vast advantages with which the Mahrattas would endeavour to recover all the losses that they have sustained from him or his father whilst he has our force to contend with on the other side of his dominions. You will mention that he has boasted everywhere in the most insulting manner of success gained over them during the late war, and if Nanna will in the event of this apprehended rupture agree to renew the war, you may promise that if he desires it, we will furnish three or four battalions of good infantry with a train of artillery to join the Mahratta army. And as the Bengal troops are in a better condition than those of Bombay, we will detach that number or even a greater, from the frontier of the province of Oudh, to form a junction with the Mahratta army destined to act against Tippoo at any place that may be fixed upon as most convenient; but if Nanna should prefer it, the detachment shall be furnished from Bombay. My own wish however would be to send the Bengal troops as I could be more certain of their quality and place them under an officer of my own choice. Should Nanna make a difficulty in agreeing to defray the whole or part of the expense of the detachment, you may relinquish the demand entirely or defer the discussion of it to a future day. And to give the utmost incitements to co-operate with us should we be attacked by Tippoo, you may declare that we shall make no claim for any share of the conquest that may be made by our united force on the northern side of his territory; when you are certain that Tippoo has commenced hostilities against any of the Company's possessions, you are at liberty to enter into the whole or as much of the engagements as may be necessary to secure the alliance of the Mahrattas. Should Nanna have previously proposed that we should engage to assist the Mahrattas in case of their being attacked by Tippoo, you will, I take for granted, have answered that unless provoked we are not permitted to enter into hostile engagements against any Power in India.

**No. 15**—Cornwallis writes to Boddam to furnish the Mahrattas with troop Bombay and to attend to the marine establishment.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—R. H. BODDAM, GOVERNOR OF BOMBAY.

*Lucknow, 26th September 1787.*

Sir Archibald Campbell having informed me that from a variety of intelligence he has reason to apprehend that Tippoo has resolved to



invade the Carnatic, I have instructed Mr. Malet to offer, among the inducements to furnish a corps of three or four battalions of sepoys with a train of artillery to act with their army against the northern possessions and I have left it to the choice of the Poona administration to receive this detachment from Bombay, or from our force stationed on the frontier of Oudh. I have signified to Mr. Malet that my own wish would be to send the detachment from Bengal, as we have several regiments in good condition for service, and they can easily be spared from this country; but should Mr. Malet stipulate that those troops should be furnished from Bombay, you will be pleased to comply immediately with a requisition from him to that purpose. And in the event of a war, you may depend upon the utmost exertions of our Government to supply you with sufficient funds for all your necessary public services. I have no doubt of your zeal and application in making every arrangement that you think will conduce to your own security or to promote the general interest of the Company; but as at present we have no King's ships of war in India, I must recommend a very particular attention to your Marine Establishment.

**No. 16**—In this letter, which clearly establishes the defensive attitude of the English, Campbell expounds fully to Malet the nature of the agreement that is to be made with the Mahrattas.

FROM—ARCHIBALD CAMPBELL,

TO—C. W. MALET.

*Fort St. George, 28th September 1787.*

On a perusal of the letter joined to the information and instructions formerly transmitted to you by Lord Cornwallis and his Council you will perceive the determination is that the Company shall in all events consider an avowed union between any of the native powers with France tantamount to a declaration of hostilities against the Company and the States so uniting themselves with France and receiving aid from that nation whether it be the Mahratta, Tippoo or the Nizam must be considered as foes to the British Nation and be treated as such. Lord Cornwallis has told that if the French should supply Tippoo with an European force, Nanna need not be under any apprehension about the safety of the Mahratta State as the Company would in such an event grant them unquestionable support. This assurance from Lord Cornwallis ought, and I hope, will go a great way to instil confidence into the minds of the Poona administration and this point being clearly understood I conceive that the Company and the Mahrattas will be in a state of absolute security against the effects of an open alliance and co-operation between Tippoo and the French.

But there is an essential consideration that is not provided for by this arrangement which is the line to be pursued by the Mahrattas in the

event of Tippoo's invading the Carnatic or dependencies without the avowed assistance of France. One mode has occurred to me as extremely likely to prevent any such attempt on the part of Tippoo or of overthrowing him completely in the event of his making such an attempt. It is simply this, that whenever Tippoo invades the Carnatic or attacks the allies of the Company whom they are bound to protect, the Mahrattas should in such an event penetrate the frontier of the Mysore Country. As the Mahrattas will expect a compensation for this service, we have it in our power to satisfy them in a liberal manner by sending from Bombay a battalion of European troops, a brigade of Sepoys and a good field and battering train of artillery, accompanying them on their expedition, stipulating at the same time that all the conquests made by this united force should belong to the Mahrattas on their paying for the troops and stores employed on that service, or appropriating a district counting sufficient for the discharge thereof. e

By the aid of such a force the Mahrattas might probably acquire in the course of one campaign an addition to their revenues of 16 or 18 lacs of Pagodas annually, and the Company would not be under the necessity of committing themselves by engagements to join the Mahrattas in case Tippoo should upon any future occasion quarrel with them without being aided by the French.

Thus our agreement with the Mahrattas would have a two-fold operation,—One a defensive alliance by which the Company and the Mahrattas should support each other, if either party is attacked by any of the Native Powers, provided such Native Powers are aided by an European State.

The second condition would be a security to the Company that the Mahrattas would attack Tippoo if he invades the Carnatic or its dependencies in consideration of which aid all conquests by our joint force are to be ceded to the Mahrattas.

Unless the Poona Administration are determined against any agreement with us. I imagine there is only one part of the propositions stated by me to Lord Cornwallis that they can find fault with, which is the caution wherewith we wish to avoid any engagement to support the Mahrattas with a military force in the event of a rupture between them and Tippoo, provided the French do not take part in the dispute.

You know well that our objects in India are now confined to the preservation of our situation in point of dominion exactly as it is and to the extension of our commerce. Having no view to conquest it would be unwise in us to take a part in the disputes in the Country Powers which could not fail to be injurious to our trade and while European nations do not take a part in any of the controversies that arise. I hope you will be able to convince the Poona Ministry of the propriety of our remaining neuter.

No. 20—Campbell communicates to Malet the complete disavowal of Cossigny's policy by Conway and the latter's sincere desire to maintain friendly relations with the English.

FROM—ARCHIBALD CAMPBELL,

TO—C. W. MALET.

*Fort St. George, 16th October 1787.*

My information respecting the motives of Tippoo are various and nothing has yet transpired through any of the channels from which I receive intelligence to satisfy me of the certainty of his operations. Reports still prevail of his intention to enter the Carnatic and the Rajah of Travancore has yet equal cause of alarm ; by your last Letter and enclosures it would appear his views are towards Mallabar Coast possibly against Goa. At any rate I imagine he is too well informed of our preparations to meet him if necessary to think of an invasion of the Carnatic unless he is supported by some other Power than his own.

From a gentleman just now at Pondicherry who is a particular friend of mine and who during his stay there has been on an intimate footing with Monsieur de Conway the new Governor, I have the pleasing information that that gentleman has in the most explicit and unreserved manner avowed to him his sentiments respecting the line of conduct he means to pursue in this country and has evinced the warmest disposition to be on good terms with the English Government which is agreeable to the instructions which he has received from his Court. He strongly condemns the encouragement given to Tippoo's embassy which he is confident will not be relished at home, and he disapproves of the whole impolitic and unauthorized system of his predecessor Monsieur Cossigny in carrying on intrigues with the Country Powers through the medium of a few adventurers, whose acts, if not timely put a stop to, would soon effect a belief among the Native Princes that the English and French nations were not cordially at peace. He also declared in the most candid way his disapprobation of the Viscount de Souillac's intemperate conduct on his late discussions with the Supreme Government of Bengal.

In the only matter I have had to negotiate with Monsieur de Cossigny which was respecting the French gunners taken at Gingee on their road to Seringapatam, as mentioned in my letter of the 28th of September, he has spiritedly disclaimed any knowledge of such a circumstance and assured me that he never will countenance anything of the same nature ; he has confined Tippoo's officer as a mark of his disapprobation.

In short, the whole of his declarations, open as I have every reason to think they are sincere, lead me to believe his disposition is inclined to cultivate that peace and harmony which subsists by the present strong ties between our respective Courts, and my hope is, that from his prudent and discreet conduct the Native Powers will soon be convinced, the English

and French nations have agreed upon wise extended systems for the improvement of their commercial interests all over the world, and that no ordinary squabble or unjust contest between the Princes of India will induce them to favour measures inimical to the great line they have adopted for the mutual advantage and benefit.

There is no foundation for the report circulated by Monsieur Montigny of the Marquis de la Fayette coming out in the character of Governor General; on the contrary, Monsieur de Conway, vested with the appointment of Commander-in-Chief of all the French establishments in India and the chief seats of their Government, is now transferred to Pondicherry.

Count de Conway's power extends to the naval as well as to the military department, but does not reach to the Islands. He has appointed a new French Agent at Calcutta and has assured Lord Cornwallis of his fixed determination to pursue a fair and impartial line of conduct in all matters where the interests of the two nations come into discussion. Monsieur de Conway has recalled Monsieur Montigny from Poona and declares his intention of making known to all the Country Powers his determination to preserve inviolable in every particular the state of harmony and friendship happily subsisting between the French and English nations in Europe. The knowledge of these circumstances will I hope enable you to remove all apprehension with the Poona administration, of the possibility of a variance being likely to happen in Europe and, as I have already observed, it is the intention of the two Courts to cement their present friendship by every reciprocal accommodation, it is not likely that the Court of Versailles will countenance any act of their servants in India that may interrupt it.

No. 21—Intelligence of road-building by Tipu for military purposes.

FROM—R. H. BODDAM,

TO—C. W. MALET.

*Bombay Castle, 29th October 1787.*

The Resident at Anjengo under the 23rd ultimo transmitted us a letter which the King of Travancore had addressed him, expressing of his apprehensions, on account of having received advices from the King of Cochin, that Tippoo was expected at Calicut, from which place towards the Ghauts a road was making to facilitate his approach, and that part of his troops were destined towards Trichinopoly.

The intelligence we have likewise received from the Resident at Calicut confirms the circumstance of a new road being made with the additional one that barracks are actually erecting and that the Durbar were inquisitive to learn of him whether any King's ships or troops were expected shortly

here and the Bibbee of Cannanore it seems had cautioned the Chief of Tellicherry to be on his guard as she was advised the Nabob meditated some designs against it.

We are desirous you should be informed of these circumstances 'altho' they do not excite in us any apprehensions from him at present as from the purport of your intimation to us in your Letter of the 5th instant we think it probable that whatever his designs might have been towards the Malabar Coast they will be diverted for some time by other objects.

**No. 22**—Boddam reports to Malet the inexpediency of weakening the Bombay garrison in any way on account of the critical state of affairs in Europe.

FROM—R. H. BODDAM,

TO—C. W. MALET.

*Bombay Castle, 8th November 1787.*

It was our intention should the requisition suggested by His Lordship be made by the Poonah Government for troops from Home to have furnished two battalions of seven hundred men and a proportionable number of artillery which could be detached at the shortest warning and though short of the force proposed by His Lordship, would yet have been more considerable than we could well have spared from our very limited Establishment. But the important advices we have just received from Europe descriptive of the very critical state of national affairs enjoin us to be guarded while the issue is so uncertain; nor should we deem ourselves justifiable in weakening our garrison at this juncture. You will therefore see the absolute necessity in case the requisition expected by the Governor General should be made, that the Poonah Ministry may be induced to give a preference to the Bengal troops which will be also consonant to His Lordship's wish.

The enclosed extracts of intelligence communicated by the British Ambassador at the Ottoman Court to the Resident at Bussorah and of which we think it necessary you should be apprized will evince the propriety of being cautious of reducing our military force.

No accounts have been received here from Goa respecting Tippoo's troops being in the Sawant's district.

**No. 23**—Campbell informs Malet of the receipt of a letter from Tipu expressing his friendly disposition towards the English.

FROM—ARCHIBALD CAMPBELL,

TO—C. W. MALET.

*Fort St. George, 11th November 1787.*

I have lately received an answer from Tippoo to the letter I wrote him on the 19th of September wherein he assures me in the strongest

terms that he never will violate the treaty subsisting between him and the English and that the movements of his troops were merely to chastise some refractory Polygars of the coast of Mallabar dependent on his Sircar. , In answer to a subsequent letter I had occasion to write him he has repeated the same assurance of a pacific and friendly disposition toward us.

Notwithstanding these professions, I have received intelligence of a nature too undoubted to be unattended to, that large bodies of Tippoo's troops are ready to take the field and are still contiguous to our frontier. While this is the case, I shall continue to keep our preparations in a state of readiness to give him the best reception possible.

I shall be impatient to learn the result of the negotiation lately recommended to your attention from Bengal and I cannot help thinking that whether Tippoo intends an attack upon the Carnatic or not, the idea suggested to Lord Cornwallis of engaging the Mahrattas to penetrate the northern districts of the Mysore Country in case Tippoo should ever invade the Carnatic and of recompensing the Mahratta State with troops and artillery from Bombay and all the countries conquered by the arms of those troops, would render the security of the Coast both permanent and effectual. The very idea of such an agreement subsisting between the Mahrattas and us would deter Tippoo in future from any attempt upon the Carnatic.

We have nothing new from Europe and the best understanding continues to subsist between us and the French Government.

**No. 24**—Declining to satisfy Nana's wishes, Cornwallis gives detailed instructions to Malet to soothe Nana's feelings and to induce him to avail himself of the opportunity of a breach of the treaty by Tipu or the French to recover his lost dominions.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—C. W. MALET.

*Calcutta, 14th December 1787.*

While I conveyed to you my late instructions for making certain propositions to the Poona administration in the event of our being forced into hostilities with Tippoo, I was sensible of the disadvantages under which you must have stated them and perfectly aware of the uncertainty of their success. I confess, however, that I should have considered an absolute negative or even a reception of them as some sort of humiliation to this Government and I should have looked upon it as peculiarly unlucky, if upon the supposition of a general alliance having been formed against us, a categorical answer had been demanded of Nanna, as it would no doubt have appeared to him a strong indication of our apprehensions of it.

I was therefore extremely happy to learn that thro' your prudence and caution we had avoided disadvantages of so inconvenient a nature in negotiation by the assurances which have been made by the minister through you to this Government.

4. We are still in a predicament in which considerable address may be required to retain or conciliate the good will of the Mahrattas, for by regulating our conduct by the principles of the Act of Parliament and our own instructions, we are under the necessity at present of declining a closer connection with them.

5. It is equally my determined resolution as it is also my clear opinion that it will prove the soundest policy towards effectually promoting the national interest and reputation, to preserve a constant fairness of conduct, and to hold an uniform open language to the native powers of this Country.

6. You will, therefore, upon receipt of this, demand an audience of Nanna for the purpose of delivering the answer of this Government to the propositions that you transmitted from him; and you will in the most civil and conciliating terms recapitulate to him the declarations, that I have uniformly made since my arrival in India which are in substance, that I have the most sincere esteem for his person and character and the most friendly concern for the prosperity of the Mahratta State, but that in compliance with the laws of my country and my particular instructions I have it not in my power to accede to the proposition made by him or to enter into any other new political engagement which could eventually involve us in war for any cause whatever but that of securing the honour or safety of the Company's subjects and territories of its allies, which were specifically named and included in the late treaty of peace. You may state that altho' for the above reasons I am precluded from meeting his wishes on the present occasion, yet that if set at liberty by any change of political circumstances, I should in preference to any other Power be inclined to negotiate with him and to form a close connection between the two Governments.

8. You may say that you are persuaded that in the meantime it would be hardly satisfactory to me and perhaps might ultimately be attended with beneficial consequences to the Mahrattas to keep up the most friendly intercourse and if he approves of it a free communication of sentiments on the views and interests of both nations. You may assure him in his transactions with me he shall never meet with imposition or duplicity and that as I intend to continue several years in this country I am certain that by a constant correspondence between my words and my actions I shall have a claim to his perfect confidence.

9. To support this language it will be proper in you to remark that a very little reflection would shew him that I have already given convincing

proofs that my conduct is regulated by the above principles only, for if I could have been influenced to depart from them by the dictates of ambition and the desire of acquiring power and dominion, the condition of the upper provinces while I was in that quarter, furnished the most ample field for temptation with a force in my hands which could not have been resisted and with unlimited offers of advantages to the company and even the most pressing solicitations from the principal parties to interfere. I adhered without the smallest deviation to the original objects of my journey which were to inspect the state and discipline of the troops and to establish certain regulations for the internal government of the provinces.

10. Having heard a report that Sindia has expressed some dissatisfaction at the Prince's having been allowed to proceed from our dominions, you will, in order to obviate the effect of any such complaint, take an opportunity during the conversation of mentioning to Nanna that we are not only bound by decency to grant an asylum to the unfortunate Prince but that it would have been highly ungenerous to have detained him against his inclination; that with a liberal personal treatment to his Royal Highness I have been scrupulously careful that even our civilities should be consistent with our declared resolution of maintaining the strictest neutrality in all the differences of our neighbours.

\* \* \* \* \*

12. I know that it will be difficult to impress the minister's mind with a strong persuasion of our friendly disposition to his country while we are under the necessity of refusing our co-operation against a dangerous enemy. It will, therefore, require the utmost of your ability and address to soothe and if possible to satisfy him. Should he be inclined to converse freely and discuss the subject fully, many conciliatory arguments besides the above may be made use of. It may be in your power to state that Tippoo as an acknowledged ally of the French has the same claim for support from that Nation, as can be demanded from us by our allies who were described in the late treaty of peace.

13. Whilst he abstains from injuring us or those allies we cannot act against him without committing directly or indirectly an infraction of our treaty with France and you may add with great truth, that while the two nations seem to entertain for each other the most pacific sentiments in Europe, any step in this government that might tend to disturb their tranquility would certainly be considered as highly unjustifiable and would incur disapprobation. You can also call to Nana's recollection that by our declaration the same obstacles that prevent us from complying with his wishes equally preclude Tippoo from receiving an open assistance from the French.

14. You may assure him that we shall not retract our promise for if the French should take an avowed part with Tippoo against the Mahrattas,



we shall be ready to make a common cause with them in the war. You may likewise say that as the French policy has been generally extremely ambitious and as there appears to be no bounds to the designs of Tippoo, the violence or injustice of either of those Powers may soon remove, the present political restraints of this Government and leave us free to form the closest, alliance with the Marattas. You may inform him that he may be assured of my disposition to treat with them when in my power upon the most liberal terms and that he may rely upon it that our force shall be kept in readiness to act with vigour at the shortest notice. However cautious we may be in giving provocation, we think it prudent and necessary for the security of our honour and interest to maintain large armies both of Europeans and natives in constant pay and in strict discipline. We have already ordered the Bombay army to be completed to the new establishment according to the instructions from the Court of Directors and you may add that if he has any means of obtaining information of the condition of the armies in the Carnatic and in Bengal you are persuaded that he will see sufficient reason to be convinced that we have it in our power not only to defend ourselves but to render essential service as allies to all those who by treaty may have a claim upon them.

17. But, above all, it will be of the utmost consequence for the future credit of this Government if, in the course of your conferences you can induce the Minister to look to the probability of a failure in engagement with us on the side of the French or of Tippoo as an event for the Mahrattas and to bring him to a fixed determination in his own mind and if possible to an explicit declaration to you to seize that opportunity to recover the territories that Tippoo and his father have dismembered from the Mahratta empire. To accomplish this a variety of arguments will occur to you which will probably make great impression upon him. You may with confidence assert that he may have the utmost reliance on our fidelity in the performance of any engagements that we may be induced to contract, and I conceive that you may be able to make him feel how much his personal reputation and his interest in the State must be raised if it should be found practicable to recover their lost dominion during his administration. Your success in this point would be a service of great value. It would tend to keep the Mahrattas in a state of preparation in case of an emergency and would save this Government the mortification of becoming suitors for their assistance.

18. I shall likewise be solicitous that you should be able to persuade Nanna that he may place the utmost confidence in my personal honour and good faith, and you may assure him with the most absolute certainty that no consideration shall ever induce me to deceive him. An appeal to my past conduct will give weight to your representations upon this subject and this ought to impress him with the firmest reliance upon it for the future. But you may add that you desire him to observe it narrowly

under an assurance that he will find the invariable tenor of it, agreeable to my professed principles, and that as you are certain it will never exhibit any act of duplicity, you call upon him to place that confidence and reliance in it, which he might with reason renounce if any future act of this Government, whilst I preside at it, should be found at variance with its professions. These arguments are suggested with a view to remove that diffidence and suspicion which seems strongly to pervade the Mahratta character.

19. There is one argument which it is possible Nanna may urge, although I do not think he has any grounds for it in your negotiations. That our expectation of his assisting us in case Tippoo should invade the Carnatic without the assistance of the French, entitles him to call unto us for similar support on Tippoo's attacking him. The answer to it is sufficiently pointed out in the preceding part of this letter which clearly avows the line of conduct I must from policy and necessity follow. But as upon this ground he may require a more explicit explanation, it may be proper, if urged, to inform him that the unqualified assurance which was made to him of affording his nation assistance against the forces of Tippoo and the French, in case they should unite to attack the Mahratta dominions at a time when such a union was apprehended by himself, was a proof of national attachment which afforded us reason to expect a similar return if Tippoo had attacked our dominions and that in fact the Mahratta State would have derived the principal advantages of such a confederacy since they would have acquired the territories conquered by the assistance of our arms whilst the benefits to us would only have been a division of the forces of our common enemy.

20. I am exceedingly sorry that my intentions have been so much defeated respecting the presents to the Peshwa and I am sensible that it has been principally occasioned by my having inadvertently given way to the solicitations of the vackeel to deliver them to him instead of sending by people of our own to be delivered in the first instance to you. You may be assured that in this omission of form there was no designed inattention to you ; on the contrary, I am very sorry in every respect that it happened and particularly so as it appears to have given you some uneasiness. You may take an opportunity to mention the subject again to Nanna not as a point of any material consequence but by way of expressing my disappointment at my intentions having been frustrated by the timidity of the vackeel, and assuring him that the large elephant which was obtained with considerable difficulty from the Governor of Rohilcund, was received back with joy by his old master and is at this moment reckoned one of the finest elephants in Oude. You can take occasion to add, that it is very little worth my while to countenance a misrepresentation upon so insignificant a point as the value of even twenty elephants.

**No. 25**—The Calcutta Council directs Malet to renew his negotiations with Nanna in case of invasion of Carnatic by Tipu and gives him general directions on the subject of command of the joint army and partition of conquests.

FROM—CALCUTTA COUNCIL,

TO—C. W. MALET.

*Fort William, 14th December 1787.*

The explicit instructions communicated to you by the Governor General under this date in answer to your several letters addressed to him and to the Board, renders it unnecessary for us to reply particularly to the propositions from Nanna for an offensive and defensive alliance as stated in your letter of the 31st October.

The negotiation on the propositions is only to be renewed in case you should learn with certainty that Tippoo has actually invaded the Carnatic or the dominions of our Ally, the Raja of Travancore, and upon the supposition of a possibility of this event, altho' we think it extremely improbable, we shall for your guidance furnish you with our sentiments on the subject.

It must be evident that an equality of forces as to number between the Mahrattas and us can never be deemed equal in point of strength, since there is no comparison between the undisciplined rabble that compose a Mahratta army and the well disciplined battalions in our service. This consideration therefore ought to weigh with Nanna for supplying a number much beyond an equal proportion without which the operations of our joint forces would be retarded and the Mahrattas fail to derive those advantages which are the foundation and object of the junction.

These reasons are so apparent that they must, we apprehend, make an impression upon Nanna and if Nizam Ally Khan should participate in this alliance, they must be urged to him.

The operations of this conjoined armies must be directed by the English officer appointed to the command of them. Some plan will of course be formed in the commencement of the expedition in which the interests of the Peshwa and the Nizam will be consulted, but the subsequent operations must be directed by our officer whose conduct will be regulated by one object only that of injuring to the utmost the common enemy and promoting the interests of the alliance.

With respect to the other conditions for a participation of territories we think them proper. It may, however, be useful to suggest to the Peshwa that an extension of territories is by no means a principal object with us, and that we shall consider our interests effectually promoted by recovering from Tippoo what he or his father may have taken from the Mahrattas. The truth is that we do not think any advantage would be obtained by possessing ourselves of any part of Tippoo's dominions,

but it might be imprudent to make so unreserved a declaration to the Mahrattas. The condition which proposes an equal partition of such parts of Tippoo's own territories as may be conquered by our joint forces, may eventually be useful, and for this reason we do not relinquish it. A suggestion may be made in terms sufficient to influence the Poona administration to an acquiescence for supplying a large body of horse without committing ourselves directly to renounce all territorial acquisitions. If you should with certainty learn that Tippoo has invaded the Carnatic, the dominions of the Raja of Tanjore or Travancore, you will then proceed to treat with the minister on the propositions stated by him, under these instructions which are communicated for your guidance in that event only.

No. 26—Intelligence of Tipu's troops stationed in different cantonments.

FROM—L. A. YVON,

TO—C. W. MALET.

*17th December 1787.*

Having just received intelligence from the southward I have the honour to communicate it to you. Tippoo is yet in Seringapatam and it is uncertain when he will take the field ; but by the disposition he has made of the army, it is thought he will move in less than two months. There are upwards of 30,000 of his best disciplined troops at Chitteldroog with everything necessary for taking the field, at Simmagan (about 3 days' march southward of Chitteldroog and 8 from Dharvar) 15,000, where Mr. Lally is and where there are between three and four thousand camels formed into squadrons with two riders armed with firelocks and bayonets ; Tippoo has great expectations from this new cavalry which he intends to increase to 12,000. The remainder of his army is yet in Cantonments on the frontier of different coasts of his country ; at Kittoor there is but one thousand infantry besides piadas dispersed over the purgannahs. A new fort is building with all the expedition possible (about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  coss south of Kittoor at Keyroor), which is to be the Capital instead of that demolished ; and this being well situated will be of consequence which Kittoor, however strong it might have been made by art, could never have been on account of the badness of its situation. The report at Darwar is that Tippoo will certainly march against Nizam Ally Khan and there is no mention of any operations in the territories belonging to the Mahrattas ; I cannot however think that Tippoo will so soon take the field against the Nizam. The Raja of Collapoor, it seems, has formed an alliance with Tippoo (who has lately assisted him with a considerable sum of money). He has raised an army of 12,000 men with which he is encamped near his Capital under pretence of subduing some part of his country in a state of rebellion ; he has lately attacked two villages belonging to Miraj, in consequence of which Bala Sahib has called in his troops.

The disposition intended by this Government does not show any fear from Tippoo. Besides Ally Bahadur's party which is to be joined by 10,000 men under T. H., there are three Detachments ordered on service, viz., to Khandes, Panchmahal and Belgaum, unless the Mahrattas have only to assist the Nizam with a strong body of horse in case of a war with him.

Mr. Montigny is much concerned at being detained here by advices received from Goa of an approaching war between the French and the English. This was communicated by a gentleman of consideration at Bombay to Mr. Bon Homme, a French merchant, who was advised to send off his ships from the coast or he might probably lose them.

**No. 27**—Campbell reports increasing friendliness between Tipu and Nizam.

FROM—ARCHIBALD CAMPBELL,

TO—C. W. MALET.

*Fort St. George, 20th December 1787.*

The advantage you obtained by drawing propositions from the Poona Government, instead of making them yourself is an essential point gained, and has given time for your procuring the sentiments of the Bengal Government, on the whole of the negotiation in the most ample manner that could be wished. The change of appearance in Tippoo's conduct towards us has prevented any inconvenience from the delay, and we shall become daily more and more prepared to repel any efforts of his to disturb our repose.

A forged London Gazette had been circulated on the Continent, giving an account of an armament having proceeded from Portsmouth to the coast of Holland, and it is possible that this Gazette has misled people to believe a rupture must happen between the Courts of London and Paris; but we have letters from London of the 3rd of August which mention our being to that period freed from any concern in the trouble on the Continent, and so I hope we will continue.

The best understanding subsists between this Government and that of Pondicherry so that you may safely contradict any insinuations of Mr. Montigny that may be of a different tendency.

The Nizam and Tippoo continue to exchange marks of great cordiality; Hircarrahs are passing constantly between Seringapatam and Hyderabad which could not happen without some material object. From every information I can learn, Tippoo is endeavouring to form a connexion with the Soubah through the medium of intermarriage of some of his family to the relations of the Soubah.

No. 28—Report of a French frigate carrying troops for Tipu's service.

FROM—R. H. BODDAM,  
TO—C. W. MALET.

*Bombay Castle, 30th December 1787.*

Sir Archibald had been informed that the *Astre* French Frigate had sailed from Pondicherry to Mahe with 200 Europeans, 2,000 stand of arms and accoutrements for the use of Tippoo. We have however received no advice of that nature from Tellicherry, though we understand that a French Company's ship had arrived at Mahe with Monsicur Canapel as Governor of that Settlement, but no mention is made of troops.

No. 29—Malet reports his conversation with Bahiro Pant on the difference between the terms of alliance submitted to Nana and those communicated by Major Palmer to Sindhia.

FROM—C. W. MALET,  
TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 19th March 1788.*

On the 15th instant Bahro Pant paid me a visit, and communicated the following message from the Minister, that three letters had been lately received at different times from Madajee Sindea, intimating that advances had been made to him by Major Palmer, to form an alliance between the Company and the Maratta State against Tippoo; that these advances amounted to a general proposal of defensive alliance, unclogged with any of those conditions that I had lately introduced into my negotiations with this Government on the same topic, which had greatly surprised the Minister, as giving reason to conclude that Major Palmer's instructions differed from mine, or that I had suppressed the extent of mine, that he had long delayed communicating the subject of these letters to me concluding that I must shortly hear from Major Palmer on the subject, but finding no Cossids had lately arrived from that quarter to me, he had, after mature deliberation, thought proper to communicate the circumstance to me, and request an explanation as far as I was able to give it, as he was totally unable to account for such proposals coming through any other channel during my residency here, and differing so widely from those made by me professedly by the authority of the Governor-General in Council; the Minister added that when these advances were made by Major Palmer, Madajee Sindea observed that they related to a distant event, and desired to know how far he might expect assistance from the Company for the re-establishment of his affairs in Indostan; to which Major Palmer replied, that he would write to Calcutta on the subject, and Sindia promised to do the same on that of his advances to this Durbar, both engaging to procure answers in the space of a month: thus far Behro Punt communicated to me avowedly and officially from the Minister, after which, with a great show of

confidence, he added that the Minister had greatly hesitated to make the above communication from an apprehension founded on the difficulties I had already started, lest I should obstruct the progress of the negotiation going on thro' Sindia and Major Palmer, for however desirous he might be of confining any negotiation of this State with your Lordship for a closer connexion of the Company's and Peshwa's Governments to my management, yet, the accomplishment of that point was not to be sacrificed to the preference of any particular channel, and so forcibly was the Minister impressed with this idea, that he had not empowered him, Behro Punt to communicate the above to me, till he had engaged that he would do it in such a manner as should prevent my throwing any obstacles on the negotiation.

You may imagine, My Lord, that my whole attention was given to so extraordinary a discourse, which I immediately attributed to the following motives : first, an artful design of the Minister to create in me an emulation to promote his proposals for an alliance by the stimulus of the probability of this alliance being carried into effect thro' another channel. Second, a design equally artful of leading me into further explanation or a discovery of what further latitude of negotiation I am vested with relative to the alliance in question. These considerations naturally led me to conclude, that the communication I had the honour to make on the same subject in my address of 3rd February, was then conveyed to me from the Durbar, under the cloak of a fictitious channel, and on the same designing disingenuous principles.

Strongly impressed with this persuasion, I expressed great surprize to Behro Punt at what I had heard, begged to know if the conduct of his Court warranted ideas so derogatory to the consistency of your Lordship's Government, and assured him of my persuasion, that either Madjee Sindia must have mistaken Major Palmer, or that the Minister must have misconceived Sindia's letters, which I requested he would favour me with a sight of, urging that the importance of the subject and the example of a like candid conduct on my part, on all occasions entitled me to that satisfactory demonstration. Behro Punt declined favouring me with a sight of the letters as repugnant to the customs of the Durbar, and as it might, if known to Sindia, give him umbrage, but that as he had made a memorandum immediately from the letters, he would read it to me, and I might be assured it was precisely the sense of the letters ; he did so, and I found the following to be the sense of his memorandum, as far as relates to the point in question : that Major Palmer had arrived there (with Sindia) and proposed to him, that if the Company's territories were attacked by Tippoo, the Maratta State should assist the Company in the war. I stopped Behro Punt and fixed him to the explanation of this sentence, the words of which he admitted amounted to no more than I have construed, but that the spirit involved reciprocity of aid, which in such cases, was always understood : I replied that I could by

no means admit so latitudinal an interpretation of a point so accurately defined, even in his own words, which conveyed a simple application for the assistance of this Government in a certain predicament, and as to the necessary and consequential reciprocity in such cases, I begged him to recollect, how far his own Government had justified his observation by its conduct in return for the candid offer of assistance made by me on the part of your Lordship, in case the French and Tippoo should attack this state. I added, that the refusal of a sight of the letters from Sindia and the late constant reference to Nizam Ally Cawn, in cases on which I wished an explanation without a syllable having been yet communicated to me in answer from that quarter certainly appeared very extraordinary, and ill accorded with that unbounded candour and complaisance which he had always met with on our part.

One inference seems obvious from the above: that the Minister is extremely anxious to bring about by his own endeavours the alliance in question, and I think your Lordship will agree with me, that his anxiety must arise from some well founded cause of apprehension, and a consciousness of incapacity singly to oppose the power of Tippoo, against whose encroachment the alliance is directed.

No. 30—Medows sends intelligence of operations on the Malabar Coast.

FROM—WILLIAM MEDOWS,  
TO—C. W. MALET.

*Bombay Castle, 19th January 1789.*

On the 17th instant we were advised from Tellicherry that the chief and Factors had resumed possession of Dharmapatam on the 2nd instant, having previously renewed our demand upon the Prince for the restitution of it, allowing him ten days for deliberation, although no direct answer was returned he took no measure for the defence of the Island.

We learn from Callicut that a body of troops consisting of five thousand Natives, and one or two hundred Europeans under Monsieur Lally had been sent thither by Tippoo, with the professed design to extirpate the Nairs from that part of the Coast under his control.

There have been lately, it seems, two French frigates at Mahe and some merchant ships, or rather as was thought storeships, as they had landed some field pieces and small arms at Mahe, and were said to have proceeded with stores to Mangalore.

No. 31—Malet reports to the G. G. Tipu's dissatisfaction at the friendliness between the Nizam and the Company and an alleged engagement between Tipu and the Mahrattas.

FROM—C. W. MALET,  
TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 21st January 1789.*

By a letter from General Medows, dated the 1st instant, I am acquainted with his preparing to retake possession of Dharmapatam; by intelligence



received yesterday from the Southern frontier of this State I learn that Tipu's borders were threatened with disturbances by some refractory Zemindars.

On the 12th instant I was favoured with a letter from Captain Kennaway enclosing a country newspaper, in which is mentioned Nizam Ally Khan's having received a letter from Tippoo expressive of his dissatisfaction at the present amicable appearances between the Nawab and Your Lordship's Government, amounting almost to a declaration of an intended war against us and demand of the Nawab's neutrality. The same paper also mentions an engagement between this Court and Tippoo by which the former is to keep 20,000 troops in his (Tippoo's, service) the latter to pay his stipulated chout regularly; but as I have lately observed some instances of jealousy between this Court and that of Hyderabad, of Your Lordship's friendship, whence such fruits may be expected, and as Nizam Ally Khan's present negotiations with Your Lordship through his Vackeel Meer Aboo-al-Cossim may be promoted by establishing such an idea as presents itself on a cursory perusal of the above articles, I hope they have no better foundation than common durbar machination. At all events, I think it would have been impolitic in Tipu to have made so unnecessary a discovery of his intention; and as to this Government, I have no reason to think it would assent to the reported service of the troops.

**No. 32**—Report of a body of troops to be furnished by the Peshwa for the service of Tipu.

FROM—CAPT. KENNAWAY,

TO—C. W. MALET.

*Hyderabad, 28th January 1789.*

The newspaper I did myself the pleasure to transmit in my letter of the 2nd Instant, was meant merely to draw your attention to that part of it which speaks of the body of troops engaged to be furnished by the Peshwah for the service of Tippoo as a matter worth some kind of notice. I paid little regard to it myself being persuaded that both this and your durbar are too jealous of the Mysore Power to unite with it on any cordial or intimate footing; and other disposition as far as it relates to the Nizam will be strengthened by the reception given by Tipu to his Vakeel with which I understand he is extremely dissatisfied. A report prevailed here a few days since of a large party of Mahrattas having been detached towards Badami which if true appears to indicate also some suspicion or design relating to Tipu, on the part of the Peshwah.

**No. 33**—Intelligence of the arrival of Narapa and Ramapa Acharya with information of Tipu's motions.

FROM—ARCHIBALD CAMPBELL,

TO—C. W. MALET.

*Fort St. George, 1st February 1789.*

Sorry am I to acquaint you that our correspondence with Coorban Ally has been discovered and has proved fatal to him as you will see by

the enclosed intelligence recently received which has since been confirmed from other quarters. This event is very unfortunate as it was, and might have continued, a very valuable channel of intelligence which is not only entirely stopped by this unlucky detection but will make Tippoo so watchful in future.

Narrapa and Ramapa Acharea mentioned in your letter of the 9th June last, both arrived here the beginning of last month, and delivered the copies of the tokens which you enclosed. The information they brought of Tippoo's motions of the State of Tippoo's army although not very particular, appeared to be true and corresponded with our other intelligence I ordered a present of 6 rupees to be given to Narapa and 100 Rupees to Ramapa Acharea as he was the most intelligent and the person of most importance mentioned in your letter. They were told that they should be recommended to you, in case you should think proper to give them any further reward and the last in particular was encouraged to come here from Tripetty next year in the same manner, and to bring the most particular information, he could collect on his journey through Tippoo's Country.

Intelligence of Qurban Ali's intrigues with the English, his trial and execution.

*Intelligence, 20th December 1788.*

Coorban Ally being stationed at Poongonoor for the purpose of recruiting chiefly from the Carnatic, had Lal Cawn, a sepadoor and other officers under his Command. During my stay there a Subedar immediately under orders of Lot Cawn, illtreated a poor woman, who applied to Corban Ally for redress. Coorban Ally desired Lal Cawn to punish the Soupadar but he would not, and they had some words in consequence. Another time Lal Cawn had difference with some of the peons who compose the garrison of Poongonoor, and requested Coorban Ally to settle it to his satisfaction, but he objected, thinking him to blame. A quarrel between them ensued and Lal Cawn to be revenged set off to Seringpatam, and lodged information of Coorban Ally's holding a correspondence with the Governments of Madras and Poonah. After that Coorban Ally was ordered to attend the muster of 559 Recruits he had sent to Seringpatam. Not suspecting it was for any other purpose, he desired me and two other hircarrahs to go along with him; On our arrival at the Coarides, outside of Seringapatam the 26 of Mohurrum or 27th of October, he sent a person to announce to Tippoo Badshah his being there. A Vakeel or messenger from the presence brought an order to let him pass. He took Shazeer-challum and a few domestics along with him, they were conducted to the Hall of Audience, where the Badshah was sitting on his throne a youth on each side of him, with drawn Sabres. On seeing Coorban Ally, he said with a loud voice "Oid Badshah of Poongonoor, thou Traitor, draw near," Coorban Ally bowed to the ground and appeared;

"Pardon me my Lord, I am not a traitor, but a Syed and faithful servant." He was ordered to be confined and put in irons. At 12 o'clock at night Tippoo sent for him, and said "I am informed by Lal Cawn you are in treaty with my enemies, have received presents of scarlet cloth, velvet and shawls, from Balaghat and are in the pay of the English". Coorban Ally replied "Forgive me, great prince, the articles you mention have been sent me from Madras, it's true, but by my Soucar, who lately went from Hyderabad to that place; and I gave a piece of the cloth to Lal Cawn." Tippoo then ordered him back to prison, and Lal Cawn to be brought before him to whom he said "It appears that you had a share of the presents received from Ballagaut, consequently you have been in league with Coorban Ally, and both of you are traitors." He was immediately confined and fettered. The next morning all his effects and Coorban Ally's were seized and brought into the presence, and among those belonging to the latter,—the articles above mentioned, which he had brought with him to distribute among the principal persons about Tippoo. The day following, they were ordered again into the Hall of Audience, likewise Nuzzur Ally a Commander of horse and Mohidin Ally Cawn Buckshee, who had been some time in confinement, letters from Nizam Ally and Wallajah having been intercepted. The Buckshees or heads of the four principal Katcharees or Departments, and all the great officers of State were ordered to attend. A multitude assembled. Tippoo being seated on his throne, cast his eyes towards the prisoners, upbraided them with attempting to upset his government, by a treacherous correspondence with his enemies and produced the letters from each that had been intercepted, with plans of Seringapatam, Bangalore and other places, as indubitable proofs of their guilt. They were confounded, and not one of them dared to look up. Being conducted back to their respective prisons, the papers were given the Buckshees of the Katcharees, with instructions to investigate their contents, and decide on the guilt or innocence of the parties accused. That business employed the Katcharees 7 days, when each of them brought in their verdict guilty, and discovered that 4 more Rasaldars and 2 Europeans in the Chalties were concerned in the combination; also two bramins and two hircarrahs, that were detected. His report being made to Tippoo, he gave orders to cut off the heads of Coorban Ally, Lal Cawn, Nuzzur Ally, Mohidin Ally Cawn, and that the other two persons should be shot. What I have related is only what I was a witness to.

**No. 34**—Intelligence of mal-treatment of the Nizam's Vakils by Tipu.

FROM—CAPT. KENNAWAY,

TO—C. W. MALET.

*Hyderabad, 6th February 1789.*

Since I had the honour to write you last, one of his Highness's Vakeels has returned from Tippoo having been cavalierly dismissed by that Chief

on the plea that more than one was unnecessary. His conduct to the one detained is said to be such as has given much dissatisfaction to his Highness who in return has treated his messengers with coldness and some contempt. They left Hyderabad about 10 days ago.

**No. 35**—Intelligence of the change in the Government of Madras and of Tipu's movements.

FROM—JOHN HOLLOND,

TO—C. W. MALET.

*Fort St. George, 14th February 1789.*

Sir Archibald Campbell embarked on his return to Europe on board the manship Captain Gregoree and sailed the 7th instant. As far as any judgment can be formed from private intelligence, there appears every prospect of the continuation of peace with respect to the British Court. The civil commotions in France, it may be presumed will fully engage the attention of that Court in which it is supposed the King must ultimately comply with the general wishes of his subjects.

By a letter from Mr. Bannerman, we are informed that Tippoo Sultan with his army is soon expected at Callicut and that the reasons assigned for these movements is to establish his authority in those countries.

At present there is every appearance of peace and tranquility in the Carnatic. I shall do myself the pleasure of taking all opportunities of forwarding to you early intelligence of any material occurrences that are likely to be of service to you in assisting your negotiations with the Poona Court.

**No. 36**—Intelligence of Tipu's expedition against the Coorg Country.

FROM—CAPT. KENNAWAY,

TO—C. W. MALET.

*Hyderabad, 21st February 1789.*

I am informed that Tippoo marched from Seringapatam about the 20th ultimo on an expedition against the Koorg country, which is situated in the neighbourhood of Tellicherry, and that in consequence of some success of the enemy against the advanced part of his army, he has been obliged to fall back, and is devising to penetrate into the country by a different route, which however is not much more practicable than the one he has failed in.

**No. 37**—The Chief of Tellicherry requests Tipu to restore Mount Deli.

FROM—CHIEF OF TELLICHERRY,

TO—TIPU SULTAN.

*18th April 1789.*

On the 4th April 1786 Mr. Beaumont the then Chief of this Settlement wrote to your Highness by order of the Honourable the Governor of Bombay, on the subject of Mount Deli in the following words "I am directed by my superiors at Bombay to address your Highness and request your positive order for the immediate restoration of Mount Deli agreeable to the Treaty of Mangalore. In reply to this your Highness wrote to the said Mr. Beaumont in the following words, "Agreeable to the treaty of Mangalore I have delivered all that belonged to you. Now you write me requesting another fort of which I am ignorant even of the name." It appears very extraordinary that your Highness should say that you are ignorant even of the name of this place, when in the 9th article of the Treaty of Mangalore it is expressly mentioned in the following terms "The Nabob Tippoo Sultan Bahadur shall restore the factory and privileges possessed by the English at Callicut till the year 1779 or 1193 Hijera, and shall restore Mount Delhi and its districts belonging to the Settlement at Tellicherry and possessed by the English till taken by Sadar Caun at the commencement of the late War".

In obedience to the orders I have lately received from the Honourable the Governor at Bombay, I once more request your Highness will be pleased to give orders for the restoration of the said Mount Deli and its district to the Honourable Company which has hitherto been withheld in palpable violation of the Treaty of Mangalore.

Your Highness, I make no doubt, since your arrival in this neighbourhood must have seen the place I now request, but if you have not, and there should remain any doubt in your mind of the existence of such a place, I am to request your Highness will send a proper person or persons to me and I will demonstrate to him clearly where it is.

As I am convinced your Highness is very desirous of fulfilling the treaty of peace entered into between you and the Honourable Company, I have not the least doubt your Highness will comply with this my request. I hope frequently to hear of your Highness' health.

**No. 37A**—Tipu accuses the English of violation of the treaty and warns the Chief against addressing him in future.

FROM—TIPU SULTAN,

TO—THE CHIEF OF TELLICHERRY.

*23rd April 1789.*

The treaties formerly entered into between the Circar and the Honourable Company have been always observed and kept without any

difference until this time; but you have now lately broken the treaty made with the Company in the following instances.

First, you have taken Dharmapatam, a place belonging to the Circar.

Secondly, the Rajah of Coliote with his family and the family of the Rajah of Cherika; all these fled to Tellicherry with 20 lacs of rupees. You embarked all these on board a ship and sent them to the Ram Rajah's Country.

Thirdly, about 20,000 Nairs of the Circar's country with their families fled to Tellicherry. You let these people remain in your Settlement and by your advice they go out at night and rob in the Circar's districts.

I sent my people to advise that it was not proper for you to act contrary to the treaty of peace, to which you answered that you knew nothing at all of the treaty, that your superiors only knew what it was and now write me that you recollect something of the treaty, therefore I believe you are not a good man, but whether good or bad, what can I say? I have many lacs of people like you in my service, and so have the Company.

Whatever I have to say I shall say to your superiors and shall not have anything to say to you. From this time forward you must not write to me on any business; for if you do write me, I shall not send any answer. You must understand this.

*N.B.*—This letter was not signed by the Nabob, as have been the several received from him since he came into the Mallabar Country, though it was sealed with the usual seal.

**No. 38**—Hollond sends intelligence of alarm in Tellicherry on account of Tipu's contest with the Nairs.

FROM—JOHN HOLLOND,

TO—C. A. MALET.

*Fort St. George, 21st April 1789.*

By advices from the westward, we are informed that Tippoo Sultaun has been engaged in contests with the Nairs to whom his conduct has given great dissatisfaction. The religious enthusiasm he is inflamed with appears not unlikely to involve him in considerable contentions and difficulties and to excite civil commotions that may ultimately prove very detrimental to his affairs. In his late movements having advanced within a few miles of Tellicherry, the garrison of that fortress were under great alarms, but it does not appear that he committed any acts of hostility. Letters of the 1st April from Tellicherry mention that he was then at Tullejeeram, about fifteen miles north from Cannanore. They had not received any public advices for upwards of a month from Bombay, but were in daily expectations of the arrival of a reinforcement.

No troops have lately been landed at Pondicherry excepting a few, who joined from the other coast. Our advices speak of a regiment landed at Mauritius; but it seems uncertain whether it is meant they shall proceed to Pondicherry.

**No. 39**—The Factors at Tellicherry offer explanation on the charges brought by Tipu and communicate to Medows Tipu's design of blockading Tellicherry.

FROM—THE FACTORS OF TELLICHERRY,

TO—WILLIAM MEDOWS.

*Tellicherry, 25th April 1789.*

We have the honour to enclose copy of a letter addressed the Nabob by our Chief in conformity to your commands of the 1st and translate of the answer he returned thereto which we beg leave to submit to your consideration. As from the violent and intemperate language made use of by the Nabob, without at all alluding to the claim made of Mount Delly in the Chief's letter, we are led to conceive he means hereafter when the season or other matters may be more advantageous to lay the foundation of a quarrel on the pleas he urges without an idea of giving us the least present satisfaction for those we have advanced. In regard to what is alleged by the Nabob, the Chief begs leave to remark that in the first instance pointed out of taking Dharmapatam a place belonging to the Sircar, that it is almost needless to answer it—the terms on which the Honourable Company held it and his having instigated the Prince of Cherrioka his tributary forcibly to take possession of it on the 7th June 1788, as will appear on reference to the Chief's letter of the 8th being so well known, and particularly to your honor. The 2nd instance of having received or given assistance to the Gartunaddu, and Coliote with their families, the Chief positively denies having done so, not knowing of their ever being here or getting off from hence, until by private reports it was said they had fled thr' this place, that if such was the case he says it was totally without his knowledge.

The 3rd, of having 20,000 Nairs in the place, he also firmly denies, and can prove the repeated orders he has issued to prevent any being admitted, that there are some women, children, and artificers such as carpenters and weavers who have clandestinely got in, he believes, but as they were not fighting people, he did not think himself authorized to drive them out by force of arms, nor that the treaty required it. The Chief having answered that he knew nothing of the treaty must appear without foundation on reference to the different letters he has written to the Nabob, it having been the constant subject of them. It is true, the Chief did, in the conference with the people sent in by the Nabob when they talked of the treaty, say that he did not think he was at liberty to point out without

orders from his superiors, where it had been infringed upon or that he could in several instances, but that rested with them only to determine upon.

The Chief acquaints us that he has received information that the Nabob's people are repairing a battery on Bamboo hill and another opposite Cherrical Candy both within 500 yards of different parts of our lines so that it appears the Nabob means at the best to shut up every communication with this place. He has also received advice that some Christians belonging to this place as they were coming in a boat from Mahi were seized off Currichee by the Nabob's people, made Musselmen and detained. These matters we trust will appear to your Honor rather inimical.

On the 19th instant the letter for the Bibbie of Cannanore was delivered to her minister.

**No. 40—**Movement of Tipu's troops.

**FROM—C. W. MALET,**

**TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.**

*Poona, 3rd June 1789.*

Late advices from the southern frontier mention that troops are constantly defiling from Tippoo's northern garrisons towards Syringapatam; but this report may probably have arisen from a supposition of the necessity of such movements from the knowledge of the hostilities against the Nairs on the Coast, which are generally thought to include Ram Rajah and the Company; my last advices from Bombay give reason to think that Tippoo is returned to Syringapatam.

It is now some time since the whole Rasta family withdrew from hence to Wye, a family possession about 30 koss south of this place, on pretence of celebrating some nuptial ceremonies tho' discontent is by many thought to be the real cause; if so the relationship of that family to the Peshwah, its connexion with Pursaram the southern Jagirdar of this Empire, its avowed correspondence with Tippoo and its great wealth must be sources of uneasiness to the ministry.

**No. 41—**

**FROM—JOHN HOLLOND,**

**TO—C. W. MALET.**

*Fort St. George, 3rd June 1789.*

*PS.*—Tippoo Sultaun with a considerable force was long in the neighbourhood of Tellicherry and Travancore, which was the cause of great alarm; but he has at length moved off with his troops, and is gone to Coimbattoor on his return to Seringapatam.



**No. 42—Intelligence of Tipu's operations.**

FROM—L. A. YVON,

TO—THE CHIEF OF TELLICHERRY.

*Goa, 25th June 1789.*

By intelligence received from Syringaputtun the 6th inst. by one of my emissaries who left that capital the 14th ult., it appears that Tippoo intends to take up his winter quarters in the vicinity of Callicut on account of the yet frequent incursions of the Nairs of the Koorg country; with such disposition, it may be conjectured he will not remain entirely unoccupied during the whole course of the monsoons; frequent intelligence of the enemy's motions whilst encamped so near our settlement, is of the greatest importance to our Presidency as also of the troops under your command, which at this time is almost impossible for you to communicate by sea on account of the severity of the monsoons.

**No. 43—Malet reports his conversation with Nana Fadnis on the stipulation of assisting the Nizam with a quota of the Company's troops.**

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 26th June 1789.*

Pursuant to your Lordship's directions having demanded a conference of the Minister, the 12th was appointed, when I communicated to him the substance of your Lordship's negotiation with Nizam Ally's Vackeel, laying the stress which it deserved on the particular attention shewn to this Court in the reservation with which your Lordship had thought proper to qualify the execution of the eleventh article of the Treaty, 1768. Contrary, however, to my expectation, the Minister rather with an appearance of dissatisfaction asked if the renewal of this stipulation on the part of the E. I. Company was at the Nawaub's instance. I replied that he was equally well acquainted with myself with Meer Abul Cossim's embassy to Calcutta, and that the point in agitation between the States was the final and amicable settlement of ancient mutual stipulation. Perceiving that the Minister was under the influence of a jealousy of Nizam Ally's having any connexion or negotiation with your Lordship independent of this Court, without appearing to notice it I did not scruple to give them to understand that I was much disappointed by the coldness with which he had received so candid a communication of so voluntary and so supererogatory a proof of friendship, in doing which I particularly pointed out the attention of your Lordship in a case where this Court had no reason to expect it after fully explaining the unreserved state of

the original stipulation of aid and the alteration now made in it in favour of this State, and that the whole transaction was in fact the conclusion of a negotiation that preceded all the Nawaub's present engagements and connexions with this Court. The Minister, relaxing a little, assured me that he now perfectly understood my communication and attributed it to the motives on the part of the Governor-General to which I had ascribed it, but that as transactions of so great weight and so important in their consequences required mature deliberation, he would defer giving me his opinion for the present, but communicate it early by Behroo Punt. On a further consideration of the Minister's question, whether or no the conclusion of the stipulation for assisting him was at the Nawaub's instance, in addition to the conjecture that struck me at the time, of its proceeding from a jealousy of the Minister of the Nawaub's having any connexion with your Lordship's Government independent of this Court,—it occurs to me that some ground may have been given for it by the Nawaub's disclaiming to this Court his pursuit of any such object, in reply to the inquiries from hence relative to his negotiations.

On the 22nd instant I received a visit from Behro Punt, when, by command of the Minister, he communicating to me his satisfaction with the communication of your Lordship on the subject of your negotiations with Nizam Ally. Observing that as that Prince with the Bhonsla were included as allies of this State in the Treaty of Salbye in the same manner as Asophud-Dowla and Md. Ali on the part of the E. I. Company, he doubted not your Lordship would on all occasions keep that circumstance in remembrance. Observing that Behro Punt had omitted mentioning Tippoo as one of the allies of this State on the same footing as Nizam Ally and the Bhosla, I cursorily reminded him of it, the propriety of which he acknowledged, alleging that the omission was merely through inadvertence. I was led to this observation by considering that, however liberal your Lordship's construction may be of this part of the Treaty, yet in the event of the occurrence of the predicament to which it relates, it may not be inexpedient to reserve it as ground of a liberal relaxation, rather than to suffer this Court to object at pleasure to the performance of its engagements on the weighty obligation (? objection) of being relieved from them. Behro Punt was particular in his enquiries of the situation in which the force was to be held demandable by the Nawaub, whether optional for constant residence or for offence or defence; to which I replied that though your Lordship's desire to evince your friendship for this Court had induced your communication of this part of the present negotiation previous to definitive settlement, yet from what I could collect it was meant to be in force only defensively.

In my last conference with the Minister, I mentioned to him the return of Tippoo's Ambassadors to Pondicherry. He remarked that the intelligence had also reached him, with this difference that one had remained in France, and with the additional information of a large force having

arrived at Mauritius, where it was to remain till occasion offered for its employment in India. The Minister expressed a curiosity to know the issue of these Ambassadors' negotiations in France, which I was unable to gratify, though I thought it allowable to venture my conjecture that nothing of importance can have been concluded in the present distracted state of the French affairs.

**No. 44**—Cornwallis elucidates ambiguous articles of the treaty of 1768 with the Nizam with a view to their definition and assures the Nizam of the Company's firm friendship towards him.

FROM—CORNWALLIS G. G.

TO—THE NIZAM.

*Fort William, 7th July 1789.*

Your Highness' letter containing strong expressions of friendship was presented to me by Meer Abul Cossim, and has afforded me the most inexpressable satisfaction. I have perfectly understood all the matters intrusted to the verbal communication of Meer Abul Cossim; and the sincere and friendly sentiments which I have discovered your Highness to be impressed with towards me, have induced me to show the confidence I place in Your Highness' declaration, by candid and explicit conversations with Meer Abul Cossim on subjects of the highest importance, and as they all of them have a tendency to strengthen and increase our friendship, I shall communicate without reserve to your Highness what has occurred to me relative to them. It was with no small concern I found on my arrival in charge of the control of all the Company's affairs that one of the eventual and more essential points of the treaty of friendship and alliance made in 1768 between your Highness and the Company remained unexecuted on both sides, viz. the surrender of the Guntoor Circar to the Company, and the regular discharge of your Highness' demand for the peshcush from the Company. Anxious notwithstanding that by urging the due performance of this article, I should not intrude on your Highness while engaged in pursuits of importance I postponed all negotiations on the subject until I was convinced that your Highness, uninterrupted by war, had full leisure to consider the propriety of the performance of this article of the treaty and until you might have had sufficient opportunity to put implicit confidence in my assurances for the punctual discharge of the peshcush for the Northern Sirkars. I then deputed Captain Kennaway to your Highness' Court with instructions to make the demand of the Guntoor Circar by virtue of the treaty of 1768; to assure your Highness of my firm intention to discharge the balances upon fair statement due to your Highness on account of the peshcush, and to impress you with the sincerity of my intentions for its regular payment thereafter. I have already expressed my satisfaction at your Highness' immediate compliance to deliver up the Guntoor Circar

to the Company, and have assured your Highness of my firm intention to persevere in a strict system of faith to engagements; and now with such a proof of the security of your Highness' friendship and good faith, I have from a desire to testify to your Highness that I am impressed with similar sentiments, entered into a full discussion of every article with Meer Abul Cossim in order that such parts of it as are undefined and bear an obscure and doubtful meaning, may be so explained as shall preclude every necessity of future discussion; remove all grounds of misunderstanding, and give stability and permanency to that friendship which now subsists between us. In adopting this rule of conduct I do no more than fulfil the intention of the King of England and the British Nation, who by the system lately established for the government of this country, had in view the important end of giving efficacy to the existing treaties between the English and the Powers of Hindostan and of securing a due performance thereof in future. This communication, I am persuaded, will fully satisfy your Highness of the propriety of my declining the proposal of Meer Abul Cossim for entering into a new security for the discharge of the peshcush by mortgaging a portion of the Sirkars; considering as I do, the faith of the English nation to be already pledged for the due payment of it. In proof of the sincerity of my intentions that the treaty should be carried into full effect, I agree that in the 6th article of the treaty, the words "whenever the situation of affairs will allow of such a body of troops to march into the Deccan" shall be understood to mean, that the force engaged for by this article, viz. 2 battalions of sepoys and 6 pieces of cannon manned by Europeans, shall be granted whenever your Highness shall apply for it; making only one exception, that it is not to be employed against any Power in alliance with the Company, viz. Pundit Purdhaun, Madajee Scindia and other Mahratta Chiefs, Peshwa, Ragojee Bhosla, the Nawaub of Arcot and Nawaub Vizier, Rajahs of Tanjore and Travancore. That the battalions, at present not defined in number, shall not consist of less than 800 men each, that the six field pieces shall be manned with the number of Europeans which is usual in time of war; that the expense to be charged to your Highness shall be no more than the exact sum which it costs the Company to maintain a body of that force when employed on service in the field and that this expense be as per separate account; that this detachment shall march within two months, or sooner if possible, after it is demanded, and your Highness shall be charged with the expense of it from the day it enters your Highness' territories until it quits them on its return to the Company's, with the addition of one month at the average calculation of the whole amount, in order to defray the charges the Company must necessarily incur to put such a force in a state fit for service. I have not fully discussed the articles of the treaty that relate to the Nawaub of Arcot and the Carnatic on the representation of Meer Abul Cossim, that a mere reference to the articles themselves will inform

your Highness of the full force of my argument ; and although the long existing friendship between that Nawaub and the Company might be urged as further ground for declining the proposal of Meer Abul Cossim, his right to the possession of the Carnatic Payen Ghaut is fully established and admitted by the 7th and 8th articles and papers appertaining to them, there can therefore be no necessity for troubling your Highness with other reasons. In regard to the articles relative to the Dewanny of the Carnatic Ballaghaut, your Highness must be well convinced that circumstances have totally prevented the execution of the articles, and the Company are in the full enjoyment of peace with all the world ; but should it hereafter happen that the Company should obtain possession of the country mentioned in these articles with your Highness' assistance, they will strictly perform the stipulations in favour of your Highness and the Mahrattas. Your Highness must be well assured that while treaties of peace and friendship exist with any Chief, negotiations that tend to deprive the Chief of any part of his possessions unprovoked on his part, must naturally create suspicions in his mind unfavourable to the reputation of your Highness, and to the character of the Company, since the only grounds on which such negotiations could be carried on rest on a treaty existing upwards of 20 years, the execution of which is yet unclaimed, and since no provocation has hitherto been made to justify a breach in the present peaceable and amicable understanding between each other. As I am at all times desirous that such circumstances as carry with them impediment and hindrance to good order and government without bearing the smallest advantage to either side, should be so changed as to produce the good effects expected from treaties, and as the affairs of both parties might suffer great injury from being excluded from corresponding with other powers of the Deccan, I agree that in future either party, without a breach of treaty, shall be at liberty to receive and send Vakeels and correspond with any powers in the Deccan, in such manner as may be expedient for the benefit of their own affairs ; under the condition that the object of such intercourse or correspondence be not hostile to either of the governments. I have in many instances, as well thro' Captain Kennaway as thro Meer Abul Cossim, and in the first part of this letter, declared my firm intention to execute the treaty of 1768, and to live in perpetual amity and friendship with your Highness ; and your Highness will be convinced from the explanations I have given to those articles in the treaty of ambiguous and obscure meaning, that I am earnestly desirous of the adjustment of every matter on grounds fair and liberal. But it is necessary, in consideration of the subjects of conversation with Meer Abul Cossim, that I should point out to your Highness that unless just cause should be given for entering into new treaties, the laws of my country, the injunctions of the King and Company of England, as well as the faith

and honour of the English prohibit me from entering into any negotiation to make new treaties, and I have confined my conferences with Meer Abul Cossim to the explanation of that made in 1768, with a view to a more perfect execution of it. On this account I have not judged proper to comply with such requests as have been made by Meer Abul Cossim that in any shape tend to alter the spirit of that treaty. A further argument to impress your Highness with the propriety of this determination is the sanction and support of His Majesty and the Company of England to those measures that coincide with their instructions. I have mentioned this circumstance merely to assure your Highness of the strength of my assertions and the value of my engagements in regard to the Gunttoor Circar and the other articles of the treaty; and I trust that this clear explanation of the ambiguous articles of the treaty will render it effectual, and will afford your Highness a convincing proof of the Company's determination to adhere to the faith of it. Although I have not agreed to enter into a new treaty with your Highness thro' Meer Abul Cossim for the reasons above assigned, yet your Highness, in consideration of the authority vested in me by the King and Parliament of England, will consider my letter, though merely purporting a clear explanation of the several articles in the treaty of 1768, strong and efficient upon the English Governments in India, equally so as a treaty in due form could be, since the members of the Council have given their cheerful acquiescence to its contents. For further particulars of my sentiments I beg leave to refer your Highness to Meer Abul Cossim whom I have considered during this negotiation as faithfully attached to your Highness; fully acquainted with your Highness' interests, and your most confidential servant, empowered to settle any agreement for the mutual benefit of the two Governments. I have accordingly communicated to him without reserve, all that has occurred to me on the subject of the elucidation of the treaty of 1768, in the same manner as if your Highness were present. Nevertheless as your Highness' concurrence and appropriation are necessary to give a final sanction to the articles discussed, I have thought proper to mention them in this letter. For the rest, your Highness may have the most assured confidence that I will most faithfully abide by all the engagements I have entered into on the part of the Company.

**No. 45**—Intelligence of the return of Tipu's ambassadors from France.

FROM—JOHN HOLLOND,

TO—C. W. MALET.

*Fort St. George, 22nd July 1789.*

Tippoo's ambassadors returned on the Thetis Frigate, Captain Macnamara, who intended to have landed them at Mahe, but the ship having lost her passage, as I was informed by General Conway, brought

them to Pondicherry. At the request of General Conway they were permitted to proceed by land, and I have the pleasure of inclosing you a list of their suite. The General treated them at Pondicherry with great neglect in resentment of the insult offered by Tippoo to the French flag at Mahe. They had an honourable reception in France, but it does not appear that the object and success of their mission, has answered their expectations, nor do I understand that any of the ambassadors remained at Paris. One of them died on the expedition.

**No. 46**—Intelligence of the blockade of Tellicherry is not credited by Medows.

FROM—WILLIAM MEDOWS,

TO—C. W. MALET.

*Bombay Castle, 1st August 1789.*

We conceive it to be very probable that Tippoo has by intimidation incited the petty Rajahs in the neighbourhood of Tellicherry to surround the district and obstruct every communication from without, but we rather think your correspondent has been misinformed in the circumstance of that Prince's troops having surrounded the settlement and we should presume that Lord Cornwallis ere this will have expressed to Tippoo his displeasure at his extraordinary conduct towards the Chief of Tellicherry before the rains. We shall however avail ourselves of the intelligence you have communicated and shall in a few days dispatch a cruizer to Tellicherry with provisions in case the garrison or inhabitants should have been put to straits.

**No. 47**—The demand for the surrender of Gantur sarkar is considered inexpedient at the moment,

FROM—THE CALCUTTA COUNCIL,

TO—C. W. MALET.

*Fort William, 15th August 1787.*

You were informed by our letter of 25th April last that we had it in contemplation to claim from the Nabob Nizam Ally Khan the surrender of the Guntur Circar to which the Company have a clear right by the treaty concluded with his Highness in the year one thousand seven hundred and sixty-eight.

Since the date of our advices above mentioned we have naturally weighed the subject in general with its probable advantages and evil consequences, and it is our final opinion that neither the present political

state of India nor the affairs of the Company render it advisable to make a round immediate demand of its surrender from the Nizam. We have therefore determined that the claim shall, for the present, be suspended and that no negotiation shall be now commenced with Nizam Ally Khan on this subject.

**No. 48**—Yvon reports escape of his spies arrested near Mahe.

FROM—L. A. YVON,

TO—THE CHIEF OF TELLICHERY.

*Belgaum, 3rd September 1789.*

Seeing that my people have not succeeded in reaching your settlement by land from the impossibility of passing the enemy's chokies, I have taken this expedient to forward you this with a letter enclosed from Mr. Malet. The 7th ult. one of my men returned from the enemy's camp with the following intelligence that the body of the army was in their winter quarters at Coimbatore, less at Callicut and the rest dispersed in strong detachments in different posts in the Koorg Country, the whole computed to be one hundred thousand. This notice was very acceptable as some time before a report was circulated at Goa that Tippoo had actually invested Tellicherry. The bearers of my first dispatch were taken about the 24th July within sight of Mahe, from whence they were conducted to the Chief of Mangalore who immediately sent them off to Bednoor. Here they were punished and the next day the Governor dispatched them to Syringputtun. The guard on the road not thinking that their prisoners in such a miserable situation would be able to escape, neglected them and gave them the opportunity to unloose their cords, effect their flight and arrive here the 20th ult. It was however with great satisfaction I found they had been close enough to bring certain notice that everything remained quiet in that quarter, which gives reason to conclude that the enemy had no intentions to move during the rains.

**No. 49**—Hollond reports the military preparations of Tipu in Coimbatore and on the border of the Carnatic.

FROM—JOHN HOLLOND,

TO—C. W. MALET.

*Fort St. George, 7th September 1789.*

Affairs in France by the last advice appear to have been still in a very unsettled state. It is to be hoped, therefore, they will not have time to think of disturbing us in India, and it is certain that from the embarkation



of troops at Pondicherry to be returned to the Islands, there is every reason to suppose that their views in regard to Great Britain are pacific.

The preparations said to have been made by Tippoo Sultaun in the Coimbatore country and in the boundaries of the Carnatic, is a subject of alarm, and it appears by the extract of a letter from Major Dow, that Tellicherry is in effect blockaded, every caution being used to prevent its being supplied with provisions. There has yet however been no act of hostility, nor can I suppose Tippoo has any serious intentions of engaging in contest with our Government. No advices have yet been received from the Government of Bombay complaining of his conduct.

**No. 50**—Tipu's conciliatory attitude towards the Nairs.

FROM—BOMBAY COUNCIL,

TO—C. W. MALET.

*Bombay Castle, 23rd September 1789.*

The opening season brought us advices from Tellicherry but of no interesting nature. The garrison there had remained unmolested though incommoded by reason of the severity with which Tippoo's orders prohibiting provisions being brought into the districts had been enforced. It should appear that that designing Prince had held out offers to the fugitive Nairs to return and resettle with their families under promises of their not being further persecuted, and that some have availed themselves of his advances thereby sealing, as we fear, the sentence for their own destruction.

**No. 51**—Intelligence of Tipu's mounting the throne of silver and the marriage of his son.

FROM—L. A. YVON,

TO—C. W. MALET.

*31st December 1789.*

This is the sixth day since I received intelligence from Coimbatore, and now thirty two days since my man left that place. I delayed forwarding it to you till I got the enclosed paper ready, and that I might at the same time give you further intelligence from Malwan and Colapoor, which I received yesterday.

When my man left Coimbatore, Tippoo was encamped at Avlinoor or Aulabilla (16 coss n.e. of Tellicherry) part of Ally Rajah's Country, with 60,000 regular infantry, 40,000 piadas, upwards of 100 pieces of cannon, and about 2,000 horse. He has been inactive all this time, and to all appearance he will remain so this season, as the common report is that he is to return to Syringputton some time this moon, in order to mount his new throne of silver, and afterwards marry his son to the daughter of Bullia Bibby, widow of the late Ally Rajah, at the celebration of which marriage 40,000 captives, unhappy families of the Koorg country and other parts on the Mallabar Coast, are to be circumcised. Besides the troops above mentioned, several strong detachments are posted in different parts in that quarter, as in Callicut, the Koorg country, etc. It is also reported that Tippoo will leave a considerable body of Troops in that quarter, and that he has now 7,000 Commatties employed in cutting the woods in the Koorg and other parts.

**No. 52**—Powney communicates Tipu's demands on the Raja of Travancore and the latter's reply to those demands.

FROM—GEORGE POWNEY,

TO—MAJOR ALEXANDER DOW.

*Parour, 20th December 1789.*

Tippoo's Vackeel has had an interview with the Rajah of Travancore. His demands are that the troops which the Rajah has in Cranganore to be withdrawn, that the Malabar Rajahs who have had protection in this country, some of them more than twenty years, to be given up to him, that the Rajah's Lines which are erected on the Cochin country to be demolished, that unless these demands are complied with, he will bring his army against him. The Rajah has replied to the letter to the following effect that he never adopted any measure without the concurrence and advice of the English Government, that therefore before he could come to any ultimate decision on the subject of his demands, he must hear from the Government at Madras to whom he had made a reference of the whole business—the lines which he says are on the Cochin country have been erected more than 25 years; at that period it was made over to the Travancore Rajah by the Cochin Rajah in return for an assistance of troops which he gave to him to repel the Zamorin, who had possessed himself of the greatest part of the Cochin country. This happened long before the Cochin Rajah had become tributary to Tippoo. These Lines were erected at the time and possessed, as they are now by the Travancore Rajah, at the time the treaty of peace was concluded between the English and Tippoo,

so that if he had any claims he ought to have made them then. It would appear from his present operations that he intends to support his demands by force. His army is now within 10 miles of the Lines, and he is there himself with an advanced part consisting of 4,000 men with 10 guns within 4 miles of them, and he is plundering and spreading desolation within sight of them. We expect every hour to hear they are attacked.

**No. 53**—Powney reports the encampment of Tipu's forces in the close vicinity of the lines and the sending of an embassy to the Raja of Travancore.

FROM—GEORGE POWNEY,

TO—MAJOR ALEXANDER DOW.

*Parour, 24th December 1789.*

I wrote you a few days ago, and acquainted you of the approach of Tippoo's army. It becomes now difficult to procure intelligence from his camp. I had a hircarrah in last night, who said he left him at Cantoor about 10 miles from the lines. An officer who was at Vedyacottah yesterday evening out of the gateways on the lines has just acquainted me that he saw tents pitched about two or three miles from that place, but he could not distinguish so as to form any idea of the extent of the encampment. Several of his rocket men and about 50 horse came within musquet shot where he was; there they appeared to be reconnoitring; for after having stayed a short time they went off again. It is impossible to penetrate his designs; he is a most unaccountable fellow, as the Rajah has just told me that he is sending another embassy, both himself and the Rajah of Cochin, that two elephants with howdahs were to accompany the ambassadors which he intended for the two Rajahs to convey them to him. This, of course, you may imagine has hurt the pride of our old Rajah. A hircarrah who brought a letter from Tippoo to the Cochin Rajah yesterday told him of this circumstances. I really believe he means to do some act to insult the Rajah of Travancore and provoke him to commence hostilities, but the old man is aware of his designs and will command himself as much as possible. About 100 rocket men were intended to accompany the ambassadors, but they will not be allowed to come into the Lines. As Tippoo made some demands of country here about, it is concluded they were meant to attempt to collect the revenues of it, and if any resistance was made on the part of the Rajah, he would consider it as commencements of hostilities.

**No. 54**—Tipu opens batteries on the lines.

FROM—GEORGE POWNEY,

TO—MAJOR ALEXANDER DOW.

*Parour, 29th December 1789.*

*Received in Bombay, 14th January 7 p.m.*

“Tippoo has this morning opened three Batteries against the Rajah's Lines. I am afraid they will soon be carried. We must do the best we can with our small detachment, but unsupported it cannot be expected we can do much. Pray forward this intelligence to General Medows.”

**No. 55**—Report of attack on the lines, repulse of Tipu's troops, but many Madras Sepoys wounded.

The information of Hadjee Mahomed, super-cargo of an Arab ship named the Fatta Rahmanee.

He brings intelligence that about eight days ago he was at Cochin and heard a continued firing for some hours, that he was informed it was occasioned by the Nabob's people attacking the Travancore lines near Cranganore—that he was further informed the Nabob's people some days before had been gradually approaching the Travancore Lines, and when asked their business there and whether they had any orders from the Nabob to fight, answered that they had received no orders to fight but that the ground they were upon belonged to the Nabob and they were determined not to quit it, that they, the Travancore people, might if they pleased remove their fortifications, guns, ammunition, etc., and take themselves away from the Nabob's territory which they pretended to claim to a considerable extent—that upon the Nabob's people advancing very near a general conflict began which ended in the discomfiture of the Nabob's people who lost a considerable number of men, and as he, Hadjee Mahomed Ally, understood, three field pieces and that they had retired to a little distance, that sometime after the firing ceased, an officer came into Cochin with about 17 wounded Madras Sepoys, that he saw the officer himself at the house of Captain McNicol and from the description of some peculiar appearance about his left eye, Sir Francis Gordon knew it to be a Lieutenant Sober of the Madras Establishment. He likewise adds that the Nabob had marched large bodies of men to the southward, some of which he saw on his way up from Cochin.

**No. 56**—An account of the attack on the Lines and the fighting that ensued.

FROM—RAJA OF TRAVANCORE,

TO—HUTCHINSON.

*2nd January 1790.*

On the 29th December, the troops of Tippoo Sultaun consisting of horse and foot about 15,000 appeared in front of my fort, commencing an attack, and 3,000 of them entered my fort. My people opposed them, and a battle ensued, when some of them were killed, others wounded, and the remainder fled. My people are now strongly entrenched. Should any other news occur hereafter, the Resident shall be instantly advised thereof.

(Signed) Sree Palpanaven.

**No. 57**—Powney reports the renewed preparation on the part of Tipu and the necessity for repelling his aggression.

FROM—GEORGE POWNEY,

TO—MAJOR ALEXANDER DOW.

*Parour, 7th January 1790.*

There have not been any occurrences here since my last to you. Tippoo's present state of inactivity can only be accounted for by giving credit to the accounts given by the prisoners that he came ill provided with guns and men, imagining the conquest of the Raja's Lines an easy matter. He has most undoubtedly met with an unexpected and considerable check. The Raja's troops from every account behaved as gallantly as his people must have behaved otherwise. It is said Lally has joined him, we therefore expect to hear of another attempt on the Lines; the report is that Lally is to distract the attention of the troops here by an attack on Cranganore or Iacotta, whilst Tippoo with his main force is to come against the Lines. Every preparation is made to resist him, and I think he will meet with much greater opposition than he is aware of. I most sincerely concur in the sentiments expressed in Major Sydenham's letter, and I shall lament if our Government suffers this unprovoked act of the sanguinary tyrant to pass with impunity, and to be numbered with the repeated insults we have received from him without calling him to a severe account. An adherence to treaties appears to be the predominant feature in our present political line, I trust there will not be a deviation from it in the present instance, for the Raja of Travancore is guaranteed in his possessions by the treaty of peace with Tippoo, and we are bound to resent every attempt that may be made to dispossess him. You shall hear from me as soon as I have the Madras Board's determination on this affair.

## SECTION 2.

### *Formation of the Triple Alliance, 1790.*

**No. 58**—Malet reports his conversation with Bahiro on the subject of a defensive engagement with the Nizam.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 22nd January 1790.*

At the meeting I observed a particular curiosity in Bahiro Punt on the subject of our engagement to furnish Nizam Ali Khan with troops and he seemed to dwell particularly on its extent to any service offensive or defensive for which the Nabob might demand them excepting against the Marrattas or our allies. From his solicitude on the point and from what dropped from him in the course of our conversation that the Nabob had made proposals to this State for entering into hostilities against Tipu, there appears some ground for supposing that both he and this State may think our engagement gives the Nabob a title to call on us for the stipulated quota should he singly or jointly with this State think proper to attack Tippoo, which I do not understand to be the spirit of Your Lordship's intention. At the meeting I also collected that this State has received intelligence of some hostilities between our troops and Tipu's, the truth of which he expressed his solicitude to ascertain, while I endeavoured to direct his anxiety to the acquisition of some indication of the disposition of this Court in that event and though I certainly perceived that there is great good-will on the part of this Government to take advantage of any embarrassment of the affairs of Tippoo, yet it is accompanied with that kind of reserve which betrays a resolution to draw as much benefit as possible from us in pursuit of the gratification of their own designs.

**No. 59—Intelligence of fighting on Tipu's northern frontiers.****A LETTER TO MALET.***22nd January 1790.*

The discontented Zemindars of Kittoor, with the troops under the orders of Rallapah, assembled the 15th instant in the neighbourhood of Saumungur and Chickoory in number about 2,000 horses (chiefly Pindarries) and upwards of 1,000 irregular infantry, with a design to enter Tippoo's frontier. Numbers were flocking to them from all quarters, whilst Rallapah himself was waiting at the Kishna for more troops to join him. In consequence however of an order from Pursaram Bhow to disperse and recross the Kishna, the camp broke up the 18th. This sudden and unexpected change is very extraordinary, particularly, as the movement did not take place without the permission of Government, for about the 10th Pursaram Bhaou had a long conference with Rallapah at the Kishna, and after settling the affair with him, returned to Tasgaum; since which it appears that he has received orders from Government to stop the proceeding till further orders. The town of Deysnor (the capital of Kittoor, 5 coss eastward of Belgaum, the upper fort of which Bader-al Zaman Khan demolished two years ago) having previously agreed with Rallapah to surrender as soon as his forces were assembled on this side of the Kishna, the inhabitants on the 17th took up arms and delivered the place to his agent, who had only a small party of horse and foot with him, and the same day plundered a small town adjacent thereto called Nysery. Tippoo's subadar escaped the same night, but the town havildar was wounded and made prisoner. There was Rallapah's success by the assembling only of his troops, though about 16 coss distant from the enemy's frontier. The 20th, a detachment of near 1,000 men of the enemy retook the above place, after part of its inhabitants had fled, but many of the rest were killed and wounded. Jamboolicar also began in his quarter, and sent out his people, under the name of Rallapah's parties, who brought in a great number of cattle and other plunder. But the Chief of Connappoor (between 4 and 5 coss south-west of Belgaum and close to the bounds of Jambooleem) in return yesterday plundered two of his towns. Should Tippoo's forces on this side of the Tumbudra, which if assembled may amount to between 8 and 9,000 men, offer to make the least encroachment on this quarter, I really believe Rallapah would be able to defeat them, were he allowed to proceed.

**No. 60—Cornwallis communicates certain directions to Malet on the subject of securing the co-operation of the Mahrattas in the war against Tipu.**

**FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,**

**TO—C. W. MALET.**

*Fort William, 27th January 1790.*

You will probably know before this letter can reach you, that Tippoo has committed actual hostilities against our ally the Rajah of Travancore,

which being considered by this Government as equal to a declaration of war against the Company, the most vigorous measures will be taken immediately to exact the most ample reparation from him for so flagrant and unprovoked a breach of the late treaty of peace.

The letters that I wrote to you when a rupture with Tippoo was expected on a former occasion, contain sufficient instructions for your general guidance in making advances and propositions to the Poona Ministers, and I desire that you will now demand an immediate audience of Nanna to notify to him that Tippoo has broke the treaty of peace with the Company, and to incite him to embrace this favourable opportunity to revenge the injuries that the Mahrattas have suffered from Tippoo and his father by engaging heartily and vigorously with us in carrying on the war against him.

It is unnecessary to explain to you that the co-operation of the Marrattas in this contest would be of the greatest importance to our interests, but I know that supplication or a statement of our own difficulties would not be the most effectual mode of obtaining it.

You will therefore at the time that you make the above communication to Nanna convey to him likewise that we have no doubt of our own strength being sufficient to bring the war to an honorable issue, but that if the burthen of it shall be left entirely upon ourselves, we shall probably not think it incumbent upon us in the course of future negotiations to attend to the interests of those of our friends who have contented themselves with looking on a scene, in which the future peace and tranquility of India was so materially implicated with indifference. On the other hand you may inform him that if the Marrattas will determine to make an immediate declaration against Tippoo we will engage to procure for them a full participation of the advantages that may be obtained by the war, and being now set at liberty by Tippoo's breach of the treaty we will further agree to contract a defensive alliance with them for the mutual guarantee of the territories of which we may be respectively possessed at its conclusion. And should the Peshwah's Government resolve to listen to your proposition you are empowered to enter into engagements to the above effect.

I shall rely upon your prudence and zeal, as well as upon your knowledge of the temper of the Court at which you reside for recommending the adoption of the proposition that I have mentioned with judicious arguments, and should your endeavours succeed, I shall only add at present that it is my wish that the Marrattas would agree to act on their side without the junction of our troops, because the Government of Bombay will be instructed to attack Tippoo's possessions on the coast of Malabar and also because the Marratta armies being principally composed of cavalry, there might be some risk that a small body of our infantry and artillery would, in case of their meeting with a check be abandoned by them and lost.



If however you should be of opinion that they will not be induced to take an active part unless a detachment of our troops is sent to join their army, we must if possible indulge them.

Captain Kennaway has instructions to make a similar proposal of co-operation to the Nizam, and Major Palmer has been directed to endeavour to persuade Sindea and Holkar to use their utmost influence at Poona to effect a close connexion between us and the Marratta State.

As it is the intention of this Government that I should proceed to Madras immediately to take the direction of the civil and military affairs at that Presidency, you will write your dispatches in duplicate, directing one copy to the Governor General in Council, Fort William, and the other to me under cover to the Secretary of the Government at Fort St. George.

You will communicate freely with General Medows on every point of which it may be material that he should have information, and you will likewise correspond with the Madras Government, Captain Kennaway and Major Palmer.

Should you think that the service at this important time will be promoted by your going to Bombay to confer personally with the Governor at that Presidency and that you can be absent from your station for three or four days without material inconvenience to the duties of it, you have my permission to use your discretion in this respect.

**No. 61**—In this long letter Malet submits his opinions on the advantages and disadvantages of the two modes of conducting the war with Tipu, either singly or jointly with the assistance of the Mahrattas, and recommends for the consideration of the G. G. another plan of operations by combining the Portuguese, the Dutch and the Malabar Rajas under the English banner.

FROM—C. W. MALET,  
TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 29th January 1790.*

Under the sanction of your Lordships' permission to trouble you on subjects of a political nature connected with the interests of your Government, I have been induced to collect a few ideas arising from a view of the expected crisis of hostilities with Tippoo and if in submitting them to your Lordship's consideration by this opportunity, I have been betrayed into haste or failed in perspicuity I shall rely on your Lordship's candor to impute it to my anxiety to keep pace with the emergency and to a conviction that if one useful hint should reach your Lordship during the season of deliberation, it will be more acceptable than more studied compositions after your resolutions have been formed and your arrangements regulated. Without further preface or apology I shall come to the point.

I presume the existence of two obvious cases in which Tippoo may enter into a war with the British Government in India. One singly, the other in conjunction with France. Two modes equally obvious present

themselves of opposing his hostilities ; one with our own force and that of our allies, the Raja of Travancore, the Nawab of Carnatic and the Vizeer. The other in conjunction with this State which from its interests and declarations I deem acquirable though the means are at present unascertainable—and as to the probability of Nizam Ally Khan's accession to similar engagements Your Lordship's judgment will be regulated from other quarters.

Other modes less obvious but which appear in my opinion entitled to some notice present themselves in a combination with the Portuguese through Goa, the Dutch through Cochin, the Raja of Pannella through Malwan or Vengurla and with all the Mallabar Rajas separately or unitedly within the reach of our negotiations.

If Tippo attacks us singly, so highly do I think of our Power happily as it is now governed, that it becomes with me doubtful whether we should feel the influence of necessity to solicit the aid of this Government, and still more so how far any sacrifices would be expedient to effect an acquisition subject to previous difficulties and pregnant with subsequent embarrassments—some of which I shall endeavour to enumerate—1st, the probability of a controversial negotiation to gain their assistance for which they will endeavour to make us pay dear, though their advantages would be unquestionable ; 2nd, the probability that the connexion would produce the march of a body of our forces to act with a Marratta army the difficulties and inconveniences of which are numerous ; 3rd, the embarrassment that would attend the conclusion of hostilities implicated with the undefinable claims and boundless views of this Government ; 4th, the danger of too great an extension of its power no less to be apprehended perhaps than that of the present object of our attention ; 5th, the still greater danger of the connexion ultimately involving us in general defensive engagements with this Government which has hitherto been avoided by your Lordship. This danger would arise from the difficulty that would occur at the conclusion of a war in which it has assisted us to refuse stipulating for its safety in a similar case, whence would spring the seeds of a new war whenever it might suit this Government to force Tipu by its undefined claims and pretensions to commence one—6th the disadvantage of withdrawing by a junction with the Marratta army above the ghauts where every foot of success would approximate the Marrattas to our frontier, our efforts on the coast of Malabar where an impression might be made more beneficial in its consequences to the Co's affairs and by which Tippo's future intercourse with the French might be straitened.

In addition to the above arguments against submitting to any sacrifice in pursuit of this Court's coalition, it may be expected that on the appearance of our negligence to acquire it and on a prospect of our independent successes in the low country, it would not, though we rejected its terms, neglect so fine an opportunity of attempting the recovery of the large

dismemberment that have been made by Tippu and his father, and which it seems preferable for us that they should attempt alone than joined by our force as their diversion will be highly conducive to the success of our separate efforts, the less likely to make such an impression as would be formidable to us than if joined by our forces whereas in the event of a peace we should be relieved from entanglement of interests that would inevitably perplex its conclusion and future preservation.

On the other hand it may be objected that finding us slight its aid this Court may offer it to Tippu ; to which I reply that such an offer would be accompanied with so high demands, the effect of it against us would be so doubtful and to him so ruinous, that I am inclined to think the alternative of enabling himself to carry on the war with such ruinous aid or of drawing on himself a new enemy by refusing it, would be more likely to produce a peace with us than any other consequence and even admitting his accession to their terms and admission of their force, I think it very probable that the event would prove more immediately destructive to him than to us, tho' it must be confessed that this presumption establishes that predominance of their power which I think so much to be apprehended and its accompaniment with no checks of delicacy or friendship toward us.

Having said this much on the subject of opposing Tippoo's single efforts, with or without the assistance of this Government I shall proceed to the more dangerous supposition of his attacking us jointly with the French, a predicament that would subject the above idea of assailing him on the coast of Mallabar to great difficulty even though the invasion were protected by the superiority of our naval force. Whereas in the event of the French forces not having previously joined Tippoo, the equipment of such a force from Bombay as would be requisite (even with advantage of a powerful diversion on the side of the Carnatic) to act with effect on the Coast would expose that Presidency and the opulent city of Surat to imminent danger.

In the event, therefore, of a junction of the French with Tippoo by which the force of Bombay would have very little prospect of acting with any great advantage on the coast of Mallabar, the assistance of this Government seems a desirable object since by the junction of a less body of forces from B'bay than would be requisite to invade Tippoo's low country, this Govert. might be stimulated to enter into the war and a Marratta army enabled to make such an impression on the enemy's frontier as would greatly weaken his offensive or defensive efforts against the Madras army in any other quarter, but to prevent by so doing the weakening of B'bay to such a degree as to expose it to any designs of the French it probably be thought expedient to raise an additional force for the emergency or to withdraw the present garrisons of Tellicherry and Surat the remote and dangerous situation of the first of which places expose

it to imminent danger. While the Nabob of Surat whose safety is at stake might provide funds for raising under the direction of the Government of Bombay an equal force to that now kept up for the defence of the latter. Under such an arrangement by land, the presence and superiority of the squadron would combine the whole and should it be thought proper to make any serious or desultory attempts with it on Tippoo's Mallabar Coast, I think it probable that they might be productive of advantage and honor to the allies and of embarrassment to the enemy fully employed in opposing the whole force of the Carnatic on his southern and of Bombay and the Marrattas on his northern frontier.

If however, on a joint attack of the French and Tippoo the acquisition of the aid of this Government should be found impracticable, I presume the whole weight of the war (as in the last) would fall on the Carnatic in which event the strengthening of the Madras army becomes the grand object of consideration, the disposal of the garrison of Tellicherry a secondary one whether to withdraw and strengthen with it the grand army in the Carnatic, to remand it to its own Presidency of Bombay or to leave it with or without reinforcement in the dangerous station that it now occupies. While with respect to what I have mentioned relative to Surat I presume that the accession of that force would at all events be looked on as a very desirable reinforcement to the strength of Bombay, which being kept ready and collected at that place might when the scene of the French efforts is decidedly ascertained be used as occasion should dictate either in the defence of that Presidency or aid the squadron in making an impression on Tippoo's,—though in undertaking such an enterprize great care seems requisite in previously ascertaining the state of the French force at the Islands even though they had a large body with Tippoo as the employment of such a body might not preclude their having troops ready at Mauritius to take advantage of any security into which B'bay might be lulled, to make an attempt on that important place the acquisition of which would be of infinite advantage to that restless nation in its rivalry to the British Power by enabling it to treat with equal advantage with Tippoo and the Marrattas and with equal facility to gain the friendship by the liberality with which it would supply either with men and military stores to annoy us.

From this consideration of the two most obvious modes of conducting singly or jointly with the Marrattas a warfare against Tippoo singly or jointly with the French I shall proceed to what in my premises I have called a less obvious one, my idea of the practicability of which is founded on conjecture from a general view of the state of the parties, not from my knowledge of their power, views—disposition or local circumstances.—In this general view I look on the Raja of Travancore, the Dutch of Cochin, the Portuguese of Goa and all the intermediate Zemindars, Rajas, Polygars and Mallabar Chieftains of every denomination inimical to the name

and power of Tipu in the same degree in which they are exposed to the effects of his inordinate and grasping ambition.—Thus influenced I conceive them capable of being instigated under the protection and support of the British Power to enter into measures for the removal of an evil which constantly threatens them with annihilation and that so grand a stimulus to action will receive great additional force in the prospect of its being followed by the acquisition of great and substantial advantage.

If these positions have any foundation in reason it follows that negotiations may be commenced with a prospect of success for forming a combination of the above Powers against the general enemy, the operations of which would depend on the introduction of a powerful equipment of the Co.'s forces into Tipu's dominions on the Coast of Mallabar in such a manner as should be deemed most eligible by the contracting Powers, while with all deference to better information I venture to suggest the following. That a part of the Madras army marching by the way of Travancore and being joined by the forces of that Raja and a good detachment of Europeans from Cochin should enter the enemy's country from the South and taking a northern route along the coast, levy contributions and reduce such parts and strong holds as should be found practicable and advisable proclaiming freedom and protection to the ancient Nair Chieftains who on similar occasions have evinced a spirit highly capable of feeling and asserting their claims to independence; the progress of this invasion would necessarily be regulated by its success and might probably be extended to Tellicherry or the important port of Cannanore in its neighbourhood while the attendance of the squadron or such a part of it as could be spared from other service joined by some of the Bombay Cruizers might on all occasions contribute to the success of the enterprize.

And the facility of it would in all human probability be greatly increased by the operation of an armament from B'bay which landing at Goa and being joined by a reinforcement from the European force of that settlement might as circumstances should prescribe either be led in a southerly direction along the coast accompanied and in the same manner as above by a naval force to assist its operations, or be conducted through the passes in the neighbourhood of Goa to the attack of the enemy's northern provinces above the ghauts the effect of which on districts lately subdued full of malcontents and bordering on the govert. of Pursaram Bhao the great southern Officer of this State who even without authority from this Court would probably take advantage of the confusions to participate the spoil would in all probability be grand and decisive—in the event of meeting with insurmountable opposition a retreat to Goa might, I presume, be easily effected after levying such contributions as the country might afford, and as it is probable that to withstand two such formidable invasions and from the security in which the seaports between Goa and Tellicherry

would be held from the distant employment of our forces, they would be drained of their garrisons. An immediate embarkation of the troops after their return from their inland service against Mangalore, Mirjee or any other places that might be deemed worthy the attempt would most probably be successful.

Should the garrison of Tellicherry consist of its present force during these operations, it might be capable of being employed in a manner promotive of their effect.

Your Lordship will at once perceive that a plan consisting of so many parts must at all events be difficult of execution even against Tippo which difficulty would be increased in the case of the French being joined with him, since that junction might not only damp an inclination in the Dutch and Portuguese to act by the additional arduousness of the undertaking but might interfere with their rational arrangements in Europe.

If, however, it were susceptible of accomplishment, it appears to me that the allotments of conquered Coast that might be partitioned by the contracting Powers in the event of success would not only amply recompense their exactions but present a most desirable barrier to the future function of the French with the general enemy and the connexions that already subsist between the nations in Europe might be strengthened by the cement of a common interest in India. After appropriating ample and convenient possessions from the conquered countries for the European parties, due attention should be paid to the native allies by re-establishing them in their ancient possessions and if possible forming them into an amicable combination under their hereditary Princes of Coorg, Chircul, Callicut, Cochin, Travancore, etc., etc., almost all of whom are, I understand, connected by the ties of consanguinity.

Under this conjectural head Your Lordship will observe that I have not entered into any particular definition of the use that might be made of the Raja of Pannella, because though I think his country admirably situated for giving us an easy entrance into Tippo's northern dominions and though the Raja's character and circumstances present a prospect of success in a negotiation so flattering to his ambition, yet as he is closely connected with this State and as a separate connexion with him might be irksome to the Peshwa's Court, the objections arising therefrom would perhaps counterbalance the proposed advantages. I cannot, however, neglect the occasion to observe that in the event of any of our forces acting with the army of this State, the most easy method of effecting the junction would be by an embarkation from Bombay landing the troops at Malwan or Vengurla and from thence to ascend the ghauts whence their entrance on Tippo's frontier would be short and easy, but the practicability of this idea would necessarily rest on the Raja's permission.

Though I have here, my Lord, indulged myself and troubled you with a general view of possible combinations to alleviate the burthen of an

expected war yet am I not ignorant of the disadvantages of all operations depending on various and perhaps discordant parts and from what I have ventured to suggest I hope Your Lordship will not think that I have forgot the principle with which I set out of this preference due to unity and simplicity of action, should our own force be deemed conveniently equal to a speedy and honourable decision of the contest.

Admitting, however, the practicability of the above combination of Powers on the Mallabar Coast, I conceive that added to the present good of facilitating our success against the enemy, the future and permanent one would follow of depriving a restless and ambitious tyrant of the faculty of molesting our tranquillity; and even admitting the failure of negotiations directed to this end, they would probably tend to alarm and distract the councils of our antagonist and during their progress the issue of which would soon be ascertainable, our preparation might be prosecuted for the vigorous conduct of the war in any other shape that might be judged necessary. Whereas should we now without due concert enter into divided and comparatively weak efforts the consequence would be doubtful and might be unfortunate against those multiplied precautions and circumspect arrangements with which it may be supposed. Tipu has provided against the first effects of our resentment and in which a relaxation may ensue from time and change of circumstances. The hot season is now approaching in which the movement of all armies but particularly of ours is subject to great inconvenience, two or three months at least will be requisite to unite the operations of the three Presidencies in one consistent co-operative plan under the approval and support of Your Lordship's Government, and by that time the rains will be at hand when no operations by sea or land will be practicable on the coast of Mallabar. These considerations embolden me to submit to Your Lordship's deliberation the expediency of adopting for the present firm and powerful defensive plan against the enemy's designs, when after employing the remaining interval of the dry season and all the ensuing rains in completing our preparations, collecting our force and endeavouring if found advisable to promote its efficacy by the acquisition of useful allies the scene of action might be entered on with all that maturity of plan and preparation which as far as human probability admits would ensure success. To this idea, however, an objection arises in the opportunity that would be given for the introduction of a French force, if a concert does exist between them and Tipu, though the present state of affairs in France seems very unfavourable to their carrying it into effect. But of the likelihood of existence of such a concert and its effect in case of existence Your Lordship will be best able to judge.

In confining the hostilities of Tipu against the Company to the two probable predicaments of single or jointly with the French, I have not forgot that there is a possibility of the additional ones of his junction with this State or with Nizam Ally Khan jointly or separately, nor has it

escaped me that in considering the actions of Princes and States possibilities are to be admitted and some weight to be given to the influence even of passion, prejudice and corruption. But, my Lord, if in considering this possibility I incline to think it improbable, I hold myself supported therein by circumstances that in my humble opinion should influence both the reason and the passions of these Courts. For while the common danger of Tippoo's ambitious spirit renders him a reasonable object of terror to both, the bigoted cruelty with which he persecutes the Hindoos, subjects him to the personal detestation of this Court and his assumption of the insignia of royalty and arrogation of superiority involves him in a rivalry with Nizam Ali Khan. And tho' I am very ready to admit that the greatness and firmness of our Empire in Hindostan is not agreeable to the Native Powers, to whose views of ambition it presents an unsurmountable obstacle and to whose manners the liberal and equalizing influence of our institutions is obnoxious, I cannot help thinking that these sources of ill-will should operate so forcibly as to throw the inclinations of these Courts into the scale of Tippoo's preponderance particularly when it is considered that by Your Lordship's late liberal engagements with Nizam Ally Khan, our Power is pledged for the support of his. While this Court cannot forget that great part of Tippoo's dominion is founded on dismemberments from this empire, and that though he may endeavour to conciliate both by ample promises of participation, the performance must rest on the two very doubtful contingencies of his will and power to put them in force. Admitting also that too much stress must not be laid on the declarations of Native Courts yet in a case where they are supported by the interest of the party which I presume to be that of this Court, I think some confidence may be placed in those assurances which it has repeatedly given me and its disposition to take a part in any hostilities that might ensue between us and Tippu, and the state of its affairs in the North and the opening which Sindea's situation presents of our gaining the influence of his interposition to prevent the adoption of councils hostile to us, should it betray a bias thereto, are weighty pledges for the necessity of its good faith. Nor is it in a deliberation on the disposition of the Courts of Poona and Hyderabad unworthy of notice that both have at times betrayed some jealousy of the others' connexion with us and a readiness in their intercourse with me and Capt. Kennaway to throw some imputation of each having intrigues with Tippoo for the purpose I presume of drawing that degree of confidence to the one which might be estranged from the other, which most likely would not be the case were they actually connecting with him in a combination against us. And though the same inference does not apply against their having views of separate connexion with Tippoo yet in that event an option would rest with us of coaleeing with the other.



The sum of what is here said seems to amount to a probability that the Courts of Poona and Hyderabad will not unite with Tippo in hostilities against us, and the state of the French affairs in Europe gives fair ground for the same inference; yet on a comparison of that Prince's Power with ours I confess myself totally at a loss to count on any principles of reason or prudence for his provoking the contest, unless in a reliance on previous arrangements for support from some quarter, or at least of forbearance to take advantage of him during the conflict.

At all events I rejoice exceedingly that by the very apropos arrival of Genl. Medows's appointment to Madras and Col. Abercromby's to Bombay, we shall have the advantage of a vigorous established Government throughout India to meet and combat whatever may be in embryo and Your Lordship will have the infinite satisfaction of being assured that all your measures will be adopted with that alacrity and prosecuted with that zeal which must be the consequence of so harmonious an arrangement of the command of the squadron and the Government of the different Presidencies.

**No. 62**—General Medows is appointed Governor of Madras.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—C. W. MALET.

*Fort William, 1st February 1790.*

I think it proper to give you the earliest notice, that having received advice of the appointment of General Medows to the Government of Madras, and there being every reason to believe that he may be soon expected on that coast to take possession of his Government, I consider it to be no longer necessary to execute my determination to take a temporary charge of the civil and military affairs at that Presidency.

**No. 63**—Malet again forces on the attention of the Governor General the plan he adumbrated in his previous letter, of war against Tipu by reporting disturbances on the northern frontier and the chances of the success of the plan.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 5th February 1790.*

I did myself the honour to address Your Lordship on the 29th ultimo and therein took the liberty of suggesting during the concert of co-operative measures the adoption of a vigorous defensive plan against the unprovoked and wanton encroachment of the aggressor, not, my Lord, from any predilection for defensive measures but on the contrary from a strong persuasion of the preference due to offensive ones, but offensive ones so weighty and so well directed as may at once strike at the root of Tippo's unnatural and tyrannical Power. For in my mind a presumption arises that any serious impression or brilliant success of our arms in a country whose inhabitants are universally disaffected and against a

Prince, the fidelity of whose army and military chieftains is extremely doubtful, would kindle a flame that would at once endanger his new raised edifice of bigotry and despotism. It is not, my Lord, without satisfaction that I now submit to your notice the enclosed extract of intelligence lately received through a channel of credibility on the south frontier of this state close to the scene of the transactions described, because those transactions tend to confirm that idea of disaffection in the districts of Tippo's northern frontier on which I laid some stress in my last address and to establish the truth of the persuasion therein ventured of the indisposition of this Court toward Tippo, since the dependance of the conductors of the enterprise on this Court, is clearly proved by their submission to the orders that countermanded it, as this Court's collusion is established by the previous avowed patronage of so eminent a member of the empire as Pursaram Bhao. Nor can I account for the sudden check given to the designs of the malcontents but in some advices received by this Court of the inimical movements of Tippo against us to the south, and the fear of checking by an attack at so critical a juncture the ripening of those movements into actual hostilities the occurrence of which would enable them to prosecute their views of negotiation with us or enmity against Tippo with greater advantage. But as it seems that the orders for suspending the operations of the insurgents were too late to prevent an imperfect and unfortunate execution of the plan of the malcontents and as I think it likely that Tippo's commander in those parts will, to enhance the merit of his own conduct, embellish his report with circumstances of the whole being instigated and abetted by the officers on the borders of this State, it will probably be productive of some disquietude to that Prince. From this extract Your Lordship will likewise learn the strength of Tippo's force in the northern districts, an attack on which through Goa (a tract that will never be suspected) forms a part of the propositions of my address. This force is commanded by an officer named Buder-al-Zuman Khan whose head-quarters are at Dharwar which, I am given to understand, is a place of strength but no strength can supply the want of zeal and fidelity and I have set on foot an enquiry whence I hope to collect whether this officer and his subordinates are possessed of either. But allowing them to be so, Your Lordship will confess that the firmest fidelity and the keenest courage would act to great disadvantage when assailed by a most formidable foreign enemy and harassed by the revengeful spirit of oppressed and hostile subjects instigated by their ancient but now exiled chieftains numbers of whom are refugees under the protection of this State and amongst others the Nabob of Shanoor, the Zamindars of Kittoor, Annagoode, Nalgoond Gutti, Bellarree, and as I am informed many others that I do not recollect and whom it would be tedious to enumerate, though it may not be amiss to particularize Syed Mahd. Khan and his son the claimant of the principality of Curpa (Kadappa), who was closely connected with

us during the last war with Hyder and employed by Lord Mc'Cartney to act with a detachment of our forces destined for the reduction of the country the issue of which was unsuccessful.

In my last address I ventured to suggest only two modes of making an impression on Tippo's dominions, the one on the coast of Mallabar and the frontier districts in concert with the governments of Goa and Cochin, because the mode was little obvious to general observation, the other in conjunction with this State because so obvious and so closely connected with my station that to have passed it over in silence would have looked like negligence. But the perfect knowledge that is possessed on the coast of Corromandel of the practicability and probable efficacy of an impression on Tippo's dominions through the long extended tract of his eastern frontier from Madura to Palnaud taught me that it would be presumption to trouble Your Lordship on that subject.

But as the general objects and consequences of a war with Tippo are of the greatest importance to the interests delegated to Your Lordship's Government and to the nation at large, and as those consequences are closely connected with the discharge of the duties committed to my care, I shall trouble Your Lordship in as few words as possible with what has arisen from my thought on them.

I am inclined to think that the vigor of the British Governments now in India is equal to the prosecution of our just resentment against Tippo to his extirpation. But in so doing it naturally becomes a question whether in the gratification even of an honourable resentment we are to reap solid benefit, the ultimate object of the deliberations of all wise nations, or whether, by tempering with moderation the suggestions of vengeance, we may not equally vindicate our honor and more essentially promote the public good.

The general sense of the nation is against the extension of our territorial possessions. The subversion of Tippo's power would lay us under the necessity of establishing a new authority in his place, perhaps a person of his own family or the Raja of Mysore as a check between us and the predatory enemy of the Marratta Empire, of establishing our own authority and therewith extending our own frontier and in either case of entering into an intricate and almost inextricable labyrinth of controversy and altercation with this State and probably with Nizam Ali Khan on the claims which it would advance to ancient tenures which it would not fail to enforce during the war and after it, whether acting separately or in alliance with us, by every practice of art and force. Tho' it is possible that such a disposition might in some measure be controlled if acting in alliance with us by rigid stipulations that their conquests should be confined to certain limits, or if acting independently of us by the credit and force of our arms.

Were it possible to conduct a war with Tippu to such a conclusion as we might dictate, it is probable that a more humiliating one to him and more honourable to us would not be wished than to drive him from the sea coast of Mallabar, to reinstate the Nair princes in their ancient freedom and tenures to secure such a possession on the coast as should be equal to their support to the purposes of our commerce, and to the supply of the deficiencies of the Bombay revenue, to procure such of the ports between the Carnatic Balla Ghaut and Payen Ghat as should be judged requisite for our security on the frontier and to lay him under engagements to hold the remainder of his dominions in perpetual friendship and alliance with the Company, by which means a solid barrier would be opposed to the views of the Marrattas, so long as the firmness and authority of our power, the only permanent basis of all political arrangements, supported our influence over his councils.

On the 2nd I was visited by Behro Pant on which occasion our conversation principally turned on Tippu's conduct which he treated as unpardonable and by introducing a description of the superior power of the Company the perfect tranquility of the British Empire in Europe and the entire friendship of this Court and that of Hyderabad in India discovered a desire of stimulating any backwardness on our part to the prosecution of our resentment and I endeavoured to convert his language to the acquisition of a clear declaration of the disposition of this Court in the event of the expected rupture, the success of which I hope soon to be able to communicate to Your Lordship.

At this meeting Behro Pant acquainted me that the Peshwa and his Court were now ready to visit me whenever I should think proper to invite them which I propose doing as soon as I can get the images repaired that were sent me by the Court of Directors. He at the same time invited me to dine with him on the 3rd which I did.

**No. 64**—Intelligence of disturbances on Tipu's Northern Frontier.

#### A LETTER TO MALET.

*1st February 1790.*

The disturbances lately created by Rallapah's parties will, to all appearances, involve a war between the Marrattas. Pursaram Bhaou had caused the above parties to disperse and even plundered some of their Chiefs, assembled his troops without loss of time and on the 29th took, plundered and destroyed upwards of twelve towns and villages of the purgunnah of Pachhapoor, the capital of which he also invested the same day, plundered its environs and returned to Nysery towards the evening; but his Pindaries proceeded further all the same, and we hear that they made great ravages in the neighbourhood of Oakery and Chikoory. The purgunnah of Pachhapoor belongs to Benewallah the

Commander of the Peshwah's Van-guard, and its capital, which has for its defence a small weak fort upon a rocky eminence is 8 coss distant north of Belgaum. The country is at this time in the greatest confusion, and our communication on that road is cut off. Budur-al-Zaman Khan's force on this expedition amounts to near 4,000 men, viz., 200 regular horse, 700 Pindaries, and 3,000 infantry. In my last I mentioned the number of forces the enemy could muster, and that were the whole to assemble, they would amount to 8 or 9,000 men, but as yet, only 700 Behders of Serput Raou's command of 5,000 horse, have joined Budder-al-Zuman who, as occasion requires, will send for more.

Respecting the forts under Budder-al-Zuman's command I shall mention only two worth notice, which are Naolgoond situated upon a large rock four coss south of Nargoond, but of little strength; and Koosegull 5 coss s.e. of Dharwar, situated in an open dry plain. The latter has been rebuilt and regularly fortified by him since the late war and encompassed by a double trench of considerable breadth and depth. The nearest post this Chief has towards Goa is Cannapoor, distant 20 coss from that place, and about 5 s.w. of Belgaum. None of the roads from Goa through the Ghauts direct to this place are practicable for heavy artillery without being dismounted, and even thus, would be with trouble. The Raum Ghaut might be rendered practicable by about 1,000 people employed three or four days to clear away a bank and rocky path of about half a mile long. This Ghaut belongs partly to the Peshwah, the Colapoor Rajah and the Dessay of Warree, who have each a chowkey to receive duties from convoys, which they share equally. There is no fortification thereon or adjacent thereto, and the difference between this and the direct road to Cannapoor is about five coss.

As to the personal character of Buddur-al-Zuman Khan, he is reputed to be a sensible, well informed old man, whose professional abilities and conduct render him worthy of the trust his master has reposed in him. All the negotiations during the last war between Tippoo and the Marrattas were carried on by him, and he concluded the treaty of peace upon such favourable terms, when Tippoo would have ceded several places on this side of the Tumbuddra, had the Marratta general stood out for them and not retired so precipitately. In reward for this service, he was appointed to the Command of Tippoo's northern frontier with a jagheer of twelve lacks for the pay of 5,000 troops. He was formerly in the service of the Nabob of Curpa, in great esteem, and Bucshy of the horse; when upon the reduction of that country, Hyder took him into his service, and immediately gave him the command of 3,000 men. The great friends he has at Tippoo's Court, and a younger brother continually attending the Nabob's person, have maintained him thus long in his present command, in which he has been lately confirmed. He has a daughter married to a nephew of Tippoo's Burhan-ud-deen Khan, in whom the Nabob puts the greatest trust.

The Jambhotee man has assembled his troops, and forced the Chief of Cannapoor's people to retire and yesterday burnt three or four of his villages.

*2nd February 1790.*

P.S.—The enemy is encamped two coss to the eastward of Belgaum. The day before yesterday the Chief of Shahpoor (a fine flourishing town, with a small mud fort half a coss from Belgaum, belonging to Pursaram Bhaow) sent a deputy to Budur-al-Zuman Khan, who treated him with great contempt. Another was despatched to him yesterday afternoon by the same Chief, whose return is now expected. The Commandant of Belgaum has written to Budur-al-Zuman that if he comes against Shahpoor he will fire on him. We have just heard that Pursaram Bhaow is collecting troops but whether Rallapah is to be employed or not is yet uncertain. It is reported that more horses have joined Buddur-al-Zuman Khan.

No. 65—Malet expresses his joy at the official declaration made by the Poona Court of its readiness to participate in the war against Tipu and presses the necessity for precise and positive stipulations with that Court.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 8th February 1790.*

I hasten with great pleasure to acquaint Your Lordship that yesterday I received from Behro Punt an official declaration that this Court is disposed to take part with Your Lordship's Government in hostilities against Tippo Saib on a due arrangement of stipulations for that purpose relative to which he said he would again communicate with me after receiving further instructions from the Minister.

Though I am concerned that the liberality of public opinion would indulge me with some latitude of patriotic delight on this event and justify my congratulating Your Lordship in having the option of the force of so powerful an empire in the prosecution of your country's just resentment, yet convinced as I am that the springs of the political actions of States must be sought for in their interests, my principal happiness in the communication of this important declaration flows from a recollection of its having been gained in that conformity to the spirit of Your Lordship's instructions without sacrifice or solicitation.

At this meeting Behro Punt confirmed the intelligence of disturbances on the south frontier of this empire that I had the honor to communicate in my last of the 5th instant but disavowed their being instigated by this Court or its officers; Notwithstanding which he said that Tippo's officer commanding on his frontier had under that pretence actually attacked and taken possession of Padshapore, a town and district belonging to the Peshwa which Behro Punt insisted could not have been done but with the sanction of Tippo's orders. At all events this fracas from whatever cause

it springs will certainly have the apropos effect of giving some alarm and disquietude to both parties, in check of the hostile spirit of the one and promotive of the amicable disposition of the other toward us.

As however this court rests the accomplishment of its declaration of a disposition to join Your Lordship's government in hostilities against Tippo on certain arrangement not yet agitated, I think it probable that it will take advantage of the interval of settling those arrangements to take such measures with Tippo by holding forth the dread of its junction with us as will be most likely to gain satisfaction for the acts of his frontier Officer; by which should the proposed arrangement with Your Lordship's government not take place, it may be enabled to accommodate matters with that Chieftain.

I cannot dismiss for Your Lordship's consideration the above important declaration of this Court which must bring forward a decision on the great political question of accepting or rejecting the aid of this State, so pregnant with consequences of infinite delicacy and magnitude without soliciting Your Lordship's particular attention to the mode of conducting your determination. Since, should Your Lordship prefer the certain good of facilitating the punishment of Tippo to the speculative evils attendant on the aid of the Marrattas, I presume their spirit of encroachment and depredation should be canvassed with the keenest jealousy and provided against by the most minute and positive stipulations, the operation of which might be coeval with the permanence of our power. But on the other hand should Your Lordship decline their proffered aid, permit me to suggest the necessity of doing it with the utmost delicacy and in such a manner as to prevent in addition to the mortification of their pride, a discovery of systematic aversion to the extension of their power, a development that would produce a spirit of rancorous and inveterate enmity to the existence of ours.

Bahiro Pt. on his visit of yesterday signified the wish of the Peshwa to visit me with his Court on Wednesday to which I assented and expect him accordingly.

By the same letters I learnt that by advices from Tellicherry so late as 20th January, no repetition had happened of Tippo's hostilities.

No. 66—Malet reports the visit paid to him by the Peshwa.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 12th February 1790.*

I was on the 10th visited by the Peshwa attended by the great ministers of his government and all the feudal military chieftains of eminence

residing in Poona, and as the whole pomp of this Court was displayed on this occasion, an inference arises of its being studied to diffuse the eclat of the Peshwa's perfect good understanding with your Lordship's Government, an object honorable and at this juncture probably useful to the British Empire in Hindostan.

As I conceive that an intimate acquaintance with the state of Tippoo's northern frontier, the disturbances that have lately happened on it and the character of the person commanding it will be interesting to your Lordship, I enclose a paper of Intelligence that continues the thread of events contained in a former paper enclosed in my address of the 5th accompanied with answers to my queries relative to the government and state of the country.

**No. 67**—Intelligence of the situation in the Northern Frontier of Tipu and the condition of the Zeminders subjugated by him.

EXTRACT OF A LETTER TO MALET.

*9th February 1790.*

Tippoo's troops have made no further progress though they have been joined by 3,000 horse. They remained five days at Nauganoor, 4 coss east of Belgaum, and the 5th instant they marched 3 coss to Hubly, 5 coss from Belgaum where they are yet encamped. In my last I mentioned that some of their parties were within two coss of Belgaum but they were then within their own limits, and indeed part of the country taken by Tippoo from the Dessay of Kittoor since the peace, extends half a coss still nearer to Belgaum. It was thought they were coming against Shahpoor, as Buddur-ul-Zuman Khan had intimated. A material change has since taken place in Buddur-al-Zuman's conduct. He treated the first deputy sent to him from Shahpoor with great contempt, but to the second he thus expressed himself that he came not with a design to take possession of any places belonging to the Peshwah, in proof of which he adduced his not having posted his tannas in any of the towns or villages that he has destroyed, that he came only in pursuit of the parties that had made an irruption into Tippoo's country, which was conformable to his master's orders and the agreement between him and the Marratta government after Rallapah's last defeat, that his entering the purgunnah of Bachapoor was in consequence of some people of that purgunnah having joined the above parties; several of whom he took in the neighbourhood of Deysnoor, and released, after giving each a wound as a mark of their delinquency, that he has no intention to proceed further, provided the invaders are delivered up to him, or punished in the districts to which they belong or report in prevention of similar disturbances in future; on which point he has written to Pursaram Bhau and the governor of Merridge and concludes, that he will return to Koosgull as soon as possible after settling with the Jamboti Chief. As yet, Pursaram Bhaou has taken no decided steps waiting I suppose instructions from the Poona Government.



The Dessoy of Jaumbootee has sent a vackeel to Budur-al-Zuman who will probably accept a small compensation rather than proceed against so insignificant a Polygar, at a time perhaps not convenient, whose small remaining possessions he could not maintain undisturbed, as they are so close to the woods.

I proceed now to reply to your queries respecting the subjected Zemindars on Tippoo's northern frontier. They have no troops, and their extreme poverty renders them unable to raise any; nor indeed should they be depended upon to give immediate effective assistance to an army invading that quarter. Had they permission from the army to plunder the country they would have followers enough, but this might be prejudicial to the army. It might be advisable to keep them inactive till they were reinstated in their possessions by the conquerors, whom they might then assist with money, troops and information of the nature of the country roads, etc., furnishing and conveying supplies for the army, etc.

The fort of Chittuldroog is of considerable strength, well stored with everything necessary for its defence, plentifully supplied with water, and would stand a hard seige if well defended. The Killahdar is a Mussalman, who has not above 2,000 foot for its garrison and the management of the district, all the troops formerly stationed there having been withdrawn some months past. The country in this quarter as well as the others you mention, is very fertile and pleasant, and affords plenty of cattle.

The order for the dispersion of Rallapah's parties has not only disappointed him and lessened the confidence reposed in him by the Chiefs of Kittoor through his interest with the Marratta government and Pursaram Bhaou, but has almost completed the ruin of these brave and enterprising men by the expense they have incurred in raising troops. One motive perhaps for the Marratta Government's permitting the assembling of these parties was to excite Tippoo's troops to a movement, and thereby give them an opening for coming to a rupture, which as the affair has turned out, seems to be inevitable. As soon as the order was issued for the above parties to disperse, Rallapah repaired to Tasgaum where he now is with the principal men of Kittoor.

It is beyond a doubt that Pursaram Bhaou would be glad of war with Tippoo, were Government to grant his former power of raising troops, and appoint him to a command suitable to his rank, which is much to be desired, as he is one of the best of the Marratta military officers.

The report of Kurreem Saheb's being in Bednore must be a mistake, as I can assure you he was at Syringapattam four months ago, and it is not probable that he has been removed since. He was a long-while in Bangaloor, from which place he was removed about the time that Tippoo commenced his expedition against the Koorgs. He still continues under close confinement having only liberty to go out once a week to take the air and visit his father's tomb.

It is probable that the Nabob of Shahnoor might soon be enabled to raise a body of good horse on being assured of the support of an army. It is indeed to be regretted that Government has not yet given him any encouragement and supplied him with money to raise troops since Tipoo is so far distant, and his army drawn to the Mallabar coast. What progress might he not have already made with Rallapah's parties? Surely he would have destroyed the forces on the frontier, and have had it in his power to defray all expenses.

**No. 67A**—Intelligence of operations on the Northern frontier of Tipu.

EXTRACT OF A LETTER TO MALET.

*15th February 1790.*

On the 2nd instant, I communicated to you the sudden invasion of the Marratta southern frontier by Tippoo's troops; and on the 10th advised you of the cessation of hostility, and the expectation of their immediate return, agreeable to Buddur-al-Zuman Khan's declaration. He has accordingly made two marches since, and was yesterday encamped at Billoory 12 coss south east of Belgaum, the direct road to Koosegull his place of residence. It is reported that the 5,000 horse will proceed to Syringputtan with all possible expedition in consequence of orders received by Buddur-al-Zuman from Tippoo.

Pursaram Bhaou, Balla Saheb the governor of Merridge, and Ragoonaut Rao of Coorundwar, have assembled their horse, computed at upwards of 5,000, by which it appears that some movement is intended, as yet however no fresh troops are raising.

The Portuguese expedition against Malwan, some time since in agitation, begins to revive, and is expected to be carried into execution very shortly.

**No. 68**—Cornwallis approves of Malet's proposal of making the terms of the treaty as definite and positive as possible.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—C. W. MALET.

*Fort William, 22nd February 1790.*

It gave me great satisfaction to see that you had nearly anticipated the instructions contained in my letter dated the 27th of January last and that you had even the precaution to consider of means to increase the pecuniary supplies to Bombay, of which they will most undoubtedly stand in need.

Your opinion is perfectly conformable to mine, that it is not by paying an abject court to the Marrattas that we are likely to obtain their assistance, but by giving them to understand at the time that we invite them to

a friendly participation of the advantages of the war that we feel very confident that our own force is fully competent to bring Tipoo to reasonable terms ; if, however, they engage handsomely with us, we shall be ready to perform the promise which you have already been authorized to make by concluding a defensive treaty with them against Tippoo, but it must in that even be our care to express the articles of it in such terms, that they should have no pretext for calling upon us on any occasion when they may be the aggressors.

Altho' I do not think it advisable to begin by relaxing on the article of Ginjerah yet I rely so entirely on your prudence, that I feel no difficulty in giving you a discretionary power to do so, if you should have reason to believe at any time that it would be attended with essential benefit ; but if they should talk of the surrender of Salsette you must declare that it cannot be done without a reference to England, and that it will depend upon them to make such proposals as we can with propriety transmit.

You will please to correspond with General Medows without reserve, as it may be of great consequence to his military operations to know what may be expected from the Poona Government.

**No. 69**—Malet submits the terms of the treaty offered by the Peshwa.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 24th February 1790.*

Subsequent to the attainment of this satisfactory knowledge of declaration to join the war against Tipu, my whole attention was anxiously and increasingly directed to the procural of some stipulation of terms by which I might remove the precarious tenure of general profession of this Court's intentions and rivet its commitment to your Lordship's Government by some form of engagement in which I had so far succeeded as to receive a message from Bahiro Pt. on the 22nd that he had received particular instructions from the Minister on the subject and would wait on me with them the ensuing day. Immediately after receipt of this message, your Lordship's commands of the 27th ulto. were delivered to me by which my anxiety to receive the advances of this Court was greatly increased by the apprehension that further delay by opening a possibility of its receiving from other quarters the ultimate latitude of your Lordship's instructions might change my vantage ground of receiving to the less agreeable task of making offers. Thus influenced, Your Lordship will more easily conceive than I can express my satisfaction on receiving from Bahiro Pt. the ensuing day the following preliminaries from this Court for the construction of a cooperative league with your Lordship against Tipp Sultan.

1. The ancient possession of the Peshwa now held by Tippo shall be restored to the Peshwa and the principality of Curpa (Cudapa) shall be restored to the Nabob Nizam Ally Khan.

2. The ancient Zamindars and Polygurs of different districts shall be reinstated therein.

3. The Nuzzurana on such reinstatement shall be equally divided between the three contracting Powers—The Peshwa, the Co., and the Nabob.

4. The Peshwa's ancient peshcush or tribute from the said Zamindars shall be assigned to him.

5. Tippo's khalsa possessions (Crown lands) shall be equally divided between the contracting Powers.

6. The military quotas of the contracting Powers shall be equal.

7. If the Peshwa makes peace, it will be with the assent of the other parties.

8. In the event of peace being determined on, none of the parties shall introduce unreasonable obstacles.

9. If, after the conclusion of peace, Tippo should attack either of the parties, the others shall be bound to assist the party attacked, if called on.

10. If a settlement can be effected on these preliminaries, the Peshwa declares himself ready to take part with the Co. in a war against Tippo, previous to which the above preliminaries will on due discussion be reduced to particular and specific engagements.

Permit me, my Lord, to felicitate you on this acquisition of proffered terms more advantageous in their first stage than the extent of the ultimatum presented by your Lordship for their attainment and I beg that your Lordship will rest assured that in conducting the negotiation to the climax of a positive engagement pursuant to your Lordship's commands, I shall most anxiously keep in view the grand object of rendering the terms as much more advantageous as possible to your Lordship's Government and to prevent any check in this pursuit by any difference of conception on the part of the Residents with Nizam A. K. or Mhadjee Sindia I shall immediately advise those gentlemen of my present and future progress.

The principal points that at present strike me as requiring discussion in the settlement of the foregoing preliminaries and reducing them into the form of an engagement are—the ascertainment of the Court's powers to treat for Nizam Ally Khan, a point that I presume will require much delicacy and cautious management between me and Capt. Kennaway—the settlement of the quotas—the definition of this Court's ideas to ancient Polyghers and Zamindars under its dependance. The pay of our forces in the event of their acting with the Peshwa's army in compensation of

aiding in the recovery of his ancient possessions in which we are not to participate—the settlement of the plan of action whether jointly or separately.

**No. 70**—Intelligence from the Northern frontier of Tipu.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—WILLIAM MEDOWS.

*Poona, 24th February 1790.*

I have just received intelligence from the southern frontier of this State that Tippoo has order 5,000 horse that were quartered on his northern frontier to march southward. The officer that in my last I mentioned had acted hostilely against this State has ceased so to do and called in his parties.

**No. 71**—Abercromby reports to Malet his readiness to comply with any requisition for troops that may be made by the Marathas in the course of negotiation.

FROM—ROBERT ABERCROMBY, GOVERNOR OF BOMBAY,

TO—C. W. MALET.

*Bombay Castle, 25th February 1790.*

We had yesterday the honor to receive his Lordship the Governor General's sentiments on Tippoo's late conduct towards the Rajah of Travancore which he desires we should consider as a signal for open war, and under that date his Lordship has recommended our making a powerful diversion from this Coast which we shall take preparatory measures to effect while waiting to be informed what plan of operations General Meadows may suggest for carrying on the war in that quarter, which information will essentially influence our measures and operate for the general good.

His Lordship having informed us that you are empowered to stipulate with the Marratta Court that a detachment of troops from this Presidency shall act with them in case they shall insist upon it as an indispensable condition of their entering into our alliance and desired we would comply with any requisitions you may make to us in the course of your negotiations, we beg to assure you of our readiness to further his Lordship's wishes whenever you may have occasion to bespeak the assistance of this Government.

No. 72—After referring to the disadvantages of neutrality, Cornwallis communicates to Malet his opinion on the plan of conducting the war suggested in a previous letter and points out the reasons for offering the Marathas the defensive alliance. [Ross, i. 496-8.]

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—C. W. MALET.

*Fort William, 28th February 1790.*

I have received your letter dated the 29th ultimo, and I think myself much obliged to you for the free communication which it contained of the reflections that had offered themselves to your mind on the present state of our public affairs, and of your sentiments on the various modes that may be thought of for carrying on the war with honor and advantage to ourselves against Tippoo singly, as well as for meeting the different contingencies which it must be supposed possible to occur in the course of the contest.

Some considerable advantages have no doubt been experienced by the system of neutrality which the legislature required of the Governments in this Country ; but it has at the same time been attended with the unavoidable inconvenience of our being constantly exposed to the necessity of commencing a war without having previously secured the assistance of efficient allies.

The late outrageous infraction of the Treaty of Peace by Tippoo furnishes a case in point. We could not suffer the dominions of the Rajah of Travancore who was included by name as our ally in that treaty, to be ravaged or insulted without being justly charged with pusillanimity or a flagrant breach of faith, and without dishonoring ourselves by that means in the view of all the powers in India ; and as we have been almost daily obliged for several years past to declare to the Marattas and to the Nizam that we were precluded from contracting any new engagements with them for affording them aid against the injustice or ambition of Tippoo I must acknowledge that we cannot claim as a right the performance of those promises which the Marattas have repeatedly made to co-operate with us whenever we should be forced into a war with that Prince.

My dependence upon the support of both these powers on the present occasions is founded solely upon the expectation of their being guided by the common influence of passions and by considerations of evident interest, which ought to dispose them to seize a favourable opportunity with eagerness to reduce the Power of a Prince whose ambition knows no bounds and from whom both of them have suffered numberless insults and injuries.

Notwithstanding these inducements to engage readily with us in the war, I conceive it very possible that the Marattas in particular, will endeavour to extort unreasonable stipulations from us for their

co-operation. But if Tippoo shall receive no European support, it will be less necessary for us to comply with demands of that description, as I trust that our own force will be sufficient to exact a full reparation from him for the violation of the peace.

But at the same time, as the speedy termination of the war is not only a matter of the utmost consequence to the finance of the Company but will almost preclude a possibility of Tippoo's being assisted or even encouraged in consequence of any orders that this war may produce from France, I thought it right in order to obtain the aid of the Marrattas to offer them a defensive alliance against Tippoo to which they would in reason and equity have a good title, if they were to take an active part with us without having made such a previous engagement.

I have no reason to believe that Tippoo has on this occasion acted in concert with the French Government in this Country, and the convulsed state of the affairs of that nation in Europe, renders it at least highly improbable that they will be inclined to come to an open rupture with us by supporting a *Prince who has been notoriously the aggressor*.

To provide, however, as much as may be possible against that contingency, I have requested of the Commodore who has luckily the superiority in naval force to keep a watchful eye upon all the motions of the French in these seas, and I have also solicited a friendly attention to the same object of the Dutch Governor of Ceylon who resents the behaviour of Tippoo to the settlement of Cochin and has shown a disposition to take some concern about the Rajah of Travancore; but should the French contrary to all present expectation, determine to assist Tippoo, the co-operation of the Marrattas would then become of so much more value to us that it would be necessary on our part to be less difficult in assenting to conditions which might be required for our obtaining it, and with the instructions already in your possession I shall rely with great confidence on your ability and discretion for conducting the negotiation with the Poona Minister upon either of the above suppositions.

I cannot bring myself to imagine that either the Marrattas or the Nizam could be persuaded to take an active part against us in conjunction with Tippoo, tho' it does not appear entirely improbable that they may at first receive our propositions for their declaring in our favour with some degree of coldness, either with the view to obtain more favourable conditions than we may be disposed to offer; or with that of allowing two powers, who must be the objects either of their enmity or jealousy, to exhaust their strength in a struggle between themselves, and as we have uniformly professed that unless Tippoo should violate the late treaty of peace we were not at liberty to contract any alliances of an hostile tendency to him, I do not think it absolutely impossible that the Marrattas may have taken some steps or have made some professions of friendship for the purpose of encouraging him to disengage us from the restraints that we have

described by attacking our ally the Rajah of Travancore. Whatever turn the present contest may take, I am not sanguine enough to hope that we should be able to obtain any substantial aid either from the Dutch or from the Portuguese, even if they should be well disposed to assist us.

I apprehend that the funds of neither of those nations would admit of their maintaining a considerable body of troops in the field, and as the Infantry in the Dutch service is principally composed of foreigners of different nations and that of the Portuguese is in no esteem either for experience or discipline, I am afraid that they would not have it in their power to furnish us with Europeans that could render us useful service.

Should, however, a necessity arise it would become advisable to endeavour to obtain co-operation and support from both of them, and it would be our duty to negotiate for the best terms that might be practicable at the time as conditions of their acquiescence.

I shall defer entering into an examination of the most judicious mode of co-operating with or directing the exertions of the Marrattas against the common enemy until I can hear from you in answer to my letter dated the 27th January last, because I should think it incumbent upon me to agree to almost any conditions of that nature which they might appear determined to annex to their decision for making an immediate declaration in our favour.

**No. 73**—Malet submits to the G. G. the four specific modes of co-operation offered for the consideration of Nana and reports his conversation with Bahiropant on the subject of the payment of the troops serving with the Mahrattas.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 1st March 1790.*

Pursuant to the resolution communicated to Your Lordship of prosecuting with all possible expedition the accomplishment of a co-operative engagement with this Court and to bring it to a degree of readiness for settlement, I procured a visit from Bahiropant on the 27th inst. and the same afternoon had a conference with the Minister the substance of which I shall state as briefly as possible.

My conversation with Bohiropant turned principally on the following head—My expectation of pay for any body of troops acting with the Marrattas during the reduction of what the Peshwa called his ancient



possessions since actual tenure by the enemy made that task equally arduous as the reduction of any other part of his dominions and that from this consideration and the large districts that would come under this description, I should for Your Lordship expect an equitable consideration in the ultimate settlement and partition of conquests. Bahiropant admitted this language as reasonable and added that in consequence of what he had communicated from me on the subject of the expectation of pay as above, the Minister had assented thereto during the reduction of the Peshwa's ancient possessions and equal partition afterward. I mentioned that in the event of our troops joining the Marratta army, I should expect that a body of Marratta cavalry should be attached to them to prevent the inconvenience incidental to a body of infantry acting unsupported by such a corps in their armies of cavalry. This likewise he admitted as reasonable. I observed to him that by the same rule that the Peshwa wished a body of our forces to act with his army, we should, in the event of that plan being acceded to, have the option of commanding the services of a body of Marratta cavalry to act with an army of ours in which case the Marrattas would have a like claim to partition of our conquests to the south as we to the north. This likewise he pronounced a just expectation observing that the situation of the detachments acting in the respective armies should be equal. Having made this progress on points which I thought it of importance to touch on, though I at the same time tenaciously opposed the propositions of this Court which all tend to a junction of forces as indispensable, I communicated to Bahiropant the four following specific modes of co-operation, which I begged he would propose to the Minister's deliberation as the necessary preparatives for particular engagements, viz,—

1. That the Co. and the Peshwa shall carry on a war separately against Tippo with their own forces and possess separately all the conquests they make. The conclusion of peace to be by mutual consent. This mode I strongly recommended as the least perplexed, least liable to objection in its structure or obstacle in its execution and as such in every respect the most eligible.

2. That a body of the Co's. forces should join the Marratta army to be paid while reducing the Peshwa's ancient possessions, and afterward to entitle the Co. to equal partition in all other conquests made by them in conjunction with the Marrattas. To this mode I strongly objected as encumbering even the expected conquests of the Peshwa with loss and deduction, as subject to extreme difficulty in execution and very intricate and tedious preparatory arrangement, and that after all it might be deemed inadmissible by me—and I particularly dwelt on the peculiar

misapplication of such difficulties at a time when everything depended on promptitude and decision.

3. That if the Peshwa and Nizam Ali K. took the field in person, I would, as a compliment to them and as not involving too great a diminution from the force destined for our exertions in other quarters, stipulate for furnishing the Peshwa if the same was supplied to the Nabob with 2 battalions of native infantry and their guns as a bodyguard (this proposal I was induced to bring forward as a concession in the probability that Nizam Ali K. will at all events procure the junction of the corps stipulated for him by treaty). This mode however I represented as less eligible than the first as its operation would probably not equal its expense to the Peshwa but preferable in my opinion to the almost impracticable settlement of the second mode.

4. That as a mode of expediency on our side possessing all the advantages and on the other steering clear of all the evils and difficulties of the foregoing modes, I proposed that this State should immediately march an army to Tipu's northern frontier and make all possible impression, while the Government of Bombay should form an armament against Tipu's possessions on the Malabar Coast, by which means and the invasion of his dominions by the Madras army from the South in all human probability considerable impression would be made on him in all quarters, and this Court be enabled to gain without the expense of our junction, its grand object of recovery of lost territory. But should this State's invasion not be attended with the expected success, I would engage that after the rains it should be joined by a body of the Co's forces to assist its operations. This mode, I recommended as second only to the first in eligibility, since it not only gave this Court an opportunity of recovering without expense or claim of participation all its ancient possessions but ultimately gave them an assurance of the point they so strongly pleaded for of the junction of a body of our forces after a short interval when the convenience of your Lordship's government would be enabled to draw it from the quarter best able to furnish it. Bahiro Pt. hearkend with attention to this mode but strongly insisted on its being improved by my assenting to furnish the army of this State destined to the attack of Tipu's northern frontier with even two battalions, which I opposed as weakning our efforts on the Malabar Coast which by your Lordship's last letter appear to be your grand object and at the same time being too small to compensate for that weakness in our enterprize by the effect of its operations with the Marrattas. Should however this mode of expediency be ultimately adopted, it will be a grand point gained to bring this Court to look on the junction of so small a force as an acquisition. I shall not attempt to trouble your Lordship with further particulars of a conversation that if my endeavors are successful must soon be compressed into the space of a few articles.

I was very much surprized to hear from the Minister language very different from Bahiro Pt. in the morning on the subject of payment of our

troops acting with the Peshwa which I did not fail to remark to Bahiro Pt. who acknowledged that it was difficult. In a word Nanna started objections not only to my expectation of ultimate consideration in the general partition in lieu of the recovery of the Peshwa's exclusive ancient possessions but to the payment of a body of our troops acting with the Peshwa's army and that on reasons so futile and inconsistent as really distressed me to reply to, which I do not think worthy your Lordship's notice, though certainly any abuse of argument to which they may think proper to give so much weight requires my opposition and your Lordship may rest assured, shall not even have the semblance of rectitude which they might attribute to the silence of contempt.

The best judgment that I can at present form of the intention of the Minister is that he either expects from it to force me to quit my ground of further compensation in lieu of the Peshwa's exclusive pretension to ancient possessions, by the granting even the pay of our troops as a favor which, under the present circumstances, I shall be justified in looking on as an advantage or from the intelligence received from Hyderabad of the communications to Nizam Ally Khan. He may hope that my next advices may give a favourable turn for this Court to my negotiations. From the whole of my conversation with the Minister I perceived that it is a most favorite object of this Court to procure the junction of a body of our forces in which added to the facility to be expected in their progress they are actuated by the apprehension of Tipoo's directing his whole efforts against them in the event of their attacking him singly and only joined by Nizam Ali K. who, the Minister assured me, would accede to the forms that this Court might settle for both with your Lordship agreeable to the union of interest described between the States in his inclusion as an ally of this State in the treaty of Salbye.

At this meeting Behro Punt read over the modes of co-operative alliance which I proposed to him in the morning after hearing which the Minister acquainted me he would on due deliberation communicate to me his sentiments on them. And I concluded the conference by strongly recommending to the Minister the avoidance of unnecessary delay in the conclusion of a negotiation the great objects of which depended so much on dispatch.

**No. 74**—Malet communicates to the G. G. the acceptance by the Mahrattas of the fourth mode of co-operation and the difficulty in bringing the negotiation to a close.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 5th March 1790.*

On the 1st evening I received a visit from Behro Punt at which much discussion again passed on the subject of the co-operative negotiations now

on foot, the substance of which imported the readiness of this Court to proceed to a settlement on the basis of the 4th mode mentioned in my address to your Lordship of 1st inst., but with the addition of a body of our forces, the pay of which, notwithstanding what passed at my last meeting with the Minister, Bahiro Pt. told me this Court would grant.

And the greatest difficulty that I now apprehend is in my very reasonable expectation that in lieu of the exclusive conquests to be made for the Peshwa and Nabob Nizam Ali K. under their plea of ancient possession, the Co. shall exclusively possess all acquisitions that may be made by their own forces. The annual amount of what the Peshwa calls his ancient possessions will, I conjecture, amount to upward of 60 lacs per annum and the single principality of Curpa to be conquered for Nizam Ali K. on the same plea amounts, I am informed, to an annual revenue of 40 lacs. I am however very sorry that any delay should arise at this critical juncture in reducing my negotiations to some certainty since in reply to the application I made to the Bombay Government for their sentiments as communicated to your Lordship in my address of 26th June, I have received an invitation to confer with the Government in Poona, by which I shall be reduced to the alternative of bringing matters to a point without that previous desirable knowledge or of quitting my negotiations at a most critical period.

In this dilemma I shall, on a very mature consideration of both cases, endeavour to prosecute my negotiations to a point before I leave this, since by resting their conclusion on a reference to Nizam Ali K. for his accession and approval as is proposed by this Court, I shall have an interval of leisure for my trip to Bombay, and as in the interim I may expect the receipt of your Lordship's sentiments on the disavowal, which I hear Tippoo has made of hostilities against the Co., I shall on that knowledge and on the knowledge of the sentiments of the Bombay Government, be ready on my return from Bombay to stop or perfect the terms of the treaty on their return from Nizam Ali K. Should, however, this Court appear to me unreasonably dilatory in its future prosecution of the treaty, I shall if I possibly can with propriety, set out on a visit to Col. Abercromby with which view and in the hope that it will tend to quicken this Court's councils, I have signified my intention to the durbar and applied for a passport.

On the 3rd instant I had the pleasure to receive a letter from Major Palmer signifying Sindia's readiness to co-operate with his endeavours to promote the effect of my negotiations with this Court. I am, however, inclined to think that the Patel in a political point of view cannot be very solicitous to promote arrangements tending to effect so close a connexion between us and the Peshwa and so large an expansion of the power of his Lord Paramount.

Zein-al-Abidin-Khan, the person who used to furnish me sometimes with useful information from Tipu's quarter, has for some time been at

Hyderabad and as I mentioned him to Capt. Kennaway, I presume that gentleman will have the benefit of any service that his talents can be put to.

No. 75—Cornwallis gives directions for the guidance of Malet on the subject of Sindhia's offer of mediation for procuring the co-operation of the Poona Court.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—C. W. MALET.

*Fort William, 8th March 1790.*

You will easily believe from the tenor of my letter dated January 28th that the declaration of Behroo Punt that the Court of Poona is disposed to take part with us in the hostilities against Tippoo on a due arrangement of stipulations must be highly gratifying to me, especially as it has been made without any solicitation or sacrifice on our part.

Sindhia has in very obliging terms assured Major Palmer that he would exert his weight and influence at Poona to procure the co-operation of the Marrattas and he afterwards notified, through Bhao Bakshy, his determination to offer his services to both Governments in forming and maintaining the proposed alliance and co-operation, in other words to become the mediator and guarantee between them as in the treaty of Salbye.

To this last offer we can certainly give no encouragement unless the Poona ministry should join in proposing it, which is in my opinion very improbable. Nor indeed do I at any rate think it would be desirable for us to accept it as Sindia would naturally endeavour by the advantage which such a situation would give him to introduce some stipulations that would be favourable to his views in Hindoostan and here I must caution you in the course of the negotiation not to listen to any plan of that nature which might ultimately involve us in greater difficulties than even the war with Tippoo.

You will probably have heard from Captain Kennaway that the Nizam has expressed the utmost readiness to co-operate heartily with us in the war against Tippoo.

No. 76—Abercromby is anxious to know the amount of assistance that will have to be furnished from Bombay.

FROM—ROBERT ABERCROMBY,

TO—C. W. MALET.

*Bombay Castle, 10th March 1790.*

Your communication to us under the 4th instant leaves it very uncertain when the important avocations in which you are at present

engaged, will allow of your coming down. We are fully apprized of the comprehensive extent of the commission with which you are invested by the Governor General, and are desirous to render it effectual by complying with any requisition you may make to this Government. At the same time, we have instructions from his Lordship to make a powerful diversion from hence against Tippoo's coast possessions. It will occur to you, that this could not be effected with a slender armament, while to detach a formidable one might disable us from complying with the requisitions you may make in consequence of the treaty you are negotiating at Poona. The advanced season of the year, and the consideration of the time requisite to make the necessary preparations for the equipment of an armament to the southward renders it an object of extreme solicitude to us, to be informed what assistance if any the Peshwah will stipulate shall be furnished from hence in the co-operative treaty under discussion. You cannot doubt but we shall be gratified by receiving as soon as possible, your answer to a point, the early ascertainment of which, you will perceive, is of the highest importance to us, at this juncture.

No. 77—Malet communicates to Medows the terms of mutual aid on which the co-operative treaty is going to be based.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—WILLIAM MEDOWS.

*Poona, 12th March 1790.*

I have the pleasure to acquaint you that the foundation of this alliance is laid in the assent of this Court to preliminary articles on the principle of mutual aid and reciprocal partition with an option to the Nabob Nizam Aly Khan of accession to the league. The terms of mutual aid rest at present on this state's being furnished with 2 battalions from Bombay on the footing of our engagement to Nizam Aly Khan and on the Governor Genl's option of demanding and being supplied with a body of 6,000 cavalry by this State. The supply of the above 2 battalions I have been induced to comply with by the following considerations. Its being positively made a point of by this Court in relaxation of its demand of a much larger force, its sending to stimulate the Marratta exertions and give weight to diversion on Tipoo's northern frontier and its not being so great a deduction from the Bombay force as to prevent a diversion on the Malabar Coast, particularly should the Government of Bombay by prevailing on the Nabob of Surat to raise a force for the defence of that city, gain the services of the 2 battalions now stationed there. As soon as the articles of the league abovementioned can be reduced to order which I now hope will be very soon, they are to be submitted to Nizam Aly Khan and in the event of his accession to be

concluded by me on the receipt of positive advice of wars actually ensuing between the Co. and Tippo, the first notice of which will I presume be for you. But though I shall exert my utmost endeavours to induce this Government to commence its operations immediately on the execution of the treaty, well knowing the importance of a diversion, yet do I think it necessary for the information of your Council to acquaint you that I am doubtful of being able to urge it into any serious invasion of the northern frontier before the rains, as this season is so extremely inconvenient for the operations of cavalry from want of forage and as the expense of their equipment will scarcely be compensated by the progress of their arms in so short an interval of action, though to stimulate them to early operation I have restricted their participation of conquest to their actual commencement of hostility. As soon as I have reduced the terms of agreement with this Court to form and despatched them to Hyderabad, I shall set out on a visit to Governor Abercromby and as I think it probable that during my stay at Bombay intimation will be received of your intended operations, that intelligence will enable me in concert with the Governor of Bombay to conclude our arrangements in the manner most conducive to the success of yours. My last letter from Tipu's northern frontier advises the movement of his cavalry from that quarter to the south.

**No. 78**—Malet reports to the G. G. the stipulation made by the Marathas for the invasion of Tipu's territories before the rains on the declaration of war and the difference that has arisen between him and Kennaway in the negotiation of the treaty.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 15th March 1790.*

I have now the pleasure to add that the difficulty of bringing this Court to act before the rains which in my last I expressed an apprehension of has disappeared by its stipulating to invade Tippo's northern frontier with at least 25,000 Marratta or (if Nizam Aly Khan accedes) allied troops to be joined by 2 battalions and their guns from Bombay immediately on my announcing actual war between the Company and Tippo nor is our co-operative league to be affected even by Nizam Aly Khan's refusal to accede to it which however I do not think likely to happen, but of this I hope to be ascertained in 25 days allowing five for complete arrangement with this Court and 20 for the reference to and return from Hyderabad during which I shall pay my respects to Colonel Abercromby whose difficulty in supplying the detachment that I have stipulated for this State will not I hope outweigh the advantage that may be expected from the great effect of its co-operation in the Marratta invasion and I am the more sanguine in this hope, from a consideration that, in the event of the Colonel's

wishing to make a diversion on the Mallabar Coast, he will, in addition to the respectable European force of his Government, have it in his power to employ from 6 to 8 native battalions on that service.

As my power of claiming this Court's compliance with the important stipulation of invading the enemy's northern frontier after receiving the Nabob's decision will now rest on the receipt of authentic information of the actual prosecution of the war, I shall anxiously await the arrival of that necessary knowledge. Some difference has arisen on the ground which Capt. Kennaway and myself have adopted in prosecution of your Lordship's object of gaining the co-operation of our respective Courts, he having reverted to the articles of the treaty of 1768, I having proceeded on your former repeated orders and recent ones of 27 January last. But as the adoption of this ground has been referred to your Lordship who is sufficiently acquainted with my proceedings to direct his to the same course, and as in the interim my advices will have fully informed him of my negotiations, I hope that on the reference of my arranged articles with this Court to Nizam Aly Khan, he will have no difficulty to induce his accession, even should he show any reluctance which I think not likely as the principle of reciprocity on which my arrangements with this Court have been made, will in my opinion be productive of greater advantage to him than could be expected from the treaty of 1768.

No. 79—Capture of a ship belonging to Tipu.

FROM A LETTER OF G. A. BYRON, COMMANDER OF THE "PHOENIX".

*Tellicherry Road, 17th March 1790.*

Cruising off Mahie, I spoke with a vessel from Mangalore bound to the southward laden with powder, etc., for the use of Tippoo's army. As I think it would be improper to allow vessels under that description to proceed to their port whilst the disputes between Travancore and Tippoo continue, I have brought the vessel to the road, and beg you you will be pleased to order a guard on board to take charge of this until I receive further orders from the Commander-in-Chief.

No. 80—Malet reports the difference that has arisen in negotiation between Nana and Kennaway and the submission of a new article for the consideration of the Poona Court.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 19th March 1790.*

My last address of the 15th conveyed the state of my negotiations to that day in which I mentioned to your Lordship the intervention of some



difference on Capt. Kennaway's and my prosecution of the object of your Lordship's orders of 27th January last for your Lordship's more perfect knowledge of which I now enclose copy of Capt. K.'s letter and my answer on the subject. When I had last the honor of addressing your Lordship, I had hopes that it would be found advisable and practicable by Capt. Kennaway to avoid till the receipt of your Lordship's answer to his application on the subject founding his present negotiations for co-operation against Tippu on the partition articles of treaty of 1768 open in my opinion in their original state to cavill and the existence of which appears to me by your Lordship's letter of 7th July 1789 to have been rested on the Nabob's decision on that letter of which I am ignorant or of any ever having been given. But as at a conference with Bahiro Pt. yesterday he introduced some points that give me reason to think this Court possessed of intelligence of Captain Kennaway's intended or adopted line of negotiation, I have thought it necessary to relieve myself from all responsibility as to the Nabob's accession to the treaty. I am negotiating with this Court by the proposal of a new article the fate of which I may be able to make your Lordship acquainted with, before the conclusion of this letter, and which I sincerely hope will be assented, as rejection will subject all that is hitherto done and which is ripe for execution, to the danger of annihilation. The circumstances of this dilemma are as follow. Behro Punt yesterday acquainted me that the Peshwa's vacceel at Hyderabad had communicated as received from Musheer-al-Mulk that it had been settled by Meer Abul Cossim that 200 European artillery and 12 Guns were to accompany the two battalions for the Nabob; I undeceived him by citing the terms of the treaty, 6 guns and their war complement of Europeans; that the eldest son of the Nabob Walla Jah should be his father's Minister; I corrected the error to the fact of being his father's successor by the treaty;—that the mode and amount of payment of the Nabob's peshcush in lieu of the Circars was yet unsettled;—I said I was ignorant of the subject;—that through Abul-al-Cossim when at Calcutta it had been settled by mutual consent of the Govr. Genl. and Nabob that the articles of 1768 relative to the disposal of the Carnatic Ballaghaut should be rejected; I told him I was not informed and I told him the truth, for though from Capt. Kennaway's letter of 4th instant I learn his intention of founding his present negotiations on that treaty, and tho' I imagine such an intention must have been founded on the ground afforded him for that purpose by the Nabob's answer to your Lordship's letter of the 7th July 1789, on which I presume the existence or nullity of the partition part of that treaty now rests, yet am I ignorant, as I before observed, of any such answer having been given. I rest the existence or nullity of this part of the treaty on the Nabob's answer, because when your Lordship declined at his instance carrying it into effect, a like option certainly rested with him of doing the same on another occasion, unless done away by his answer to your Lordship's letter of which I repeat that I am ignorant.

At all events Bahiro Pt.'s assertion of the negotiation of that article of the treaty and desire of my confirmation or contradiction reduced me to a dilemma, since by the former I counteracted any negotiations Capt. Kennaway may be prosecuting on the ground of it; by the latter I assumed the existence of a treaty which if acknowledged by all parties should be the ground of any future co-operative treaty with Nizam Ali K., and by such an assumption prejudiced his right to accession to the terms I am negotiating with this Court. Thus surrounded with embarrassment I gave the rep'y abovementioned and to extricate myself from the appearance of giving the Nabob an option of accession to terms to which his title is doubtful, I have presented the enclosed additional article, which if not admitted, my next and only resource for bringing about that prompt settlement which your Lordship enjoins will be, if no objection occurs on deliberate consideration to propose a separate treaty independent of the Nabob who will make his own terms with Capt. Kennaway, but here likewise innumerable difficulties present in the claims of these powers which would inevitably clash if introduced into separate engagements but all of which I had congratulated myself on having settled by the easy mode described in the partition articles of my negotiations. If my additional article is admitted, the others are, I may say, ready for transmission to the Nabob to whom a period of 27 days, instead of 20 as mentioned in my last is to be allowed for determination.

Yesterday the Minister paid me a formal visit in discharge of the routine that commenced with the Peshwa. On this occasion the articles that he reserved from those sent by the Court of Directors were presented to him.

The Minister acquainted me that two vackeels were advanced as far as the south confines of this State on their way hither from Tippu with the arrears of tribute due from him adding that their despatch had long since been signified by Tippu, and would probably never have been executed but from the circumstances of the conjuncture.

**No. 81**—Intelligence of Tipu's movements.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—WILLIAM MEDOWS.

*Poona, 24th March 1790.*

I have this instant received the following intelligence from the south frontier of this State "The remainder of the enemy horse on this frontier has proceeded toward Syringputtun. Tippu has issued orders through his dominions to bring Pioneers to be furnished from the different towns and districts. The news of his being wounded is not circulated in these parts, but it is said Meer Kumer-al-Deen fell in the attack of the Travancore Lines".

No. 82—Malet reports to the G. G. the long conversation on the subject of the difference between him and Nana on the interpretation of the word "district".

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Poona, 26th March 1790.

I had the honor to transmit copy of the treaty that day (24th March) settled between the principal Ministers of this State and me, and which was to have been officially transmitted under this date to the Nabob Nizam-al-Doula and Captain Kennaway at Hyderabad.

About 8 o'clock the same morning I was surprised at receiving a message from Behro Punt particularly insisting that the criterion of conquest fixed in the first mode of the 9th article to the capitals of districts should be understood as exclusively relating to the capitals of purgunnas, but that capture of capitals of Circars should not give the same title to the possession of the dependencies, to the exclusion of the other allies from entering them.

Perceiving that this message involved the exact discussion of the forts or vantage ground of each party, viz., ours in taking strong places with large dependencies, theirs in avoiding strong places and overrunning a large space of weak ones, to the pursuit of which Bahiro Pt.'s message exactly tended by fixing the claim and test of conquest to purgunnas and the capitals to which their forces are equal and thereby rendering our reduction of forts and strong places comparatively useless. I had recourse to my copy of the treaty where I found the definition (introduced at the Conference of 24th after much debate) of what was to be the criterion of conquest thus worded, "The attack of the capital and the possession of it by one party to be the preventative against 'interference in the district by the others', which term of district may be understood as either Circar, Samsthan or purgunna, and in fact involves all, and consequently if opposed to the word purgunna which this Court insists on would give rise or be liable to give rise to very serious difference in the course of partition." As by it our troops after reducing the capital of a Circar or Purgunna would in both cases oppose the entrance of the troops of another party into that district whereas the Marrattas on the letter of this Court's construction would have a right to enter the dependencies of such Circar composed of many purgunnas even after our capture of the capital, and by the multitude and nature of their forces would be enabled during our attack or after capture of the capital to render its reduction nugatory by seizing its dependencies, or purgunnas, in which war of detail we should not either in the nature or number of our forces be able to keep pace with them. On a mature consideration of these points and on comparing the great difference between my definition of the

criterion of conquest and that insisted on by B. Pt.'s message, I declined giving any answer till I saw the Minister. In the afternoon I waited on the Peshwa to take leave on my departure to Bombay, and after performing that ceremony had a private conversation with the Minister at which though I, fully and as forcibly as I could explain the unfairness of construing any expression to the exclusive benefit of one party, and though I proposed a geographical line as the best expedient that occurred to me for settling the conquests of all parties, yet could I not prevail on him to recede from his position that each purgunna should be held liable to district conquest and that the reduction of their capitals should be the proof of their conquest and this he insisted was the agreement of all parties at the conference of the 24th, in bar of which conclusion I argued the doubt implied of such being the agreement by Behro Punt's message, since, were the matter indubitable, the message was superfluous, and as a further, and in my opinion, incontrovertible proof that the Minister's construction had not been so clearly admitted at the Conference of 24th, I adduced the words of my definition despatched to your Lordship the same night under the influence of what I had understood to be the sense of the Conference of the 24th, before any room for doubt in my mind had arisen from Bahiro Pt.'s message. All however was in vain and the Minister seeing little probability of my acceding to his position and feeling I presume as little inclination to admit my term of district Taluk, the conference was closed by reference to a visit from Bahiro Pt. the next day.

He accordingly came this morning when the subject was again most fully investigated, and in answer to the stress of the Minister's argument, which he rested on the agreement at the Conference of the 24th, I urged that even admitting that the term he insisted on had been agreed to that day, yet if on further deliberation it should be found incompatible with the fundamental principle of the treaty of equal advantage, and if in execution it should be found subject to confusion and serious disagreement, I should certainly expect that, in the interval previous to definite settlement, the Minister's candour would admit a remedy; that, however, in the present case I denied his premises and rejected his conclusion, but that actuated by the same fairness which I expected, and with reciprocal and mutual advantage for my sole object, I was ready in lieu of the Minister's term of capital of a purgunna and mine of capital of a district to admit any expedient that this Court in its wisdom could devise for the satisfaction of all parties. After much conversation, Bahiro Pt. left me to report the substance of it to the Minister, seemingly impressed with a conviction of the necessity of clearly and equitably defining this important point. At all events I apprehend its conclusion is deferred for this day and the post from Bombay having just come in, I have thought it necessary to make your Lordship minutely acquainted with the cause of delay.

No. 83.—Malet reports the further conversation between him and Nana on the interpretation of the word district, his elucidation of the word to get over the difficulty, and the final assent of Nana to the second mode of co-operation.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 28th March 1790.*

I had the honour to transmit your Lordship under the 26th instant an account of the demur that had then taken place in the despatch of the treaty that I had been negotiating with this Court, to the Nabob Nizam Aly Khan and shall now trouble you with the subsequent circumstances and sequel of that unexpected obstruction.

In consequence of the Minister's appointment on the 26th I had on the 27th a visit from Behro Punt which produced nothing but a new reference to the Minister in consequence of which I received a very long message from him in the evening complaining of my opposing the introduction of the word Purgunna as equivalent to district in the definition of the standard of conquest and partition, insisting on the friendly disposition of his Court in coming forward to take part in the war, when Tippu by every mode in his power is courting the Peshwa's friendship and alliance, urging that the Peshwa wished to make me the channel of effecting great events for the benefit of both States, his own and the Company's, but that I wilfully opposed their prosecution. In a word, the Minister desired that I would admit the word Purgunna in the first mode, or should that be impracticable that I would in alteration of the equality of partition prescribed in the second mode, grant this Court an indulgence of exclusive conquest of their ancient possessions north of the Tumbudra over and above the general partition, which indulgence they would confine to 50 lacs the Company's third of which would not much exceed 15 lacs. But at all events the Minister earnestly requested that I would defer my journey to Bombay (for which place I had resolved to set out by post this night) for one day.

In answer to this message I replied that though with great reluctance yet at the Minister's instance, I would defer my departure for one day. That as to his complaints of my opposition, I requested he would advert to the cause and vest the blame of opposition where it belonged. I expressed my high sense of this Court's desire to make me the channel of producing great events, and begged him to advert to the solicitude with which through the present negotiations I had laboured to be instrumental thereto by the establishment of them on the firm basis of reciprocity, the only one that could be productive of permanent co-operation, but which this Court was now endeavouring to shake by the introduction of the word purganna in the first mode of partition, or exclusive resumption of ancient possession



divided amongst the allies agreeable to their convenience. But should its remaining dependancies yield a revenue exceeding the annual amount of 10 lacs, either of the allies shall be at liberty by attacking and reducing the strongest place in such dependency to take possession of it as a conquest to the extent of 15 lacs and so on progressively till the whole of any Circar or Taaluk shall be reduced when the remainder under the amount of 10 lacs as aforesaid will be held divisible by the parties and it is further agreed that the operation of this explanatory article shall commence from the time of the Peshwa and the Nabob's having subdued their ancient possessions, until which period the conquest of the allies shall be subject to no restrictions.

With this expedient for preventing the Marrattas too small and our too large conquests, I signified to the Durbar that as every reasonable objection to the 1st mode of partition was hereby obviated, if the minister still refused his assent to the treaty with the 1st mode thus qualified, or after rejecting it entirely to the 2nd mode alone, and if some less objectionable mode were not (on his declining either of the above modes) substituted before night, I should look on the negotiations of the treaty as susceptible of no further benefits from my stay. But I should act on my declaration of yesterday and set off for Bombay in the course of the night.

This message was despatched to the Durbar about 9 in the morning, and I have the very high satisfaction of acquainting your Lordship that at 12 I received a visit from Behroo Punt at which he acquainted me from the Durbar that it had been resolved to expunge that 1st mode of partition entirely from the treaty as subjecting the parties acting on it to serious and almost inevitable disputes for the prevention of which the plain line laid down in the 2nd mode was adopted as the sufficient and only line of partition agreeable to which he desired me to make out my treaty. I have accordingly done so and now dispatch it to Capt. Kennaway, dated 29th March, as desired by the Durbar. Having previously prepared the enclosed copy for your Lordship, I hope the hurry of this dispatch will apologize for its being sent with the pen struck through the rejected parts.

At this visit Behro Punt acquainted me that the Peshwa would not go this season to meet Nizam Ally Khan ; that Pursaram Bhao is to conduct the war for the present against Tippoo and that he is ordered to raise troops for the purpose. He is esteemed an active commander. He mentioned to me likewise that Sewakram, the Peshwa's agent at Calcutta had expressed some apprehension of being called on by some Courts of Justice, and from the Minister begged 'I would recommend him to your Lordship's protection as the agent of this State.

On the 27th instant the Peshwa sent me 15,000 rupees on account the Mehmanee which I have carried to the Hon'ble Company's credit.

My horses, etc., being posted, I shall set off for Bombay at two o'clock tomorrow morning and hope to reach that place the ensuing night.

I acquaint General Medows of the state of my negotiations by this opportunity.

No. 84—Cornwallis gives directions for the employment of the Bombay detachment.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—C. W. MALET.

*Fort William, 29th March 1790.*

I am, upon the whole, very well satisfied with the present appearances of your negotiation.

As it is hardly possible that this letter should reach you before a final arrangement has been concluded, at least as far as relates to all operations which can be undertaken previous to the setting in of the rains, I shall now only say that if by the extraordinary art of procrastination of the Court of Poona the co-operative treaty should still be unadjusted, I think it much too late for any naval expedition and should approve of as large a body of our troops as can be spared from Bombay being sent to join the Marratta army upon the best terms that you can obtain, provided the Marrattas will immediately endeavour to possess themselves of a part of Tippoo's country and in conjunction with our troops maintain themselves in it during the rainy season.

You will easily conceive that I am desirous of this measure, because it would be of great consequence to engage the Marrattas in actual hostilities previous to that season of temporary suspension of military operations, and because Tipoo might thereby be prevented from making inroads into the Carnatic (where the rains do not commence till November) at the time that our forces could not make any progress in the attack of the Mysore country.

As Lieut.-Colonel Cockerell's detachment as well as the two battalions to whose service the Nizam is entitled will probably be joined to his Highness's troops after the rains, I do not see, if the matter should not be already settled, how we can refuse a body of our troops to the Marrattas and indeed it may perhaps be difficult to employ them more usefully in any other way. If that measure should be determined upon, I should wish the detachment to be as strong as possible for, circumstances may occur with such allies as would render its own strength its greatest security.

What was called by Mr. Holland a disavowal on the part of Tippoo of an intention to commit hostilities was in itself so evidently void of truth, and was in other respects so futile and unsatisfactory, as he in the same letter persevered in making the most unreasonable and inadmissible demands



upon the Rajah of Travancore, that I thought it unworthy of any serious notice ; and I was not a little astonished at hearing that Mr. Holland had committed it either to Captain Kennaway or to the Bombay Government.

No. 85—Malet asks Abercromby to consider the expediency of employing additional troops besides the promised quota, in assisting the Marathas.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—ROBERT ABERCROMBY.

*Bombay, 2nd April 1790.*

I have now the pleasure to submit to your consideration the result of my negotiating in a copy of the treaty that I have concluded with the Marratta State.

By the terms of partition as defined in the 9th article, you will perceive that the Honourable Company are to have an exclusive claim to all conquests previous to the commencement of the cooperation of the allies, and that acquisitions made from the period of their respective entrance into the war are to be equally divided, so that in fact the two battalions to be furnished the Marrattas by your Presidency will be paid by them, while employed in promoting the general interests of the confederacy and the particular one of the Company by the weight that they will give to the invasion of the Marrattas in check of Tippo's efforts against the Madras army.

In my letter of the 13th ultimo, I expressed my doubt of the Marrattas acting before the rains. That doubt is now removed, and you will perceive by the 3rd article of the treaty that their invasion of the enemy's territories rests on my official communication of the actual commencement of hostilities, which I shall not think myself justified in making till authorized so to do by authentic intelligence from you or the Governor of Madras. It was communicated to me by the Poona Durbar that the conduct of the invasion of the enemy's country would be entrusted to Pursaram Bhao, a Chief of considerable military reputation, and who being in command of the Marratta frontier is particularly interested in the success of it.

I was greatly influenced in confining the requisition of the Marratta Durbar to two battalions, by a desire of leaving you the power of making some equipment against the enemy on the Mallabar Coast, but should the numerous difficulties, that present in bar of a diversion in that quarter, render its adoption inexpedient or impracticable, permit me to submit to you, whether as all conquests are to be equally divided and thereby the most forcible inducement to separate attack removed, the general object of the war and the particular one of making a diversion in favour of the Madras army would not probably be promoted by increasing the stipulated detachment for the Marratta junction.

Should this mode of employing the force of your Presidency be deemed worthy attention, and which must at all events rest on the early receipt of authentic intelligence of the commencement of hostilities, it will become the object of my endeavours to introduce the additional force in the best manner possible to the Poona Durbar.

Your knowledge of the state of the French at the Islands will enable you to regulate the force that may with propriety be detached from the Presidency to join the Marrattas or to act on the Mallabar Coast, but when the present posture of the French affairs in Europe is adverted to, and that no naval force of that nation in the Indian seas is equal to the squadron under the honourable commodore Cornwallis, I presume his presence (if not required on more important service elsewhere) at Bombáy the only place where during the approaching monsoon they could make their appearance, would remove all possible cause of apprehension.

No. 86—Uththoff submits to the G. G. the estimate of expenses furnished by the Peshwa for the cavalry to be supplied to the English.

FROM—J. UTHTHOFF,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 7th April 1790.*

On the 5th I forwarded dispatches from the Bombay Government and Mr. Malet on the subject of the military arrangements at Bombay in consequence of intelligence from the Mallabar Coast of the renewal of hostilities by Tippoo against Travancore the beginning of last month.

Having applied to the Darbar for an estimate of the expense of the auxiliary cavalry to be furnished by the Peshwa by Mr. Malet's instructions on requisition agreeable to the 7th article of the late treaty I received on the 6th instant an answer to the following purport.

The allowance, to each horseman, officer or private, of every denomination, including all charges whatever, to be at the rate of 600 rupees per annum.

Every horse killed in action, or dying in consequence of wound received in action, to be paid for by the Company.

An advance called *nalbund*, the amount of which is not yet settled, to be paid by the Company on making a requisition for the auxiliary cavalry, whose allowance is to be paid regularly every month.

If the Company make the requisition for the Marratta cavalry, they must be entertained in the Company's pay twelve months, however short a time they may be employed by the Company. If they are employed longer than twelve months, they are to be paid agreeable to the time of service.

In explanation of the above, it may not be unworthy your Lordship's notice that the payment of the Marratta troops was as I am informed originally regulated by the following mode. On taking the field, an advance called Nalbundy or a third or a year's pay, subsistence while on service called Rozmura, a third more, and the balance reserved by Government till the expiration of the service. This mode of payment was I understand, pretty regularly adhered to formerly but since the time of the Peshwah Madhavrao about twenty years ago little more than the name remains and the troops have been very ill paid. Government having been backward in their issues, large deductions have been made on account of fees, some authorized, many not. There are two descriptions of Maratta cavalry in the pay of Government, one Silledar or troopers serving with their own horses, the other, Bargheer who are mounted on horses the property of Government. The horses of the former are valued at the period of their first entertainment in the service, and if killed in battle are paid for by Government agreeable to that value. The Govt., I am informed, pays 1,000 rupees for every horse of a certain quality killed in service belonging to a Hindoo, a Mahomedan being paid agreeable to the oath he takes on the Koran as to the value of his horse. All plunder except guns, elephants, and a few other articles taken by a Sillidar becomes his own property. The Bargheer's plunder goes to Government, who reward him at discretion. In the 10th article of the treaty of 1770 between the Bombay Government and Hyder relative to mutual assistance of troops, your Lordship will perceive that the pay of a private European is fixed at 15 Rupees per month, a private horseman at 15, and a sepoy at 7, officers' allowances at the discretion of the assisted, with the concurrence of the party who assists.

The above terms proposed by the Government for the payment of their auxiliary Cavalry appearing very high, and will no doubt require and admit of considerable alteration. I shall not enter into any discussion on the subject with the Durbar without Mr. Malet's instruction, and I know that this affair will be committed entirely to his more able management by his speedy return.

**No. 87**—Cornwallis communicates to Kennaway certain instructions to induce the Nizam to commence hostilities immediately.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—CAPT. KENNAWAY.

*Fort William, 8th April 1790.*

All the reasons which render it desirable that the Marrattas should without delay engage in the war apply with equal strength to the Nizam and I shall depend upon your zeal and ability to urge every argument

with his Highness and the Minister which may be best calculated to persuade them to begin their operations without loss of time.

I am the more sanguine in my hopes that your endeavours will be successful, as you can point out to them that Tippoo will be obliged to employ the flower of his forces against our main army which will be in readiness to march from Trinchinopoly by the middle of next month and consequently that they will not only find easy conquests at present in the northern parts of his dominions but that by the agreement which has been concluded between Mr. Malet and the Poona Govt. a larger proportion of these acquisitions will fall to His Highness's share, if they can be obtained before the Marrattas shall actually commence hostilities.

In order to encourage His Highness to take such an immediate and decided part as would favour the operations of the southern army or tend to prevent Tippoo's banditti from ravaging the centre and northern part of the Carnatic, you may inform him that a complete Company of European artillery, three complete Companies of lascars and a suitable train of field-pieces will in a few days be dispatched from hence by sea for Masulipatam to be in readiness to act in conjunction with other troops as circumstances may require and that Colonel Cockerell's brigade which is now advancing fast on its march to the southward will if it should be thought expedient for promoting the success of the common cause be directed to cooperate with his Highness's army either to strengthen it against any forces that Tippoo may detach to the northward or to enable it to continue its operations with more efficacy against Tippoo's dominions.

I am the more anxious that His Highness should lose no time in penetrating into Tippoo's territories as I should hope that by the Nizam's troops making some progress to the westward of the gauts, Tippoo's irregular cavalry might be deterred from venturing thro' the passes to carry their ravages and depredations into the Carnatic.

**No. 88**—Malet sends intelligence of Tipu's military strength.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—ROBERT ABERCROMBY.

*Poona, 11th April 1790.*

After taking my leave of you yesterday evening, I made the best of my way hither, and arrived at 8 this night; and on my arrival found the enclosed intelligence from a quarter of credibility on the southern frontier of this State; but though I cannot vouch for the contents of it on this occasion, I have thought it of some consequence to attempt getting it to Bombay before Colonel Hartley's departure.

The following is a copy of the intelligence mentioned in the above letter.

A man of mine is just arrived from Tippoo's camp before the Travancore lines, which he left the middle of February. He assured me that he saw Tippoo the beginning of that month in perfect health, and that he had not been wounded. His cousin Kumer-ud-deen Khan received two deep wounds on his breast, of which it is expected he will recover. Tippoo's ill success has obliged him to send for the remainder of his infantry, and upwards of 40,000 have in consequence already joined him, viz., the four brigades, Kushoons as they are called, from Cottahgiri; the camp of four more from the Koorg country, and the remaining six that were in his capital; so that his army at present consists of at least 2,00,000. All his infantry are now with the army except 5 or 6,000 that were at Simoga (towards Bednoor) who had already marched to their new station to guard the entrance of the Koorg Country, and a camp of about 10,000 men in the quarter of Mangalore and Cannanore. Part of his horse, said to be 10,000 have marched to Colaur, and the remainder are expected to proceed dismounted to the army in order to fight on foot. He has dispatched an ambassador, Coolaub khan, to the English to endeavour to make up matters. After his first repulse, he sent for his brother from his capital and keeps him now a prisoner in camp: He also immediately discharged the whole arrears due to his army, and promised to pay them regularly in future. I see no forces raising as yet in Pursaram Baou's districts, and every thing remains in perfect tranquillity in this quarter.

No. 89—Cornwallis communicates to Kennaway instructions regarding the negotiation of the treaty with the Nizam, particularly of the defensive arrangement with the Nizam.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—KENNAWAY.

*Fort William, 12th April 1790.*

I have great pleasure in declaring my highest satisfaction with the zeal and judgment with which you have conducted the negotiation to this point, and I so perfectly approve of the substance of the articles that have been mutually agreed upon that you have my sanction to put them into the form of a treaty and upon your transmitting two copies of the treaty ratified and signed by his Highness, I shall without delay return one of them to His Highness ratified and signed by me.

You may however mention to the Nizam and the Minister that it appears to me that it will be an improvement in the present agreement if instead of his Highness's or the Company's present possessions being specified it shall be inserted in the treaty that the territories belonging to the Contracting parties and to their respective allies and tributaries which are to be

mutually guaranteed to each other, shall be particularly named and specified at the termination of the present war. And that instead of requiring that the Peshwah who on account of his youth could be of no use shall take the field in person, it shall only be declared that the Peshwa's Government shall be looked upon as bound to employ its whole forces in a vigorous prosecution of the war.

Should His Highness object to the first alternative I do not by any means desire that you should press it upon him ; but if it is not made it will be proper to add at the end of the second article as it stands at present, the words " The possessions belonging to the Company and its allies and tributaries which are to be guaranteed by His Highness will be particularly named and specified at the termination of the present war."

I conceive that his Highness can have no objection to excuse the Peshwah from taking the field nor to the introduction of similar stipulations to those which have been agreed to by Mr. Malet and the Poona Minister, viz. that neither of the three Powers who have entered into the present alliance shall have a claim to the participation of any conquests made by the others previous to the period at which they shall have respectively commenced hostilities against Tippoo by an actual invasion of his territories with a considerable force and that each party may send Vackeels to attend the army of the other Confederates in order to be witnesses of their conduct, and when the treaty is reduced into form I should wish it to be more distinctly expressed, that none of the Parties is to be at liberty to enter into separate negotiations but that all propositions from Tippoo are to be communicated to each other and that peace is only to be made with him by the mutual consent of all the Confederates.

You will, I am persuaded, be able to state these observations to His Highness in so friendly a manner as to give him no room to suppose it possible that they have proceeded from a spirit of cavil or a desire to take any advantage of him.

You may likewise take that opportunity to express both to himself and to Azeem-ul-Omrah how highly sensible I am of the liberal manner in which they received my propositions to join with the Company in the present war and of the openness and fairness with which they have discussed the different articles which are to constitute the terms of our alliance and you may give them the strongest assurances, that they shall have no reason to repent of their having treated me with so much candour but that in return I shall have a pleasure in embracing every opportunity that offers to give them convincing proofs of my sincerity and friendship. It will also be proper upon that occasion to desire that His Highness will, for the sake of regularity, furnish you with an answer to be transmitted to me to the letter which was delivered to him by Meer Abul-Kassim as it will be stated at present to be one of the treaties which has been concluded between his Highness and the Company.

I trust that the more His Highness reflects upon the nature of his proposition that I would engage to interfere in case the Marrattas should at any time make unreasonable demands upon him, he will more clearly see that as the Marrattas have acceded heartily and cordially to the confederacy it would be highly improper in me to suppose that they would be inclined to treat one of their own allies with injustice, and consequently that such an assurance must appear to them in a light highly injurious and offensive.

But in order to prove to His Highness how anxious I am to go every justifiable length to show my regard to his interests and to gratify him in his wishes, you may inform him that provided the Marrattas do not positively object to it I will agree to its becoming an additional article in the present treaty that should differences arise between any two of the Confederates, the third party shall be bound to interpose his good offices, and to take every means in his power to bring those differences to a just and amicable settlement, and you may add to His Highness, to Azeem al Omrah and to Meer Abul Cossim, that, should an article to that effect be assented to by the Poona Government and any case should arise in which my interference should be called upon in consequence of it, they will always find me in the best disposition to endeavour to save His Highness from the necessity of submitting to mortification or injury.

It appeared to me that as the substance of the agreements is precisely the same, it would be most regular that a treaty of confidence should be formed for the three parties in one instrument, though I should not choose to press it either upon his Highness or the Marrattas.

Should both those Powers see the propriety of adopting my idea, I shall leave it to you and Mr. Malet to arrange and prepare the general treaty for my signature according to the terms of the stipulations that have been already settled. But should any objection be made by either of them it will at least be necessary that a treaty similar to that which has been made by each of them respectively with us, should also be entered into between those two Governments.

You can be at no loss to find arguments to convince His Highness of our sacred regard to the faith of treaties and of the sincerity of our promises to employ the most vigorous exertions in carrying on the war when you have it in your power in the one case to point out to his observation that it is for the sole purpose of protecting and saving an ally from destruction that we have engaged in the present contest and when in the other you can enumerate to him the powerful armies which we have already equipped at an enormous expense, and which will begin their operations immediately in different quarters.

You can also remove all his apprehensions respecting the stability of our treaties by stating to him that as all treaties which are made in India

must now be communicated to the King's administration in England, whose duty it is to take care that the national honor shall not be injured by a breach of public faith, there will not be the least risk that any future Governor-General will venture to infringe any of the treaties that shall be concluded by me.

His Highness will easily perceive that as Tippoo will probably employ the greatest part of his forces against our army to the southward of the Carnatic, and as the setting in of the rains will soon interrupt all military operations to the westward of the Ghauts, almost the entire burthen and danger of the war will fall to our share for many months to come, and that it will therefore be peculiarly incumbent upon him and the Marrattas to show their earnestness and zeal to promote the success of the common cause by commencing their operations without an hour's delay, in order to make such immediate acquisitions as to enable them to embarrass and distress the enemy by maintaining their armies in his country during the season of the rains.

I think it necessary to add that I have an entire reliance upon your sparing no pains to persuade His Highness to adopt that plan of operations, and to encourage and incite him to employ the greatest activity in the execution of it.

**No. 90**—Malet communicates to the G. G. information on many matters—his return to Poona, the raising of recruits by Hiern and the arrival of Tipu's agents at Wai.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 13th April 1790.*

On the 4th instant I was honored with your Lordship's letter of the 8th ulto. Had not the completion of my engagements with this Court on the 29th ulto. rendered Mhadjee Sindia's interposition unnecessary at present, Your Lordship might rest assured that I should have been exceedingly averse to hearken to any terms for the promotion of his views in the north with which this Court might have accompanyd its negotiations for south co-operation; and I cannot admire the circumspection with which your Lordship waved the acceptance of the authoritative interposition which Sindia offered with this Court and which certainly would have been conducted with at least as much regard to his own interests as ours and probably have involved us in a previous struggle for the establishment of his influence. At the same time I am strongly of opinion, that the appearance of such a cordiality and such an interposition may be suspended over the apprehensions of this Brahmin Court with advantage to our interests, and I shall accordingly give the Minister to understand that the



good will of the Peshwa prevents our having recourse to those good offices which our friendship and connexion with Mhadjee Sindia give us a claim to and which we are assured of his readiness to grant.

On the same day I received a letter from Mr. Secy. Chamier announcing the actual prosecution of the war against Tipu on which I resolved immediately to return to my station but was detained by the recollection that no answer could yet have been received at Poona on the reference of the treaty to Nizam Ally Khan of 29th ultimo, and by Col. Abercromby's desire that I would wait the arrival of another post which having reached B'bay the 8th I on the 9th signified to that Board my intention of setting off immediately for Poona which I did on the 10th and arrived here the 11th at night having previously settled with Col. Abercromby to whose zeal and alacrity I cannot do justice, the mode of compliance with this Court's requisition for the stipulated aid from his government.

On the 12th I signified to this Court that an armament had been equipped from Bombay to act against the enemy to the south, in the formation of which regard had been paid to the discharge of our engagements with the Peshwa and that as the stipulated force was held in readiness for that purpose, I begged to be immediately informed when the Durbar intended to require their presence that I might give Col. Abercromby timely notice. To this message I have not hitherto received an answer.

It is now my intention to announce to this Court without delay the commencement of hostilities and to demand its immediate preparation for the discharge of the 3rd art. of the treaty, influenced thereto by Mr. Chamier's communication of 16th March, sent by a letter from General Medows of 21st ultimo, intimating his expectation of the movement of the grand army from Trichinopoly by the middle of May, and by a persuation of the great importance of the diversion of this State being ready to operate about the same time, which cannot be expected without immediate preparation, which may be and ought to be commenced before the receipt of the Nabob's decision on the option of accession.

I have much pleasure in acquainting your Lordship that from the success I have already met with in procuring recruits here under the good management of Capt. Hiern the Commander of my Guard, I have great hopes of making the permission of this Government for that purpose highly serviceable and acceptable to Col. Abercromby. Near 100 have been already dispatched to Bombay, who were procured in six or seven days.

My assistant Mr. Uhthoff mentioned to your Lordship under the 7th instant the terms of payment that this Government had proposed for a body of cavalry, which appearing unreasonable I shall make known my sense of them to the Minister. Should the idea of procuring a body of cavalry be held desirable by your Lordship, I should be happy to be informed of it, and of the rate, the number and in what time it would be

acceptable, when, should not this Govert.'s terms be reducible to reason, I might be able to acquaint your Lordship of the practicability of effecting the design in some other way.

P.S.—I am informed that Tippoo's agents are arrived at Wyhe at 30 coss hence where the Rasta family resides, whence they are expected to come on to Poona. The enclosed is my last intelligence from the southern frontier of this state.

No. 91.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—WILLIAM MEDOWS.

*Poona, 16th April 1790.*

I yesterday made a formal annunciation to the Regent Minister of this State of the prosecution of the war between the Honourable Company and Tippoo Sultan, and demanded the effectual discharge of the Peshwah's engagements as stipulated in that event by the treaty of 29th ultimo.

Since writing the foregoing, it has been officially signified to me that the detachment of the Company's troops abovementioned will be required to join the army of the State before the rains.

No. 92—Cornwallis censures the conduct of Hollond, ex-Governor of Madras, and directs Malet to incite the Marathas to commence hostilities without delay and to grant any additional assistance that they might require.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—C. W. MALET.

*Fort William, 17th April 1790.*

I am unwilling in a correspondence of this nature to pass censures upon any of the Company's Governments ; but the circumstances which have occurred, oblige me to say that I consider Mr. Hollond, the late President of Fort St. George, as highly culpable in having communicated Tippoo's disavowal of a premeditated design to attack the Rajah of Travancore's Lines on the 29th of December last, in a manner which impressed you, as well as several others of the Company's servants in official situations, with a doubt of its having become indispensibly necessary for this Government to resent that act as a flagrant violation of the late treaty of peace ; because the Government of Fort St. George was at that time in possession of proofs of the falsehood of Tippoo's assertions as well as of his hostile disposition to the Company. For, in the same letter which contained the disavowal, he persevered in making the unjust and inadmissible demands that the Rajah should restore Cranganore and Iacottah to the Dutch and demolish part of the lines that cover the northern frontiers of his country.

The abovementioned letter from Tippoo has never been looked upon in any other light by this Government, than as an insidious attempt to lull the Madras Government into a fatal supineness, in order that he might gain time to destroy one of our allies without being intercepted by our interference, and we have consequently continued to press forward all our preparations for war without any relaxation, being convinced that our duty requires that we should exact signal reparation from that Prince for the daring outrage which he has committed.

You will therefore communicate the above resolution to the Minister in the most explicit terms, and that it may operate as a spur to induce them to commence immediate hostilities, you will at the same time notify to them that General Medows has received orders to attack Tippoo's southern dominions with a very large army as soon as may be practicable in order to force him to abandon his designs against our ally, the Rajah of Travancore, and to return to the defense of his own territories and that the equipment of the army with which General Medows is to act is already in so great forwardness its operations will probably have commenced before you can make the above declaration.

You may also notify to the Ministers that I am ready to engage to form the defensive alliance that they proposed against Tippoo for the mutual protection of the territories which the contracting parties may be respectively possessed of at the conclusion of the war, which territories to prevent all future disputes or doubts must be distinctly described in that treaty, and as there is at present every appearance that Nizam Aly Khan will co-operate heartily with us in the war, I shall consider his Highness as particularly entitled to participate in all the advantages of the above stipulations.

I need not explain to you that it will be of the utmost importance for the success of the common-cause and of the operations of our army in the southern parts of the Carnatic that the Marrattas should be persuaded to attack his northern territories immediately and by that means oblige him to divide his forces.

As the Nizam has already made a requisition of the two battalions and the six field-pieces which we are obliged by the former treaty to furnish, the Marrattas will by your agreement be entitled to the assistance of an equal force upon the same terms from Bombay, and as I am afraid that the near approach of the south west monsoon will render it impracticable to make an efficacious diversion from that Presidency on the Coast of Mallabar, I am so far from having any objection to supply the Marrattas with a larger force if they should desire it, that, provided they will agree to commence hostilities before the rains, I shall approve of their being joined by as large a body of the Bombay troops as can be spared, consistently with the security of that settlement and with any plan of operations in which that Government may have previously engaged.

Indeed, I am so much of opinion that there is great danger of the Carnatic being overrun during the operations of our army to the southward unless the Marrattas can be brought to act without loss of time that I should not only relinquish the objections which at first struck me against the junction of our troops with the Marratta army, but likewise approve of your agreeing that the Company should defray part or even the whole of the expence of anybody of our troops with which it might be thought expedient to assist them, in addition to the number that they have already required, provided that it should appear to you that they have otherwise resolved to defer their operations till after the rains and that by making them such a concession they could be prevailed upon to proceed immediately with a considerable force to open hostilities.

Considerations of our own interest may not be equally urgent to induce us to furnish an additional body of troops to the Marrattas after the rains are over, but as I have great doubts from late inquiries that I have made whether any force that it may be possible to detach from Bombay can be employed with effect against Tippoo's possessions on the Coast of Mallabar and as a body of our infantry with a suitable artillery might enable the Marrattas to attack his northern dominions with great success and by that means create a powerful diversion in favour of General Medows, I should be inclined to grant such additional assistance upon the best terms that could be obtained for it; and after having declared those sentiments I shall leave it to you to negotiate the points that I have mentioned according to your own judgment and discretion.

As the means of providing draught and carriage cattle for the various services of the army must be externally circumscribed at Bombay, my wish is that in making all arrangements of co-operation with the Poona Government you should endeavour to persuade the Marrattas to undertake to furnish and to deliver at the Island of Bombay the number of bullocks that may be necessary for the complete field-equipment of any corps of our troops that may be directed to act with their army, and it will be reasonable that an allowance should be made for the real expence of such supply on the general settlement of the public accounts.

In support of the propriety of your proposition that all the contracting parties should employ their whole forces in the prosecution of this plan, you may take an opportunity of stating to the Minister that instead of confining ourselves to the amount of forty battalions which was mentioned by Behro Punt, it is my determination that not only all the troops in the Carnatic which exclusive of a numerous native establishment of cavalry and infantry consists at present of a regiment of European cavalry and a body of European infantry and artillery, shall act against Tippoo, but that the forces of the Presidency of Bombay and large reinforcements from this Government shall likewise attack him in different quarters which all together will greatly exceed forty battalions.

Cornwallis expresses his satisfaction at the prospect of the conclusion of the treaty and his opinion on the advantages of the various modes of giving effect to the treaty.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—C. W. MALET.

*Calcutta, 19th April 1799.*

[See Ross, ii. 20-21]

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No. 93—Malet sends a detailed report of his conversation with Bahiro Pant and Nana on the subject of the junction of the detachment from Bombay with the Maratha forces which was finally agreed to and on the subject of partition of conquests and future guarantee of possessions.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 19th April 1799.*

In my addresses of 13th and 16th instant I had given your Lordship such an account of my proceedings since my return hither as appeared immediately necessary for your Lordship's information but as a more particular detail may be requisite for a clear development of the extreme intricacy of the present state of the negotiations at this Court and that of Hyderabad, I shall, however reluctantly, at so busy a crisis, proceed to trouble you with it.

On the 13th instant I received a visit from Bahiro Pt. at which after the usual compliments on my return from Bombay, he acquainted me that it was resolved by the ministry not to apply for the detachment of the Co.'s forces of which this Court had an option before the rains. I immediately expressed my surprise at this change of sentiment by the Durbar on a point that had been so strenuously insisted on, and which I had only granted to the most pressing importunity. I represented the impropriety of the Durbar's conduct in not previously informing me of a circumstance that would have given an entirely new face to our arrangements, now settled with a view to this detachment and that even had it acquainted me with its resolution during my residence at Bombay, I might have been able to concert with that Government to have disposed of the troops in a manner suitable to our interests. I observed that this change of the plan of action would give great reason to suspect a general change of disposition, since I should never have assented to the small force stipulated for this Court to act with before the rains but in the conviction that its smallness would be compensated by the eclat of our junction. I insisted strongly on the merit of having procured this Court the option of our force to join them at the point least admissible by our Government at a time when the troops could have been employed so effectively elsewhere.

I gave Bahiro Pt. to understand that depending on the faithful performance of this Court's part of its agreements, we had not had recourse to Mhadjee Sindia's mediating offers, since it would be unnecessary to burthen his friendship with soliciting what the cordiality of this Court so readily acquiesced in, whereas should we perceive a probability of disappointment, we must have recourse to the friendly mediation which could prevent it. After discussing this point and being assured by B. Pt. that he would use his good offices with the Minister on the subject, he acquainted me that by letters from Govinrao, this Court's Vackeel at Hyderabad, the Peshwa had been informed on the part of Musheer-al-Mulk that the Nabob's entering his tents had been in consequence of Capt. K.'s engaging that on his so doing the war should at all events be carried on against Tippo, that peace should not be made but by mutual consent, that on a peace each party should guarantee the possessions of the other against Tippo, that there should be an equal partition of conquest without discrimination of time for commencement of hostilities, and that should any condition favourable to the Nabob be agreed on by Mhadjee Sindia or the Peshwa with the Co.'s Residents at their respective Courts, he (the Nabob) should be entitled to benefit thereby. In the course of this conversation B. Pt. said that the Minister had looked on Musheer-al-Mulk's assertion of Capt. K.'s having assented to the above engagements as groundless, since as Capt. K. must have been informed of my proceedings, it was not likely that he should have yielded the point of future guarantee which I had so strongly opposed, nor that he would have been less particular than me in a stipulation as to the commencement of hostilities and appropriation of previous conquests. Nor did I scruple to confirm this idea of Musheer-al-Mulk's assertion being exaggerated, by an assurance that Capt. K. had made no engagements with the Nabob but rested his Highness's proposals on reference to Calcutta, and in the interim assured me that he would use his influence to prevail on the Nabob to accede to the treaty concluded between me and this Court.

After this conference the following considerations occurred to me on the subject of this Court's declining the junction of our troops. 1st, that it may be influenced thereto by the recollection of the payment falling on the Peshwa while by the conditions of the treaty the services of the detachment would be equally advantageous to the Co. as the Peshwa; 2nd, that from the short interval of action before the rains and difficulty of acting in the rains, its services would not be productive of advantage abstracted from the company's share equal to the expense; 3rd, that this Court may have views of making a merit with Tippo and his friends at this Court of declining the admission of our troops, to gain thereby (and by such other means as it will not scruple to practise, those large sums which I am informed Tipu's agents are charged with for this Court through the powerful mediation of the Rasta family.

Had I been able to procure the original settlement of the treaty of 29th ulto with this State, without admitting the junction of a body of our forces, the merit would have been great on my part considering the orders of Government. But as that junction has now been introduced in a manner peculiarly advantageous to our interests and as the immediate object of diversion during the war and our general one of subsequent diversion, are now closely connected with it, its adoption by this Court became highly desirable. At my conference therefore with the minister on the 15th instant, when I announced the prosecution of the war and demanded this Court's compliance with its engagement, I expressed my surprize at B. Pt.'s intimation of the Peshwa's change of resolution relative to requiring the junction of our troops. The Minister confirmed B. Pt.'s intimation, and acknowledged that the Durbar having it in contemplation to employ a much larger body of its own troops than stipulated by treaty it was intended not to require the Company's detachment. On receiving this answer, I entered much at large on the subject, recapitulated the arguments previously urged to B. Pt., and stated the evils to the general cause and particular inconveniences to the Company, which would arise from so material an alteration in the general plan of the war at this advanced period of the season. If expense was the object that deterred this Government from requiring our troops, I endeavoured to remove it by producing the very moderate statement of their monthly charge scarce equal to the pay of 800 horse at the rate of the estimate this State had furnished me; how unworthy then of consideration when put in competition with the charges which the Co. at this moment incurs and the efforts making by all its Governments, insomuch that should the Peshwa persevere in declining the junction of the Co.'s forces, I should look on it as a failure in the discharge of the spirit of the treaty, since the grand and primary object of all wars is, or should be, speedy and honourable peace, and if the Peshwa declines using the means of promoting that desirable end, there would be too much room to complain of a spirit incompatible with the objects of the alliance, particularly as from the nakedness and defencelessness of Tippoo's northern frontier, the presence of the Co.'s forces with a Mahratta army in that part would in all human probability be attended with the most important and decided consequences, which if not attempted, and if on the contrary the Peshwa's efforts were withheld and a system of expecting rather than promoting events adopted, the least disagreeable consequence to be apprehended was the commencement of a most important alliance with distrust instead of confidence and cordiality, since the other contracting Powers could not be satisfied with reservation tending to throw on them the burthen of the war at a time when taking the share of it is of the utmost importance. I did not scruple in the course of this discussion to give the Minister to understand that reports had reached me of causes for this change in the intention of the Durbar in the intrigues of the powerful friends

of Tippoo at this Court strengthened by the approach of that Prince's agents, which he heard and replied to with an air of innocence and confidence accompanied with a reference to futurity for the proof of the sincerity of the parties in the present alliance. But all my arguments and all my endeavours were ineffectual to procure either an explanation of his intention as to waving the requisition of our troops or an answer whether or not they would be required which he assured me he would communicate by B. Pt. the ensuing day. What passed at this meeting relative to the negotiations at Hyderabad and the communications from thence of Capt. K.'s having absolutely entered into terms with the Nabob were mentioned in my letter of 16th to that gentleman copy of which was forwarded to your Lordship.

I accordingly received a visit from B. Pt. the next day who acquainted me that in consequence of my representations, the Minister had resolved to make the requisition for the junction of our forces but that it was proposed they should embark at Bombay, land at Vengorla or Malwan and proceed from thence to join the army of this State on its southern confines. I mentioned that though this route was in every other respect eligible, yet some difficulties presented from the lateness of the season and the present state of our understanding with the Raja of Pannella through some part of whose territory the road lay; I also mentioned the great additional expense that would be incurred by so distant an embarkation which I doubted not this Court would defray, when it was considered that by landing our troops in this State's territory immediately opposite to Bombay that expence might be avoided. At all events I requested B. Pt. to procure me an immediate answer to these points particularly to the route and time of demanding our troops.

For the further particulars that passed at this meeting with B. Pt. on the subject of Capt. K.'s and my negotiations permit me to refer your Lordship to my letter to that gentleman of 16th.

Cheerfully as I acquiesce in the merit of Capt. K.'s negotiations with the Nabob, permit me, my Lord, to hope that in the comparison of his negotiations and mine, and in the justice of his laying much stress on the advantageous terms he has procured, the difficult circumstances of the Courts with which we have had to deal may not be forgotten. The Peshwa, a jealous and reluctant observer of the increase of our power highly obnoxious to his own, the Nabob, an apprehensive beholder of the Peshwa's advance to years of maturity and anxious by the acquisition of the Co.'s friendship to found a claim to future support for himself and family against the predatory ambitious spirit of the Mahrattas, to which his territories are constantly exposed, the Peshwa long used to influence the Nizam's Councils and to assume a superiority in their political intercourse; the Nabob anxious under the countenance of our power to extricate himself from such a dependance; the Peshwa bound to us by no treaties of aid or alliance and having claims of tribute on the power



whose annihilation is now probably at hand which claims would be involved therein, the Nabob bound by treaties of aid and alliance more beneficial to us were they practicable than his present terms. The Peshwa's claims to former possession now blended in the general mass of partition were great and expensive. The Nabob also claims to ancient tenures, but not equal to those of the Peshwa.

The Peshwa so formidable to the Nabob that it would have been impracticable to have concluded a separate alliance with the Nabob to his exclusion, the Nabob so little formidable to the Peshwa that without the smallest apprehension of the consequences he is perfectly master of his connexions without burthening his friends with his support. Thus far for the circumstances that may be allowed to have had some weight in a more favourable arrangement of partition for the Peshwa than that settled by Capt. K. with the Nabob. With respect to the article of quotas, I am of opinion that the body of 25,000 of the allies joined by the Co.'s four battalions and commanded by an active Officer, would have been an effective force for the purpose of diversion before the rains, and probably better calculated for the purposes expected from it than a much larger force granted with reluctance, which was strongly and invincibly expressed by this Court to the employment of a larger body. At all events the option of staying at home should not have been excepted to by his Highness, since it gave him an opportunity of conferring a favour on his allies.

These are the points of Capt. K.'s advantage and the only one on which the Nabob rests his objections to the treaty of Poona except the article of reference of guarantee to your Lordship, on which I shall be silent, as I shall on the powerful factions with which in the course of my negotiations I have had and still have to struggle at this Court.

Upon the whole, should it be found ultimately practicable to close Captain K.'s and my negotiations without clashing and contradiction I shall in that event be of opinion that our residence at our respective Courts has been mutually serviceable by promoting an emulation in each Court to make quick and separate engagements and I am free to confess that without such a stimulus I should not have expected the terms I have procured nor to have been able to conclude them with so much expedition. Capt. K. is the best judge of the effect similar causes may have had on his Court.

## SECTION 3

*Tipu captures Travancore lines—British reaction to  
this Aggression—Cornwallis speeds up diplomatic  
and military arrangements  
(April—June 1790)*

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No. 93A—Report of Tipu's assault on the lines.

FROM—THE RAJA OF TRAVANCORE,  
TO—THE RESIDENT OF TRAVANCORE.

*Anjingo, Received 20th April 1790.*

On the 13th of the month the troops of Tippoo Sultaun commenced an assault on my lines which was returned. On the 14th likewise an engagement occurred. On the 15th in the morning they entered the Lines, made a desperate attack, and killed and wounded 4,000 of my people and as, they were in great force, my Lines surrendered to the Sultan. It is my bad fortune that no opportunity presented for the Company's troops to come to my assistance. As I place the greatest confidence in the Resident, I write this to impart to him my affliction, whose speedy reply I hope for.

No. 94—Cornwallis congratulates Malet on his amicably settling the difference that arose on the interpretation of the words "Capitals of districts" and gives directions regarding the speedy conclusion of the treaty.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,  
TO—C. W. MALET.

*Fort William, 26th April 1790.*

As the difference which arose between you and the Peshwa's Ministers on the construction of the words capitals of districts which were mentioned in the 1st mode of cooperation and partition that was intended to be proposed for the Nizam's accession to the Confederacy has been amicably accommodated by the entire rejection of that mode, it is unnecessary for me to enlarge further upon the subject, than by declaring that I consider the firmness with which you resisted the attempt of the Poona Ministers to gain an unreasonable advantage in the terms of the treaty and the sensible arguments with which you combated their assertions

and positions, as fresh proofs of the zeal and sound judgment which you have uniformly manifested throughout the whole of this important negotiation.

I shall only repeat that when the treaty as now settled shall be reduced to proper form and transmitted to me for that purpose, it shall without delay receive my ratification, and I trust that the few objections which have been made by the Nizam will have been removed and that nothing will in future occur amongst the Confederates themselves to interrupt an united and vigorous prosecution of this just and unavoidable war until they shall have it in their power to dictate their own terms of peace to the common enemy.

I never conceived that the tribute which it is agreed by tenth article shall be paid by the Zaminders and Polygars to the Peshwa was intended to be claimed by the Poona ministers in addition to the third share of the conquests that may be made upon Tippoo by the arms of the Confederates, but merely that it was requested by them, that it should be allotted as part of the third share to which they will be entitled on account of its being in point of situation and contiguity to his other dominions particularly convenient for the Peshwa, and I hope that upon that head they will give his Highness full satisfaction, and I must add that, as the season is now so far advanced and as immediate cooperation from the Marrattas may be of great importance to our affairs, I do not wish that the conclusion and ratification of our treaty should be longer retarded even if the Ministers should not assent to the fair and equitable construction which I have hitherto given in my own mind to the meaning of that article.

It is likewise so reasonable that the Marrattas should follow his Highness' and our example in employing their utmost exertions in carrying on the war that I cannot doubt that they will readily give him the assurances upon that point that he has required, and I have sufficient ground to be confident that you will spare no pains to convince them that they are called upon to strain every nerve in promoting the success of the common cause as much by considerations of their own interest as by a due regard to their engagements with the other members of the Confederacy.

**No. 94A**—Malet communicates the suspension of the requisition of troops from Bombay by the Peshwa on account of a particular difference of opinion between the Nizam's and the Peshwa's Governments.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—ROBERT ABERCROMBY.

*Poona, 28th April 1790.*

Mr. Malet and Mr. Uththoff being both ill to write, the former gentleman desired me to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 24th instant and to acquaint you that by very late letters from Hyderabad the Nabob Nizam Aly Khan demands that in case the Peshwah should not take the field in person, the Marattah quota of troops should join him and act

under his orders. This demand is not altogether agreeable to the Peshwah, to Captain Kennaway, or to Mr. Malet; but should it be persisted in, he scarcely knows how compliance with it can be avoided. At all events the Peshwah has taken advantage of this occurrence to rest on it a suspension of his requisition of the troops from your presidency; observing that, should the Marattahs join the Nabob there will be no occasion for those troops, but, that should it be so determined that the Marattahs do not join the Nabob, he will still persevere in his requisition, and in that case, settle their route not by Panella as it was formerly thought of, but directly through his own dominions.

No. 95 - The Bibi of Cannanore is hostile to the English.

FROM—MAJOR DOW,  
TO—ROBERT TAYLOR.

*29th April 1790.*

[Delivered by Capt. MacDonald (10 p.m.).]

Major Dow desires me to inform the Chief and factors of Tellicherry that from the behaviour of the Beeby of Cannanore this day in permitting her people to mix with, and act in conjunction with Tippoo's sepoys and firing upon our troops, as well as admitting Tippoo's troops into Carby fort, or at least the same people that fired upon our troops, and also by firing upon us from Carley fort, Major Dow conceives the Beeby ought to be considered as our enemy, and that every exertion in our power ought to be used against her.

No. 96—Taylor warns Dow against making any attempt on Cannanore whose Bibee has been warned of the consequences of hostility.

FROM—ROBERT TAYLOR,  
TO—MAJOR DOW.

*Tellicherry, 29th April 1790.*

We had just written you previous to the arrival of Captain McDonald in respect to our apprehensions of not being able to supply you with the quantity of ammunition you might want, and the very last musquet cartridge in garrison that was made up has been just sent you by two Pattamar boats, and although we join with you in opinion that the Bibbee of Cannanore should be considered as an enemy and acted against vigorously, yet from our inability to render you that assistance we would wish and the difficulties that you might in our opinion meet with, induces us to wish you would comply as far as you can with the recommendation we have already made you.

The Chief has written to the Bibbee calling upon her for her reasons for acting as she has done this day, as contained in your message just delivered to us by Captain McDonald, and threatening her if she does not take a more friendly part she must abide by the consequences that may ensue. She has been desired to send her answer to you, which we hope will be such as to put matters in a more favourable situation, but should it prove otherwise, we think it would be too hazardous an enterprize to attempt Cannanore, and would therefore recommend that you move

as near to us as possible, for which purpose we have ordered the Drake Snow immediately to come to anchor off Egar, and to send her boat on shore to know what assistance she can afford you. Provisions and ammunition have been sent in three Pattamar boats.

We have only to mention to you, that Colonel Hartley has recommended to us in the strongest terms, not to move to any considerable distance from this place, nor to engage in any operations that might in the slightest degree expose us to any hazard ; we therefore most earnestly wish to have you near us, and will be glad to know as soon as possible what determination the Bibbee comes to, and how you are situated.

**No. 97**—Dow gives an account of the encounter with Tipu's troops in the vicinity of Egar.

FROM—MAJOR DOW,  
TO—ROBERT TAYLOR.

*Camp Egar, 30th April 1790.*

I marched from Cadroor the day before yesterday in the morning, with an intention of surprizing the Nabob's encampment, on the rising ground of Egar, and as there was no road for guns without going considerably to the northward of it, and as I judged it to be the most effectual method of effecting my purpose to get between it and Cannanore I moved rather farther that way than what I originally intended. The Nabob's troops had been apprized of our approach, and had in consequence decamped. I however came up with them and drove the whole force into Cannanore and under the guns of Carby Cottah Fort, to which as it was impracticable to follow them without battering guns, I returned with the detachment to this place about eight o'clock yesterday evening. There are now some of the Nabob's troops on Rhandaterrah, about sixty in the redoubt at Moplan Ghaut which I purpose sending a detachment against.

The Mucquas were not permitted to land at Cannanore with the Chief's letter to the Bibbee. I herewith forward it. Our loss in killed and wounded has been but very trifling, the particulars I shall acquaint you with as soon as I receive the return. Brigade Major Hook and Lieutenant-Bell, slightly wounded, are the only officers hurt. The gallant and spirited behaviour of the officers and men in general merits my warmest praise.

The battalion you directed me to return into garrison at the end of six days is in readiness to move at the shortest notice, and can embark from this if necessary.

**No. 98**—Hartley reports the panic prevailing in Travancore on Tipu's taking the Travancore lines and his difficulties in landing troops and stores and his efforts for defending Cranganore against Lally.

FROM—LIEUT.-COLONEL HARTLEY,  
TO—ROBERT ABERCROMBY.

*Camp near Aycotah, 1st May 1790.*

I have the honour to inform you that I left Tellicherry with the troops and vessels under my command on the 22nd ultimo, Captain Byron

of His Majesty's ship *Phœnix* in company, he having obligingly offered me his assistance in landing the detachment.

Some leagues out at sea, Capt. Lildadale of the *Shaikh Gallivatt* came on board and brought the verbal intelligence of Tippoo's having carried the lines, and in the evening, we met with the *Panther* cruizer, with despatches containing the certain information that on the morning of the 15th April the enemy had taken the Travancore lines, that the Rajahs fled precipitately in the greatest disorder, leaving every thing in possession of Tippoo, that the two Madras battalions had quitted Paroor, and come to Iycotta from whence Mr. Powney, the Resident dated his letters. I did not hesitate a moment in proceeding to the assistance of the Rajah of Travancore, and having understood that Iycotta was recommended by Mr. Powney as the best place for disembarking the detachment, we steered for it, and having a favourable wind, we arrived at the anchorage of that place in the afternoon of the 23rd ultimo. I immediately went on shore to confer with Mr. Powney and know the situation of affairs, and I soon learnt that the detachment could not have come at a more critical and opportune moment than the present. The whole kingdom was panic struck, not five thousand of the Rajah's army were together, inhabitants of every description had fled to the southward far beyond Cochin. Every town and village was deserted, and the whole country was given up for lost, Cranganore excepted, which kept its garrison. The Rajah's minister was here with the remains of his army; he called on me, and was greatly reassured on hearing of the force I had brought with me, and instantly sent expresses different ways with the tidings. He assured me, that the stated expence of the army (calculated at forty-five thousand rupees per month exclusive of contingencies) would be regularly paid, that grain and other provisions would be fully supplied, and that the Europeans might kill whatever cattle they pleased. Having fixed these agreements with him, I went on the 24th ultimo at day break to reconnoitre Paroor which he wished to make the general rendezvous of his army, as they would flock in very fast, hearing of our landing which they have since done: after viewing the ground and determining its situation I returned on board, and gave out the necessary dispositions for landing. Captain Byron at the same time sent his master to sound the shores, and mark out the channels for the smaller vessels.

On the 25th early in the morning the troops got into the boats, and as I was very anxious to have them on shore we made immediately for the nearest land, but found the whole for about five miles so very shoal with soft mud that we could not sufficiently approach until the middle of the day, when a favourable beach was found where owing to the great exertions of Captain Byron and his boats' crews the whole army with its immediate necessities were landed by seven o'clock the same evening. On the 26th we proceeded to get on shore the stores and provisions, and having more than immediately wanted I determined to deposit them

at Cochin, for which purpose I wrote a letter to Mr. Van Angelbeck, the Governor, for proper and sufficient store houses, and his ready answer gave me all I desired on that head. On the 27th the Yarmouth, Betsey and Diana dropped down to that place, and on the 28th in the morning, everything being landed which I required, the rest of the transports and Bottellas, with the paymaster and commissaries followed to deposit their respective charges in places prepared for them. I must not here omit to mention, that the rapidity and safety with which the troops and stores have been landed, is entirely owing to the unremitting attention and personal attendance of Captain Byron and his officers and the hard labour of his people. I never beheld in the course of my experience so much zeal as he showed for the public service, and I should not do justice to so very able and active an officer, were I not to express in this public manner how much the detachment I have the honour to command have benefitted by his assistance. The transports gave all the little aid they were capable of. I wish I could say any thing in favour of the Company's marine. Lieut. Selby of that corps being here for his health, I have taken the liberty of employing him to disembark the stores, etc., at Cochin, Lieut. Beattie, the boat master, being ill and fatigued from the service imposed on him. By my orders to him and the Captain of the Panther, a copy is enclosed, you will be enabled to judge of their proceedings there.

As this country is so much intersected with rivers, Messrs. Selby and Beattie will be found very useful during the rains; and as I shall from time to time want provisions, etc., from Cochin, I intend keeping the fishing boats, which will prove a less expense to the Hon'ble Company than being obliged to hire boats there.

Understanding from the instructions given by you to Captain Jervis, that the treasure he has on board for Anjengo is destined for the Rajah of Travancore, and his minister (being the efficient person) having expressed a necessity for its being delivered here to enable him immediately to make the necessary payments to the army under my command, and he having assured me that he will explain his reasons to the Rajah, I have taken it upon me to order Captain Jervis to do it accordingly. He is afterwards to proceed to Anjengo with your despatches.

I am at present encamped on the Island of Vipeem, with my right to Cochin, and my left to Iycotta, twelve miles from the former, and four from the latter. This Island belongs to the King of Cochin, and so does the greatest part of the country here about extending a good way above the lines. He is tributary to Tippoo, but since my landing here, the King has sent his ambassador to me assuring me that the King his Master will join the Rajah of Travancore and give every assistance in his power in carrying on the war. I have desired the ambassador will write to his master, and whatever his intentions are he will please to communicate them by letter to the Honourable the Governors of

Bombay and Madras and send them to me, that they may be forwarded as quick as possible.

Cranganore is about six miles up the river from Iycotta. Monsieur Lally with about five hundred men and one Cooshun has been detached from Tippoo's Camp and been before the place for some days past. The fort is garrisoned by three battalions of the Rajah's troops. I have been so much engaged in getting my detachment on shore that I had not time to reconnoitre it before the 29th ultimo and was very apprehensive that it would fall into Tippoo's hands, learning that Lally had opened his trenches within three hundred yards of the place. On the 27th in the evening I sent Capt. Blackford of the Engineers to examine the state of the place, his report being favourable for its being defended, and wishing I could spare time to look at it, I went up with Captain Byron in his barge, and arrived there about sunrise in the morning of the 29th. The officer in command reported to me that they had not heard any work carried on during the night; but since Lally had come before it, they had not sent a single man without the works. I ordered a party immediately out taking care not to advance too far, and making their retreat secure; after they had marched about two hundred yards, and observing no enemy making their appearance, I followed them myself, with Captain Byron, Chief engineer etc., and found about four hundred yards from the work, the head of a trench which had been advanced three hundred yards and a battery marched out at the head of it, but not any of the enemy near which led me to believe they had abandoned their design. I gave orders for the works to be immediately destroyed, but Lally with a few of his troops made his appearance. After a few ill directed shots taking place, the Rajah's troops returned into the fort, several shots were fired from the works, and it was said, did some execution.

Tippoo is encamped about ten miles from Cranganore on the Lines, with an advanced camp about three miles from Cranganore, besides that of Lally's; various reports are spread of what he means to do. The minister yesterday informed me that he heard that a large body of troops had moved towards Paroor; and if this should be true, it would appear as if he wished to get in my rear. Situated as I am, I am under no apprehensions of his cutting off my communication with Cochin, nor do I fear any attack from his troops, but as I am totally unprovided for moving, I can only act on the defensive; and however well provided I might have been, I do not think in the present moment, while Tippoo remains with his army here, that I should attempt any thing else.

Other reports say that Tippoo is preparing to move towards Pallicautcherry and which I rather suppose to be true, as I cannot think it can be an object for him to stay here, and suffer the Madras army to enter his country without opposing them. You may rely on me, Honourable Sir, that every care and exertion on my part shall be attended



to for the safety and the support of the troops you have done me the honor to put under my command.

Captain Knox, Commanding Officer of the two battalions from Madras, has put himself and detachment under my orders.

**No. 99**—Taylor directs Dow to provide for the defence of the conquered places on the Malabar Coast and to put the Rajas in possession of their respective territories.

FROM—ROBERT TAYLOR,

TO—MAJOR DOW.

*Tellicherry, 2nd May 1790.*

As the service for which your detachment took the field has been accomplished beyond the northern and eastern boundaries of our districts, the different forts and small posts on these sides being now in our possession, and as we are likewise in possession of Corechy redoubt and another small post to the southward, we would recommend it to your most serious consideration how these different places are to be maintained without dividing and weakening your force, which it is our fixed opinion ought to be kept united. It is equally our opinion that the former proprietors should be put in possession of these posts, and positively enjoined to keep a sufficient force of their own people in them for their defence. We shall afford them such supplies of ammunition and provisions as they may require, and if attacked afford them what assistance may be in our power, but after they are put in possession of the posts, they must be peremptorily told that it is expected they will defend themselves against the enemy, as they cannot suppose that we are to divide the small force we have, which is only sufficient for our own defence, nor can we attempt to keep the field during the rains.

As the season is now so far advanced, we do not think it advisable to prosecute any operations to the southward, our possessions already extend to the French districts on that side, beyond which it is not our intentions to proceed.

Our superiors at Bombay will be advised of our proceedings, and requested to send us immediately after the rains their sentiments on the conduct we ought to pursue.

You will therefore please to put the Cotiote Rajah in possession of Cadroor and Nattoor with the posts in front of Mora Connah under the beforementioned injunctions.

The chérical Rajah must be put in possession of the northern posts subject however to such orders as we may receive from the Government of Bombay respecting the districts of Rhandaterrah, which is mortgaged to the Honourable Company. Coreechy being at no great distance may remain in our hands for a few days until we discover the proper person it ought to be delivered to.

After having settled these matters which we suppose will not take up much time, you will please return into this garrison with your whole force, and if you think it advisable, the guns and heavy stores may be embarked in the Pattamar boats at Eggar or opposite to Attarah.

It is the more necessary you should return into garrison, as it is very probable that Tippoo, on hearing of our operations, may detach a force against this place, which might arrive in time to intercept the return of your detachment, and from the very near approach of the rains the Sepoys etc. ought to have time allowed them for hutting themselves properly at this place, which the ample supply of materials they can now obtain will enable them to do.

In returning with your detachment we would recommend your coming by the plain of Randaterrah.

No. 100—Malet intimates to the G. G. the readiness of the Mahrattas to begin the war on the commencement of operations by the Madras army.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 3rd May 1790.*

Indisposition has for some days deprived me of the honor of addressing you, a cessation of my disorder gives me the satisfactory prospect of being again able to resume the functions of my office, and I embrace the first moments of convalescence to assure you that I shall exert myself to recover what term has been already lost. This Court is extremely urgent for satisfaction on the time of the commencement of operations by the Madras army, expresses great surprize at the campaign not having yet commenced and gives me to understand that the army of this state cannot move till certain intelligence is received of the Madras army's having commenced hostilities. I have given every satisfaction on this head that my intelligence furnishes, that is to say, I have assured the Durbar that hostilities will be commenced before the rains and urged them strongly to be in readiness to take advantage of it. I have in consequence this day received from Behroo Pant an assurance that Pursaram Bhao will enter his tents the 5th, and that he will be in readiness to enter the enemy's country with 25,000 men as soon as news arrives of the commencement of hostilities by the Madras army. But that, should not that news arrive till after the Kistna becomes impassable, he will not be able to make an irruption. I have strongly insisted on the necessity of the Mahratta forces crossing the Kistna before it becomes impassable as the Durbar may rest assured on the faith of my word that the Madras operations will commence before the rains, though perhaps not soon enough for the intelligence reaching this before the setting in of that season.

I have every reason to expect that the conclusion of the treaty regulated by the alterations proposed by Nizam Ally Khan will be effected in a few days.

**No. 101**—Taylor sends intelligence of the conquest of the Malabar Coast as far north as Rhandaterrah.

FROM—ROBERT TAYLOR,

TO—THE SECRET COMMITTEE OF THE COURT OF DIRECTORS.

*Tellicherry, 4th May 1790.*

In the present very critical situation of affairs on this coast, we deem it a duty highly incumbent on us to give you the fullest information in our power, commencing our account from the 9th ultimo, the day on which we were assured that the sword was drawn against Tippoo.

We have to add that since Major Dow has been out with the troops, he has cleared the country as far to the northward as the extremity of Rhandaterrah, and we beg leave to observe that both the Major and the troops have on every occasion shown the greatest steadiness and gallantry. They will return in a few days into garrison, on account of the near approach of the rainy season and the different posts in our neighbourhood will be occupied by the troops of the respective Malabar Powers in whose countries they are situated.

The Cherical, Cartinaddu and Cotiote Rajahs are with us here, and the Corga Rajah is well inclined towards us, but the Bibbee of Cannanore has not declared herself.

Captain Easterbrook has promised to call at Iycottah to carry you the latest intelligence from Colonel Hartley.

**No. 102**—Malet regrets that the Poona Court does not show any alacrity in spite of Bhau's entrance into his tents.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—WILLIAM MEDOWS.

*Poona, 7th May 1790.*

Though Pursaram Bhao did enter his tents agreeable to what I wrote you the 3rd instant, I am not very sanguine in the expectation of any great alacrity from this Court, whose habits of evasion and procrastination are confirmed on the present occasion by the introduction of Tippoo's pagodas, the circulation of which has been greatly promoted by the demur that has taken place in the conclusion of the treaty forwarded to you the

29th March by the Nabob's objection to some parts of it which, though very immaterial in themselves, have in their consequences proved of so great an importance as to make me regret extremely that the Nabob could not make the signature on the spot compatible with his interests, since by the delay I look upon the whole alliance to be endangered.

I have still however the faintest promises to rest my hopes on, though I am inclined to place my grand reliance for forcing this Court into a full discovery of its intentions, on your movements and successes: that they may be quick and brilliant is the sincere wish of me.

No. 103 *Taylor gives an account of the operations on the Malabar Coast and the dependence of the various Rajas on the English.*

FROM-ROBERT TAYLOR.

TO-ROBERT ABERCROMBY.

about 15 miles to the southward of this, where we understood there was a considerable deposit of stores and provisions.

It remains for us to give you an account of our operations since our letter of the 27th ultimo, and the enclosed papers form a chain of the transactions that have taken place. With respect to the Bibbee, she has never yet declared herself in our favor, and appears more disposed to side with Tippoo, for, in Major Dow's action of the 29th ultimo, her troops were joined with Tippoo's and fired upon ours; she also received the fugitives into Carley, one of her forts, and from thence fired her cannon upon our people. The Chief has written her several letters endeavoring to prevail upon her to take part with us, to which she has hitherto returned vague and evasive answers.

The Cherical, Cartinaddu and Cotiote Rajahs are still here. The Cotiote has been put in possession of the different posts we have taken in his country, and proposes residing at the fort of Natour across the river about four miles inland. The Cartinaddu will remain in Tellicherry during the rains, and collect his people to be ready to act hereafter as occasion may require. The Cherical Rajah will also remain at Tellicherry during the rains, as he has represented that his returning to the jungle would disgrace him in the eyes of his people. He has also represented to us that while he lived in the mountains the only means by which he and his people subsisted were by plundering, and making occasional depredations in the woods and jungle, but which resource being no longer left him, he requested we would supply him and his people with rice during their stay here, offering to settle with the Hon'ble Company hereafter for such quantities as he might receive, when put in possession of his country. On considering his request we could wish to decline complying with it, but as by keeping him at Tellicherry we secure him in the interest of the Hon'ble Company, we have thought it better to allow him to remain with a few of his followers which he begged we will permit to the number of 200, the rest will disperse and shift for themselves until their services are wanted, and we have to request you will as early as possible in August favor us with your sentiments on this head.

We beg leave to observe, it appears to us that the Moplas in general are more attached to Tippoo's cause than to us or the Malabars, for as they differ in religious tenets from the latter, and have possession intermixed with theirs, they are very jealous of the Nairs getting authority over them, and this appears pretty clearly from the Rajah of Cartinaddu's Mopla subjects to the southward, none of whom have yet acknowledged his authority; the behaviour of the Cannanore Moplas is another proof of their inclination; we should therefore consider them as disaffected to us, unless they expressly solicit our protection, or submit to the authority of their ancient Malabar Chiefs.

To the enclosed paper of protection we shall procure the seals and signatures of the different Rajahs and we most earnestly request, Honourable Sir, you will be pleased as early as possible at the opening of the season to favour us with your directions as to the conduct we ought to observe towards them, as well as for our guidance in general, and we beg leave to assure you we shall pay the strictest and most implicit obedience to your orders, unless you shall be pleased to allow us a latitude of action on any particular emergency.

*Paper of protection:—*

In the name of the Honourable English East India Company and of the Governor General of Bengal, I, Robert Taylor Chief for transacting all affairs of the English Nation at Tellicherry, do hereby assure you

(Here enter the Rajah's name and titles) that provided you will enter heartily into the war against Tippoo Sultaun, and act vigorously against him, the English East India Company will assist and protect you, and do every thing in their power to render you independent of Tippoo Sultaun. —And as you have agreed to enter into an alliance with the Honourable Company, on the same basis of friendship that formerly subsisted between both parties, and as you have also agreed to grant receipts for such supplies as you may receive from the Honourable Company, and to settle for the same hereafter, I do hereby further assure you that in any future treaty that may take place between the Company and Tippoo Sultaun you shall be included and considered as an ally of the Honourable Company. In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and the Honourable Company's seal and you have affixed your seal at Tellicherry this 4th day of May 1790.

**No. 104**—Referring to a variety of subjects, Cornwallis gives certain directions to Malet regarding the negotiation of treaty with the Mahrattas.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—C. W. MALET.

*Fort William, 10th May 1790.*

[Partly in Ross, ii 25.]

I received a letter from Kennaway by which I have the satisfaction to find that all impediments on the part of the Nizam, to the final adjustment of the treaty are likely to be removed, as his Highness, by approving of Captain Kennaway's letter to you, dated the 17th ultimo, has in fact engaged to accede to whatever the Minister and yourself may determine upon the alterations which he has proposed.

You are already so fully acquainted with my inclination to make almost any sacrifice that could be required, for the purpose of obtaining an immediate and rigorous co-operation of the Peshwa's Government in the present war, that I need not say more upon that subject.

Considering however, that the eventual operation of the Confederacy may deprive the Peshwa of the tribute which he now receives from Tippoo, I will freely confess that I do not think it by any means unreasonable in him to expect that a tribute from the restored Zamindars to the amount of 12 lacs may be allowed to him exclusive of his share in the general partition of the countries that may be conquered by the arms of the alliance.

Upon the whole, after making allowance for the distance of the correspondence and the pressure of the time, I must, in justice both to you and Captain Kennaway, say that everything has been as well settled as our most sanguine expectations could have led us to hope. When the treaty is reduced to a proper form, and transmitted to me, I shall ratify it with the greatest pleasure.

I have long foreseen the probability of your Court's being jealous of our friendship with the Nizam and I trust that, in my answer to the propositions transmitted to me by Captain Kennaway, I have been sufficiently guarded on that head. We must be careful to keep this circumstance constantly in our mind during the continuance of the war; and if at any time, it should be thought for the good of the common cause that larger body of troops from Madras should be employed with the army of the Nizam than could possibly be spared from the Bombay establishment to join the Marrattas, yet it may probably be inexpedient that such a measure should be adopted unless the Poonah Government could be induced to join in recommending it; But altho' I state this as a possible case, I do not think from my late correspondence with General Medows that it is a probable one.

After the indiscretions which you have already experienced both on the part of Nana and Musheer-al-Mulk, it will be needless for me to caution either you or Captain Kennaway against trusting either of them with secrets that regard the other, unless the occasion and the object should be very important.

Should the two battalions and the six pieces of artillery be demanded by the Poonah Government, it will become peculiarly requisite to avail ourselves of the article of the treaty which entitles us to send a Vackeel to attend the Mahratta army in the field, as his intervention may be convenient and necessary in many arrangements respecting those troops; but, at all events, I should wish you to select a proper person for that office, as by that means we shall at least have the satisfaction of securing a channel of authentic information of all their proceedings and operations.

As it is possible that the reasons which may put the Madras Government under the necessity of taking into their own hands the temporary management of the revenues of the Carnatic and the Tanjore country may be misrepresented to the Peshwah and his Ministers, you will please to inform them that owing to the misconduct or infidelity of the Aumils

or other servants of the Nabob and the Rajah a balance of many lacs of Pagodas has accrued upon the sums which they had agreed to pay as their equitable share for the maintenance of the military establishments which were kept up for the common defence of the country that the expence of the present preparations has been almost entirely defrayed by remittances from Bengal and that unless some steps were taken to secure the regularity of the payments during the continuance of the war, it is obvious how fatal the consequences might prove not only to the countries of the Nabob and the Rajah but to our allies in general.

You will particularly assure the Poona Government that during the operation of this measure, which will last no longer than the urgency of affairs may render it absolutely indispensable, every care shall be taken that the Nabob shall want nothing that may be requisite for his personal convenience or for the proper support of his dignity.

**No. 105**—Taylor sends prisoners through Cochin.

FROM—ROBERT TAYLOR,

TO—JOHN GERARD VAN ANGELBECK, GOVERNOR OF COCHIN.

*Tellicherry, 11th May 1790.*

I now dispatch four boats with prisoners, whom I request you will get conveyed to Colonel Hartley or wherever he or Mr. Powney may direct.

Knowing as I do your friendly inclinations towards the English, and from the interest which I make no doubt you take in the present contest with Tippoo Sultaun, I am induced to hope that you will give every assistance towards expediting the prisoners to their place of destination.

**No. 106**—Taylor sends intelligence of the despatch of boats laden with prisoners, of a clandestine mode of supplying Tipu's troops with rice and the general state of affairs in Malabar.

FROM—ROBERT TAYLOR,

TO—ROBERT ABERCROMBY.

*Tellicherry, 12th May 1790.*

The Drake snow sailed for Cochin on the 10th, having under her convoy the Arab vessel taken by Captain Byron which he has directed to be sold, together with a vessel belonging to the Bibbee of Cannanore likewise captured by Captain Byron, and which he has directed to be kept until the Bibbee declares herself, or if sold, the produce to be reserved until then; both vessels are under charge of one of Captain Byron's Officers.



The luggage boat also accompanied the Drake having on board a quantity of gunpowder, which, at the request of the Ram Rajah's minister signified to us by Mr. Powney, we purchased from the merchants. By this opportunity we sent 150 prisoners to be disposed of in the Travancore country, and by some Pattamar boats that followed the next day we got quit of about 250 more, so that we have but few remaining. The Drake and Pattamar boats will return as speedily as possible, and we have directed Lieut. Taylor just to call here on his way to the Presidency, if the weather will permit, in order that we may give you the latest intelligence.

We beg leave to request your directions on the following head. A clandestine mode has been pursued of supplying Tippoo's troops with rice. His own boats, navigated by his own people, leave his ports to the northward with cargoes of rice, and if captured by our vessels they immediately pretend to belong to some person at Mahi, notice soon arrives there of the capture, and of consequence, a claim comes to us from some European at that settlement. Several boats have been captured and stand in this predicament, and are known by many of the inhabitants of this place to be Tippoo's. We have hitherto resisted these claims but we wish to be favoured with your orders how to proceed in future.

Matters remain here in the same state as when we last wrote you, but as we hope the march of the Madras army will send Tippoo into his own country; such a movement will probably make a great alteration in favor of the different Malabar Powers, who will thereby be more encouraged to assert their independance, our movements having been hitherto confined to short distances from our garrison.

It would be very material for us to secure the Bibbee of Cannanore in our interest, and thereby that of the rest of the Moplas, but until some favourable event takes place, or that we should be in greater force to move from hence after the rains it is scarcely to be expected. We take the liberty to offer this subject to your serious consideration.

The Cotiote Rajah this day took leave of the Chief to go for a short time to a place about 15 miles distant, to perform some religious ceremonies; when he returns he means to take up his abode at Nattour, and has put about 500 men into the different posts that have been given up to him. But the country belonging to the Cherical Rajah being immediately behind Cannanore and running northward and eastward from thence, and the country of Cartinaddu Rajah running considerably to the southward of Mahi, we cannot before the rains attempt any thing in either of these places. Circumstances hereafter must determine what is most proper to be done, and in every operation we shall keep in view the grand object recommended to us, namely the safety of this place.

The country of the Cotiote being more immediately in our neighbourhood has been first secured and given up to its original proprietor, and can

at any time be succoured from hence, but from the desolated state it is in and the very few inhabitants that remain, we are apprehensive it will be a long time before we can avail ourselves of supplies of provisions from thence.

We have the pleasure to acquaint you that the Malabar in general are in our interest, the Moplas or Moors excepted, who are either attached to Tippoo or hesitating which side to take, but which a favourable change of circumstances we have no doubt would determine in our favour.

**No. 106A**—Report of the capture of Travancore lines, the demoralisation of the Raja's troops and the particular discomfort during the rains in the island of Vipeen. Hartley takes post at Aycotta.

*Cochin, 10th May 1790.*

We stopped a day at Tellicherry and heard there that the Travancore Lines were forced, but from no certain intelligence—but on our way we heard it for certain and that the two Madras battalions and the Rajah's Minister with a part of his army were at Iycottah on the Island of Vipeen waiting our arrival and anxiously expecting us. Vipeen is an island contiguous to Cochin to the northward, about 15 miles long, and a mile and a half broad. On the 23rd April we arrived off Iycottah when Colonel Hartley immediately went ashore with Captain Byron through a very high surf and had an interview with the Minister which determined him to land the detachment. The troops on their landing were exposed to very hard rain and their situation truly uncomfortable without tents or huts, in which state they remained the whole night. The lines were carried by Tippoo on the 15th and the Travancorians were too nimble footed to suffer much in their persons, tho' many of them lost their arms. The lines were breached for near a mile and Tippoo entered in three divisions before day break and met with no resistance, the Travancorians being asleep and off their guard. The panic the loss of the lines has occasioned is astonishing, the Minister could not get together above three or four thousand men on Vipeen, and nothing but the expectation of our arrival could make those keep with him. On our landing the news soon spread over the country and the Rajah's people have returned in such numbers that they are now above 10,000 strong on Vipeen, but in want of money, provisions, ammunition and everything else, so that they had in fact better be away from us than with us. The country seems totally destitute of resources to enable an army like ours to move, it is intersected everywhere with broad and deep rivers, especially in this neighbourhood, and there are no boats which is alone a fatal bar to our operations. Cranganore, a fortress in sight of our camp, was evacuated by the Rajah's troops three nights ago after standing a day's battering from the enemy. It is a strong and commanding place and was lost for want of stores and ammunition which Colonel Hartley could not spare from our stock to defend it. By the last accounts Tippoo was

encamped himself at Alva on the northern bank of the Cranganore river, and had a part of his troops at Paran and another part eight miles to the southward of it, so that he is advancing considerably into the Rajah's country. The Travancorians seem to have lost all spirit and resource with their Lines and for want of their help which we might reasonably expect I do not see that we have any prospect to be able to move or do anything before the rains. At Vipeen we are, I think, very secure and that Tippoo so late as it is now will never venture to pass a broad river to attack us. The rains here are very violent and expected to set in every day, and it is impossible for him to keep this country and subsist his army during the rains, besides the operations of the Madras army and our allies must draw him off. The situation of the troops on Vipeen will be very uncomfortable during the rains, as they have not yet made any cantonments, but they must keep up their spirits with the idea that after the rains the Travancorians will recover their spirits and find some resources to enable us to move and take possession of all the country between this and Tellicherry. Our greatest danger at present is that there will be a famine amongst the Rajah's people on Vipeen, but I suppose the Colonel will take some measures to prevent this by desiring them to remove to the southward keeping perhaps near 2,700 of them who are what are left of six battalions of the regular sepoy and may be brought into one line. The Rajah himself is to the southward with about 13,000 Nairs, but I am afraid if Tippoo's troops have time to pursue their success and penetrate further into the country they will make but a poor resistance. For my own part I have my doubts whether Tippoo is now in this country, the deserters say it, but I imagine he is gone to oppose the Trichinopoly army. It is certain however that Lally's Corps is here and they opened batteries against Cranganore of 36 pounders; our stores and money are deposited here, the Rajah pays the expense of our detachment, the Madras battalions have been long in the Rajah's pay and it is almost certain that if they had been in the lines and defended the breaches, Tippoo never would have taken them; they would in that case have inspired the Rajah's troops with courage and confidence by their example, whereas by keeping aloof they must have considerably damped their spirits and ardour and had better not have been in the country at all. The Dutch here cry aloud against them and say their conduct has been disgraceful to our nation, and indeed I really think so.

**No. 107—Dow's operations near Tellicherry.**

FROM—MAJOR DOW,

TO—ROBERT TAYLOR.

*Camp Egare, 12th May 1790.*

To find a subject to fill up a letter to a person at the fountain head of intelligence as you are, is in short a difficult task; however rather than

not write at all, I shall transcribe part of my journal of our manoeuvres since we took the field.

On the 24th ultimo a Captain, two Lieutenants, fifty non-commandants and privates, one hundred lascars etc. of artillery, with four six and two lb. guns, three Captains, five Subalterns, two grenadier Companies, fifty battalion men who had been taught the great gun exercise of European infantry, the second, third and tenth battalions of sepoys marched out of Tellicherry under the command of Major Dow.

The 25th we encamped before Cudroor house in which there were about an hundred and fifty men, who held out until next day when a breach having been made by two six pounders, they surrendered prisoners of war. Lieutenant Lambe, a Corporal of Grenadiers, and some of the native troops were wounded.

The 28th we had a march of about fourteen hours and lost a Serjeant of sepoys by a stroke of the sun.

The 29th marched at half past 4 p.m. and about ten saw the enemy moving off towards Cannanore from Egare on Randaterra where they had been encamped; they consisted of two Cushoons, the number said to be about four thousand under the command of a Syed Mahmood. We followed them until we were in reach of the guns of Carlie and Pen forts belonging to the Queen of Cannanore; they saluted us with a few shots; the enemy having sheltered themselves behind banks, rocks and played off a considerable number of sky and ground rockets, and begun to snipe; this kind of an engagement continued between us from noon to about eight o'clock at night when we marched off towards Egare which we reached about two o'clock in the morning. Lieutenants Bell and Hooke were wounded, the former in the leg, and the latter in the wrist, three of my detachment were killed, and about fifteen wounded, three sepoys were killed, three matrosses, six lascars, and twenty-four sepoys wounded. The Europeans behaved exceeding well; they were from the evening of the 28th until about four o'clock in the morning of the 30th without either victuals or spirits served out to them, and had only a little hard black biscuit to chew of the former day's allowance; water was scarce, the march long, the heat of the sun when drawn up on the top of the hill near Carlie excessive, notwithstanding, there was not the least sign of a murmer amongst them, except that they had not sufficient satisfaction for the loss of their comrades.

On the 30th Ally fort surrendered to Lieutenant Budden who was sent with two Grenadiers Cos. of sepoys against it; the garrison consisted, of about 80 men and were permitted to carry off their private property.

The 6th instant Vonroy was summoned by Lieutenant Hunt with two Grenadier Companys, but the garrison, (about 80 men) stood out until

Captain MacDonald with a gun and reinforcement of fifty Europeans, some Companies of sepoys etc. arrived, a breach was made, and an attempt to storm it when the enemy called for quarter, which was a fortunate circumstance, as the breach was considered impracticable when the storming party had got into the ditch. A serjeant Richardson of Sepoys was killed, and Lieutenant Munbee wounded in the eye with a lance as he was attempting to ascend by one of the scaling ladders.

Captain Murray's battalion was employed in driving off or taking prisoners the men who garrisoned the posts of Corecchee, Mooni colat, Natoor, Bamboo Hill etc. round the Tellicherry district.

You will no doubt hear some animadversions on the manner in which this business has been carried on, but do not be too credulous. Lt. Hooke had been refused leave to go to Bombay and is highly displeased as I understand in consequence.

**No. 108**—Malet reports to the G. G. the requisition by the Poona Government of the Bombay detachment to join the Mahrattas first by way of Palset, and finally by Jaygarh, the arrival of Tipu's ambassadors, the expected march of Bhau to the Kistna, etc.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 14th May 1790.*

After a very anxious process of verbal and written remonstrance on the late conduct of this Court, I on the 12th instant demanded an audience of the minister at which by fully explaining to him the consequences of his doubtful and suspicious measures, I might stand acquitted in the opinion of your Lordship and of this court of having neglected every possible effort and explanation in prevention of the misunderstanding that seemed to be approaching between the two governments.

In reply I received a message that matters having at length been brought to a conclusion by the Durbar, Behro Punt would wait on me with an account of it this afternoon. He accordingly came and on the part of the Minister acquainted me that though from the nature of this Durbar and the various views and interests of the great members of the state, the conclusion of the late engagements with me had been interrupted, yet was he fixed and determined to execute them. Pursuant to which he would without delay proceed to the completion of the treaty and hasten the march of Pursuram Bhao to the Kistna whose force would consist of 25,000 men, that this army would encamp on the north bank of the Kistna till the receipt of intelligence of the commencement of the operations of the Madras army, when it should cross at all events whether fordable or not, but that it would be expected that an equal force of the Nabob's should also cross. He also signified to me from the Minister

the requisition of the Bombay detachment by the way of Palset, a place to the south of Dabul, and from thence to ascend the Ghaut of Tewra, between Sittarra and Pannella which route would introduce the detachment to the Deccan near Merridge. Finding that Palset is on open road and consequently dangerous at this season of the year, I strongly objected to it and proposed the introduction of our troops through some of the Mahratta avenues in the Bombay harbor whence (as the Minister seemed to have a strong repugnance to their coming by the easiest route near this city which Bahiro Pt. said was to prevent affording cause of clamor to the opposite party) they might proceed south to any Ghaut that would lead them to the Deccan south of Poona. To this proposal B. Pt. said he would give me an answer after consulting the Minister.

On his own part B. Pt. entered into a long detail of the causes that had delayed the execution of the treaty, etc., particularly explained the intrigues of the Rasta Family and the great interest made by it with every individual of the Durbar in favor of Tippoo's negotiations, whose agents have brought large sums in specie and much larger in bills, supported with liberal offers of territory for this State's assistance, or, if that should be found unacquirable, neutrality. That to these temptations various and powerful arguments had been adduced to influence the Durbar, and amongst others the very great expense that would be necessarily incurred by the payment of arrears to put the army in motion on an expedition, the success of which was doubtful and in promotion of the views of a confederacy the advantages of which problematic. B. Pt. did not scruple to assure me that very flattering proposals had been made him by the opposite party, on his rejection of which and on the constancy with which he had at all times opposed their views he laid great stress and seemed to found much merit, and in reply to which I expressed my satisfaction accompanied with an assurance that any essential and real service done to our affairs would not be unnoticed. On the present occasion however, I did not fail to let him know that so extraordinary had this Court's conduct appeared to me for some time past, particularly after the repeated promises I had received from himself, that I was really at a loss for the degree of faith to be placed on his present communications, nor could I on the strength of them venture to contradict the apprehensions that I had lately expressed to your Lordship of this Court's intentions and disposition, in which state of doubt and suspense my whole dependance rested on the individual wisdom and good faith of the Minister. In reply B. Pt. warmly assured me that no change would now take place in the determination of this Court which he communicated to me as final and immutable. But still expressing doubts which nothing but the personal assurances of the Minister could remove, he proposed a conference on the ensuing day to which I assented. In the course of this conversation B. Pt. pointedly endeavored to throw the imputation of futility on Nizam Aly Khan's motions, questioned the adequateness of his present force to effectual

operation, and observed that the intelligence received by the Durbar gave reason to think that, instead of increasing it His Highness had given some of the feudatory troops leave to retire to their homes. To all which I replied that this Government should in decency put itself on a footing of equal forwardness with the Nabob before it ventured to criticize his measures, which were so highly meritorious with respect to your Lordship's government and the Confederacy in general, and that time alone by exhibiting a different conduct could detract from them.

On the 13th, agreeable to appointment I visited the Minister and on the information with which Gen. Medows has been so good as to keep me regularly furnished acquainted him with the junction of the Wallaja's and Trichinopoly armies and of that gentleman's resolution to command them in person in his intended invasion of Tipu's dominions which he might look on as certainly to take place about the beginning of June. To this intelligence I added strong instances on the subject of Pursaram Bhao's quickly moving to the frontier and was assured by the Minister that he would march in 4 or 5 days and that his force notwithstanding the stipulation of the treaty, would not fall short of 25,000, exclusive of our two battalions. He repeated what B. Pt. had previously communicated of this army's encamping on the north bank of the Kistna and in addition to the expectation expressed by B. Pt. of the Nabob's acting with an equal force, he observed that the Nabob might proceed within his own dominions even to the south of the Tumbudra but that he must not be understood as having commenced his operations while he remained within his own boundaries even though he had crossed those rivers. On the subject of urging the Nabob as to his force or entering the enemy's country relative to which the Minister strongly insisted on my writing Capt. Kennaway, I made the same reply as to B. Pt. with this addition that notwithstanding the superior forwardness and even the march of His Highness in person he had not yet made any such instances to this Court. To this the Minister replied that with every allowance of apparent merit in the Nabob's movement, the issue alone must be the test of his intentions, and if on that test the Nabob were to fail, this Court would lose one of the dependancies on which it acted. He expressed his readiness to bind himself by the same ties to the Nabob that he expected from him as in fact he is by treaty, but doubted the Nabob's present force amounting to that with which this State was resolved to act, and so far from increasing it, he repeated the intelligence of B. Pt. of his giving some of his feudatories leave to retire to their jagirs. That therefore whatever appearance it might have, the Minister repeated his desire that I would write particularly to Capt. K. on this subject and prevail on him to make such instances to the Nabob as to procure perfect sincerity to this Court on its expectation of the Nabob's acting in the manner and with the force abovementioned.

I in warm terms complained to the Minister of the extraordinary delays that had taken place in the completion of the treaty, to which he generally answered by reference to what B. Pt. had mentioned to me the day before, adding that he hoped that in my representations to your Lordship I would so manage as to preserve the good understanding of the two States and rather palliate than exaggerate appearances. He assured me that whatever doubts appearances may have given rise to and from whatever causes those appearances may have sprung, he was firm to his engagements and would after settling the little points of discussion that still remained, proceed on the first auspicious day to sign and seal. This conversation brought on the production of the treaty and some articles were adjusted on the spot, particularly that of the Nabob's claims on the Zemindars, Poligars, etc., which were agreed to be inserted in the Nabob's own words though the Minister insisted on it as an indulgence to the Nabob, for that former usage gave him no claim. The clause of acting with the Co.'s forces introduced by the Nabob in the article of the allies supplying us with cavalry, was so expressed as to prevent on the strength of the Nabob's clause the cavalry cavilling at acting on detachment and their pay was reduced from 600 to 500 per annum per horseman. On the article of partition the Minister acquainted me that the Nabob had informed this Court of his expectation of prevailing on Capt. Kennaway to annul that part which stipulates the commencement of participation and cooperation to be coeval, and of substituting general participation without any obligation as to operation; I assured the minister that though the Nabob had originally made applications to Capt. K. to that purport yet on being taught by that gentleman their impropriety, he had ceased insisting on them. This not proving satisfactory, I found it necessary to tell the Minister that any stipulation as to partition that Capt. K. might make with the Nabob, would of course apply to this State. This I thought I could safely say from my conviction that Capt. K. neither has nor will grant any indulgence in a point the necessity of which is evident and is particularly recommended to his observance by your Lordship in your letter to him of the 12th ultimo.

From this subject of the treaty I proceeded to the requisition of the 2 battalions from Bombay on which the Minister repeated what had been communicated to me by B. Pt. In reply I explained the difficulties of the route proposed by the Durbar and strongly urged the landing of our troops in some of the Marratta rivers in the Bombay harbor, whence they might proceed through the Cokun, while the guns which could not pass that way might be brought up the Bhore Ghaut and passing by this city join the detachment to the south. This mode I strongly recommended as removing every difficulty either of conveyance of the guns or march of the troops and on which I was promised an answer this day, so that it ought to arrive in time for insertion in this address.



This, my Lord, is the substance of my conference with the Minister which as it was held for the purpose of giving me satisfaction on the important points now in negotiation, he closed with a general assurance that whatever obstacles he might meet with and whatever temptations might be held out to him, I might rest assured that nothing should warp him from his engagements and friendship with the Company and he accordingly desired me to write your Lordship so and to make such communications as to prevent any misunderstanding or diminution in the amity of the two States. I replied that my whole dependance was on his wisdom and sincerity which I had frequently mentioned in high terms to your Lordship and that on his conduct on the present occasion rested the verification of my word and the establishment of my representation of his character.

B. Pt. has signified to me with some marks of expecting a similar attention, your Lordship having lately written Nizam Ally Khan, Musheer-al-Mulk and Meer-Aboal-Cossim, I am not sorry for their feeling a little jealousy on this point. While I have explained the compliment on Your Lordship's part by the real and unequivocal mark of friendship in the Nabob's late conduct, should this State act in future agreeable to the last assurances of the Minister, I should be glad to learn your Lordship's sentiments, on making B. Pt. some consideration for the part he has taken in the conduct of our negotiations agreeable to the expectations abovementioned in the former part of this address.

From the prospect of our battalions acting under Pursaram Bhao and from that Chieftain's being now entrusted with the very important charge of conducting this State's part of the hostilities against Tipu in which we are to be so strongly connected, as well as from the respectability of his personal character and rank in this State, I have proposed to the Minister to make him an entertainment previous to his departure which will not, I hope, be disapproved of by your Lordship. I have given Col. Abercromby notice of the probability of his being soon called on for the two battalions and on receiving the answer of this State as to the route shall instantly communicate it to him.

I have this instant received a message from the Durbar acquainting me that though it disapproves of my proposed mode of introducing the Bombay Detachment, yet in consequence of my representation of the danger of landing the troops at Palset it has come to the resolution of desiring that the Bombay Government will immediately dispatch them to Jaygarh about 25 coss south of Fort Victoria, where there is a safe river into which the vessels may enter and land the troops. I shall immediately communicate this intelligence to the Bombay Board and rest compliance with the Durbar's requisition on their information of the practicability of complying with it.

**No. 109**—Taylor reports the capture of Tipu's boat, the Coorg Raja's eagerness for the friendship of the English, and the operations of the Chirakkal and Kolattur Rajas who have signed a treaty of friendship.

FROM—ROBERT TAYLOR,

TO—ROBERT ABERCROMBY.

*Tellicherry, 17th May 1790.*

We beg leave to acquaint you that on reconsideration we have delivered up to Mr. Dineur the boat under a Portuguese pass and colours, which by our last advices we informed you was brought in here, but we have detained the other boat as she is the acknowledged property of Tippoo's subjects, and shall dispose of her and the cargo by public sale, reserving the produce in our treasury until we are favoured with your orders regarding it.

We have the pleasure to inform you that Major Dow with the detachment under his command marched in garrison yesterday, leaving such posts as we could conveniently succour in possession of the Malabars in our interest.

We now send up in the Panther 3 Officers of Tippoo's grabs lately captured by Captain Byron, and 5 kiladars of his troops taken in our neighbourhood with 5 servants, also the Naquedah of the vessel, said to be an Arab grab captured by Captain Byron and 3 discharged sepoy's of the third battalion.

The Chief this day received a letter from the Coorga Rajah expressive of his attachment to the Honourable Company, and his desire of having an interview with the Chief by coming to Tellicherry, for which purpose he requested we would send him an escort of 20 sepoy's with an European Officer to conduct him hither, more as he said to prevent the Malabars molesting him in the way, than from any fear of Tippoo's troops, but as his country is at a considerable distance from hence, and the Cannanore Moplas not in our interest, we do not think it prudent at this time to comply with his request. We shall therefore excuse ourselves to him on this head, and endeavour to prevail on him to make the visit accompanied by his own people only, sending him passports addressed to the different Malabars, our friends. And at all events we have little doubt of preserving him in the Company's interest during the present contest.

The Cherical Rajah has requested a small supply of arms, ammunition and provisions which we have granted him. He this day acquainted us that he will in a day or two set out with his people for his own country and dispose of them in such a manner as will most effectually annoy the enemy, after which he will return hither with 200 men and remain during the rains.

The Cotiote Rajah has acquainted the Chief that his people have possessed themselves of the fort of Cuttiaddy within his own districts, in which they found 100 of Tippoo's troops, whom they dismissed after taking their arms from them; in this place they found four pieces of small cannon.

The Cherical and Cotiote Rajahs have interchanged assurances of amity and friendship with the Honourable Company under their hands and seals and we expect the Cartinadu Rajahs to do the same in a day or two.

**No. 110**—Malet reports the grant of the concession of the tribute on the Poligars, the arrival of Rasta with a large following raising commotion in Poona, the tardy advance of Bhau, and the appointment of Ulthoff as paymaster of the Bombay detachment.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 21st May 1790.*

The concession of the tribute on the Polygars as mentioned in the 10th article of the treaty of 29th March was granted, my Lord, in lieu of many more important demands of indulgence made by this Court on the commencement of our negotiations for an alliance, and as the only mode that I then saw of bringing on the speedy settlement of terms, which I thought of the last importance in the then state of this Court's disposition, before the occurrence of any events or the introduction of any new influence to cause a change in it and from what has since happened I cannot help repeating my expressions of concern that its instantaneous conclusion, when referred to the Nabob Nizam Aly Khan was found incompatible with his interests. In my late letters I have endeavoured to give your Lordship a circumstantial account of affairs here, which I shall now continue, sacrificing the apprehension of being troublesome, to the necessity of detailing the intricate circumstances of this Durbar's domestic situation.

On the 19th instant Luximan Rao Rasta entered town from his family residence of Wye accompanied by Tippoo's Vackeels with a retinue of about 200 men, whose guard on the evening previous to their entering the town when encamped at a small distance, fired several volleys on receipt, as it was given out, of the news of their Master's conquest of the Travancore lines and country. The arrival of this Chief, the avowed patron of Tippoo's interests, so attended, certainly appears extraordinary at this critical period and seems as though he was resolved to rest the decision of the rivalry of his family with the Minister on the determination of the prevalence of the Company's or Tippoo's influence in this Durbar. Thus circumstanced, great signs of apprehension of some domestic

commotion have for some days past been betrayed by the administration, the different guards of the town and of the Peshwa's palace have been greatly strengthened, pretended prodigies and astrological predictions have been circulated, and strongly impressed the minds of men with that dread of impending dangers and the whole town seems in a state of terror and alarm. In this state of affairs here I received on the 19th a letter from Captain Kennaway intimating his intention of prosecuting his new terms of a general alliance, and by the same post your Lordship's instructions of the 26th April to close as soon as possible on the articles of 29th March, and on the day following I received the acquiescence of the Bombay Board in this Court's requisition of our troops. In this critical and interesting predicament I resolved to give the minister neither cause for further delay, nor plea for temporizing with the Rasta faction on the pretence of any deviation on our part from original engagements to which the news of Tippoo's success against the Travancore Lines might have proved an additional inducement. I accordingly on the 20th instant demanded a conference with the Minister which he being prevented granting by the death of some of his relations, I was in lieu of it visited by Behroo Punt. At this meeting I complained loudly of the treaty being still left unexecuted on trivial pretences and as the terms of demanding this State's cavalry and the payment of our detachment were the only obstacles, I begged that the cavalry article might remain in its present indefinite state, and that I would transmit the terms of their supply to which I could not accede, to your Lordship when your demand of them would rest on your approval of those terms. As to the difficulties introduced about the payment of our troops after insisting on their unworthiness I begged the Durbar would stipulate to assent either to the article of the Treaty of 1768 or your Lordship's late agreement with Meer Abool-Cosim as to their payment as the rule of action, assuring him that I knew of no other engagements relative to that point and those engagements are generally that the expence of the detachment shall be paid without any specification of sum. Behroo Punt seemed to think these expedients would remove all further delay but at the same time expressed much curiosity about Captain Kennaway's negotiations at the Nabob's Court, to which I generally replied that, that gentleman had given his support to the plan of operations proposed from hence. I next proceeded to the subject of Rasta's arrival with Tippoo's agents and begged him from me to acquaint the Minister that I thought the admission of publick Vackeels from that Prince at this season incompatible with his engagements with the Company and drew from it an argument of the necessity to execute the treaty without loss of time to prevent the doubts of this Court's disposition that would otherwise naturally arise from so suspicious a circumstance. Behroo Punt in reply to my instances on this subject gave me to understand that the introduction of the agents was entirely an act of the Rasta family, seemed pleased in

being charged with a remonstrance on the subject from me to the Minister and in the strongest terms, repeatedly assured me that he could safely pledge himself for the immutability of this Court's resolution of abiding by the engagements with me on the part of your Lordship. I expostulated on the delays that still prevailed in Pursaram Bhao's movements who has only marched 1 coss since my last address and is now encamped about 5 miles from town. On this head, he gave me the usual assurance. For information relative to the dispatch of the detachment from Bombay and what passed between me and Behroo Punt on that subject permit me to refer you to the enclosed copy of my address to the Bombay Board of last night.

Having written thus far, Captain Kennaway's letter of 13th instant was delivered to me, containing the following paragraph, "The treaty with the Nizam in its corrected form has been communicated to the Mahratta Vackeels and every alteration which they have suggested admitted into it, I hope to forward two copies of it to you tomorrow, one as it stood before shown to them and, one as it is now to remain".

From this very important information of the Mahratta Vackeels' assent to Captain Kennaway's new arrangements which, I presume must from his having substituted them to the former ones, have the merit of superior advantage, I shall cease urging this Court to execute the treaty of March the 29th, especially as I may expect to receive Capt. Kennaway's treaty tomorrow when I shall regulate my conduct agreeable to its tenor and this Court's disposition.

From a very strong conviction that it will be much for the benefit of the public service to have a person, so well acquainted as Mr. Uthhoff is with the genius and habits of these people, with the detachment to join the Mahratta army, I have permitted of his acceptance of the paymastership to the Bombay detachment for the present service and am confident that his particular discharge of the duties of that office will be as meritorious as his general knowledge and information of the people will be beneficial. Permit me to hope that your Lordship will not disapprove this temporary sacrifice of Mr. Uthhoff's assistance at this station to the prospect of making him so much more extensively serviceable. In the interim of his absence I have applied to Col. Abercromby for a gentleman to supply his place and have reason to think Mr. Lankheet will be sent me for that purpose.

**No. 111**—Tipu makes profession of friendship and intends to send a *valil* to Madras for settling matters amicably.

FROM—TIPU SULTAN,

TO—WILLIAM MEDOWS.

22nd May 1790.

I have received your friendly letter of the 20th of Rajab 1204 (the 6th April) by your hercarrah and I have understood the whole of its

contents. What you wrote me respecting your arrival and appointment to the Government of Madras I understood and it has been the cause of much pleasure to me as the friendship and goodwill between this Circar the English Rajah (the King of England) and the Company, which is founded on particular treaties is so well known that it stands not in need of explanation. Nevertheless at this time, notwithstanding the bonds of friendship are firmly established, in consequence of the intervention of certain necessary and important concerns, and the representations contrary to the fact of certain shortsighted persons to you, they have caused an army to be assembled on both sides; as this event is improper among those who are mutually at friendship, I therefore wish, in order to clear it up and to have certain important matters represented, to send to you a person of dignity together with some other persons, that the Vakeel of the Circar having arrived with you may explain the whole circumstances to you, and that the dust which has obscured your upright mind may be removed. Agreeably to the custom of friendship, you will quickly inform me of your approval of my sending a dignified person of this Circar, and you will send orders to the confines of the Carnatic not to molest him, but that the Vakeels be escorted to you in safety. In a word the wish of my heart is this, that agreeably to the articles of the treaty of peace, our friendship may daily increase, and that by the favour of the Almighty there may never be the smallest deviation therefrom. In the same manner as I before wrote on this subject, so I now again write to you. Constantly rejoice me with accounts of your welfare.

No. 112—Capt. Little reports his warm reception by Ekam; he encounters great difficulty in transporting his baggage.

FROM—JOHN LITTLE,

TO—C. W. MALET.

*Cont. next Singapore, 25th May 1791.*

The 25th I wrote to inform you of the arrival of the detachment and have now got everything disarranged. The Subedar Panniam Pann has been particularly civil and attentive, and I believe has and will continue to exert himself to the utmost of his power in our favour. From the manner I was received at Jergah I judged it best rather to exceed my orders in bringing the boats up the river: they all returned yesterday and I have no doubt but the vessels will get well back to Bombay before the rains.

The Subedar here has given me an understanding there is no proper draught bullocks in the country and that new yokes are to be got in that almost every thing must be carried by man. He proposes sending a part of

the baggage on and the same people to return for more which I am obliged to adopt. Four hundred coolies and one hundred bullocks with a Company of sepoys proceed tomorrow morning to the village of Amba up the Gauts with amunition etc. If no more can be got, I fear it will take that number four trips and at least as many days every time.

I have brought with me fifteen days' provisions from this day; by the time it is expended, I hope to be supplied with a bazar. Amba is a poor place of a few huts only. I hope I shall soon be removed to some other place where supplies can more certainly be procured and farther from the monsoon.

P. S.—I hope the camels will soon join us, or I shall be distressed without them.

**No. 113**—Cornwallis gives directions to Kennaway on the line of conduct to be pursued towards the Nizam.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—CAPT. KENNAWAY.

*Fort William, 31st May 1790.*

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I am fully aware of the importance of giving the Nizam every encouragement in our power especially since we have reason to doubt the sincerity of the Marattas, and I approve therefore of the articles of agreement which you have signed relative to the Bengal Detachment understanding it of course to be considered by the Nizam to be no farther binding than may be compatible with previous military arrangements which from circumstances cannot now be altered.

I enclose copies of the letters that I have written to Colonel Brathwaite and to Lieutenant-Colonel Cockerell from which you will be enabled to explain in a satisfactory manner to His Highness the principles on which my orders were necessarily given, and I am persuaded you will be able without difficulty to make him sensible of the dangerous consequences that might attend my sending positive and unconditional orders to the troops which are placed under the immediate command of General Medows without giving that General time to prepare against the ill effects which such orders might produce to the general plan of operations.

By the time this letter reaches you His Highness will either have passed the Kristna or he will have determined not to pass it till after the rains. If he should have passed it and the Mahrattas still hang back, and there should really be reason to apprehend that Tippoo Saib could send a formidable force against him, he must at all hazards be supported without loss of time and without regarding distress which the troops will suffer by making a long march at that season. But if he should not have crossed the Kristna he can have nothing to fear from Tippoo before the breaking

up of the rains, and I really think that in that case it would be for the safety and advantage of the common cause that Cockerell should be employed for the defence of the Carnatic till that period when he might without much risk leave a country in which the rains would soon be expected to commence and when, unless a powerful co-operation on the part of the Marrattas should render it unnecessary, the Nizam may depend upon being joined by so considerable a body of our infantry as to enable him to advance with confidence against the enemy.

I sincerely lament the delay which has attended the movement of the army from Trichinopoly, but when it does march we have every reason to flatter ourselves that its successes will be rapid as to give our friends the greatest encouragement, and you may likewise inform the Nizam that we receive the most satisfactory assurances from the Mallabar Chiefs, and that if the Marrattas should not require the assistance of any part of the Bombay army, Colonel Abercromby, who is an excellent officer, will in person invade Tippoo Saib's country with a large force as soon as the monsoon breaks up on the Mallabar coast.

I cannot help thinking that notwithstanding the present doubtful appearances, the Mahrattas will ultimately perform their engagements and take part with us, but I am too sanguine in this opinion. I can never believe that they would adopt a contrary line and assist their inveterate enemy Tippoo Saib whom they have so much cause to hate and to dread. It is however possible that the apprehensions of the Nizam and his ministers of their hostile intentions may again revive on the present occasion, and although I should wish you to avoid a discussion of this delicate subject if it was practicable, yet if you find them seriously alarmed, you may repeat in the most explicit terms that so long as His Highness acts heartily with us, and fulfils his engagements, we shall think ourselves bound to defend him against attacks from any quarter whatever. But you must be sensible that if the Marrattas will not be with us, it is very material that they should not be against us, and on that account that it is very desirable to avoid giving them any kind of provocation. I wish you always therefore to speak of them in public with great respect and in all conversations discourage any tendency to censure their conduct.

**No. 114**—Cornwallis directs Col. Brathwaite to command Lieut.-Col. Cockerell to proceed to join the Nizam's army, but this order was to be cancelled under certain circumstances. (Ross, ii 27).

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—COL. BRATHWAITE.

*Fort William, 31st May 1790.*

I have this day received information from Captain Kennaway that he has acquainted General Medows that a requisition has been transmitted



to me from the Nizam that the whole or part of the detachment under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Cockerell may be ordered to join and cooperate with His Highness' army. But at this distance I cannot at present judge whether previous arrangements will have permitted General Medows to render it practicable to comply with that requisition.

In the event however that General Medows has directed the whole or any part of the detachment to remain on the north side of the Kristna until my instructions on the above point shall arrive, I desire that you will order Lieutenant-Colonel Cockerell to proceed immediately with the whole or such part of his detachment as may have been destined by General Medows for that purpose, to join the Nizam's army in the manner and by the route that may be prescribed to him by His Highness through Captain Kennaway. You will be pleased to give Lieutenant-Colonel Cockerell every assistance in your power to enable him if necessary to execute this order with all possible expedition, and should the measure take place, you will notify it to the Members of the Board at Madras as well as to General Medows and the Commanding Officer of the Center Division in the Carnatic.

There are at the same time three circumstances that may occur, any one of which you are to consider as a sufficient ground for preventing the effect of this order. First, an application to you from the Board at Fort St. George or from the Commanding Officer of the Center Division that the detachment may proceed on its march to assist in the defence of the Carnatic. Second, your being informed by Captain Kennaway that the detachment can be of no material use to the Nizam's army during the season of the rains. Third, your being acquainted by that gentleman of His Highness having dispensed with the junction of the detachment.

The two latter are very likely to happen, if the Nizam's army should not have crossed the Kristna before the swelling of the river; but in either of the three cases that I have mentioned, you are to order the Detachment to continue its march to the southward.

**No. 114A**—Cornwallis gives specific directions for the movement of Cockerell's detachment under certain circumstances.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—LIEUT.-COLONEL COCKERELL.

*Fort William, 31st May 1790.*

Some new circumstances have occurred in the situation of public affairs, which have rendered it necessary for me to give you the following conditional instructions.

Should you obtain certain information that the Nizam's army has crossed the Kristna and should you have received no positive order to

proceed on your march to the southward after you had reason to believe that General Medows and the members of the Board at Fort St. George were acquainted that His Highness' forces had attacked Tippoo Saib's northern dominions, or should you have no ground to suppose that the services of the detachment were urgently wanted for the immediate protection of the Carnatic, you are to halt at the nearest place to the spot where you may receive this letter that may be convenient for the troops under your command until you can communicate with Captain Kennaway and with Colonel Kelly commanding the center division of the Carnatic army.

You are, immediately after your determining to halt in consequence of the supposed case above stated, to transmit copies of this letter to Col. Kelly and to Captain Kennaway, acquainting the former that you will order two of the battalions of your detachment with Captain Montagu and his half company of artillery and four-six pounders to proceed to the Carnatic if he shall think proper to desire it, and notifying to Captain Kennaway that you are ready to march instantly with the remaining four battalions and artillery or with the whole detachment if Colonel Kelly shall not have required the above mentioned proportion of it, provided Captain Kennaway shall declare the measure to be necessary either to fulfil any engagement with Nizam Aly Khan or to give efficacy and security to his operations.

You are clearly to understand that, if the case which I have supposed to be possible of the Nizam's having crossed the Kristna and having placed a dependence on receiving aid from your detachment has not happened, you are to proceed without interruption upon your march according to such instructions as you may be in possession of previous to the receipt of this letter.

**No. 115**—Malet reports a new difficulty that has arisen on the question of the precedence of the Peshwa's name in the title of the treaty.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

*Poona, 31st May 1790.*

By my last despatch of the 28th instant your Lordship will have learnt that the conclusion of the treaty with this State was very nearly effected; the only obstacles that then intervened were the insertion of the Honourable Company in the title next to the Peshwa instead of the Nabob and of the words "every month" in the stipulation of the payment of our troops, both of which points having been previously pointed out their rectification in the conclusive instrument looked like design. On representing these circumstances many arguments were used for preserving the Nabob's precedence in the title to which I opposed that in the treaty

to be exchanged between this State and the Nabob, the Nabob's name as the Principal should be inserted after the Peshwa, and by the same rule, in the treaty transmitted to your Lordship the Company should certainly be the party mentioned immediately with the Peshwa, but that if the Durbar thought proper to alter their natural order, I should follow its example and in my copy give the Peshwa the rank he gave the Company. The insertion of "every month" was likewise cavilled at and the difficulty of altering the treaty after going through the ultimate process of sealing, strongly urged, all which made me more strenuously insist on the reasonableness of my expectation and the impropriety of this Court in putting the Peshwa's seal to an act, certain points of which had previously been objected to by me. This little altercation terminated the 30th, when I received an assurance that a new copy should be prepared with the corrections I had suggested, and this morning it was sent to me for approval which I have signifyd, and desired that the seals may be put as soon as possible, and if effected before the evening I shall endeavor to present it to your Lordship with this address.

I have the pleasure to acquaint Your Lordship that all the carts and cattle that I was desired by the Bombay Board to furnish Capt. Little's detachment have been despatched to Jeyagur so that I hope very little time will be lost in the interval of landing and marching. This morning the Karkun appointed from hence to join Capt. Little waited on me to take leave, on which occasion I presented him a pair of shawls and a letter for Capt. Little, of which I have the honor to enclose copy.

The time of the accomplishment of some of the predictions that have lately been circulated here having elapsed unverified by the threatened calamities, the terrors that were so lively on the arrival of Rasta have somewhat subsided and men's minds relieved by the failure of the part seem less apprehensive of the predictions that yet remain to be fulfilled. The circumspection of government however is not relaxed and one or two of the principal astrologers are confined till their deserts shall be determined by the period of their prophecies.

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No. 116—Cornwallis expresses his desire to bring the Mahrattas into the net of this alliance even by some concessions.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,  
TO—CAPT. KENNAWAY.

*Fort William, 26th April 1790.*

"I need hardly state to you that though it would be desirable to obtain terms of precise equality in our treaty with the Marrattas, yet as their hearty and early co-operation with us in the present war is of the utmost importance to our interests, I would even designedly give them some advantage rather than retard the commencement of the operation of their forces. You will however observe by the enclosed copy of my

last letter to Mr. Malet that I did not put the same construction that His Highness did upon the meaning of the 10th article of our treaty with the Poona Government, though for the reasons that I have mentioned I was induced to consent that the other more favourable construction should be admitted if they should insist on it."

I am at the same time not without hopes that the point will now be brought to a liberal and satisfactory explanation between them and His Highness to which I wish that you should do everything in your power to contribute.

In the meantime it will be a very important part of your and Mr. Malet's duty to prevent as much as possible all jealousies and misunderstandings between the durbars where you respectively reside.

**No. 117**—Malet expresses his disgust at the delay in signing and exchanging the treaty, and the objection to the march of his guard from Poona to join Capt. Little, and makes bitter comments on the want of candour and consistency of Indian Courts.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 4th June 1790.*

On the 2nd instant I was honored with your Lordship's commands of the 10th ultimo and am extremely sorry that your satisfaction on the removal of all impediments on the part of the Nabob to the final adjustment of the treaty of 29th March will have received a check by an appearance of new obstruction from the introduction of this new treaty after having in fact engaged to accede to the other and after the conditions that he proposed had been assented to. This obstacle however like all former ones will I trust be surmounted by Capt. Kennaway, when on the advice of the conclusion and exchange of that treaty here, he explains to the Nabob how much he is bound in honor and prudence to accede to it, an event that will relieve me from an almost intolerable burthen of anxiety and suspense at a crisis when instead of the conclusion of treaties all parties should be strenuously engaged in the prosecution of the war, for by yesterday's post the Madras government acquainted me with General Medow's departure for the army which would probably move immediately.

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By the copy of my letter to Capt. K. of the 28th ultimo, Your Lordship will perceive that though the negotiation between the Nabob and that gentleman for part or the whole of Col. Cockrell's detachment was carried on secretly and still remained unfinished, I had reason to think it was not unknown to this Court. I shall therefore take advantage of the arrival of your Lordship's letter to assume the merit of candor by letting the Minister know that such a negotiation is or has been on foot and that in the same manner as your Lordship in one of your later letters desired me to offer this State the junction of a larger body of our forces than that

stipulated and the object of it if ultimately agreed on, will be the promotion of the general interests of the alliance.

A very long and a very painful experience, my Lord, has taught me how little reliance is to be placed on the candor or consistency of Indian Courts amongst whom expediency is always ability and knavery too often address, and whose actions I have been so long used to judge by this standard, that in some cases where their conduct may have had the appearance of friendship and cordiality, I have been apprehensive of the imputation of censoriousness by imputing it to motives less liberal and less obvious; but it is my duty to scrutinize actions and, if possible, develop their springs, while government, free from prejudice and regulated solely by principles of wisdom and sound policy, will form its judgment and determination on the broad foundation of public honor and utility.

The remark on what your Lordship has delicately called indiscretion in the Ministers of this and Nizam Ally Khan's Court has drawn from me the foregoing general outline of the distrustful eye with which I view the acts and designs of this and every Court in Hindostan which my constant conduct since I have had the honor to fill this station will I hope, convince your Lordship, that while on one hand I shall be watchful to avoid an imprudent confidence, I shall on the other, by a rigid observance of the fairness of your Lordship's politics put them as far as in me lies beyond the reach of suspicion or the imputation of duplicity.

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As I am not certain that Captain Little's Detachment is furnished with any money for immediate disbursement and as I shall not wish to be too suddenly importunate with this Court on the subject of its payments though I shall by no means neglect the object of keeping it to a faithful observance of its necessary engagements, I have with some difficulty procured for Bills on Benares and shall deliver to Mr. Paymaster Uththoff Rs. 22,625 to take with him to the army.

Your Lordship will have learnt by the copies of my late correspondence with the Bombay Board that this Government objected to the march of my guard from hence to join Capt. Little as I had agreed with Col. Abercromby it should. This extraordinary obstacle, I presume, arose from the wily spirit of its politics and a desire even in the moment of action, to avoid a conspicuous display of its decided connexion with us, too palpable for contradiction in its negotiations to gain from Rasta and Tippoo's agents who are still here, the treasure with which they are entrusted. To avoid therefore this obstacle which would materially affect the stipulated strength of the detachment, I have with previous notice to Behro Punt fallen on the mode of sending off my guard by detachment and hope soon to effect the junction of the whole by this means.

I am at a loss to account to your Lordship for the reasons of the treaty not being yet signed, since it is impossible to explain to you the trifling

verbal disputes and cavilling on terms by which it has been delayed since my last address and which, as they are confined to the Persian version and have originated entirely with the ministry of this Government, have been as disgusting to the Minister (as he assures me) as to me. I have assented to every alteration proposed by this ignorant and litigious officer when it was possible consistent with the spirit of the alliance, and having this morning settled the last disputed points deferred mentioning the subject earlier in this letter in the hope of being able to close it with an account of everything being accomplished. But though the Peshwa's copy is actually signed and sealed, and though I pressed for the exchange this afternoon the Minister requested that Sunday being an auspicious day might be fixed on for the purpose, and on my urging the distress I was under for assigning a satisfactory reason to Your Lordship begged me from him to give the real one of this and tomorrow being inauspicious. Painful experience however gives me a distrust which nothing but absolute execution can remove, and were it not that the requisition of our detachment, the good reception it has met with, and the quick march of Pursaram Bhao to the Kishna give me reason to think this Court is sincere in its resolution of ultimately concluding the treaty, I confess that the late delays would give me much more uneasiness than they already have.

In answer to the instances that I made to this Court (on the receipt of advice of General Medow's departure from Madras to join the army) to repeat its orders to Pursuram Bhao to be ready for action I have been assured that his preparations are in great forwardness and that his orders of equipment extend to 25,000 horse and 5,000 foot beside our detachment.

**No. 118**—Malet reports the long conversation he has held with Nana about the temporary appropriation of Tanjore and Carnatic revenues, and the mode of rewarding the rebel Zemindars, and communicates the exchange of treaties and the new interpretation put on certain clauses of the treaty.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 7th June 1790.*

The audience of Tippoo's agents being put off, I proceeded on the 6th to the Ministers' where the ceremony of exchanging our treaties was performed. The Peshwas' copy being dated the 1st, I regulated mine accordingly and have now the honor to enclose copies of the treaty as presented by me and received from the Peshwa, having thought it advisable to keep the Peshwa's sealed original treaty till honoured with your Lordship's commands relative to forwarding it. I need not remind your

Lordship that a copy of the English and Persian Treaty is to be returned to me ratified by your Lordship in the space of 75 days.

After exchanging the treaties it was settled that I should write to Capt. Kennaway, and the Peshwa to the Nabob, forwarding copies of the treaty now concluded and demanding the Nabob's accession agreeable to the engagements communicated by him to this Court and to me by Capt. Kennaway under the 17th April.

The Minister assured me that strong injunctions had been forwarded to Pursaram Bhao since my communication of General Medows' departure from Madras to join the army and that in consequence of what I had suggested he had been ordered to regulate the junction of the Bombay battalions either to the south or north of the Kishna as circumstances should direct. In reply to my query of how many troops Pursaram had already assembled, he referred me to the report that I should soon receive from the Commander of our battalions and spoke as though he expected that I should have no reason to be dissatisfied with the account.

I embraced this opportunity of acquainting the Minister agreeable to your Lordship's instructions of the 10th ultimo that in like manner as an offer had been made to this State of an additional force from Bombay to act with its armies, so was there some prospect that in consequence of the Nabob Nizam Ally Khan's application some additional force might be granted to him, but that it was yet uncertain, and should it be brought to a settlement the object of the measure would be the promotion of the general interests of the alliance. I likewise communicated to him the probability of a new arrangement being made of the Carnatic, Tanjore revenues and explained the causes. After which I was asked if those Princes whose revenues were to be appropriated would be entitled to any benefits or acquisitions that might arise from the war and how long their revenues would be put under other management, I replied that their revenues would be appropriated to supply deficiencies in mutual agreements for a system of general defence and was glad to get rid of a question which I knew not how to answer. As to the time of appropriation I replied that it would be regulated by necessity.

Having concluded the business of my meeting with the Minister I proceeded to the Peshwa's to whom the circumstances of the exchange were communicated and on which he signified his satisfaction and approval.

On taking my leave I left my vacceel by the Minister's desire to receive some communications from Behro Punt who soon after brought the following—

That if the Nabob was desirous of settling his separate articles with the Co. the Durbar should not object on the following conditions.

First, that the expression in the 2nd article, which makes the Peshwa a kind of auxiliary and the Nabob and the Company principals, should be

omitted, viz. "has engaged to join in the war and to employ a proper army."

Second, that the 3rd article should be entirely omitted.

Third, that the 5th article contains the sense of the 6th, that the 6th therefore was needless.

I immediately replied that this message was totally different from that of the 26th decidedly and generally rejecting the Nabob's articles which I had long since communicated to Capt. Kennaway and from the purport of the letters this day agreed on with the Minister to be written to the Nabob and Capt. Kennaway, and so I should expect an explanation of such contradictory circumstances. To this Behro Punt sent me word that what had been already communicated to me was the real sense of this Court with respect to the treaty now signed and sealed which it was so hoped and expected should be made triple, since exclusive of the 3 article it contained everything that the articles of the Nabob did and many other necessary points. But that should the Nabob, contrary to all expectation and his own engagements, insist on the execution of the articles which he had agitated with Captain Kennaway, this Court had from motives of delicacy desired me to make the above communications that by that softer mode of rejection, His Highness might be soothed to accede to the others, and most sincerely hope that after the many obstacles that have been surmounted Capt. Kennaway will not add to the number and prevail on His Highness to accede without reserve to the treaty now executed as I cannot help thinking that his forming any separate engagement, how trifling soever, the difference would be attended with future cavil and perplexity, nor can I conceive what good object he can have in the prosecution of separate articles similar as he says in substance, but which with all due deference to his Highness's decision, are sufficiently different to give room for much and serious discordance.

I have been again desired by the Durbar to enquire of Capt. Kennaway whether the Nabob meant to enter the enemy's country in person. If not, how many forces he meant to detach and at all events the Minister is anxious that Capt. Kennaway should join his instances to those of the Vakeel of this Durbar to prevail on his Highness to act with weight and promptitude as this State engages to do.

With respect to the appropriation of the Tanjore revenues Behro Punt has communicated to me that the Tanjore Government is a branch of the Sattarra family and from the consequent connexion between it and the Peshwa, the latter should think he had a plea to interpose in the affairs of that prince. I replied that my communication with respect to the revenues of Tanjore was merely from the candor of your Lordship on a domestick point, that the hold taken thereof to introduce a mediatory influence was extremely ill-placed, that in politics dependence and protection were unalienable and that on us only who protected Tanjore



could Tanjore be dependant. In a word, I advised the Durbar before they talked of interfering in the affairs of a branch of the Raja's family to look well to its own conduct to the pretended head of it at Sattarra, and retorted that if interference were to be talked of, the Company might more justly under the name of the Raja of Tanjore interfere on behalf of the Raja of Sattarra than the Peshwa busy himself in the affairs of Tanjore. To this Behro Punt replied that though the Governor General had made the communication in his usual candor yet had the same intelligence been previously received from other quarters, and though he did not give an answer to my objections to the Peshwa's interference in the Raja's affairs yet did he not chose to relinquish the pretension.

By message from the Minister I have been applied to for the line to be followed in rewarding any Zemindars, Killadars or any other dependants or officers of Tippoo who may come over to any of the allies and in what manner any allotments to such persons of money or territory is to be held in the general system of partition. Thinking this a point of much consequence and in the settlement of which we may be enabled to provide for the Nairs and other malcontents of Tippoo's government, who may join our arms on the Malabar Coast or elsewhere, I declined giving any other answer than that as Vackeels would reside in the different armies the requisite measures would be taken on a due consideration of circumstances. In the interim, I have thought the point of consequence for your Lordship's consideration and should be glad to be honored with your sentiments.

I received so much satisfaction from the following account of Capt. Little's progress that I have taken the liberty to give it in his own words. "The Subedar Parsuram Punt has been much more expeditious in getting the artillery and baggage on than I expected. Everything will be off this ground to-day (1st June) and be at the top of the Ghauts I hope by the 4th, which is about 14 coss from hence. This expedition has been owing to the coolies having relays of fresh men. The weather has become very threatening." The alacrity in the Peshwa's officers has a good appearance and will I hope be satisfactory to your Lordship.

I met with so many difficulties in settling the stipulations for supplying the Co. the 10,000 cavalry that I thought it more prudent to leave the article in its present state than accede to the terms proposed to me, which I shall transmit to your Lordship by another opportunity, and on seeing which Your Lordship will be able to determine on the expediency of having recourse to the option. In fact as the distress of any of the allies is engaged to be relieved by the 8th article there will be no occasion for having recourse to the 7th in that event, and as in sending for them to make conquests of which the allies are to receive 2/3rds the expense would not perhaps be compensated by our remaining share.

*Poona, 7th June 1790.*

I this evening mentioned to Behro Punt the propriety of the treaty being accompanied with letters from the Peshwa's Minister, etc., to your Lordship and received for answer that letters had been received from your Lordship by Nizam Ally Khan, his Minister and Abol Cossim but none for this Court in the course of the present negotiations, that therefore it would not be proper for the Peshwa to write, but if I thought proper the Minister and Behro Punt would. This I waved. Permit me to submit to Your Lordship the propriety of a short letter to the Peshwa and Minister with the ratified treaty mentioning the receipt of the Peshwa's copy, and if not improper a letter to Behro Punt mentioning that I had communicated his conduct throughout the negotiation.

No. 119--Cornwallis gives directions to Malet for maintaining harmony and friendship between the Nizam and the Mahrattas and shows his complete grasp of the political situation.

FROM--CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO--C. W. MALET.

*Fort William, 7th June 1790.*

A number of circumstances, and particularly our having no reason to suppose that Tippoo would have given us so much time to make our own preparation, have hitherto concurred to render it apparently of great importance to our interests that the Mahrattas and the Nizam or even that either of those Powers should not only engage to join us in the war against Tippoo but also that they should be prevailed upon to proceed to immediate acts of hostility in order to create a diversion in our favour, and as there seemed to be no insuperable incompatibility in the terms that were originally proposed by both Durbars, without previous communication with each other for joining in the Confederacy with us, it appeared that time might be gained in bringing the agreements with each of them to a conclusion, and that in other respects, no material inconvenience could arise from the separate prosecution of yours and Captain Kennaway's negotiations.

The case however, will be greatly altered after the treaties shall be signed and both those Powers shall have completely and heartily embarked with us in the war and all future transactions amongst the members of the Confederacy must be conducted with perfect concert and with the utmost circumspection.

As it will be my constant and earnest study to give the Nizam and the Peshwa's Ministers every possible convincing proof of our firm determination to execute all our engagements with them in the most liberal and honourable manner, I trust that in the discussion of our relative interests,

no serious differences can ever arise directly between either of those powers and this Government. But as unluckily there are at present strong seeds of disunion between those two States from His Highness's evident impatience to disengage himself from the degree of dependance in which he has been held for some time past by the Mahrattas and from jealousy which will be but natural for the latter to entertain at observing the symptoms of a plan on his part to form different political connection; and as altercations or even a coldness between those powers might be productive of the most pernicious effects to the general interests of the Confederacy, it will require the utmost prudence and vigilance both from you and from Captain Kennaway to watch and to soften any subject of discontent that may accidentally arise on either side, and indeed I know that I can place an entire confidence in both of you for doing the utmost by every persuasive means in your power to preserve that degree of harmony and cordiality between them which will be absolutely necessary to secure an efficacious exertion of their joint efforts in prosecuting the great objects of the alliance.

The Mahrattas will, no doubt, expect that particular attention should be paid to their opinions and wishes respecting the mode of carrying on the war on account of the great force which it will be in their power to employ in promoting its success. I should therefore be glad for that reason, as well as for other considerations, that the plans for the operations of his Highness's and their own arms should either originate with them, or receive their sanction before they are transmitted to me or to General Medows for our approbation; and when the events of war shall produce propositions and negotiations for peace I shall act in every respect in the openest manner with our allies, and I shall hope that, in the course of such discussions His Highness may also be prevailed upon to withhold or to desist from any pretensions in his own favour which would give disgust or jealousy to the Mahrattas.

His Highness's requisition that the whole or part of the Bengal detachment under the command of Lieutenant Col. Cockerell should be ordered to join and co-operate with his army arrived at the time that your letters had given me a very unfavourable impression of the state of your negotiations at Poona, and my guarded conditional compliance with it, was given with the view not only to encourage him to adopt prompt and vigorous measures against the common enemy, in order to create a useful diversion in favour of our southern army but also to fortify his mind against apprehensions which he has more than once expressed of possible dangers from a change of disposition in his allies.

The frank and explicit declarations which the Minister gave you of his determinations to abide by his engagements and to proceed immediately in the prosecution of the war, have given me a confidence in his sincerity, which I desire that you will express to him in the strongest and most friendly terms.

Altho' Behro Pant may have exaggerated the extent of his good offices upon the late occasion, yet as it is likewise possible that he may be favourably inclined towards our interests at least when they are in competition with those of Tippo and as it may be of considerable value and convenience to us that such a disposition in him may be encouraged and strengthened, I shall with great pleasure approve of your making him handsome present in my name as a mark of the impression that your representation of his services and attention to you has made upon me, and as you can form the best judgment of his expectations I shall leave the amount or nature of the present entirely to your own discretion.

As at the time that I wrote to the Nizam and Azim-ul-Omrah, I likewise wrote to Meer Abul Cossim, it occurs to me that perhaps Behro Pant may be mortified when the letters arrive for the Peshwa and Nana Furnaveese, to find that there is not one likewise addressed to him, I have therefore enclosed to you a letter for him but as, on a former occasion, you discouraged my corresponding with him, I submit it entirely to your option whether you should deliver the letter, or merely a civil message from me in such terms as you may think proper.

It will give me great satisfaction to be able in any manner to show marks of particular personal attention to the Minister. I shall therefore be glad if you will be at pains to discover either from himself or from Behro Pant whether I could do anything within reasonable bounds of expense that would be peculiarly grateful to him ; and as he continues his buildings at Benares, it has occurred to me that perhaps he may wish to obtain some marks of distinction there, which I should have no objection to grant.

I trust that I shall soon have the pleasure to receive the treaty in proper form for my ratification ; and as the consequences of the connexion which the Nizam had formed with Kutb-al-Deen Khan will have quickened his Highness's motion in passing the Krishna, I am not without hopes that Parsuram Bhau will on that account have also been induced to cross that river without waiting for official accounts of the commencement of the operations of our southern army.

Your intention of giving an entertainment to Parsuram Bhau, previous to his march, was exceedingly proper and well judged, and has my perfect approbation.

**No. 120**—Little relates his difficulties in sending his baggage up the ghat.

FROM—JOHN LITTLE,

TO—C. W. MALET.

*Amba Village, 7th June 1790.*

I am sorry to acquaint you that a good deal of rain has fallen and the guns are not yet got up the Ghauts, which is very difficult. Two companies

of sepoys are now with them to assist but cannot promise myself in what time they may succeed, as it is thought they will be obliged to take them to pieces to be carried up a great part of the way.

The last stage before I came to the foot of the Ghauts I acquainted the person deputed by the Subedar of Ratnagiri to assist us, that it was my intention to wait there till he came up with the remainder of the baggage but finding my presence necessary here to endeavour to get a bazar established, he took offence at my coming away without first seeing him and rather slackened in his endeavours to assist us, but I have since done everything in my power to induce him to exert himself, and for that purpose have sent down to him the person I found waiting for us here from Pursaram Bhau. I have met with greater difficulties than I at first expected from want of regular assistance and a sufficient number of people to transport the artillery and stores. The twelve double carts arrived the night before last, but an unfortunate dispute between the sepoys sent with the other cattle from Poona has retarded their arrival and they are now detained at a village about 18 coss from hence. On hearing this I immediately got a letter wrote to Pursaram Bhau to inform him of the circumstances and I hope they will soon be permitted to join us.

I am very apprehensive of the want of a bazar and that the rains will make one yet more difficult to procure, but I am persuaded this still more depends on the good will of Parsuram Bhau towards us. Money will be absolutely needful very soon as I have only one month's pay for my battalion and by some accident the pay for the other battalion was left behind.

Both the battalions were completed to 740 firelocks before we left Bombay and the two Companies from Poona were to make up the number to 800 each, but a considerable desertion, I believe, of about 70 men of each battalion, afterwards took place and a good many have gone off since we landed I suppose about 30 men from the two battalions. The arms and accoutrements to that number is with us and I was ordered to recruit but have yet not got any. I shall send you returns by the next opportunity.

**No. 121**—Cornwallis makes Kennaway aware of the Nizam's real object in joining the war and asks him to keep a strict eye on some noblemen of the Nizam's Court for counteracting Tipu's designs.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—CAPTAIN KENNAWAY.

*Fort William, 7th June 1790.*

I must own that I am a little apprehensive that the Peshwa's Ministers may think that you have acted with some indelicacy towards them by your actually signing the treaty with the Nizam previous to your receipt of their approbation of it.

I felt a very serious concern at receiving Mr. Malet's letters of the 7th and 10th ultimo for without the co-operation of the Marrattas I could not flatter myself with a certain prospect of the speedy conclusion as well as the decided success of the war, two events which are absolutely necessary to save this Government and indeed the English Company's affairs from the greatest possible distress; besides that, if they had not taken part with us there would always have been reason to apprehend that their jealousy of our getting the Nizam out of their hands might in the course of the contest have even inclined them to take part against us.

The alarm is now happily over, and I trust that everything will go according to our wishes, but I must desire you to keep it for ever uppermost in your mind that the great objects to which I with so much anxiety and indeed almost solely look forward, are not the same with those which principally occupy the thoughts of the Nizam or at least of His Minister and Meer Abul Kassim. My views are at present entirely confined to the reduction of Tippoo Saib's power and to the speedy termination of the war, but I suspect the first and favorite point of the others to be the emancipation of His Highness from the power of the Mahrattas, and that they are such shortsighted politicians, that for the chance of obtaining it they would even now be glad to see a coldness between us and the Poona Government without considering that such an event might possibly so raise our affairs as to put it out of our power to effect what they desire.

The die is now cast in regard to Lieutenant-Colonel Cockerell's detachment and the conditional orders which I sent on the 31st ultimo must operate according to circumstances, but I have my apprehensions that if any part of that corps should join the Nizam during the rains, and without any previous communication and explanation, it will create fresh cause of jealousy at Poona, and I likewise think that the brigade would be more usefully employed in covering the Carnatic until the rains break up to the northward unless the Nizam would be in danger of receiving some serious check without their assistance.

I cannot conclude without expressing my approbation of your zealous and successful efforts to encourage His Highness to act immediately, the revolt of Kutb-ul-Deen will prove an additional incitement and I trust the whole will produce a good effect on the Peshwa's Ministers and on the operations of Parsuram Bhau, but I must remind you that Tippoo Saib has likewise the means of corrupting and it would be advisable that you should keep a vigilant eye not only upon Shums-ul-Omrah but even upon Mohabut Jung and many of the other principal people about His Highness's Durbar, and if you should have occasion to expend some money in endeavouring to discover and counteract intrigues of that nature, I shall by no means think it uselessly and improperly employed.

**No. 122**—The Artillery crosses the ghats, but Little complains that he could not make presents to Balajipant and others and solicits Malet's instruction regarding the presents to be made to Bhau.

FROM—JOHN LITTLE,

TO—C. W. MALET.

*Curwa, 10th June 1790.*

I have the pleasure to acquaint you the artillery was all got up the Ghats yesterday, but with the greatest labour on account of the rain. The same day all the cattle arrived and Ballajee Punt. I was totally unprepared to make him the present you recommended, but told him it was my intention and sent him the money to-day for an entertainment. This is the third or fourth time I have been very awkwardly situated on account of having nothing proper to present these people with particularly to the Subedar of Ratnagiri who at least merited such an attention from me on the Companies' account. I shall still be more at a loss when I come to join Persram Bhau and therefore beg you will instruct me on the occasion and if you think proper to send me some things of that sort which I am convinced myself is necessary but cannot answer how far the Government of Bombay may be satisfied with the expense. Your opinion however will be a sanction to me for what ought to be done.

The Rajah of Panella sent to demand of me by what authority I entered his country and denied being subject in any manner to the Peshwa. Nothing else material happened except a demand for money for the coolies he sent to assist in carrying the baggage. I hope to cross the Warna tomorrow and shall make what speed I can to Tasgaon which, I fear, will be very slow on account of the deepness of the roads from the rains having been so severe. The men suffer a good deal from it.

I shall send you a return of the troops artillery and stores as soon as possible ; everybody being employed and the rain together has prevented their being got ready. Ballaji Punt required one for the Durbar and I made answer that I was preparing one for you to be presented.

**No. 123**—Malet reports to the G. G. his strong protest against the audience granted to Tipu's Vakils by the Peshwa.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 11th June 1790.*

On the 8th instant Tipu's agents were introduced by Rasta to an audience of the Peshwa, notwithstanding my strong opposition as incompatible with the engagements now concluded between the two States to which it was replied that their mission was for the settlement of arrears

of tribute previous to the present hostile arrangements of this Court against their Master. It appears to me that it is the object of this Court to get from them if possible the money with which they are intrusted, the payment of which has been made conditional but I shall not cease to object to an intercourse so contrary to our engagements and which may be converted to the conduct of improper intrigues.

I have signified to the Durbar my expectation of its adopting without loss of time some regular mode for discharging its engagements relative to the pay of the detachment and shall acquaint your Lordship with the result.

**No. 124**—Cornwallis approves of the appointment of Uthhoff as Paymaster.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

TO—C. W. MALET.

*Fort William, 14th June 1790.*

I approve very much of Mr. Uthhoff's being appointed Paymaster to the Bombay Detachment which is to join Persuram Bhau, not only because that measure is likely to prevent any misunderstanding between the Commanding Officer of our troops and the Mahratta Chief, but as it will be the means of your obtaining the most minute information of everything that passes.

I shall not feel quite easy until the treaty is signed, although I think that the indecent manner in which Rasta brought Tippoo's Vackeels to Poona must be highly offensive to Nana Furnaveese, and must in great measure force him to make a common cause with us in order to support his own power, and as he has so often triumphed over the attempts of his enemies, I hope there is no danger in the present instance of his being forced to yield to them.

**No. 125**—Malet communicates to the Governor General his opposition to the introduction of defensive agreements with the Nizam by Kennaway.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 14th June 1790.*

In answer to Capt. Kennaway's persuasion of the circumspection with which he had used your Lordship's cautious latitude of admitting the Nabob's defensive proposals into a new treaty, permit me to refer to my letter of the 24th ultimo and the 7th instant to Capt. Kennaway with the extracts that accompanied the latter. From Capt. Kennaway's letter to your Lordship of the 3rd June it appears that such admission had the



sanction of his opinion of the policy of general defensive arrangements with His Highness the Nabob, so that my surprize at the act is now transferred to the principle on which it was done.

In your Lordship's letter to the Nabob Nizam Ally Khan of the 7th July 1789, your defensive arrangements with that Prince are restricted in their opposition to Tippo. In Capt. Kennaway's letter to me of 12th March he expressed his disapproval of the Nabob's proposal of general defensive engagements in his persuasion of your Lordship's objections thereto and in that of the 25th following that he had refused those proposals a place in his preliminaries; In your Lordship's letter to Capt. Kennaway of 12th April defensive engagement is cautiously rested on the assent of this Court the improbability of gaining which was enunciated in my letters to that gentleman. Your Lordship's letter of 29th April to the same gentleman specifically confined your latitude of defensive engagement to the time of the present war and to me of the 10th great stress is laid on the caution with which your Lordship had replied to His Highness's propositions.

With all these materials before him when Capt. Kennaway addressed your Lordship on the 3rd of June, I am at a loss to account for his idea of the policy of introducing general engagements of defence with Nizam Ally Khan, unlimited as to time, against the power of the Mahrattas, particularly at a period when we were anxiously endeavoring to procure the assistance of this Court and when the state of its disposition was extremely precarious. Abstracted from the above materials which, I presume should have regulated Capt. Kennaway in the conduct of the late negotiations, I am on general principles very doubtful of the policy of contracting defensive engagements with States whose councils are so fluctuating, whose faith is so precarious, and whose power is so unstable as that of the princes of Hindostan, without putting them on the footing of our present allies, the Nabobs of Oude, and Arcot, of the practicability or expediency of which I presume nothing need be said. I readily agree with Capt. Kennaway that the permanence and vigor of the Nabob's government are highly desirable to us and I took the liberty of cursorily mentioning this opinion to that gentleman in my letter of 12th April last. But all my observation teaches me that to pledge ourselves for its defence and support would be ruinous in its consequence and probably impracticable in the event.

It is with reluctance that I shall scrutinize that merit on which Capt. Kennaway lays so much stress of the Nabob's moving in person, but from the importance of the obligation attributed to it and the still more important recompense to which Capt. Kennaway thinks him entitled for it I cannot help observing that His Highness's generosity will have laid a very heavy tax on our gratitude if for the eclat of his march he should draw us into defensive arrangements by which after the conclusion of the

present war we should be exposed to constant danger of a similar one with this state in the defence of him and his successors. Nor can I conceive that any pretence will be given to the Nabob for relaxing in his present zeal by not succeeding in a pursuit his success in which appears by Capt. Kennaway's correspondence never to have rested on a more flattering contingency than the assent of this Court. The advantages of the treaty are certainly adequate to the faithful discharge of it, in which if the Nabob and this Court do not fail, I presume, we shall have no reason to complain of their lukewarmness; but if His Highness, under pretence of disappointment in an unreasonable expectation should relax in what is due to his engagements, I presume he will have little claim to those generous and disinterested motives assigned for his conduct in Capt. K.'s dispatch of the 1st April last. I hope however that the authority granted by your Lordship to Capt. K. in your letter of 29th April for giving His Highness assurances of defence and protection during the present war will enable him so fully to convince His Highness of your Lordship's friendly disposition as to prevent any diminution in that share of zeal and vigour which he has hitherto manifested.

I am promised regular payment of the Bombay detachment as soon as I can furnish the Durbar an authentic account of its expense for which I have applied to the Governor of Bombay and Capt. Kennaway.

By Capt. K.'s letter to your Lordship I perceive that Nizam Ally Khan has written Nanna on the subject of difference between him and Hurry Punt which I never heard had arisen to a degree of notoriety.

**No. 126**—Cornwallis suggests the answer to be given by Medows to Tipu's proposal of sending a Vakil to Madras.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—WILLIAM MEDOWS.

*Fort William, 16th June 1790.*

We now desire that Tippoo may be informed in reply to his letter, that actuated by an earnest desire to save many thousands of innocent subjects belonging to both States from suffering the calamities which unavoidably attend upon war, we have not only dissembled our sense of many exceptionable parts of his conduct to us for several years past, but have even on that account forbore to show our resentment at his detaining, in direct contradiction to the terms of the treaty, a number of our unfortunate countrymen who were so unlucky as to fall into his hands in the course of the former war. But now that his violence and spirit of ambition has impelled him not only without the least provocation, but after the most conciliatory propositions had been made to him for terminating the differences that had arisen between him and our ally, the

Rajah of Travancore, to commit the most flagrant violation of the late treaty of peace, by attacking the dominions of that Rajah who was included by name in that treaty as an ally of the Company, we have at last been obliged to seek for safety and redress by force of arms, and that we trust for success in the bravery of our troops and in the justice of our cause.

That affairs having arrived at that unfortunate state, it no longer rests with you to bring them to an accommodation, and that a new treaty of peace can only be negotiated and concluded by the Supreme Government at Bengal.

That it could therefore answer no useful purpose to receive a Vakeel from him, and consequently that you must decline it. But that, if he should at any time be disposed to offer propositions for making ample reparation to ourselves and to our allies for all the injuries that he has done both to us and to them, you will transmit those propositions without loss of time to us for our consideration.

As the correspondence with Tippoo, as well as the negotiations with all the Native Powers and Chiefs, will of course be conducted by General Medows, we direct that whilst he holds a language with that Prince corresponding with the above instructions, he will in no way agree to relax in his military operations but continue, until he shall receive orders from us to the contrary, to prosecute the war with the utmost possible vigour.

**No. 126A**—Cornwallis asks Kennaway to convince the Nizam of his open and straightforward conduct by submitting to him the answer given by Medows to Tipu and expresses his disgust with the authorities who had sent the Madras detachment in so unmilitary a condition.

Mentioned in Ross, Vol. II, p. 32.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—CAPT. KENNAWAY.

*Fort William, 17th June 1790.*

I have received your letters dated the 25th, 26th, 29th and 30th of last month.

The Madras Government having a few days ago, transmitted the copy of a letter which was addressed by Tippoo Sultaun to General Medows, I am glad to embrace the opportunity which it has furnished, to give the Nizam a specimen of the openness with which I am determined to conduct myself towards our allies in all our transactions with that Prince.

I therefore enclose a copy of Tippoo's letter, and of the answer which the Madras Government has been directed to return to it, in order that, by your communicating the whole or the substance of those papers to His

Highness, and his Ministers you may be enabled to show that they may depend upon the sincerity of the assurances that you have already given them, that we will adhere strictly to our engagements, and enter into no negotiations with Tippoo without the knowledge and full approbation of the other members of the Confederacy.

At so early a stage of our military operations we cannot form a judgment of the terms to which it may be in our power to oblige Tippoo to submit ; but that we may be properly prepared for discussions at the time that any negotiation shall be opened, I wish you to ascertain and communicate to me as soon as you conveniently can, the objects which his Highness would be principally desirous to require at the conclusion of a peace.

You will have known before this time that General Medows, with the army under his command, has attacked Tippoo's southern dominions, and I make no doubt of your having availed yourself of that information to incite the Nizam to make the most rigorous exertions on his part to distract and distress the common enemy.

I have so repeatedly stated to you my earnest desire that the utmost care may be taken in all our transactions with the Nizam to avoid giving any ground for discontent or jealousy to the Mahrattas, that it is unnecessary at present to enlarge further upon that subject, and as there is no material difference amongst the parties respecting the substantial points, I trust that the few misapprehensions, which have occurred in settling the articles of the triple alliance, will soon be finally and amicably accommodated.

Your uniform accounts of the good disposition of the Nizam and his Ministers give me great satisfaction, though for the sake of His Highness's own reputation and interest, as well as that of the other Members of the Confederacy, I cannot but lament that the movements of his forces are so exceedingly tardy.

At the same time I must, in candor, admit that it was not unreasonable in him to expect that our southern army should show him an example by commencing its operations ; and I am also obliged to acknowledge that from your report of the state of the Madras Detachment, upon Major Montgomery's own authority, His Highness has great reason to complain of a failure, on our part, in affording him the support to which he is entitled by treaty and by repeated promises.

It may not be possible to apply any immediate remedy to the defects of those two battalions. But you may assure His Highness and his Ministers that I am highly displeased at their having been sent to him in so unmilitary and so imperfect a condition, and that I shall not only call the Commanding Officer of the Northern Division of the Carnatic army, or any other person who may have participated in the negligence of employing troops that appear to be so unfit for service, to a most rigorous

account for his misconduct ; but I shall also take the earliest possible opportunity to replace them with others that are complete in numbers and perfect in military discipline.

**No. 127**—Malet presents a gold time-piece to Behro Pant.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 18th June 1790.*

Since my last address of the 14th I have been honored on the 16th with a letter from General Medows dated 25th ult., camp at Trichinopoly, advising his resolution of marching the next day, immediately on receipt of which I sent a note to Behro Pant.

Tippoo's agents are still here, and from my Durbar intelligence Luxman Rao Rasta continues to interest himself with great activity in their affairs.

Reports are current here that Tippoo is returned or on his return to Syringputtun.

It escaped me to mention before that I presented Behro Pant a gold time-keeper on the conclusion of the exchange of treaties.

**No. 128**—Little solicits Malet's advice on the ceremonial that is to be observed at his interview with Bhau.

FROM—JOHN LITTLE,

TO—C. W. MALET.

*Compta, 21st June 1790.*

I arrived at Tasgaum with the detachment the 18th and should have immediately wrote you of it but wished at the same time to give you some account of our reception.

I found Pursaram Bhau encamped about two coss from the town at this village with about 2,000 horse. He moved on yesterday a coss or two further, and at his desire I took up the ground he left. Ballajee Punt, the Sirkar and Gunput Row another Carkoon sent by Pursaram Bhau to attend the detachment had before been particularly desirous to know what

presents I had to make Parsuram Bhao as it was proper he should be acquainted therewith to regulate his to me. I had not then received the shawls from Poonah or heard your sentiments on the matter. I therefore avoided making any answer, but have since made it my business to enquire what would be proper on the occasion, and from the best information I could get which coincides with the opinion of Mr. Uthhoff, who I believe to be well acquainted with these matters I told them that I should present him with a horse, shawls, kincubs and white cloth. The Bhao had at this time sent for the Carpoons, and on Ballajee Punt's return he told me that he intended sending a Sardar to meet me and that after that I should pay him (the Bhao) a visit which should be returned and a present made me of Rs. 500 for an entertainment, and that this arrangement was agreeable to instructions from Nana. Understanding that this was the way in which a superior amongst themselves received an inferior officer not entitled to any honourable distinction, and that it was not sufficiently respectful to the situation I had the honour of filling and might possibly be the means of destroying that influence I ought in particular to have with the officers of the 2,000 horse to be attached to the detachment by the terms of the treaty, I therefore made answer that such a meeting being in my opinion not sufficiently respectful and creditable to the station I had the honour to fill I could not accede to it, but that as Nana had directed it I could not take it ill from Parsuram Bhao. In the meantime the matter should be referred to the two Sarkars to be adjusted. Ballajee Punt returned this morning and said the Bhao had sent to Poonah about this matter. As this is the first business of the kind I ever was engaged in, I was fearful of giving up any point that ought to be maintained. If I have erred I trust it is on the right side as a few days' delay under the present circumstances can make very little or no difference.

I expected long ere this from Bombay that an establishment for the detachment would have been sent me, instead of which I received one for a brigade. I am now about getting one made out as soon as possible, a copy of which I shall send you and another to Bombay for the approval of the Governor-in-Council. In it I shall be obliged to make a considerable augmentation to the artillery of the draught cattle and drivers, both on account of their smallness being ill fed and the deepness of the roads from the rain. If a future agreement and a new one must be made, it would be proper I think to stipulate that he (the Chowdhry) should be obliged to supply them each daily with a certain quantity of grain or forfeit a consideration to the Company, but in a time of scarcity to be left to the discretion of a Committee or the Commanding Officer of the detachment. A number of his cattle have died for mere want of sustenance, and you may suppose the rest is not in proper condition.

Lt. Ken the Quarter-master has not yet been able to get up all the stores. I have been delayed a good deal by the quantity sent for the surgeon which had not been packed for bullock carriage.

No. 129—Malet communicates to the Governor General intelligence of the movements of Medows and Hartley, the strength of Bhau's army and the difference between Bhau and Little on the subject of ceremonials.

FROM—C. W. MALET.

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 28th June 1790.*

My last address was dated the 18th, and on the 22nd I submitted to your Lordship under cover to Mr. Hay my letter to Capt. Kennaway of that date. On the 23rd I was favored with letters from Genl. Medows and Col. Hartley, the former advising his being advanced near 20 miles toward the enemy's frontier on the 27th of May, and the latter that Tippu had broke up his camp in Travancore and moved toward Paligatcherry on the 17th of the same month, which I communicated to this Court.

On the 25th I had the pleasure to learn from Capt. Little that he arrived near Parsuram Bhao's Camp in the neighbourhood of Tasgaum on the 18th. But that owing to some difference regarding the ceremonial he had not yet had a meeting with that Chieftain, which point having been referred by Parsuram to the Minister and by him mentioned to me, my endeavours have been used to accommodate it to the satisfaction of all parties and hope to have it in my power to communicate my success in the course of this address. Captain Little computes Parsuram's force at about 2,000 horse, but as he had had very little opportunity of gaining accurate knowledge as Parsuram changed his ground on his approach and as I have certain intelligence of another encampment in the neighbourhood of Tasgaum of 1,000 men and several pieces of artillery, I think it probable that Parsuram's force when Capt. Little wrote may have been about 4 or 5,000 men, a very small proportion indeed of that force which this Court has given me reason to conclude should be ready on the arrival of the Bombay detachment. I have accordingly not failed to represent in the strongest terms to the Minister my surprise at the tardiness of his preparation after his repeated assurances and especially after the serious manner in which he in person on the 6th inst. rested their verification on the report that I should receive from the Commandant of our detachment on his junction. On the 26th Behro Punt returned after an absence of some days from Poona when I immediately repeated through him my expressions of surprise at the small force collected by Parsuram, to which I added that this backwardness was rendered still more conspicuous and more suspicious by the continuance of Tippoo's vackeels here, the frequent conferences between the Minister and Rasta and by the actual payment of about 4 lacs of rupees into the Peshwa's treasury on the 26th inst. Observing that however irresistible this Court's passion might be to procure this money, I conceived it could not be got but by some assurances of advantage in return, incompatible with the interests of the present

confederacy, so must I deem the whole negotiation and the residence of Tippoo's agents in Poona contrary to the 12th article of the treaty of alliance.

I likewise represented to Behro Punt that while transactions of so very doubtful an aspect were conducting here it was peculiarly awkward that notwithstanding Capt. Little's near approach to Parsuram's camp, his meeting with that Chief should hitherto be delayed on frivolous pretences and I proposed that as an expedient for Parsuram's going out in person to meet Capt. Little (however fully I was convinced of its propriety from the usages of this Court and the Peshwa himself to military Officers) he should send one of his son or his brother to pay that compliment to the Commander of so large a body of the Honourable Company's troops to whose junction, abstracted from what is due to ceremony in the intercourse of nations, it was political to give as much eclat as possible. To this proposal I am in expectation of an answer, and hope it will be conformable to my wishes, since should it not, I do not think myself justified in making any further concession either from my knowledge of the usages of this Court or from what I think due to the dignity of my country involved as it is in the character of its delegates as to the honorary presents.

**No. 130**—The Chief of Tellicherry accuses the Bibi of Cannanore of hostility to the English and seeks Abercromby's permission for the reduction of the place.

FROM—ROBERT TAYLOR,

TO—ROBERT ABERCROMBY.

*Tellicherry, 28th June 1790.*

On the 19th instant a cossid arrived here from Mr. Lewis Anthony Yvon at Belgaum dated the 11th ultimo, whose return affords us the present opportunity of addressing you. Nothing of consequence has occurred here since our last letters of 17th ultimo having been perfectly quiet ever since and to all appearance we shall remain so during the rains. We have a plentiful supply of rice and in other respects are moderately furnished with provisions. By the best information we can obtain there are but small parties of Tippoo's troops in the different posts southward between this and the Travancore country, but at Cannanore a body of eight thousand belonging to Tippoo who are allowed by the Bibi to remain there although the Chief has used every endeavour to prevail upon her to send them away and to enter into an alliance with the Company, but to this she has ever returned the most evasive and equivocal answers and her conduct has a most pernicious effect on the behaviour of the Moplas in general who, considering her as the head of their caste, follow the example she has set them, and by most the greatest part have neglected or evaded the orders of the different Malabar Rajas to whom they were formerly subject and



have even had the insolence to ill-treat, as they found opportunity, the Nairs who to a man are our friends. The reduction of Cannanore we have every reason to suppose would produce the most beneficial change in their conduct. Tippoo's troops would be obliged to remove, and the Moplas seeing their asylum in our possession would throw themselves under our protection and unite with the Nairs. In another point of view the reduction of Cannanore would prove very beneficial by securing the Company a considerable quantity of pepper annually exported by the Bibi in vessels of her own and sold at different ports in India on her own account. It is very probable the Bibi, if she finds we are successful against Tippoo or that her place is attacked and likely to fall, will be desirous of entering into an alliance with the Co. But we submit it, Hon. Sir, to your consideration how far after such conduct she is entitled to any favor. She even now detains one European and a Parsee prisoner, although they both belong to this garrison and have been repeatedly demanded. Indeed it is very probable she will give them up to Tippoo as she did upon a former occasion some unfortunate English and Lascars who were stranded on her coast. From the general tenor of the Bibi's conduct and that of her predecessor who is accused of having first invited Hyder Ally to invade the Mallabar Country, it is plain that she never will be cordially our friend, and that even should she enter into any terms with the English she would take the first favourable opportunity of breaking them. One motive that very probably weighs with her against coming over to us is that she has by Tippoo's assistance usurped the Cheral Raja's territory, which she may be unwilling to restore. Should you determine to attack Cannanore on the opening of the season we shall be glad to be favored with the earliest intelligence. The fleet will probably be upon this coast very early and could most effectually assist our operations, so that with a force from Bombay joined to our own garrison there would be very little doubt of success. Or should Tippoo by withholding his troops from the Travancore country enable Colonel Hartley to join us the purpose would be equally answered and the Bibi might be sent to her possessions in the Lacadives or kept at Bombay, but these are merely suggestions which rest not with us to determine upon. We beg leave to mention that early in August some of the Bibi's vessels are expected to arrive at Cannanore. One is particularly richly laden from the Arabian Gulf which might easily be intercepted by our cruisers if sent down in time. Should it be thought advisable to attack Cannanore, we beg leave to mention the articles we should be in want of for a siege. One thirteen inch mortar with three hundred shells, one 10 inch mortar with 500 shells, and for field service two 5 inch howitzers with carriages and limbers complete; two 12 lb. field pieces with carriages and limbers complete, and 2 tumbrels, as it is most probable that in the course of the next season we shall be enabled to establish the Rajas and various Chiefs in their ancient possessions. We have to remark that it will

prove a matter of extreme difficulty to satisfy so many different claimants and to keep them in any tolerable degree of dependence, and we take the liberty to recommend to your consideration by what mode of tenure they are to hold their respective possessions whether as independent Rajas and Chiefs or whether as Zemindars of the Company. If the former, what stipulations you would wish us to make with them. The Cartinadu Raja remains here anxiously waiting to be put in possession of his country which lies to the south of us ; the Cotiote Rajah is in possession of his country ; Cheral Raja with his people is subsisting by depredations on the countries to the northward ; the rest of the Mallabar Chiefs in the Mallabar country, from whence we expect them to come up here at the opening of the season. We have only to add that while Tippoo remains inimical to us and thereby the generality of the Moplas who either openly or secretly will act against us, we cannot expect that the Mallabar Chiefs will ever be in security, nor could we in prudence detach any of our force to a distance from hence, and we beg leave to assure you nothing shall be undertaken from hence until we receive your orders which we hope to be favored with early in August. Since writing thus far we are just informed that a body of about six thousand men are on their march from the southward to join those already at Cannanore and that they had passed Barragurry.

**No. 131**—Little points out to Bhau in vain the favourable conditions for commencing operations immediately.

FROM—JOHN LITTLE,

TO—C. W. MALET.

*Compta, 28th June 1790.*

The Bhau having just sent me notice the report of there being 12,000 men and 12 guns under Burhan-deen at Dharwar was without foundation, I observed to him that this was the time to act while no troops had yet been assembled to oppose us and added it would give our Government great satisfaction to hear he was in readiness, and therefore requested he would let me know what time I might expect the army would march. I urged also the present state of the Krishna that it was still fordable and that it would not be expected to be so twenty days hence which he knew would reduce the army to the necessity of either passing in baskets or waiting perhaps three months till the waters fell again. He replied that, however agreeable it might be to himself and to me to avail himself of the present opportunity that it was not in his power to move till he received orders from Poona. He observed that he had not heard that the Nizam

had moved, notwithstanding Major Montgomery having joined him, but he believed both the Nizam and the Mahrattas would march whenever it was publicly announced at their Durbars that the army under General Medows had commenced hostilities. I have since informed him of the General having marched towards Tippoo's country. I think that within these few days the Bhau's camp has rather increased, but do not suppose that he has now more than 2,000 men, if so many. Six guns are arrived from Poona, and four more he informs me are on the way with some money for the troops. Whenever orders arrive, his whole intended force he tells me can be collected in a very few days. I think it extremely lucky that this detachment arrived as it did, otherwise, I believe the whole blame of delay would have been thrown upon us, and from some circumstances that has passed and which I could only guess at the time I believe they would have been very glad to have kept us all the rains in the Conkan while it was the interest of Purseram Pant, the Subedar of Ratnagiri, to get us out of his country as fast as he could or we might not have been so fortunate in getting forward.

I am sorry I have been obliged to keep your servant so long who came with the carts; I found him to be very active and useful and from the very few drivers that came with the cattle many more of them would have starved without his assistance. Mr. Uhthoff has nearly completed a statement of the expense of the detachment which shall be sent you in a few days together with the establishment for each department. I consider myself very fortunate in meeting in him both a person well qualified to assist me with his advice from his good sense and experience in the intercourse I may have with the Mahratta Commander and also in seconding me in his department of commissary and paymaster in the injunction of economy enjoined me by the Government of Bombay.

**No. 132**—Cornwallis communicates to Kennaway certain instructions regarding the conclusion of the Treaty with the Nizam and enjoins on Montgomery strict compliance with his directions.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—CAPTAIN KENNAWAY.

*Fort William, 3rd July 1790.*

A copy of the treaty will be executed by me in a few days, and returned to Mr. Malet to be delivered to the Peshwa, and although in my own opinion, it would be most desirable that the three Confederates should execute this treaty of confederacy in one instrument, yet you may assure His Highness that, if contrary to my wishes he should think it worth while

to require it, I shall not only sign a separate instrument, but also readily confirm and include in it the small deviations from some of the articles of the treaty concluded by Mr. Malet, to which you have already agreed.

It is unnecessary on this occasion to desire you to repeat to His Highness how much I have been dissatisfied at Major Montgomery's detachment having been sent to join his army in a condition which, exclusive of all other considerations, reflects discredit upon our own military establishments ; but I approve highly of your having requested Colonel Brathwaite to take proper means to render that detachment more efficient and serviceable, and it would give me pleasure to hear that your application to him had been successful.

In the meantime, however, I desire that you will inform Major Montgomery that until I can receive answers to the questions that I have asked of the Madras Government, I shall not impute blame to any particular person for the disgraceful state in which that Corps has joined the Nizam's army, but that it has been no small disappointment and mortification to me, that from its defects in numbers, discipline, and equipment, it is incapable of rendering the services to the Nizam to which he is entitled by his treaty with the Company, that I shall therefore expect and require of him to take every means in his power to make some compensation for the deficiencies both in the strength and the quality of the troops under his command, by preserving the strictest internal order and discipline amongst them, by showing the utmost alacrity on all occasions to render every service that they may be capable of performing and that may be required of them, by conforming without hesitation or remonstrance to His Highness's general camp regulations, by being as little burthensome as possible for the supply either of public or of private wants, and by showing the most conciliatory and accommodating disposition in all his intercourse either of visits or in business with His Highness, or with any of his Ministers or military officers.

I am willing to believe that Major Montgomery and the officers under his command will from a sense of duty and propriety be sufficiently inclined to act according to the above instructions. But as I cannot allow the interests of the public to suffer by the indiscretions of individuals, I desire, in case of differences arising at any time between the Nizam or his officers and Major Montgomery or any other person belonging to that detachment, that you will immediately report the particulars of such differences to me as well as to General Medows, in order that no time may be lost in taking the necessary measures for preventing any material injury to the public service.

It would no doubt be extremely unreasonable to demand in this instance from His Highness the full sum which he stipulated to pay for the aid of

two complete battalions, and I have therefore no objection to such deduction being made at present, as may appear to be proportioned to the deficiency in the numbers of that detachment.

You will however explain to His Highness and to his Ministers, that as soon as the present or any other detachment shall have been completed to its proper establishment, it will neither be reasonable nor admissible to make deductions for any temporary deficiency in numbers which may arise by the common casualties of service, because the expense of recruits to replace them and new clothing and arms will be considerable, and will be defrayed by the Company ; and you will at the same time be at pains to explain the nature of our military regulations and customs respecting returns, in order to show the Nizam that no officer can venture to sign a false return of the corps under his command, without exposing himself to the utmost hazard of disgrace and ruin and therefore that the presence of one of his officers at the mustering of those troops would be entirely superfluous.

As it is necessary that those battalions should consist of a certain number of effective men, in order to establish our demands for their pay upon his Highness, it is rather delicate to put an absolute negative upon his being permitted to employ one of his own officers to see them mustered, but I wish the practice to be avoided if it can be done without giving offence, or creating suspicions of our want of faith of which you will be easily able to judge, as it would show too much diffidence in the honour of our officers, and might occasion altercations with them ; I shall therefore be glad if you can prevail upon the Nizam and his Ministers to confide in the returns, which you can acquire monthly from the detachment for their satisfaction.

I approve very much of your having sent Lieutenant Binning to act as interpreter to Major Montgomery, tho' I am extremely sorry to learn that the Major and his officers are so little acquainted with the language of the country as to render it necessary, as it must prove on many occasions very disadvantageous to the public service.

The description which Hafez Ferid-adeen-Khan gives in his letter to the Nizam of the conduct of Kutab-Udeen-Khan, and the circumstance that you mentioned of Kutab-udeen having allowed his son to accompany Ali Reza Khan on his return to Tippoo, must naturally suggest to His Highness the necessity of acting with the utmost circumspection in all transactions with Kutab-udeen ; but as it appears to me that the latter has already gone far enough to ruin himself in Tippoo's confidence, I do not by any means think it impossible that the Nizam may be able by prudent management to make some advantageous use of him in the course of this war.

No. 133—Little enumerates the obstacle put by Balaji Pant on his march and the many difficulties confronting him.

FROM—JOHN LITTLE,

TO—C. W. MALET.

*Camp at Compta, 3rd July 1790.*

It has made me very easy to find the ceremony in question is not altogether a needless form, and that in many cases it just becomes as necessary to a person in my situation, in as much as they consider it respectable.

Ballajee Punt's interference with the cattle was one of the tricks put in practice that I hinted at in my last. He absolutely put a stop to the march of the detachment for three or four days by counteracting my orders, at a time too when I had great doubts whether I should be able to get on at all from the nature of the road we had to pass and the season. Both the Warna and the Kristna even so high up as where the detachment forded, have been so full for some time that their only communication is by means of baskets. I have explained fully to the Chowdhury the nature of the service he is engaged in and the consequences attending a direct disobedience of my orders in the presence of Ballajee Punt, but they are so connected together as well as in consideration of the nature of the service I am on, that should it even happen again I must be obliged to dissemble as before as punishment would not be the means of correction. When he arrived he had not a rupee for the maintenance of the cattle notwithstanding you had advanced him money for two months and he depended, he said, on me for his current expenses; at times I have given money and at others have got straw; at last I refused him totally and he threatened to carry his cattle to Poona. He has not had above a third of the drivers for the draught and about a fifth at times could not be found for the carriage bullocks. They were also without gunnies or ropes to sling the ammunition. At last he equipped about two hundred of them for guns and with these I have scrambled on in the best manner I could till I left the monsoon behind and came here. Since Mr. Uthoff arrived and the Chowdhury's Caroon, the cattle have been better attended to and also considerably improved. I have been obliged to make a new agreement much on the same terms as before, a copy of which shall be sent you. This was in consequence of some departments not being sufficiently provided for and for others too much.

When the jasuses first came I was led into a mistake by Mr. Cuno telling me they were sent for the use of the detachment, and their demanding batta from me to go there. I concluded that you had sent them, and ordered as a thing of course that two of them should get ready to go to Poona, when Ballajee Punt to my surprise claimed them and refused to let them go. He has since however had four or five of them about my tent constantly, and tells me they are to obey my orders and that I must pay



by Capt. Kennaway and which, in fact, do not militate in any essential point, with the articles of our treaty with the Peshwa, you may assure the Poona Ministers, in the strongest terms, that no step shall ever be taken by us, either in that case or in any other, that can interfere with our performing the stipulations of our treaty with them with the most scrupulous honor and punctuality.

The accounts, which you gave me, of the progress and advanced state of Parsuram Bhao's preparations, and of the ready assistance, which had been given by the Peshwa's officers to facilitate the march of the Bombay detachment, have been very satisfactory, and they encourage me to hope that I shall soon have the pleasure to hear that Captain Little has formed a junction with the Mahratta army, and the united forces have actually invaded Tippoo's dominions.

I am persuaded that you will not omit the proper means to obtain the issues of pay to our detachment with as much regularity as may be practicable. But I am aware of the difficulties that will be frequently thrown in your way, both by the spirit of procrastination and by the avarice of the Mahrattas, and therefore, notwithstanding the high rate of exchange at which you procured it, I approve highly of your having transmitted a small supply of money by Mr. Uthoff to Captain Little, to prevent his suffering any immediate distress or inconvenience.

As our right to require of the Mahrattas to defray the expense of all staff officers that we may think proper to appoint to the detachment is not clear and indisputable, I do not wish you to insist upon any demands of that nature, in which you may have reason to believe the Minister would not acquiesce without much reluctance; but on the contrary, upon objections being made, I would rather have you assume a merit for liberality by readily relinquishing them.

I am the more unwilling to appear unreasonable in our demands of payment for those troops, as I must confess that the stipulation of equal partition of conquests might furnish the Mahrattas with strong arguments for expecting that, in equity, tho' the agreement is against them the whole of the expence of those troops should not be charged to their particular account; and, indeed the application of the same rule would render the expense of the assistance of 10,000 of their cavalry so intolerable to us that nothing but an extreme necessity would induce me to demand it.

You judged very properly in leaving the mode of rewarding Zemindars, Killadars, etc. who may either revolt from Tippoo, or who may render services to any of the Confederates during the war, open for future discussion; as I conceive it to be impossible that all the cases that may occur, could be provided for by any rules that could at present be delivered. But you may assure Nana that he will ever find me ready to bear a reasonable part of the expense of any agreements that either of the Confederates



may enter into with people of the above description for the benefit of the common cause, and that I make no doubt of their being disposed to make a liberal return to us, in similar cases, at the time that the objects of the Confederacy shall be accomplished and finally arranged.

Nothing short of an apprehension that a weak forbearance or even an excess of delicacy in this Government would have endangered the general interests and safety of all parties concerned, could have prevailed upon us to adopt the strong measure of taking the management of the Nabob of Arcot's and the Rajah of Tanjore's countries into the hands of the Company. But, as the resources of Bengal, without a substantial aid from those of the Carnatic would be utterly incapable of furnishing the means for prosecuting the war with vigour and for fulfilling our engagements with our allies, the total failure of the Nabob and the Raja in the performance of their parts of the treaties, which subsist between them and the Company, the immense balance which is now due of the proportion of their payments for the common defence of the Carnatic and the hopeless prospect of their affairs being better conducted by the negligent and corrupt servants and favourites to whom they have unfortunately given their confidence, rendered a decided interference on our part absolutely unavoidable.

You may state the above outline to the Ministers as the real cause of our having been forced to take a temporary management of the Nabob's and the Rajah's revenues into our own hands ; and you may declare that they will only be retained during the continuance of the war, or until the balance due to the Company shall be discharged. You may likewise inform them that a liberal proportion of their respective revenues not less than one-fifth part is allotted for the maintenance of their family and the support of their personal dignity, and that by their existing treaties with us, their claims to a share of any acquisitions that may be made by the war from common enemy, can, in no shape interfere with the engagements that we have contracted with the Nizam and the Peshwa.

As the Rajah of Tanjore is a dependent on the Nabob of Arcot, and has long been connected in friendship with the Company by the ties of specific treaties, I am persuaded that the Peshwa's Ministers will, upon a little reflection, be sensible that it would be highly irregular and improper in the Peshwa, or in any other power whatever, to interfere in any temporary arrangement of his affairs on which his negligence and dissipation and the exigencies of our mutual interests may render it necessary for us to insist, and I trust that a delicate and prudent forbearance from any such attempt will prevent the declaration which you must otherwise make on our part that it would be totally inadmissible.

I have, however, to show my disposition to be civil to the Court of Poona again written complimentary letters to them upon my receipt and ratification of the treaty, and have given a *khelat* to Shevak Ram, the Peshwa's *vakeel* at this place.

**No. 134A**—Cornwallis compliments the Peshwa on the conclusion of the treaty.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—THE PESHWA.

*Fort William, 5th July 1790.*

Notwithstanding that the friendship between you and the Company is already very firm and requires no addition to its strength to render it famous throughout Hindostan, yet as it may be considered incumbent on those anxious for friendship to adopt every measure that tends to the preservation of the happy system existing among friends, particularly when the advantages to be derived from it are the punishment of a Prince, whose insatiable ambition and thirst for power sets at defiance the sacred engagements of treaties, and who, in utter contempt of the late treaty, has made a wanton and unprovoked attack on an ally, when, had he been so successful as he would have been but for the immediate measures I adopted, he would have obtained an accumulated strength and no Power in the Deccan would have been safe from his attacks, and by his punishment the peace and security of the inhabitants of the Deccan would be secured. Under these considerations I have derived very great pleasure from the repeated intelligence communicated to me by Mr. Malet, of your readiness to cement an alliance with the Company, in order for the complete attainment of these desirable ends and above all from the receipt of the treaty entered into by you, with all the due forms to render it sacred, that I may ratify it on the part of the Company. I lose no time in signing and sealing it that Mr. Malet's engagements, which I consider equally binding as were I myself on the spot, may be fulfilled of by returning the treaty signed and sealed within 75 days.

God be praised that this important business, which teems with benefits to all the world, is brought to the present issue, and I have no doubt but the engagements now solemnly entered into will be strictly adhered to on all sides, and you may rest assured that on my part it shall be rigidly abided by.

To.

(II) Nana Furnaveese

of the same tenor.

To

(III) Behroo Punt,

Expressive of the Governor General's approbation of the zeal and exertions he has displayed throughout the negotiation.

**No. 135**—Malet reports his conversation with Bahiro Pant on the subject of the presence of Tipu's agents in Poona and the tardy preparations of Bhau and communicates his own interpretation of the clause of defensive alliance with the Nizam.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 6th July 1790.*

In my last address of the 2nd I acknowledged receipt of your Lordship's commands of the 7th ultimo. The letter which it contained for Behro Punt was extremely apropos and I lost no time to deliver it. My former discouragement of writing him was on a general principle of the expediency of avoiding correspondence with secondaries and I then troubled your Lordship with my reasoning on the subject. But your Lordship's consideration has amply provided against the evil of that general rule.

On the present occasion I obviated all cause for pique which Behro Punt might have felt on the appearance of superior attention paid to Meer Abul Cossim in a similar situation at Nizam Ally Khan's Court. I have not yet made any use of your Lordship's latitude of giving him more substantial proofs of your favour, but shall, should occasion dictate.

On the 3rd instant the Minister intimated to me his intention of making a journey (for the performance of some religious ceremonies) to Toaka on the Gunga 60 coss hence. This circumstance added to my desire of communicating to him the substance of part of your Lordship's letter and of coming to some explanation on Pursaram Bhao's operations and the residence of Tipu's agents here induced my requesting a visit from Behro Punt previous to one I meant to pay the Minister before his departure. He accordingly called on me the 4th, when I acquainted him that one principal cause of my troubling him was to communicate to him the high satisfaction which your Lordship had felt and according to your usual frankness had commanded me to make known to the Minister on the openness and candor of his conversation with me on the 13th May, for your Lordship's sense of which I referred him to your letter sent him (Behro Punt) the day before. I observed however that my pleasure in executing these commands was greatly damped by the present state of affairs here so different from that prospect of cordiality which the Minister's professions had presented and on which your Lordship's letter to me had been framed. I then recapitulated the few troops assembled under Pursaram Bhao, notwithstanding the Minister's reference to the report I should receive when our detachment joined and notwithstanding the instances which, by the Minister's desire, I had made to Capt.

Kennaway to urge the Nabob, and I warmly remonstrated against Tippo's agents being suffered to remain here at a time when in the eyes of all beholders their presence was prejudicial to the interests of the alliance and derogatory to the dignity of the Peshwa as carrying the appearance of double dealing. On the first of these points Behro Punt assured me that Pursaram Bhao was as anxious to commence his operations as I could be, but that permission could not be granted till certain intelligence was received of General Medows having actually entered on hostilities, of the probable time of which and of the causes of the General's halt he was very inquisitive to collect information. As to the appearance of few troops with the Bhao he repeated and pledged himself very seriously to me that the inconveniences of forage prevented their collection, but that the troops were in readiness in their respective quarters and would be collected in a very short time.

On the latter point he assured me in terms as strong as he could express that I need be under no apprehension of the presence of Tippo's agents causing any change in the engagements that had been concluded. That those agents on learning the disposition of this Court had wanted to withhold payment of the tribute money which they had brought with them, but on coercive language being used, it had been settled that they should pay it, which they were now doing by degrees. I remarked it was extraordinary that after this Court had insisted on the moneys being paid, delays should be admitted in the mode favourable to the intrigues of the agents and promotive of distrust and suspicion amongst the allies by which the insidious object of their Master would be greatly forwarded. In a word I submitted to Behro Punt whether it were most advisable to shew delicacy to the allies or to Tippo. If to the former, let his agents be dismissed. If to the latter, let them remain in Poona and pay their money as might best suit their designs and the views of this Court. That for mine own part I could not but lament that by representing their residence here and the circumstances of it, I must very reluctantly become the propagator of doubts and suspicions. But if from delicacy to this Court I attempted to veil or palliate circumstances so notorious and so serious, I subjected myself to consequences for which I was sure he in his candor would not wish me to become responsible. Behro Punt acknowledged that appearances and the common voice threw a strong imputation of impropriety on the transaction. He likewise acknowledged to me that he had certain intelligence of the agents being instructed to prevent if possible their dissension, from which piece of information I drew new arguments of the insidious designs of Tippo, strongly insisted on the extreme danger of the dissension to which such a measure would subject the alliance and the certainty of its affecting that cordiality and unanimity so absolutely

requisite to its prosperous conduct and happy termination ; and urged Behro Pant as he valued the permanance and success of an alliance to the formation of which he had so largely contributed, to combat with all his force the admission of so pernicious a measure.

On this subject and on that of Pursaram Bhao's operations Behro Punt said it would be advisable that I should speak to the Minister in person to which I assented and fixed on the ensuing day, but advised him previously to explain to the Minister that while Tippo was working through the influence of the Rasta family to shake the strength of the present confederacy and by his insidious acts, to throw discredit on the consistency of this Court's measures not only in the eye of all the Powers of India but of Europe, your Lordship was incessantly employed in promoting the interests of an alliance one principal object of which was the aggrandisement of the Mahratta Empire and the resumption of its former possessions. In the course of this discussion I asked Behro Punt if any obstacle to the dismissal of the agents rested on the power and opposition of Rasta, he assured me, not, but I thought the question might lead to a desire of convincing me of it.

On the 5th I waited on the Minister and soon proceeded to the business of my visit by acquainting him that it was occasioned by the receipt of a letter from your Lordship the substance of which relative to your Lordship's satisfaction with his friendly assurances to me of 13th May, I communicated and by my desire to see him before his departure for Toanka to receive from him an answer to the two points which I had yesterday fully explained to Behro Punt and now again recapitulated to him concluding with a request to be favoured with his sentiments on them. In reply to my queries relative to Pursaram Bhao he assured me that no impediment would arise from his absence to the faithful execution of the treaty on the arrival of the intelligence on which his (Pursaram's) acting depended. He repeated and confirmed the abovementioned causes of the troops not being assembled and in strong terms begged me to rest assured that the most positive orders had been issued to the different chieftains appointed for his service to hold themselves in readiness to join on the shortest notice.

With respect to Tippo's agents he also positively assured me that nothing had passed with them but on the subject of the money they had brought after the payment of which they would be dismissed. I asked him how much they had brought. He replied 15 lacs or one year's tribute, beside Durbar charges. I observed that as the Peshwa looked on this as his property he certainly had on that principle a right to make the agents surrender it immediately. He replied that decency where practicable was in all cases preferable to violence, particularly in matters of account ; that the money with which these people were charged was in various

coins, receivable here only as bullion whence arose great delay and altercation in the settlement of its value. I asked how much had yet been paid, he replied about 12 lacs. By this rule I observed the remaining three would require a very short time. He replied that to the real causes of delay some were added by the acts of the agents. I observed that those very acts taught the necessity of counteracting them and I pointed out to him the policy of giving the Peshwa's allies real cause of complaint by a false delicacy to those who were palpably employed in scattering the seeds of distrust and suspicion among the confederates. In a word, that their residence here was inimical to the perfection of that great political fabrick whose foundation was wisely and deeply laid but the completion of whose superstructure required the most careful preservation from the destructive blast of dissension. He again assured me that their money paid, the agents should be dismissed. I asked in what time he would probably return, and whether they would leave Poona in his absence. He said that he should be back in about 25 days and that it was probable they would not be despatched till then. I urged my apprehension that he would not be back so soon and pressed their dismissal in the interim as highly requisite for the satisfaction of the allies agreeable to the tenor of the treaty. He seemed somewhat embarrassed by the eagerness with which I urged this point, observing which, I assured him that confident as I might be (after receiving his assurances) with respect to their errand here and dismissal from hence, yet the honor of the Peshwa and the interests of the alliance made me extremely anxious for the removal of an evil that affected both. Some conversation ensued between him and Hurry Punt, after which the Minister gave me to understand that I should hear further from him on the subject.

The Minister told me he had intelligence of Burhan-al-deen's being on his way from Tippoo to the north frontier to oppose Parsuram Bhao and of Tippoo's return to Seringputtun, but that he was doubtful of the credit to be given to either. He enquired particularly about the motions of the Madras army and asked me if I had heard of General Medows' having detected any treacherous or illicit correspondence carried on in it by Tippoo. I replied, not. Strongly recommending to the Minister to look on my instances relative to Parsuram's preparations and the dismissal of Tippoo's agents as the council of a friend and referring him to Behro Punt for the full discussion that had passed between us the preceding day I took my leave. Not having perceived that the Minister felt any particular jealousy at the prospect of the Nabob being joined by a large body of the Company's forces, and observing no forwardness to benefit by your Lordship's former offers of reinforcing the detachment already allotted to the service of this Government, I thought it would be inexpedient to say anything more on that subject, particularly as I am informed of its being in agitation to

form a considerable army under Colonel Abercromby for the attack of Tippoo's possessions on the Mallabar Coast, a plan that carries every appearance of being productive of the most important consequences in the great work of humbling and distressing that Prince, and in preference to which no argument occurs for employing our troops with this Govt. but the saving of expense.

I perceive by Captain Kennaway's late correspondence and particularly by his last letter to your Lordship of the 21st ult. that we differ essentially in our construction of your Lordship's sentiments with respect to defensive arrangements with Nizam Ally Khan. He construes your instructions of the 12th April into a wish of that measure ; I look upon them as the adoption of a very guarded alternative eligible only as freeing you from the embarrassment of proposals more ineligible and in fact inadmissible. He looks on a general defensive arrangement with the Nabob as natural and beneficial ; I look on no alliance as natural and beneficial in which the prospects of advantage are not equal and reciprocal, and with all submission to correction I presume that such a connexion would rather be a dependance of the Nabob on the Company for protection against the Maharattas than an alliance in which the Company could possibly expect assistance from him in the same predicament ; and after the insertion of the defensive article against Tippoo, the Maharattas are the only remaining Power in Hindostan to whom defensive arrangements can relate, a power that not only borders on and almost surrounds the whole of the Nabob's dominions but actually has officers stationed through a very large part of them, charged with the collection of its share of the revenues equal in many districts to that of the Nabob, the consequence of which is endless and frequently serious altercation. Most heartily do I agree with Captain Kennaway in his persuasion of the policy of the preservation of the Nabob's power from annihilation and so consistent is that idea with justice and so deeply founded in natural and political necessity, that whenever the speculation shall be attempted to be put in practice, I humbly think that the Nabob or his successor will be entitled, independant of obligation, to all that countenance and protection which may be consistent with the circumstances of the times. And this my Lord appears to me the most advisable system in most cases with the Princes of this country, since without involving us in frequent and serious sacrifices of our interests to their fluctuating and capricious politics, it establishes that kind of mutual dependance which habituates those to whom it extends to look on their welfare as closely connected with ours and in fact gives us ground to hope as much from them as though they were bound by engagements, since, when compatible with their interests, it will probably gain as much as engagements would, whereas if incompatible with their interests, no engagements would bind them, or benefit us.

I have great pleasure in acquainting your Lordship that it has just been communicated to me by Behro Punt that the Minister after I left him yesterday gave Hurry Pundit orders to endeavour by all means to dismiss Tippoo's agents before his return, to take care that his absence should cause no delay in the movement of Parsuram Bhao on the receipt of intelligence of General Medows' commencement of hostilities, and to pay me 25,000 Rs. for the Bombay detachment on account in the interim in settlement of its monthly demands.

**No. 136**—Little communicates to Malet the movement of the Nizam's army and his appointment to meet Bhau.

FROM—JOHN LITTLE,

TO—C. W. MALET.

*Compta, 24th July 1790.*

It is settled that I am to wait on the Bhao tomorrow, and I think of adding two more gentlemen to the heads of corps to accompany me, which altogether will make six. He proposes bringing with him about twenty when he returns the visit. One of whom Chintaman Row is to get the same presents as himself and to receive them last. Understanding there was nothing improper or unusual amongst them in it, I have given a hint to dispense with the attendance of Chintaman and four or five of the others, if it was agreeable to him.

Ballajee Punt informed me last night that the evening before the Bhao had received information that ten days ago the Nizam had ordered his army to cross the Krishna in consequence of General Medow's having taken Caroor, he added there had not been much fighting and that Tippoo was not there. The Bhao had sent accounts of this immediately to Poona and says he expects orders to move very soon.

**No. 137**—Malet reports to the Governor General a visit from Buchajee Mehendele and the presentation of a khelat to him on the eve of his departure to join Medows.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 24th July 1790.*

On the 23rd I received a visit from Behro Punt accompanied by his brother Buchajee Tautea, on the occasion of the latter's taking leave of me



to proceed on his journey to join and reside with General Medows as the Vackeel of this State agreeable to the 11th article of the treaty of Poona. At this meeting Behro Punt assured me that I might place perfect reliance on the former verbal assurances of the Minister and the late ones conveyed in his letters and intimated that his quick return might be imputed to his anxiety to accomplish the important points of Parsuram's passage of the Krishna and the dismissal of Tippoo's agents. But not deeming these professions sufficiently authoritative for your Lordship's satisfaction, I requested the favour of an interview with the Minister on the 25th and particularly recommended to Behro Punt to prepare him to give me such positive satisfaction on those points as might enable me to preserve the consistency of those assurances which I have already been the channel of conveying to your Lordship.

It may not be improper to acquaint your Lordship that on Behro Punt and his brother taking their leave I explained to the latter the importance of the office he was about to fill, on the discharge of which the cordiality and good understanding of two mighty States would greatly depend. I felicitated his Government and mine on this delicate and weighty trust being delegated to a person so closely connected with Behro Punt (who had so greatly promoted the establishment of the perfect amity at present subsisting), as he was of course bound by every consideration of private and public honour to improve and cement it. On these points both Behro Punt and his brother gave me the strongest assurances of exerting their best endeavors and in return presented Buchaba a khelat and promised to furnish him with such letters to General Medows as should insure him the best reception.

I am informed that Parsuram's force has been immediately increased since my last address, but, as I have not received any positive intelligence of it from Capt. Little, cannot vouch for its authenticity.

I have great satisfaction in acquainting your Lordship that this day I have been favoured with a *Parvana* from the Durbar for purchasing and supplying Col. Abercromby with 1,000 head of draft bullocks, which is an extraordinary and I believe unexampled instance of permitting their exportation to our settlements, the Durbar's repugnance to which arises from religious prejudices and a dread of those sacred animals being consigned to an untimely end. I cannot yet pretend to judge of my probable success in the execution of Col. Abercromby's commission, but the permission to execute it is certainly a strong presumptive proof of this Court's being now sincerely bent on the prosecution of the war, though somewhat retarded by its habits of procrastination and the obstruction incident to its aristocratical constitution.

No. 138—Little sends intelligence of the recruiting for the completion of his battalions and of his interview with the Bhau.

FROM—JOHN LITTLE,

TO—C. W. MALET.

*Compta, 26th July 1790.*

I have the pleasure to acquaint you that the two battalions are now recruited to 1540, strong, which is three or four more men than there are musquets here. I have given orders to stop, but think it advisable to complete them to 1600, allowing for the men that are yet to come from Poona. It should be recollected that recruits require a considerable time before they are fit for any thing, and there will be no want of arms as an account may always be laid with a certain number of sick whose arms must of course be unemployed. It would also perhaps be improper to recruit any nearer to Tippeen's country.

The Bhau's camp has been in a soft bottom between two Nullas. I kept at a little distance on a hard high ground. On the 16th a good deal of rain was observed to fall among the hills at a distance, and in the evening in an instant the Nullas rose to the height of 15 feet where no water was before and fell again before morning. The situation however became disagreeable, and he sent to let me know he had just received orders from Poona to march and that I must accompany him to about a coss distance where he purposed halting three or four days. He then should proceed three coss further, and there wait for Bunneo Bapoo's force, and that after a little time he should go on to the banks of the Kristna and there wait for further orders to cross. I proposed to him in reply that, as I was on good ground and he was going to short a distance, it would be better for us to stay for the present and make one movement of it, to which he acceded, and on the 18th he moved his camp about half a mile to a rising ground. Today he sent me notice that 250 horse had joined him from Poona and that 2000 more had descended the Ghat on their way, that 15,000 foot of the enemy had arrived on the southern side of the Tumbudra, and that there was 5000 at Dharwar. On the 9th I paid my respects to Bhau accompanied with six gentlemen, and he returned the visit the 13th with from fifteen to twenty officers, all of whom he previously insisted on receiving the usual presents, but was particularly strenuous in favour of Chintaman Rao, a young man on his first expedition, of higher rank than himself, who he requested might be given the same presents as to himself and also might be preferred in receiving them the last. After making some remonstanc on the utility of bringing him at all, I found him so bent on it that I was obliged to accede to his wishes, except in giving the preference to the Rao by making the present last to him.

Mr. Uthhoff is greatly better, but I apprehend yet too weak to write you:

**No. 139**—Malet gives a detailed description of his conversation with Nana, principally on the subjects of Bhau's delay in crossing the Kistna, the presence of Tipu's Vakils and the causes of Medows' halt at Caroor which caused apprehension to Nana.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 27th July 1790.*

I shall in this address endeavour to convey to your Lordship the particulars of my conference, which in my last of the 24th I mentioned having demanded of the Minister on the 25th.

After expressing my joy at his speedy return, I entered on the subject of the delay that had occurred in dismissing Tipoo's Vackeels and in Pursuram Bhao's passage of the Kistna, qualifying the subject with expressions of concern at being under the necessity of troubling him again on these points, but that the assurances, both verbal and written, which I had already been the channel of conveying from him to Your Lordship make me peculiarly solicitous to procure and transmit some positive and specific satisfaction on those important points. I reminded him of his promises before his late excursion, and remarked that the period of their accomplishment was elapsed. The Minister replied that his return in sixteen days instead of a month had prevented the execution of those promises, that I might depend on Tipoo's agents being soon dismissed and on Parsuram Bhao's being ordered across the Kistna, but that at present he was in expectation of letters from Nizam Aly Khan relative to the operations of the armies of the two States. I expressed my satisfaction at the Minister's assurances, but observed that as to the expectation of letters from Nizam Ali K. I could assure him on the authority of Captain Kennaway by letters of only eleven days that the Nabob's quota and the detachment of the Co's forces had actually crossed the Kistna and moved toward Raychore. I reminded him of the warmth with which he had long ago pressed me to write Captain K. to urge the Nabob, and expressed my concern that the backwardness of this State now gave the Nabob and Captain K. so reasonable a ground for retorting that language. In a word, I requested that as confidence was the corner stone of the alliance and as your Lordship in your late communication of Tipoo's application to send a Vackeel and your reply had given so decided a proof of your being guided entirely by that rule, he would by fixing an early day for the dismissal enable me to convince your Lordship and Captain K. of his being actuated by the same principle. To this language the Minister replied that though the Nabob's quota had crossed the Kistna, yet while Mohabut Jung remained at Raychore, his and Parsuram Bhao's present position were to be looked on as similar, since the Nabob's territories in those parts were very extensive and Raychore was Mohabut Jung's own jagir; that however, though he could not fix a day, I might rest assured that both the points I insisted on should be soon executed, the former in 6 or 7, the latter in 15 or 16 days.

I replied that, if all the parties of the Confederacy were thus solicitous to adduce arguments in justification of their backwardness, none could be expected to advance; I observed that I could not admit Parsuram to be on a footing with Mahabut Jung in any respect till he had assembled an equal force and was actually across the Kistna, where likewise the Peshwa had territories. As to the not specifying a day for the execution of the points I contended for, I was willing to impute it to the Minister's not having yet ascertained it in his own mind, as I was sure he would not, were it in his power to gratify me, deprive me of the pleasure of such a communication to your Lordship; but that I certainly had hoped (after so long an interval as the Court had had for coming to a decision and after the former assurances I had received that Pursuram would be ready to cross in 7 or 8 days from the time of the arrival of intelligence) that so distant a conjectural interval as 15 or 16 days would not now have been pitched on by the Minister, one month and 25 days having already elapsed from the communication of Genl. Medow's movement from Madras, one month and 9 days of his march from Trichinopoly and 14 of his capture of Carroor. I reminded the Minister of the assurances that had frequently been given me of the superior execution that I might expect from the forces of this State than from those of Nizam Ali K., and repeated my expressions of concern and disappointment that hitherto everything was so far behind hand. To this the Minister generally replied that by what he had observed of the relative situations of Mahabut Jung and Purasram he did not mean to lay a claim to further delay, that Pursaram should cross soon, but that once crossed he must refresh his forces in the enemy's country, the Peshwa's districts not being extensive enough, that as to the execution of the Nabob's and Peshwa's forces he still rested its proof on experiment.

Many enquiries were made of the cause of General Medow's halt at Carroor, which I answered by assigning the reason furnished me by the General himself of putting that place in a condition to receive his sick people and his superfluous followers. The Minister told me that other reasons had reached him, viz. the desolation of the country, the poisoning of the water even the rivers, and the embarrassment caused by the appearance of Tipoo's cavalry. I replied that the interests of the subjects when not connected in a common cause with the prince seemed to invalidate entire credit being given to the first, as Tipoo would find it difficult even with his whole force to execute so extensive a plan of destruction, and that mere orders at such a season of confusion would prove very inadequate to effect it; that as to the second, I was surprised he could have given credit to so impossible a thing as that of the poisoning rivers, when at this season of the rains I doubted the practicability of poisoning even wells and tanks; but allowing that both tanks and wells and rivers were poisoned I begged to know what means of existence were left for the wretched inhabitants of the country or even for the enemy's cavalry that had made their appearance—and of which I assured him I had received no authentic

accounts ; but that from private channels I had heard that a few Beydars or looties having ventured to approach the camp had been pursued, their chief taken, and the rest taught to keep a respectful distance. The Minister intimated that he had received intelligence of Genl. Medows' having called on Col. Cockrell, Col. Hartley and the Raja of Travancore to join him with their respective detachments and forces. I replied that I thought not, as I was well assured that General Medows deemed his present force fully equal to the accomplishment of the objects it was designed for, and that the idea of its probability was contradictory to that of the desolation of the country.

• An expression having been dropped of the probability of Tipoo's sending a large force or moving north in person, which had a tendency to impeach the prudence of Parsuram's crossing the Kishna, I observed that the longer Parsuram's invasion was delayed the greater resistance might undoubtedly be expected, as the enemy would have time to recover from the panic which was hitherto general throughout the northern frontier, insomuch that had the Mahrattas made a vigorous incursion they would ere this have probably been masters of the greatest part of the country north of the Tumbudra, that at all events if Tipoo should send or lead an army to the north, the junction of the Nabob's and Peshwa's forces with the addition of our detachments would form a powerful force to oppose it, that our infantry would have at least an equal share of the danger with their cavalry, and that the Minister might rest assured our armies in other quarters would not remain idle spectators during so fine an opportunity for prosecuting their several impressions. Should, however, the enemy's force be deemed too formidable to oppose by the Mahrattas singly or jointly with the Nabob's, a circumstance not at all likely to happen, I observed that they could as easily retreat across the Kistna as the enemy advance across the Tumbudra.

Some language having been advanced by the Minister which seemed meant to establish, on the usages of the Courts of Hindostan, the propriety of permitting Tipoo's agents to remain here, I took no other notice of it than by reminding the Minister of your Lordship's answer to Tipoo's application to send Vackeels to General Medows and by desiring his sentiments on our receiving people in that character. The subject was then shifted by saying that such was the custom in Hindostan, but that on the present occasion this Court was resolved to sacrifice it to its engagements with your Lordship.

From the general turn of the Minister's conversation it appeared to me that this Court wants to have Tipoo so effectually engaged or so positively worsted as to enable the Mahrattas to enter his dominions without the smallest apprehension, which I endeavoured to counteract by generally insisting on the necessity of all the parties entering agreeable to their engagements boldly and decidedly into the war, by which alone unanimity could be preserved, the great objects of the alliance accomplished, that delay

on the part of this Court or the Nabob, exclusive of its general prejudice to the Confederacy, subjected them to one of the two evils—of our making distinct conquests or by the employment of his whole force against us to gain advantages which would expose their future progress to difficulty and the operation of the alliance to doubt, while, if the objects of it were cordially and unanimously pursued, success was absolutely above the reach of chance. I urged that hesitation now was more imprudent than precipitation would have been in the conclusion of the treaty, which important step once taken it became the part of wisdom to support it with vigour, not to waste that time in words and fruitless disputation between friends which should be employed in bold and decided acts against the common enemy.

To an invitation that I sent Behro Punt this morning to an entertainment, I have just received for answer that he will defer waiting on me till he has effected the dismissal of Tippo's Vackeels, when he shall be able to meet me with pleasure, and that he hopes it will be in 3 or 4 days.

Orders preparatory to the grand equipment stipulated by treaty have been issued from the Durbar for the purchase of camels and bullocks, and for the feudatory chieftains to hold themselves in readiness before the Dussera, about the 18th, October, the usual time of assembling the Mahratta armies. But your Lordship will have gained such a knowledge of the character of our allies as to perceive that our principal hope of bringing the war to an honourable and speedy conclusion must rest on the vigorous exertions of our own forces, and I have scarce a doubt but that under the direction of such able commanders the wise arrangements that have been made will before the close of the ensuing dry season force the enemy to accept of such terms as may be consistent with the honour and interest of your Lordship's Government to prescribe, with due attention to the pretensions of the allies, consistent with their conduct in the discharge of the engagements.

**No. 140**—Buchajee Mehendele, Peshwa's Agent, is sent to Meadows's camp.

**FROM—THE PESHWA,**

**TO—WILLIAM MEDOWS.**

*Poona, 28th July 1790.*

It has been resolved that the Circar, the Nabob and the Company should attack Tipoo, agreeable to which you at the head of your army have commenced your operations. As it is proper that a trusty person from the Circar should be with you, Buchajee Ragonath is dispatched for that

purpose who will reside with you to whom, agreeable to the stipulation of the treaty, you will make your communications. Always write me of your health.

**No. 141**—Little communicates to Malet the insufficiency of cattle and the necessity of employing a person in confidence for communication with Bhau.

FROM—JOHN LITTLE,

TO—C. W. MALET,

*Compta, 28th July 1790.*

*[Recd. 31st July 1790.]*

It had occurred to me that it would be proper to settle some points at this time with the Bhow, so far at least as to be made acquainted with the person or persons he intended to trust sending messages to me in time of action with the enemy. The Choudhurie's agent also had not fulfilled his engagements in procuring a sufficient number of cattle for the march of the detachment. I therefore had some thoughts of getting another person to supply the deficiency by means of requesting the Bhao's assistance, so that by setting up a competition it might cause a lowering of price, to the advantage of the service. Balajee Punt, I have come to believe, is too much interested in the cattle contract to be the means of lessening its advantages. He would of course have been an improper person to employ on this occasion. I therefore for this purpose, as well as to adjust future communication between the Bhao and me when it would only be proper to employ a person in my own confidence, proposed sending Lt. Ross, who is acting as Major of brigade, to wait on him. The idea of employing any other person gave Balajee Punt's pride the alarm, and he brought me for answer that the Bhao refused all communication of this sort but thro' the medium of himself, who he added had been appointed for that purpose by your favour and that of Behro Punt. Alleging that a mistake might have happened, I wrote to the Bhao and after some shuffling received what amounted to a confirmation of his former answer. In the course of the service a more urgent occasion than the present for employing a confidential person may occur, and I think it but a due respect to the situation I have the honour of filling, to leave the propriety or necessity for such a communication to my discretion; in doing it, however, I shall always avoid as far as possible anything that may be disagreeable to the Bhao or of giving unnecessary trouble. From the whole tenor of the Bhao's conduct I cannot help thinking but that he is inclined to lessen that consequence which, it appears to me you think necessary I ought to have in this detachment. I at the same time believe it does not proceed from any irregularity, but that it is what any other person in his situation would aim at; to propose questions where there is a probability of his being

averse to answer and afterwards from the influence of Government obliged to accede to, might only tend to irritate. I therefore submit to your judgment whether it would not be well to obtain instructions from the Durbar to him to communicate to me his intended operations and the means of carrying them into execution. The same information will of course be made from me to him, in order that the best judgment might be formed of the propriety of the measure. This I am in hopes would sufficiently establish the respectability of my situation, so that it might be beneficial to the service. It however might be better effected I think by my being granted credentials as Vakeel from our Government, so far as it relates to the necessary intercourse with the Bhao as commander of the Mahratta army, particularly as he has repeatedly given me to understand that he considers me merely as commander of this detachment.

I beg you will do me the favour to furnish me with a copy of the proper address and compliments in Persian that is due to the Bhao when I have occasion to write him, and in what manner I should be addressed in turn.

**No. 142**—Little sends intelligence of the arrival of Bunno Bapu with a few hundred troops.

FROM—JOHN LITTLE ;

TO—C. W. MALET.

*Compta, 1st August 1790.*

Roop Ram, the Chowdhury has applied to me for a letter to you. What he has done, I hope will be the means of his people behaving better for the future, but could have wished, if his business would have allowed, that he had stayed a little longer to adjust every thing at first himself.

The troops under Bunnoo Bapoo are arrived. I have rode round their camp and think there may be about four or five hundred horse; Balajee Punt says about five or six hundred, and it is given out that they are two thousand strong. Some days ago the Bhao sent to acquaint me that he means to march tomorrow three coss; his artillery was sent on towards the Kristna some days before.

**No. 143**—Bhau intends to cross the Krishna and desires the English detachment to follow him.

FROM—JOHN LITTLE ;

TO—C. W. MALET.

*Compta, 3rd August 1790.*

The Bhao has sent to acquaint me the army is to cross the Krishna at Erur Manjavee, about two coss below Ainapur, that most of his guns are already over, and is desirous that this detachment should pass next; the



rest are to follow as fast as possible, and as they arrive his own troops and himself to be the last. [*Erur Sangavi*, 8 m. due s. of Miraj.]

I took an opportunity some days ago to remind him of the 2,000 horse to be attached to this detachment; he says that shall be done when once the whole have crossed.

We march from hence this morning.

No. 144—Malet reiterates to Bahiropant his demands for the dismissal of Tipu's Valils and Bhau's crossing the Kistna and reports the movements of Medows.

FROM—C. W. MALET;

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 3rd August 1790.*

On the evening of 31st I was visited by Behro Punt in consequence of having signified to him receipt of the ratified treaty with letters from your Lordship for the Peshwa, the Minister and himself, the latter of which I delivered to him, and desired that a day might be fixed for my presenting in person the other letters and the ratified treaty to the Peshwa and the Minister. He assured me an early day should be appointed, but that some delay might occur in the choice of one suitable to the importance of the occasion. I embraced the opportunity of the very quick return of the treaty and the cordial language of your Lordship's letters and perfect confidence in the wisdom and good faith of the Minister, to enforce the arguments that I have so often urged for the dismissal of Tipoo's agents and Pursuram's passage of the Kishna, observing that in whatever view I placed the backwardness of this Court on those two points, it was irreconcilable to good policy and good faith, since, if caused by the factious opposition of any member of the State, the impression thereby conveyed to foreign States was derogatory to its honour and subversive of confidence in its power; if by motives of present pecuniary advantage, it was at the risk of endangering the confidence and cordiality of the alliance and of sacrificing those extensive territorial acquisitions that were the object of it. I have since been informed by Behro Pant that the 4th instant is now positively fixed for the dismissal of the Vackeels.

Your Lordship will have perceived by my late correspondence with Capt. Kennaway that my expectations from this Court relative to the footing of the Bombay detachment with respect to money and subordination will be entirely regulated by the settlement that may be made by that gentleman with the Nabob.

I shall pay very particular attention to your Lordships instructions on the subject of the dependance of the Raja of Tanjore on the Nabob of the Carnatic and his connexion with the Hon'ble Company, should future occasion produce any further conversation with the members of this Court on that topic.

Agreeable to your Lordship's wish, I have the honour to enclose the Peshwa's original treaty in Mahratta and Persian, and embrace the opportunity to assure your Lordship that I have experienced the most heartfelt pleasure on the approbation with which your Lordship has been pleased to honour its conclusion. But, my Lord, though I may not be held responsible for the good faith of this Court in the discharge of its engagements, I confess to you that without it my satisfaction is incomplete.

By the Madras courier of the 14th ultimo just received, I learn that Genl. Medows resumed his progress the 3rd ultimo and by the 5th had advanced to Arravecourchy\*, which I shall immediately communicate to this Court.

I am this moment honoured with your Lordship's letter of the 8th ultimo covering others for the Peshwa and Minister, which I shall present with such an exemplification of the indulgences granted to Hindoo pilgrims as may be most likely to convey a proper sense of your attention to this State.

P.S.—I have the pleasure to acquaint your Lordship that the Dundas sailed from England the 1st April and arrived at Bombay the 31st ulto.

**No. 145**—Malet communicates to the G. G. the happy intelligence of the delivery of the treaty at 6 a.m. on the 6th, in full darbar accompanied with the news of Medows' advance to Daraporam and the giving of certain presents to him on that occasion.

FROM—C. W. MALET ;

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 7th August 1790.*

I have now the pleasure to acquaint Your Lordship that on the 4th Tippo's Vackeels had their audience of leave of the Durbar, and will, I am assured, set out on their return to their master in two or three days.

In consequence of my desire of an early day being appointed for the delivery of the ratified treaty, the ceremony was settled to be performed at 6 o'clock on the morning of the 6th, that unusual hour being fixed on as the only auspicious one for several days, and by my wish of running no risk of the stipulated time being suffered to elapse under pretences which, however frivolous to us, are highly important in the eyes of these people. I accordingly waited on the Peshwa at the appointed time and was received in a very full Durbar. After sitting some time, the critical moment was announced and I delivered into the Peshwa's own hands your Lordship's

\* Caroor, 50 m. west of Trichinopoly, and on the then S-E frontier of Mysore. Arrave-Kurchi 35 m. and Daraporam 55 m. S. W. of Caroor.

letter and the treaty with such expressions of congratulation on so important an event as seemed suited to the occasion, and which were answered with assurances of friendship and satisfaction. I had great pleasure in accompanying this act with an account of General Medows having advanced to Daraporam without opposition, which I was enabled to do by a letter from the General so late as the 11th ulto. very opportunely received the night of the 5th, nor did I fail to draw from it my usual conclusion of the necessity of Pursuram Bhao's immediately commencing his operations; to which the Minister replied that, though at a late conference with me he had not found it expedient to fix a day for the dismissal of Tippo's vackeels or the crossing of the Kistna, yet I had been witness to his quick compliance with my wishes in the former instance, so should I have no further cause to complain of delay in the latter; in a word, that orders had been issued to Pursuram and that I should soon hear of his having crossed the Kistna. To which I generally replied that I doubted not but that good faith and the interests of the alliance would be adopted as the rule of the Durbar's councils and conduct. On taking my leave I was presented with cloths, a sirpccch, jigha, string of pearls and horse, which shall be carried to the Hon'ble Company's credit.

Upon a general consideration of the Court's conduct, its concluding the late treaty, its granting me leave to purchase cattle for the Bombay Government, its sending for and incurring the expense of two of our battalions and a train of artillery, its not obstructing my money negotiations for the Bombay Government, and its giving me permission to raise recruits by which that Presidency has lately received its principal supply of men from this quarter, I am certainly inclined to draw favourable conclusion of the sincerity of its intentions of entering into the war, tho' at the same time I cannot attempt to exculpate its entertainment of Tippo's agents or its dilatory entrance on action,—which may, I think, be generally accounted for in the wary procrastinating genius of this State, the embarrassments incident to its feudal aristocratic form of Government, the reluctance of its military tenants to quit their agricultural employments at this season of the year, and the repugnance of the Durbar to make the requisite advances for enabling the army to take the field, to all which may be added the factious spirit of some of its principal members instigated by the money and the intrigues of Tippo. A very short time must now reduce the matter to a certainty, since having once crossed the Kistna I know not on what plea immediate hostilities can be evaded, particularly if Mohabut Jung's operations have been commenced as Musheer ul Mulk promised Capt. Kennaway they should by the 28th ultimo. But at all events, it appears to me certain that Tippo must be exceedingly alarmed at such hostile preparations, and that even admitting him to have received private assurances of their not being employed vigorously against him, he will not be able to reconcile a reliance on such professions to the state of his affairs or to the interests and dispositions of the professors.

## SECTION 4

*First stage of the War (August 1790—Jan. 1791)  
Campaigns of Generals Medows and Abercromby,  
Parashuram Bhau and Mahabat Jang.*

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No. 146—Malet reports to the G. G. his conversation with Nana on the subject of the dismissal of Tipu's agents, the Bhau's progress and the plan of operations after the rains, and requests the G. G. to put Capt. Little on an equal footing with Montgomery.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 15th August 1790.*

On the 13th instant I visited the Minister by invitation and presented to him your Lordship's letter that accompanyd the ratifyd treaty. At this meeting he asked me if I had any certain intelligence of Tippo. I replied not, he said that he was in the same predicament and could not procure any certain accounts of his motions. He enquired of Genl. Medows' motions on which I was enabled to answer satisfactorily by a letter from him at Daraporam so late as the 13th ulto. Wishing to remind the Minister of Tippo's Vackeels who are still here, I observed that it was extraordinary, no certain knowledge of his motions could be procured from them. He said it was the case and that the despatches they received were through such a variety of hands that nothing certain could be collected through that channel. I took advantage of this opening to intimate my surprize and concern at their not having yet left Poona and still more at their being suffered to receive and send despatches to and from their master, the substance of which had never been communicated to me. The Minister replied that they certainly would set out in a day or two, and as to their receipt of despatches from their master he likewise had heard of some having been received, but that he had forbidden all

further communication of their despatches or of any further proposals from them to the Durbar. I begged the Minister to consider that though agreeable to my desire of promoting the good understanding of the two states to the full accomplishment of the great objects of the alliance, I might adopt his mode of accounting for transactions here and represent them accordingly to your Lordship, yet as the other powers of India had agents here who communicated matters of fact and represented what they heard and saw, the extraordinary delay of the departure of the agents and their continuing to receive expresses from their master must appear mysterious and dissatisfactory and give those concerned in the alliance such real ground of complaint as I found it difficult to invalidate. I begged him to recollect the delicacy of my situation when, if by rejecting the obvious tendency of positive facts, I preferred a reliance of his explanation of them and involved my credit on the verification of his assurances, of the observance of which, I was sorry to say, I had hitherto some reason to complain. He replied that my credit should not suffer by a reliance on his veracity, that it was in vain to multiply professions, but that the Vackeels were ordered to depart and should go very soon. I said it had been reported to me that they carried on a correspondence toward the north of Hindostan, meaning with Holcar, which I had good reason to believe true. But he declared it could not be.

I next enquired of him the progress of Parsuram Bhao, when he replied that the artillery had all crossed, and that for the greater expedition the rest of the army was ordered to divide and pass at the different places where there are boats; though this seemed to me to bear some appearance of founding a plausible excuse for a large force not being collected, I took no notice of it, only lamenting that so much time had already elapsed in inactivity, and that the 8 days in which I had been taught to expect that Parsuram would commence his operations after my communication of hostilities was already protracted to a full month. He said it was necessary to advance so circumspectly that there should be no occasion to fall back. I replied that on the present occasion promptitude and decision were prudence, the loss of time might render invasion difficult, whereas a vigorous impression on the enemy's defenceless frontier would confirm the panic that already prevailed and in all human probability render the whole country between the Tumbadra and Kistna an easy conquest. To this, as to the preceding subject, he generally assured that Pursaram's operations should be commenced without loss of time.

Wishing to give your Lordship some authentic intimation of the Durbar's intentions relative to its plan of operations after the rains, I questioned the Minister on that point, on which he at first seemed inclined to give me satisfaction, but afterward changed his communication into a general one, that the preparations of this State were ordered to be ready by Dussera (about the middle of October), but that no particular arrangements as to the conduct of the war had yet been settled; when

they were, I should be informed of them. Since communicating to your Lordship in my address of the 3rd instant that Capt. Little had expressed some dissatisfaction at the mode of his communication with the Mahratta Commander, I have the pleasure to acquaint you that I have been furnished with positive injunctions to the person through whom it is conducted to act on all occasions agreeable to the gentleman's wishes, and the Minister assured me that he would write Pursaram Bhao to treat them on all occasions with the utmost confidence and attention.

The above contains the substance of my conference with the Minister at which I might perhaps have been justified by telling him in plain terms that by his conduct to Tippo's Agents he had infringed the 12 article of the treaty of Poona, and that by the delay in the operations of Pursaram Bhao he had not fulfilled the 3rd Art : But as it appears to me but too obvious that amongst the probable motives of this Court's conduct assigned in my last address of the 7, Tippo's money and intrigues have had too great a share and as by too abrupt a declaration of my sense thereof, I might without benefiting my grand object of accelerating its motions, prejudice the cordiality of my personal footing with the Minister and thereby hurt my prospects of procuring cattle, men and money for the Bombay Govt. in the two last of which I have been fortunate enough to be very serviceable to Col. Abercromby and have hopes of being so in the former, I thought it more advisable to proceed by a more gentle mode of conveying my sentiments, thereby leaving an opening to your Lordship on a general knowledge of the State of our affairs to adopt such a judgment of this Court's conduct as wisdom and policy may suggest.

Having observed that an incidental charge for certain military expences and for the support of the dignity of the commanding officer is inserted in the account disbursement of the Madras detachment acting with the army of Nizam Ally Khan, also that a charge is incurred on account of an aid-de-camp, permit me, unknown to and without any application from Capt. Little, to submit to your Lordship's consideration the propriety of that gentleman's being put on a similar footing with Major Montgomery in a situation the circumstances of which are so perfectly correspondent.

I have not received any advices from Capt. Little since the 28th ulto., when he was under orders to march, but which, notwithstanding the Minister's assurances, will not, I apprehend, be carried into execution with the speed which good faith and good policy (abstracted from all separate and secret intrigues with Tippo) seem to require, and which if not put in practice, will, in my humble opinion, amount to an uncontrovertible proof of the existence of such intrigues.

I do myself the honour to return the duplicate copy of the ratified treaty which is become unnecessary by the safe arrival of the original ; I perceive that the Persian date is omitted, which I presume must have proceeded from my not having inserted it in the copy sent from hence. I mentioned

this circumstance to the Minister telling him at the same time that the English date was inserted, but if he thought proper I would add the Persian date also or procure its insertion in another copy from Calcutta, when I would receive the one already delivered. He replied that it was immaterial as the English date was annexed to your Lordship's copy and the Persian to that of this State transmitted to Calcutta.

**No. 147**—Malet communicates the departure of Tipu's Vakils from Poona, Medows' capture of Coimbatore and the passage of the Kistna by Bhau's army.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 21st August 1790.*

I have great pleasure in acquainting your Lordship that Tippo's Vackeels have left this place and on the 19th inst. were 16 coss hence toward their master's frontier. In reply to my enquiries of the Minister what despatches they carried from hence to their Master, I was informed that it consisted of letters from the Peshwa and Minister in answer to those sent by Tippo, and that they contained merely an acknowledgment of the articles and money sent by that Prince, the words of which as communicated to me by Behro Punt are contained in a separate letter. It will, however, naturally occur to your Lordship that much negotiation must have passed with these agents since their arrival through the channel of the Rasta family, through which, I apprehend, the clue is still preserved, though the Minister has been uniformly reserved to me on that subject.

I had infinite satisfaction in communicating to this Court on the 17th instant that Genl. Medows had advanced without opposition to Coimbatore and taken possession of that place without suffering either from poisoned water or want of provisions, whence I inferred the fallacy of the Ministers' former intelligence on those points observing however, that Tippo's retreat from Coimbatore and declining the contest with Genl. Medows was an incontrovertible proof of that Prince's dismay, since prudence certainly dictated the propriety of his encountering the General singly who had so fairly urged him to a contest. When avoiding it he subjected himself to the infinitely greater embarrassment of being very soon obliged to defend himself against a multitude of assailants with an army already dispirited by the necessity of retreating before one of them. And this obvious conclusion of Tippo's diffidence of his power to withstand General Medow's force is very much corroborated by the latest intelligence that I have received from my correspondent on the southern frontier of this State and have the pleasure at the same time to acquaint your Lordship that agreeable to my instructions intelligent persons have been despatched by him to proceed through the enemy's Capital and Camp to Genl. Medows with

a token to authenticate their employment, the counterpart of which I send the General by this post.

On the 20th instant I had the pleasure to receive the following intelligence from Mr. Uththoff of the 15th.

"On the 14th in the morning both battalions had crossed the Kistna, the artillery went next and nothing now remains but my stores and some private baggage. We shall all be over, I trust, by tomorrow at noon. Our plan of operations is, I understand, to proceed with all convenient expedition across the rivers Ghut Purba and Mal Purba, after which the whole of the Bhao's force will collect and proceed toward Dharwar. His artillery with a few troops was found on the south side of the river and they have since moved forward. The Bhao's son is now crossing with another party a few coss down the river. The Bhao himself will in all probability cross as soon as possible after us. Grain and forage are extremely dear."

**No. 148**—Malet reports the satisfaction of both the Peshwa and Nana on the receipt of Cornwallis' letters, the purchase of one thousand cattle for the Government of Bombay and the presence of Tipu's army on the south bank of the Tungabhadra.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 28th August 1790.*

I was favoured with a letter from Capt. Little dated the 17 from Caloor south of the Kistna in which he gives it as his opinion that Parsuram's cavalry does not exceed 5,000, but that the quotas of Rasta and the Pratinidhi (another great feudal Chief) have not yet joined. On the 22nd I had the pleasure to forward that gentleman a letter from the Minister to Pursaram Bhaou enjoining him to treat Capt. Little with the utmost confidence and cordiality. On the 23 the Minister sent me the ratified copy of the treaty to insert the Persian date, tho' on a former occasion he expressed his indifference about it. I accordingly added the date which I shall by this opportunity communicate to your Persian interpreter to preserve the correspondence in his copies.

Since my last address your Lordship's letters of the 7th July to the Peshwa and Minister have been presented and were received with expression of satisfaction suitable to the benevolence and disinterestedness of the measure which they communicated, much curiosity has been shown to discover whether it originated from the recommendation of any other quarter, to which I have replied that added to the general motive of benevolence I am of opinion that your Lordship has been greatly influenced in the procural of the indulgence from the Vizier by that regard for this Court which has so uniformly marked your administration.



I have, this day, had the pleasure to learn that the person whom I employed to purchase cattle for the Bombay Government has effectually performed that essential service in the purchase of one thousand head and by my letter to Mr. Secretary Hay of this date your Lordship will perceive that I have procured that presidency another supply of cash; recruits also come in fast, which I, in a great measure, impute to the dearth which begins to prevail in this country from the scarcity of rain.

It has been signified to me by the Minister that 5 battalions of Tipu's infantry had reached the south bank of the Tumbudra and were collecting boats and baskets to pass that river to reinforce his northern stations. On receipt of this intelligence I expressed my hope that Parsuram Bhao would not let slip so fine an opportunity of distressing the enemy by cutting off so large a detachment which his present force was duly equal to effect. If this intelligence proves true it is reasonable to infer that Tipu has taken the alarm and is really apprehensive of the preparations in this quarter.

**No. 149**—Malet sends intelligence of the invasion of Tipu's territories by Parashuram Bhau, the capture of several places and the escape of two European prisoners.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 18th September 1790.*

Your Lordship's knowledge of the painful state of anxiety and suspense in which I have been long held by the dilatory conduct of this Court will enable you to form a judgment of the extreme pleasure that I now have in congratulating your Lordship on Pursaram Bhaou's actual invasion of the enemy's Country and reduction of a number of places on his northern frontier; Capt. Little's detachment with Parsuram Bhao's army, subsequent and authentic advices mention having advanced on the 9th inst. within 3 coss of Dharwar, the enemy's principal garrison on his northern frontier, near which place Buddurul-Zuman-Khan was encamped with an army of about 8 or 10,000 men, 4,000 of which arrived lately from the South under the command of Sher Khan.

I have applied to the Minister for a particular account of the places taken by Parsuram and intimated to him the necessity of Captain Little's being made particularly acquainted with the acquisitions made by the Maharatta army. I have not yet received the account required from the Minister in lieu of which I take the liberty of troubling your Lordship with the names of the following places which have reached me from a very credible quarter, Egoonda, Soandootee, Hooly Batgari, Purrushgur, Kittoor and Dacenoor; these places were all abandoned or surrendered except one that was taken by assault.

As I hope that this commencement of hostilities will be followed by a like conduct on the part of Nizam Ally Khan, the necessary consequence to the enemy must be embarrassment in his councils, failure in his resources, and in all human probability dismay and discontent and defection in his army, particularly, if the important diversions proposed by General Abercromby and Colonel Kelly can be executed in aid of General Medows' design of penetrating the Ballaghaut from Coimbatoor.

Though judgment from effects cannot be admitted in exculpation of this Court's late delays, yet I confess that on adverting to the consequences I do not lament them, for while Tippoo's retreat before General Medows has hitherto removed all necessity for a diversion, the General's progress during the inaction of the allies has made the Company masters of a valuable and extensive tract of territory independant of all claim to participation, while ours to a share in their conquests is coeval with their commencement, which has happened opportunely on the approach of what may be expected to prove the most arduous period of the war when the efforts of our armies are to be directed against the natural and improved strength of the interior parts of the enemy's country and when every man drawn from the defence of those quarters must necessarily lessen the difficulty of penetrating them.

At an interview with the Minister on the 15th inst. he again assured me that no determination was yet come to relative to the conduct of the war after the rains, but that the necessary preparations were making for discharging the stipulations of the treaty.

I have received undoubted intelligence that the Raja of Tanjore has written this Court on the subject of the assumption of the management of his revenues by the Company's Government and requested its interposition in his behalf. I think it probable that I may in consequence receive some message from the Durbar on the subject, if so I shall endeavour to execute your Lordship's instructions of 5th July in such a manner as to convince the Minister of the impropriety and inadmissibility of his interference.

I have great hopes, by means of my correspondent on the south frontier of this State, of being able to convey General Medows good intelligence of the enemy's strength and situation by a succession of emissaries through his country and army; the same person has likewise my instructions to communicate to Captain Little every intelligence in his power that can be serviceable to that officer.

On the 16th instant two Europeans came to me who made their escape about three months ago from Chittaldroog, a fort in Tipoo's country. One of them was a drummer in the 100 Regiment and was taken at Bednur, the other was one of the unfortunate crew of the Hannibal. Both had been forced with many others of their countrymen to submit to circumcision, and have suffered terribly in effecting their escape, one having lost the use of one, the other, I fear, of both arms by cuts of sabres which are yet unhealed.

**No. 149A.**

List of persons of note killed in Tippo's army in the actions of the 13th and 14th Sept. 1790.

Burhan-al-Deen; Commander of one Wing.

Abdul Hulleem.

Mahomed Ibrahim, his brother, Commander of a Kushoon.

Meer Abbas Navacit, Master of the Mint and a favourite companion of Tippo.

Meer Ally Rukkee, Bucshy or Chief of 4 Kushoons.

The younger brother, name unknown, of Syed Kummar-ul-Deen, Chief of the Askur Kutcherree or of the unmounted Cavalry.

Meer Kummar-ul-Deen, Commander of the other wing, two wounds—one in the arm, one in the thigh.

After the action Tippo ordered the wounded Europeans that had been left by the English to be collected to the number of 17 to whom he added several others from those in his service and putting them in chains sent them to Seringputtun giving out that he had gained a great victory and that the three principal officers of the English army were amongst the prisoners. Tippo has issued the most peremptory orders to all his armies to collect meat and send it to his army.

**No. 150**—Cornwallis urges Malet to object to any person of the Rasta family holding a position of trust in the army and gives certain directions for quickening Bhau's movements.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—C. W. MALET.

*Fort William, 20th September 1790.*

I entertain no very sanguine hopes of deriving any material advantage from the co-operation of the Mahrattas until the Dussera is over and until they are stimulated by the near prospect of conquest from General Medows' entering the Mysore Country ; for the Coimbatore Country is so distant and so little known by them, that I cannot expect that our successes there will have much effect on their cold and wary politics ; I have every reason at present to hope that General Medows will be able to ascend the Ghats early in the next month, but you will receive better information from the General himself.

You judged very properly in not expostulating too warmly and urging to Nanna the breach of treaty of which, in strictness, he has already been guilty. But it will be necessary that you should positively object against any person of the Rasta family, who are the professed enemies of the Confederacy and the declared friends of Tippoo, holding any situation of power or trust in the army.

It will not, I hope, be difficult to make as sensible a man as Nanna see the fatal consequences with which so impolitic a measure would probably be attended, in their proper colours, and you may add, if you please, that you have received the strongest injunctions from me to remonstrate against it.

I have desired General Medows to communicate to you his plan of operations, a knowledge of which would greatly assist the Mahratta General, and if he means to act a fair and honourable part, would tend to promote the success of the common cause ; but as it would have a very contrary effect if it was entrusted to those who may be inclined to betray us, I should recommend great circumspection to you on this head, if I had not seen so many proofs of your discretion and judgment and of your thorough knowledge of the people with whom you have to deal, as to render such a caution unnecessary.

As Tippo's success at the Poona Durbar was principally owing to his engaging the private interests of individuals in his favour, perhaps it might likewise be advisable for us to endeavour to quicken Purseram Bhao by holding out prospects of personal advantages to himself, if by his exertions and good conduct, the army under his command should essentially contribute to bring the war to a speedy and successful conclusion ; and upon this point I should be glad to know your sentiments.

**No. 150A**—Cornwallis directs Kennaway to spur the Nizam to a vigorous prosecution of the war and to avoid any expression that might bring about coolness between the Nizam and the Marathas.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—CAPTAIN KENNAWAY.

*Fort William, 20th September 1790.*

I must acknowledge that the dilatoriness, both of His Highness and the Maharattas, in proceeding to action has been no small disappointment to me and it has already been highly prejudicial to the general interests of the Confederacy. But as I trust that they will soon remove all cause of complaint upon that head, I wish you to continue the same temper and moderation in your remonstrance which I have recommended in my letter to Mr. Malet.

The sentiments that I have expressed in that letter on the necessity of great caution in communicating General Medows' plans to their Government, will also be nearly applicable to your situation ; and I know that I can depend upon your prudence for being open or reserved in such

communications according to the views and disposition of the ally with whom you are placed. I am likewise sensible that your zeal will, without stimulation, prompt you to avail yourself of every favourable opportunity that offers, to remind His Highness and his Ministers that they are equally called upon by honour and interest to perform the engagements which they have contracted and to animate them on all occasions to make their utmost exertions in the vigorous prosecution of the war.

We must expect to meet with frequent symptoms of jealousy between the Nizam and the Mahrattas. But unless the latter should openly and decidedly relinquish the Confederacy which is a case I can hardly suppose, I wish you to remain constantly upon your guard against giving the former the least encouragement to hope that I could be induced to enter into new and separate engagements with him during the present war, and indeed as much as possible to wave the subject altogether; for as I know that Meer Abul Cossim and the Ministers' party are very desirous of fortifying themselves against the arbitrary interference of the Poona Government by a close connexion with us, they would be likely to exaggerate any civil expressions that might drop from you, in order to bring about, as a preliminary step that coolness between us and the Mahrattas which it is at present so much our interest to avoid.

You will be informed by General Medows that if the centre army can be employed to make an important diversion in favour of the army under his own immediate command, it would be possible for him to spare a considerable body of infantry and artillery to co-operate with a detachment of the [Nizam's] august army in the reduction of the country of Commum. But if the case were otherwise, the objections which have been made to that plan by the Mahrattas would probably have rendered it unadvisable to undertake it.

I shall with great pleasure agree to your making an allowance to the amount of Rs. 200 per month to Unkah Jung, if you shall be of opinion that it will essentially tend to secure a continuance of his zeal and good offices to promote good humour and harmony between Major Montgomery and Mohabet Jung and His Highness's other officers, as well as to incite him to do his utmost at all times to obtain sufficient supplies for the reasonable wants of the detachment.

I desire that you will inform Major Montgomery that the assurances which he has given me through you of his determination to prevent all unnecessary waste of the public money, and to do his utmost in every other respect, to forward the good of the service and the accounts that you have likewise transmitted to me of the attention that he has paid to the discipline of his detachment, and of the prudent and accommodating manner in which he has conducted himself with Mohabet Jung have given me the greatest satisfaction.

**No. 151**—Cornwallis directs Palmer to communicate to Sindhia the slowness of the Marathas in the prosecution of the war and to obtain information on the strength of the parties in the Poona Court.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

TO—MAJOR PALMER.

*Fort William, 22nd September 1790.*

It has been suggested to me by Mr. Malet and I perfectly concur with him in opinion, that as it is probable that the tardiness of our allies in commencing the operations may become the subject of discussion at a future day, it would be proper that you should be furnished with copies of the parts of Mr. Malet's correspondence with me which relate to the performance of the stipulations of the late treaty of alliance by the Mahratta State to enable you to communicate such circumstances to Mahadjee Sindia as in your judgment may appear to be requisite in order to make him master of the subject.

A considerable degree of delicacy must be observed on our part to give these communications the appearance of confidence and cordiality, and not of an appeal to his judgment or an application for his interference with the Court of Poona.

I entertain great hopes that the late rapid successes of General Medows and the probability of his being able to invade the Mysore Country early in the next month with an army that Tippoo cannot resist will hold out so tempting a prospect of conquest and work so forcibly on the avarice and ambition of the Mahrattas as to stimulate them to exertions, which a regard to good faith and to the observance of their solemn engagements has not yet been able to produce. But if I should be disappointed, the ultimate object of your communications to Mahadjee Sindia would be to insure that Chieftain's good opinion of the justice of our proceeding in the event of our being obliged from their lukewarmness in the common cause to refuse the support which they may expect in the pursuit of their particular views and interests.

I have so good an opinion of the understanding of Nanna Furnaveese as to believe that he sees how much it would raise the credit of his administration, and promote his own interests as well as those of his country, to reduce the power of Tippoo and recover from him the rich and extensive territories which he and his father have taken from the Mahratta State. He has, I know, met with formidable opposition, and altho' he has hitherto apparently carried his point by the signature of the treaty, the prevalence of his power must be considered as doubtful until he shall show that he has sufficient authority to enforce the execution of the Peshwa's engagements.

A competent knowledge of the strength of the different parties at the Poona Durbar and of the likelihood of Nana Furnaveese being able to support himself in his present station, would greatly assist us in

our future dealings with that State, and closely watched as Mr. Malet must constantly be at that jealous court, I should think it possible that you, who live in a Mahratta camp, in which there are several powerful Chiefs at a distance from the busy scene of intrigue and cabal, might obtain a good information on that head as even the resident at Poona himself.

At any rate if a favourable opportunity should offer, you may make the experiment, and I shall not object to your giving reasonable encouragement to any person whom you should have grounds to believe capable of giving intelligence on the above point that would be worthy of your notice.

**No. 152**—The surrender of Palicatcherry to Lt.-Col. Stewart.

FROM—GEORGE HARRIS,

TO—JOHN CHAMIER.

*Camp Coimbatore, 23rd September 1790.*

I have the honour to acquaint you by direction of the Commander-in-Chief for the information of the Council that the important fortress of Palicatcherry surrendered yesterday morning to a detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel Stuart.

The fire from our batteries was so well directed as in two hours to silence the guns of the fort and to effect such a breach by the next morning as induced the garrison to ask terms that were granted on their surrendering prisoners of war.

Sixty pieces of cannon and a good quantity of grain is found in the fort—some satisfaction—for the grain and guns Colonel Floyd's detachment was obliged to leave, and it is still a more pleasing consideration that Tippoo did not dare to accept our challenge of marching two days towards him and halting one, after our moving out in support of Colonel Floyd on purpose to tempt him, while a large detachment from the army was carrying on the siege that he evidently came down the Ghats with the hope of raising.

P.S.—More particulars will be forwarded to you as soon as they are received. The loss was very trifling, ensign 52 wounded, 1 Serjeant killed, 3 men slightly wounded.

**No. 153**—Cornwallis asks Malet to offer to the Mahrattas the assistance of two or three more battalions provided they could be spared from Bombay.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—C. W. MALET.

*Fort William, 27th September 1790.*

If General Medows' army and the force under Colonel Kelly should ascend the Ghauts early in the next month, as the General proposes, I think the Mahrattas will be so perfectly convinced of our determination

to attempt the entire destruction of Tippoo's power, and of our having a force that is very likely to accomplish it, that they will look with confidence to the prospect of recovering the extensive and valuable territories which have been wrested from them, and that an object so tempting to their avarice as well their ambition will stimulate them after the Dussarah to execute their engagements with vigour and effect.

The complete success of General Medows in the Coimbatore country, and the accession of the Bibbee of Cananore to our alliance, which gives us possession of all the southern part of the Malabar Coast, and ensures to us the assistance of the Nairs and Moplas, will, I have reason to believe, render it unnecessary to send so large a force from Bombay to the southward as Colonel Abercromby at one time intended.

Wishing, as I most ardently do, to use every exertion in my power to bring the war to a speedy conclusion, I should be sorry to see a man remain idle whose services could be brought into useful action.

If, therefore, it should appear clearly to you that the offer would be received as a mark of our liberality and you should be convinced that the troops would be employed efficaciously for promoting the interest of the common cause, I should have no objection to send two or three battalions more to the Mahratta army from Bombay to be paid at our own expense, provided Colonel Abercromby should be of opinion that he could spare them without disappointing any requisitions that may be made to him by General Medows or from the cost of Malabar.

You will please communicate my instructions to you on this head to Colonel Abercromby, and request that he will inform you whether the force remaining with him at Bombay will admit of his furnishing the troops that I have mentioned, in the event of your finding that the offer of them would have a favourable effect upon the Poona Government.

**No. 154**—Malet sends to the G. G. intelligence of the strength of the Bhau's army and of the operations at Dharwar.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 28th September 1790.*

On the 26th I wrote Capt. Little. On the 27th was favoured with a letter from that gentleman and enclosed I have the honour to submit copies of both to your Lordship's notice. From the contents of the latter and corroborative accounts that have reached me through other channels of perfect credibility added to the communications of this Court I have no hesitation in assuring your Lordship of my entire conviction that its force now acting against Tipoo is fully equal to the stipulations of the treaty, for inclusive of the number of horse and foot in camp many parties are stationed in the different posts that have fallen into Pursaram's hands.



As there is some reason to think that the Commander of the fort of Dharwar has objections to admitting Buddur-al-Zuman, as to retreat would be as impracticable in the face of so large a body of Mahratta cavalry, as to remain in his present situation, not to mention his openness to attack, or even to enter the fort would probably cause scarcity of provisions, I am not without hopes of soon hearing that something decisive has been achieved in that quarter, which would in all probability be followed by the easy reduction of the rest of the Doab, especially if Capt. Kennaway's instances to the Nabob are at length successful in procuring the vigorous co-operation of Mohabut Jung.

**No. 155**—Malet sends to the G. G. the report of Medows' entrance into Mysore territory, of the Peshwa's taking the field in person and of the halt of Tipu's Vakils at Bagalkot south of the Kistna.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 2nd October 1790.*

A report is prevalent here that Genl. Medows has forced the Gudgarhutti Ghaut with a great slaughter of the enemy and entered the Mysore Country which, tho' the General's last advices of the 28th ult. give no room to lay much stress on, yet it has greatly increased my anxiety on account the non-arrival of two mails that are now missing.

Though this Court declined accepting the offer of further assistance from Bombay which I lately made at General Abercromby's instance on its being resolved that he should not take the field in person, yet as I think, the reduction of the important post of Dharwar will be highly beneficial to the alliance, I have suggested to the Minister that, that enterprize may be greatly facilitated by a reinforcement of our troops and a supply of war-like stores to which I have not yet received an answer.

I am informed thro' a channel of great credibility that the Peshwa accompanied by the Minister will take the field in person after the rains, which are now nearly at an end. But the actions of these people are regulated so much by expediency and depend on such a variety of contingencies, that I am still at a loss how far to depend for the execution of a measure which I really believe is at present intended. In the interim I have good ground to suspect that this Court still keeps up a correspondence with Tipu through the agents lately here that halted some time at Baugelcota, a place belonging to Rasta, south of the Kistna, and that, that Prince has actually applied for the good offices of this Court for terminating the war which necessarily needs to make it arbiter of the terms, but on these points I have not yet received the smallest intimation from the Durbar, and such is the extreme artifice of these people that it is not impossible but these pieces of information may be circulated to shake the consistency of the Confederacy or precipitate us into some measures that may justify

our allies in the pursuit of their own interests. But all these acts, will I hope and trust, be rendered totally innocent by the decided advantages of our arms under Genl. Medows, and that his successes by breaking through all the webs that chicanery may weave, will secure to us that place in the negotiation of a peace which we have held in the prosecution of the war.

**No. 156**—Malet informs the G. G. of his conversation with Bahiropant at an entertainment given to the latter, on the subject of Tipu's Vakeels detained by Rasta at Bagalkot.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 5th October 1790.*

In the evening of 2nd instant I gave Behro Punt an entertainment the last of those included in that formerly given to the Peshwa. At this meeting I endeavoured in the course of conversation to collect from him whether there were any grounds for the intelligence communicated in my last of a correspondence being still kept up between this Court and the enemy. He, in reply, solemnly disavowed his knowledge of any between the principals, but could not deny his having heard reports of a correspondence still subsisting between Tippo and Rasta, by whom the agents lately here had been detained at their family fort of Baugalcota under pretence of sickness, but that the Minister on hearing it had ordered them to be suffered to remain there no longer,—which certainly amounts to a verification of great part of the intelligence contained in my last with the difference of the correspondence being held with a secondary instead of the principal. Tho' Behero Pandit qualified his acknowledgment of having heard the reports abovementioned with the warmest protestations, that such correspondence was contrary to the regent's will, whose fidelity to the alliance is not to be shaken, as a proof of which he adduced the present equipment and progress of Parsuram Bhao and the levies and preparations that are making for prosecuting to the utmost the advantages already gained.

**No. 157**—Malet reports Tipu's descent of the Ghaut, the despatch of cattle to Fort Victoria and an encounter near Dharwar between a party of Mahrattas and an enemy force.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—ROBERT ABERCROMBY.

*Poona, 7th October 1790.*

I troubled you with an hasty letter the 3rd instant, and the same evening despatched another mail which I presume conveyed you the same intelligence that I have received of Tippo's having descended the Ghaut in considerable force, on which subject the General under the 13th ult. writes me that "I am a good deal worried upon hearing Tippoo is

come down the Ghauts and am going tomorrow to march to Sattimunglum to see, and if, it is true, to attempt driving him up again ”.

I have great pleasure in acquainting you that I have this day despatched 300 bullocks with their yokes etc., to the Resident at Fort Victoria out of 998 that reached this place yesterday of the 1,000 that I have purchased on your account and it is a great addition to my satisfaction that after a march of near 200 coss in 14 days through this rugged country without a halt, they are still in excellent order and will, I trust, be delivered so to the Resident above mentioned. You will observe by my last that I have written Capt. Little on the subject of supplying him, if compatible with the forms of his contract, from the remainder of the cattle now with me, which, since my last, I find I can conveniently quarter here at a tolerably cheap rate and which I will now do till I can ascertain whether I can dispose of those that may remain over and above our wants. When if I cannot, I will do with them as you may think proper. It is not I think improbable that before this reaches you, you may in consequence of my last have desired me to send them to Salsette ; if so, I will, in the event of not being able to dispose of them to my wish, send them there if you repeat your instruction to do so and which I mention from the recollection of the probable greater dearness and difficulty of maintenance on Salsette or any other of our possessions from the extreme scarcity of pasture and grain at this barren season, whereas I now find as above mentioned that I can conveniently dispose of them here and have them ready to transport to you at a fortnight's warning in, I doubt not, excellent order. On this point let me request the favour of your speedy answer.

I have this moment received a letter from Mr. Uthoff of the 27th ultimo containing the following ; “ We returned here yesterday by a sweep to the westw rd passing within two miles of Dharwar ; the enemy have left two or three of their dead here and we have ten or a dozen prisoners of theirs. Our loss in killed and wounded seems to be nearly the same as theirs. They carried off two horses, a camel and some tattoos. They had with them 2 guns and a party was advanced from the fort to support them. Dhondo Punt had about 700 horse and the enemy about 1,500 Sepoys and 700 Peadas according to our Durbar account. I hear that Tippoo is gone toward the Ghaut to oppose General Medows with 125 guns and a numerous cavalry and infantry. It seems the intention here to keep in the neighbourhood of Darwar till we are prepared for the siege.”

From this it appears our detachment has been engaged in an action with the enemy, the circumstances of which are obscure from the non-arrival of a previous letter of the 25th. The intelligence contained in the above corroborates that of General Medow's of the 13 about Tippoo and still leaves a possibility of the truth of the intelligence mentioned in my letter of 30th ult. I have not yet received an answer to my offers of aid to this Court from your Government.

**No. 158**—Malet communicates further details of the encounter near Dharwar, and the capture of Hubli and inquires about the reverse in the south.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 9th October 1790.*

I have this instant received the letter of the 25th from Capt. Little's detachment by which I find that none of our people were concerned in the fray therein mentioned, which was confined to a party of Maharatta horse commanded by Doondo Punt that were attacked by a party from the garrison of Dharwar, who, after killing 4 or 5 and wounding near 20, made good their retreat.

I have not yet received an answer from this Court to my offer of applying to the Bombay Government for a reinforcement. In the meantime foot soldiers are levying and despatching hence to the south and a howitzer has moved the same way. One of the Hubelys which had refused to surrender to the detachment under Parsuram's son has fallen to the Bhao who marched there in person. It is a place of consideration with a wall and a ditch and was formerly the seat of an English factory. Parsuram has sent to levy footmen in his own districts and to bring up some heavy guns from his towns of Merridge and Tasgaon.

The report lately mentioned to your Lordship as circulated here of General Medows having ascended the Gudjurhutti Ghaut is now changed to a confused rumor of Tippoo's having descended that Pass and forced our army to fall back, and uncertain accounts of something having happened in that quarter contained in the Madras Courier of 22nd Ult. make me extremely anxious for the receipt of further advices.

**No. 159**—Cornwallis writes to Malet to counteract by his arguments any half-heartedness that the Suttimungulum disaster might cause to the Marathas,

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—C. W. MALET.

*Fort William, 11th October 1790.*

The affair which happened near Settimungalum, between Tippoo's army and the detachment under the command of Lieut. Colonel Floyd, will not, I trust, materially interfere with the execution of our general plan of operations, but the advantages, which Tippoo gained there, will no doubt, be related to our allies with the grossest exaggerations, which, unless counteracted by Captain Kennaway's and your representations, may have the effect of rendering them more backward than ever in fulfilling their engagements,

It will be proper in you to state to the Peshwa's Ministers that if conformable to the terms of the treaty, and to the true interests of the Mahratta State they had commenced vigorous operations against the common enemy at the stipulated period, it is highly improbable that Tippoo would have ventured to have moved with his army to a great distance from his capital on either side of his dominions, and, therefore, that it is to their slowness in entering Tippoo's country that the small disadvantage which we have sustained must be principally attributed.

At the same time, however, as encouragement may on this occasion be more useful than remonstrance, I wish you to be at particular pains to explain to them how little our force or our spirits are affected by the small loss that we have met with. A circumstantial account of the action will, no doubt, have been communicated to you by General Medows, and you will have an opportunity to describe, in the most incontrovertible manner, the decided superiority of our troops and leaders over those of the enemy, by desiring them to advert that so small a corps as that under the Command of Colonel Floyd had been able without suffering considerably, to make head, for three following days, against Tippoo and his whole army.

Numberless arguments will suggest themselves to you to show them that the Mahratta State is now called upon to make its utmost exertions by every consideration of honour, interest, and safety, and I trust that the Ministers will clearly see that, exclusive of the Peshwa's being bound in honour to fulfil his engagements, a more favorable opportunity can never offer for recovering the territories that have been conquered from the Mahrattas than by our powerful co-operation, and that, should they allow Tippoo to acquire any additional strength at our expense, it would certainly, before long, be attended with the most dangerous consequences to their country.

To this you will add that this trifling event has not, in the smallest degree, altered our determination to prosecute the war with the utmost vigour, and that our allies shall never have just reason to complain of a deviation, on our part, from the strictest principles of honour and good faith.

**No. 160**—Malet reports to the G. G. the requisition made by the Marathas for two battalions and five hundred European Infantry and his representation to the Court of the bravery of Colonel Floyd.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 12th October 1790.*

On the 10th inst. I had the infinite satisfaction to learn from the Madras Government that Col. Floyd after defeating with singular gallantry and conduct the repeated and vigorous attempts of the enemy to cut off his

retreat, had been joined on the 16th Ultimo at Valladdy by Genl. Meadows who had advanced to that place by forced marches to his succour. Finding that this Court had received accounts of these transactions from other quarters and having learnt that they are circulated greatly to the advantage of Tippo by his emissaries and that a salute had been fired on the occasion at Dharwar, I thought it proper to make a communication to the Minister by my Vackeel Nurud-Din-Hussein Khan of the whole that had come to my knowledge, detailing the circumstances from the gallant conflict of the cavalry on the morning of the 13th to the desperate but abortive charge of the enemy's horse on the line on the evening of the 14th. After hearing the whole the Minister with many expressions of admiration declared his high satisfaction with the issue of an affair that had so imminently endangered the safety of Col. Floyd and the brave men under his command, whose preservation was equal to a victory, as this must have been attended with consequences highly prejudicial to the Confederacy. He at the same time jointly with Hurry Punt begged me on their part to request General Meadows, which I have done, to look on Tippo as an enemy from whom every thing is to be suspected that the art of man can devise or the complete possession of the means of putting his devices in execution can enterprize.

I have this instant received a message from the Minister that the Durbar has, in consequence of my offer of aid from Bombay for the reduction of Dharwar, come to the resolution of applying through me for a body of 2 battalions and 500 Europeans infantry, that every requisite for the batteries and approaches both in guns and workmen will be furnished from hence ; that in the interim Parsuram Bhao will be employed in shaking that place and disturbing it with a distant cannonade. And after the capture of the place the disposal of our people shall be at our option. I have replied for my satisfaction that our troops should not be exposed to disgrace in going to Dharwar without a proper apparatus for acting effectually ; it is necessary that this Court should permit the Commander of my guard Capt. Hiern, in whose ability and experience I have the fullest confidence, to survey the guns, ammunition, etc., that they mean to allot for this service ; and on his approval it will be equally necessary that they should be despatched instantly to the scene of action. While I will concert with General Abercromby the preparation of the force he may be able to spare, which, on intelligence of the above apparatus being sufficiently advanced on its way toward Dharwar, shall be immediately embarked from Bombay on boats which this Government shall send for the purpose, and landing at the same place, Captain Little's detachment did, shall proceed with all speed to the place of destination. I have also advised the addition of a small party of artillery to this Court's requisition for the management of the guns but above all, instant and prompt decision. I am not at present exactly acquainted with the force that General Abercromby can spare consistently with the present state of affairs, but from his well known

zeal for the service and a letter received from him yesterday I am convinced that he will do every thing that can be done for the good of the alliance. Strong opposition was made in the consultation of the Durbar to the requisition of our assistance on grounds of national punctilio, to which I replied that as little hesitation ought to be entertained by this State to call on our aid for infantry as we should feel in the event of having occasion for its cavalry. I am promised an answer relative to my demand of Capt. Hiern's inspecting the artillery tomorrow and am just now assured that orders have been issued to remove the impediments that have arisen in the clearance of Bombay grain boats.

**No. 161**—Malet communicates to the G. G. the requisition of two pieces of battering cannon for the reduction of Dharwar and the absence of any enthusiasm for the war in the Poona Durbar.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 16th October 1790.*

Your Lordship need not be at the trouble of furnishing Major Palmer with copies of that part of my letters necessary for his communications to Mhadjee Sindhia as he is furnished by me with duplicates of my correspondence with your Lordship. I subscribe entirely to your Lordship's opinion of the necessity of our success to stimulate our allies to action, and in this point of view, while I admire exceedingly the gallantry of Colonel Floyd's retreat, am forced to lament that it will probably be attended with some delay in the execution of Genl. Medow's design of penetrating the Mysore Country, the execution of which at this time, added to the advantages of a standing harvest to his army, would have put him beyond the reach of the Madras monsoon and the consequent difficulty of pursuing his operations in the low country during that season.

Your Lordship will have learnt from former letters that no person of the Rasta family is employed in any situation of trust or power in Pursaram Bhao's army.

Your Lordship may rely on the circumspection of my communications to this Court relative to General Medow's plans and design.

Parsuram Bhao is so deeply engaged by family interest and personal enmity against Tipu that I am in doubt of the necessity or expediency of attempting to stimulate his exertions by any prospects of personal advantage from your Lordship since, not to mention the jealous observance of this Court to which all Capt. Little's intercourse with him is subject, the great wealth and power of his family would necessarily render such a line of conduct burthensome and expensive. Exclusive of the above considerations, I am in hopes that from some circumstances that have come to my

knowledge that the Bhao's exertions will be further stimulated by a prospect of thereby fixing in his own person, to the exclusion of Hurry Punt, the command of any additional force that may be destined for the present war. I shall pay strict attention to your Lordship's instructions relative to the supplying of Bombay with money.

Your Lordship will be surprized to learn that I have not yet received an answer from this Court to my proposal of its permitting Capt. Hiern to inspect the artillery destined for the siege of Dharwar, and more so, when I acquaint you that, instead of it I have just received a message from the Durbar after 4 days deliberation that two pieces of battering cannon will be expected to be joined to the force formerly applied for from Bombay, and that 1 piece and a mortar will be sent hence, to which I shall reply that after so much time lost, I am exceedingly concerned at the issue of deliberations which, so far from producing an answer to my easy and reasonable proposal, seems to involve the projected seige of Dharwar in delay and difficulty; for that, in the first place, I doubt the sufficiency of 3 pieces of battering cannon for the purpose; in the second, the Kokan will, for a month to come, be almost impassable for 2 heavy pieces of cannon and the ghat so soon after the rains still more so; in a word, that the application for 2 pieces of cannon will delay and embarrass the object in view and is unbecoming this Court to make, as it has already signified to me its having plenty of ordnance fit for the purpose. On this ground I shall repeat my instances of immediate despatch and that I will be answerable for the timely junction of a reinforcement of troops from Bombay. The Durbar has also applied for my good offices to procure supplies of ammunition by purchase from Bombay in the event of their being wanted, with which I shall comply as I shall, even with their application for the two guns, if I cannot, by any other means, promote the early prospect of reducing Dharwar to effect which, I am very anxious on a consideration that if Genl. Medows should be overtaken and rendered inactive by the Carnatic monsoon below the Ghauts, Tippo will be at leisure to divert his whole attention this way and to the coast of Mallabar, and if this fortress is not subdued, it will probably force Pursaram Bhaou to relinquish his valuable and expensive acquisitions as rapidly as he has made them.

Tomorrow is the Dussera, but I am sorry to acquaint your Lordship that notwithstanding the assurances I have received I do not yet perceive any signs of great forwardness as to the Peshwa's taking the field or the assembling of an army, and I think, your Lordship will ere this have collected that the grand object of our allies is to reap as great a benefit as possible from the war and to stimulate Tippo's and our exertions to the exhaustion of our mutual force, by which means they may become the arbiters of future negotiation, which object only can and, I confidently hope, will be completely counteracted by the success of our arms.



No. 162—Malet communicates the capture of Palacatcherry.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 19th October 1790.*

This morning I received a letter from General Abercromby signifying his readiness to comply, as far as in his power, with any requisition of aid from this Government for the reduction of Dharwar. But I have not yet received the Minister's decision relative to the supply of a battering train.

On the 17th instant I had the very high satisfaction of learning the capture of Polgautcherry the 22nd ultimo which I immediately communicated to the Durbar and was congratulated thereon. This early and important piece of success will, I hope, entirely do away every evil consequence of Tipu's late descent of the Ghauts by enabling the General to prosecute his original plan and prove the futility of the enemy's appearance even in so great force either to disturb the siege, the General was carrying on or interrupt his general arrangement.

No. 163—Malet reports to G. G. the final decision of the Poona Court to send four guns and one mortar and communicates to him Medows' march from Coimbatore; he, however, regrets the silence of the Court on his proposal of the inspection of guns by Capt. Hiern.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 22nd October 1790.*

On the 20th I received a message from the Durbar intimating that agreeable to my proposal it had been resolved to send 4 guns and one mortar from hence for the siege of Dharwar, which with two to be procured by Parsuram from Tasgaum and Merridge should be sufficient. In answer to this message I have signified Genl. Abercromby's readiness to afford a body of troops equal to the occasion, but repeated my request that as the management of the guns to be furnished by this Government will fall on our people, Capt. Hiern may be permitted to inspect them; this request I have enforced with every argument that the mutual good of the alliance or its own reasonableness could suggest, and my anxiety to procure the Minister's assent is greatly increased by Capt. Little's account of the Bhao's artillery. Should, however, the Minister persevere in his non-compliance with my wish, I shall state the case to General Abercromby, and should he think proper to comply with the Durbar's requisition, suggest his accompanying the reinforcement with a couple of battering guns as a substitute in the

event of the inutility of those to be sent hence, since it will be better to incur some delay, some inconvenience and some additional expense than subject our arms to the serious evil and disgrace of marching a large force for the avowed purpose of reducing a place, on approaching which we should, from want of apparatus, find ourselves unable to attack. Though I have most urgently begged this Court to give me a speedy answer on this point, I am not yet favoured with it ; but in the interim I have, to save time, kept General Abercromby acquainted with the state of the negotiation by which he will be enabled to make every arrangement for immediate action, and this Government has, I am informed, given orders for assembling the bullocks and for every other preparation for the movement of the guns.

By letter from Madras received the 21st I had the happiness to learn that Genl. Medows marched from Coimbatore the 29th and that the center army was likewise to move into the enemy's country in which I greatly rejoice as I should have lamented exceedingly any necessity that could have caused the division of the latter force and the deprival of Genl. Medows and the Carnatic of its co-operation and support. Should the General be able to force the enemy to reascend the Ghauts and follow him into the upper country, I presume great destruction would ensue to his affairs which must already be greatly deranged by the defalcation of his revenue in Coimbatore, on the Mallabar Coast, in the Doab or country between the Kistna and Tumbudra, and by the advantage which all the Amils and Zemindars of his dominions will take of the dangers, real or assumed, with which they are threatened, to withhold or evade payment of their respective quotas. But the complete operation of this distress in the enemy's affairs rests, I conceive, on General Medow's ascent of the Ghats and entrance of the Upper Country, by which means, even should he not advance to Seringaputturn, the enemy will be held so completely at bay as to be unable to act in that decided manner against the allies in the Deccan and on the Mallabar Coast as he will, should the General find the ascent of the Ghats impracticable.

**No. 164**—Capture of Vaniambady and the flourishing condition of the country.

EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM LIEUT.-COLONEL MAXWELL.

*25th October 1790.*

I have the pleasure to acquaint you for the information of Government, that the army under my command yesterday passed the barrier, which separates this country from the Amboor district, and encamped near Vaniambaddy. That fort having been evacuated by the enemy in the morning, was taken possession of immediately on coming to the ground of encampment. The country is highly cultivated, and a rich crop is now

on the ground, and nearly ripe. The inhabitants having received from me assurances of safety and protection, have returned to their villages, and promise to supply the army with rice, which they are now beating out. The appearance of plenty, and the intelligence I have received, gives me reason to hope, that while in this country, the army may be fully supplied with provisions, and no endeavour shall be wanting on my part, to encourage them to supply us when farther advanced.

**No. 165**—Malet reports to the G.G. the despatch of a letter by Tipu to Rasta with reports of Tipu's victories, Rasta's intrigues with Tipu, and the permission granted by the Poona Court for the inspection of guns.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 25th October 1790.*

On the 23rd I received the following message from Behro Punt, that the Minister had commanded him to acquaint me that on the 21st inst. a procession of camel couriers arrived here with a letter from Tipu to Rasta, the purport of which was that having descended the Ghaut of *Gudgurbhutti* on the 4th of Mohurram he had attacked and, by the blessing of God, totally destroyed a body of English troops consisting of 8 battalions and 700 Europeans, taken 10 guns and all their baggage and suffered none either of the troops or their leaders to escape. That looking on him, Rasta, as his friend he had thought it necessary to make him a partaker of the pleasure of his victory and that as he was desirous of sending a person of consequence to reside with the Peshwa, he begged the necessary purwannas might be granted for the friendly reception and unmolested passage of Ally Ruzza who, on his arrival, would regulate his conduct agreeable to the will of this Durbar. To this communication was added the Minister's desire that I would transmit it to your Lordship which I assured him should be done, reminding him at the same time of the answer that had been given by your Lordship to a like proposal from the same quarter on the commencement of Genl. Medow's operations and begging that I might receive timely notice of the reply to be given by the Durbar which has been promised.

On the 24th instant the Minister at length assented to my wish of having the battering guns destined for the siege of Dharwar inspected by Capt. Hiern, but the carrying it into practice rests on the return of the Master of the ordnance from a religious ablutionary visit to a neighbouring river. The Minister has acquainted me that as he means to have the Peshwa's guns managed by their own people there will be no occasion to include artillery men in my application for a reinforcement; but, should, after all this delay and luckwarmness, the reinforcement be sent from Bombay, I shall submit to Genl. Abercromby the expediency of sending a few artillery to supply on occasion the want of skill in these people.

This morning I have had the pleasure to receive a letter from Genl. Medows dated 1st inst. near Suttumungaum which will enable me fully to convince the Minister of the falsity of the reports circulated by Tippo's advocates of his having advanced to Coimbatore and General Medows' retreat from that place. It was in addition to my pleasure on receipt of this letter to learn that one of my emissaries had reached the General through the enemy's camp and been thought worthy of the General's bounty by the clearness of his intelligence.

It would be difficult to convey to your Lordship an idea of the intrigues, real or pretended, of which I daily receive accounts at this Court. From one quarter I am told that a Vackeel from Tippo is absolutely concealed in Rasta's house, from another that large sums of money continue to come from that quarter, and that a person has been privately sent from hence. But disinclined as I am to pay much attention to the reports of spies or even to have recourse to their agency except on particular occasions, I must confess myself divided between the degree of credit to be given to bruits and the suspicion of their being artfully contrived and designed to sow distrust and dissension in the Confederacy. This much however may, I think, be pronounced on the character and genius of our allies that, they will omit no means of converting the alliance to their exclusive benefit, while our dependance for asserting our right and controuling all intrigues must rest on the success of our arms. But should that success be ever so brilliant and decided, I humbly presume that it would be politic to make such use of it as, if possible, to avoid reasonable dissatisfaction to the allies in the mode of concluding the war, since it will certainly be an object of some consideration to emerge from it with the prospect of a lasting peace.

**No. 166**—Malet communicates to the G. G. his representation to Nana for the vigorous prosecution of war on Tipu's northern frontier, for the equipment of the grand army, and for the assumption of the command by the Peshwa, and reports the capture of Harpanhally and other places.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 29th October 1790.*

On the 26 I had a meeting with the Minister at which I recapitulated the events that had happened in Coimbatore from the 13 ulto. to the 1st inst., at which time I acquainted him that Genl Medows was advanced near Suttimunglum in quest of the enemy with a resolution if possible to bring him to an action, or should he decline the contest to force him up the Ghauts. The Minister and Hurry Punt both agreed that the events subsequent to Col. Floyd's retreat clearly evinced the falsity of Tippo's communications and that his advance to an accommodation in the proposal

of sending a Vackeel here was an additional proof of it. They agreed, however, in the necessity of Genl. Medows proceeding against so artful and powerful an enemy with the greatest care and circumspection.

I urged the Minister by every argument that I could use on the necessity of despatch to take advantage of the present favourable season of Tippo's full employment below the Ghauts to redouble his exertions on his northern frontier and particularly, in pushing the reduction of Dharwar. He replied that he was equally sensible with me of the expediency of acting as I recommended, that in consequence thereof Pursuram Bhaou's force had been increased and instructions sent him to act with the utmost vigour, and he, the Minister, was happy to have it in his power to acquaint me by dispatches just arrived of the capture of Harponelly 16 coss of the Tumbudra, the capital of a considerable district by a detachment under Narsing Rao accompanied by the exiled Zemindare, also Moondgoda and Nunduntta, both capitals of districts, besides which Thanas had been established in about ten other less considerable places. He said he was equally anxious with me for the reduction of Dharwar, but apprehended he should not be able to despatch the battering cannon in less than 15 days as the draft bullocks could not reach Poona before that time from the places where they were grazing. I expressed my concern at so long a delay, and repeated the offer, I had formerly made, of supplying all the bullocks from those in my charge belonging to the Bombay Govt. that should remain after furnishing the B'bay detachment, for which the Minister made an acknowledgment, but said they would be insufficient. From the circumstance of the time requisite for the arrival of the bullocks for the above purpose I took occasion to observe the backwardness of this Court's preparations for its grand equipment as stipulated by treaty to be ready after the rains, adding that the principal cause of my present visit was to request he would, for your Lordship's information, acquaint me with the intention of the Durbar on this point. To this he replied with an assurance that I should receive information of the resolution that might be come to from Behro Punt, from whom I have since been assured that orders have been issued for collecting the force of the state as usually attendant on the Peshwa and that, in the interim, it will be determined whether the Peshwa shall take the field in person or the Command be entrusted to Pursaram Bhaou or some other Chieftain. I think it necessary to acquaint your Lordship that no large bodies of the feudatory troops of this State are yet collected here, tho' should the resolution be seriously adopted, I think an army might be soon assembled in addition to that now acting under Pursaram Bhaou, which Behro Punt formally assured me, stands on the Durbar records at 22,000 horse exclusive of foot and tho' he adds the whole of that number may not have joined yet as the rainy season is now at an end it will soon be completed. It is in confidence mentioned to me in reply to my instances on the subject of the Peshwa himself taking the field,

that great difficulties and inconveniences present thereto, since the Peshwa is not yet of an age to act with that vigour and decision, which should mark his first essay in arms, while to follow the example of the Nabob and remain inactive would be discreditable. Again, to send Hurry Pundit in command of the army would be attended with circumstances of inconvenience from his connexions not exactly favourable to the Confederacy, nor likely to accord with the views and operations of Pursaram Bhao; and to continue the latter Chief in command, tho' probably more execution may be expected from him than any other, is strongly opposed by the Nabob who is exceedingly anxious to have his own movement countenanced by the Peshwa himself or at all events by the movement of the Minister or Hurry Punt. In addition to the above reasons in bar of the Peshwa's taking the field it occurs to me that economy is another grand preventive and that the Minister will be extremely glad to avoid incurring so heavy an expence productive of so little real good unless this difficulty can be surmounted by prevailing on the Nabob to restore him part of the cessions made him by this Government when he abandoned the cause of Ragobah and adopted that of the then infant Peshwa and the Ministry.

On the 27 I was honoured with your Lordship's commands of the 4th instant. It would be in vain to attempt to express the pleasure I shall have in acquainting this Court with your Lordship's resolution of remaining in India during the present war, which will certainly give all that consistency to the confederacy which can be drawn from a confidence in the deliberative and executive powers of our Government in this part of the World, and I trust that the prospect to your Lordship of Genl. Medows' succession will be an additional inducement to this Govt. to assist by its cooperation a speedy and honourable termination of the war. Your Lordship's instructions relative to my communications to this Court in the event of a Spanish war shall be punctually obeyed.

**No. 167**—Cornwallis gives certain directions to Malet for dissipating any apprehension of Nana on account of Tipu's incursion into Coimbatore country.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—C. W. MALET.

*Fort William, 31st October 1790.*

The Mahrattas appear now to be fairly embarked and whilst we can continue to occupy Tippoo's principal force I have no doubt that so able a Minister as Nana Furnavese will see how much it will raise his own reputation and promote the interest of his Country to prosecute a war with vigour, which holds out so flattering a prospect of extending the

dominions of the Peshwa reducing the power of so formidable and dangerous a neighbour.

For these reasons I have no apprehension of the Minister swerving from his engagements so long as he sees reason to be confident of success ; but if doubts were infused into him and he could be alarmed by reports of Tippoo's bringing a powerful army against him I should then be afraid of the intrigues of Rasta and dread the influence which large pecuniary offers might have on a timid and avaricious mind.

The only real advantage which from the last accounts I have received I think it likely that Tippoo will derive from his late irruption into the Coimbatore country, is the delay that the destruction of our magazines at Errode and Sattimungulum may occasion in the operations of the southern army, and Tippoo would certainly make use of the interval to endeavour to gain or to intimidate the Marrattas.

In order, therefore, to counteract as much as it is in our power any attempts that may make of this nature in the event which I have supposed, I must desire you if the exigency should, in your opinion, require it, altho as yet I have made no public notification here of my design, to assure the Minister that if the want of a sufficient stock of provisions to enable us ascend the Gauts and the setting in of the north east monsoon should for a few weeks impede our progress, our future exertions shall be increased in proportion to the temporary disappointment, and that I am determined in that case to embark for Madras with considerable reinforcements early in December to take upon myself the conduct of the war.

I shall probably write more decidedly to you on this subject in a few days, and in the mean time I trust to your discretion to make use of the authority I have given you.

**No. 168**—Malet makes remonstrances to Nana for the delay in despatching guns to Dharwar and equipping the grand army and makes bitter comments on the evasive and procrastinating attitude of the Poona Court.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 6th November 1790.*

I flatter myself no assurances are necessary to convince Your Lordship that I have not been backward in urging this Court's dispatch of the guns necessary for the siege of Dharwar that I might make the requisition of the intended reinforcement from Bombay, and I lament not having been yet able to surmount the delays that I have met with, not only on the general principle of the political necessity of vigorously prosecuting the war but from the apprehension that should Genl. Medows be unable

to effect an invasion of the Balla Ghaut after the return of the enemy from the present descent in Coimbatore which cannot be far distant unless obstructed by the General's movements, Tippoo will be at leisure to send such a force toward his northern frontier as joined to the respectable body already in Dharwar, will, not only relieve that place from all danger, even after the junction of a reinforcement from B'bay, but in the inadequate state of this Govert.'s force under Parsuram to its engagements for the dry season and that of Mohabut Jung still more so, expose the allies to the discredit of losing their recent acquisitions more rapidly than they have been gained. Thus circumstanced, tho' I have not thought proper to suggest the above as an argument, yet has it made me extremely urgent in my remonstrances to the Minister on the backwardness of the grand equipment of the state and on the disadvantageous idea that will be conveyed to Your Lordship of its fidelity, if a reinforcement of our troops which we are bound by no obligation to send, should join Parsuram Bhao before its own stipulated preparations are completed, at a season when everything may be expected that can be enterprized by the utmost exertions of the enemy, and in reply to the stress laid by this Court on the great additional force already with Bhao to that stipulated for the rainy season, I have observed that tho' the article of the treaty only conditioned 12,000 yet had the Minister constantly assured me that Bhaou's force would amount to 25,000, abstracted from the main equipment, after the rains, for which I now contend. To this language I receive the assurances mentioned in my last address that the military force of the state is ordered to assemble, that I shall soon receive the determination of the Durbar on the Peshwa's taking the field or not in person, and that last night, the 7th, some of the battering cannon destined for the siege of Dharwar had been drawn out of the arsenal, preparatory to their departure for the army.

It would be tedious to trouble your Lordship with a recapitulation of the arguments by which I have endeavored to stimulate this Govert. to a faithful discharge of an alliance, which, I have reminded the Minister, was of his own seeking by his declaration of the 7th February last. But as my arguments, though drawn from the rational sources of national interest, national honor and covenantal obligation, do not seem to have had the desired effect, their failure must be imputed to causes which, however vicious, have greater weight on the personal or Governmental affections of this Durbar. Under the first head may be included the utmost influence of venality and avarice; under the second, the desire of seeing the two grand barriers to its views of universal power mutually exhaust their strength on each other; while withholding the exertion of its strength, that object will be promoted by avoiding giving a preponderance to the scale, and at the same time its wealth, power and resources kept in reserve to act as occasion may require and preserve an influence over the councils and operations of the principal competitors.



In a word, my Lord, without diving into the dark and fathomless abyss of this Court and Nizam Ally Khan's foreign and domestic intrigues, it is evident from their lukewarm and evasive conduct that they are influenced by other considerations than that of a sincere and hearty devotion to the accomplishment of their engagements; and though the effect of them even in their loose and tardy style of execution, has been extremely detrimental to the enemy in depriving him of recruits for his cavalry, in draining his finances and depriving him of a large portion of revenue, thereby fully proving the wisdom of your Lordship's engagements with them, yet am I of opinion that to enforce the full operation of those engagements much will in future depend on the success of our arms.

I have been informed by Behro Punt that his brother Buchajee appointed to reside with Genl. Medows has reached Madras and had meetings with the Acting Governor and the Nabob. Your Lordship's knowledge of the intriguing disposition of the Nabob's agent while he resided at this Court will suggest the expediency or not of instructing the Madras Government to keep a watchful eye over the motions and connexions of Buchajee without seeming to intrench on his personal liberty or official character. I have just received an assurance from the Durbar that the guns will proceed in two or three days, that orders have been sent to the officer at Jeyghur to receive and assist the expected reinforcement of our troops in the same manner as Capt. Little's detachment and to signify the requisition to Genl. Abercromby to dispatch the troops destined to assist at the siege, which I shall signify to the General with the requisite advice relative to their dispatch.

**No. 169**—Cornwallis announces his determination to take the field in person for the speedy conclusion of the war.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—C. W. MALET.

*Fort William, 7th November 1790.*

It gave me great satisfaction to find that the account of Colonel Floyd's action near Settimungalum was so favourably received by the Minister and that, from his application for a further assistance of our troops and his determination to send some heavy cannon to Purseram Bhow, it seems, instead of discouraging him, to have stimulated him to greater exertions.

I sincerely hope that General Abercromby will feel himself at liberty to afford the aid required, at least for the purpose of reducing Dharwar, but as I have given my opinion to the General that it would not be necessary

to keep a man more this year than he formerly intended for the defence of Bombay on account of the probability of a Spanish war, I cannot help expressing my further wishes that the whole detachment may be permitted to serve with Parsuram Bhao during the remainder of the campaign, as such a body of infantry must be highly useful to the Mahratta army on many occasions, and will enable them to reduce forts which otherwise would greatly retard their progress.

The translations which accompany the enclosed letters to the Peshwa and Nana Furnavese will inform you that I have finally resolved to proceed to the Coast, and as I am very anxious that this resolution should not be imputed to a diffidence in those persons who have at present the direction of the war or to any thing unpromising in the aspect of our affairs, I must desire that you will explain in the clearest terms to the Peshwa and the Minister when you deliver the letters, that my principal object in taking the field in person, and in carrying such powerful reinforcements from this country, is to convince the public in general, and our allies in particular, how sincerely earnest I am in my wishes to circumscribe the dangerous power of Tippoo; and to bring the war to a speedy and happy conclusion, and you may intimate a hope that the Peshwa who is at least as much interested in the general success of the war, will follow my example.

**No. 170**—Cornwallis writes to the Peshwa intimating his desire to proceed to the theatre of the war and conduct the operations personally.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—THE PESHWA.

*Fort William, 8th November 1790.*

Mr. Malet will have strongly impressed you with the firm resolution I have made to carry on the war with the greatest vigor against Tippoo, that I need not trouble you with any further mention of it. But I cannot avoid expressing, notwithstanding I have had occasion already to do so, the lively sense I entertain of the exertions of your Government, and the vigorous measures you are pursuing to prove yourself firm to the treaty between us, and to circumscribe the dangerous power of an enemy, who, urged on by the strong confederacy formed against him, will leave nothing untried to defeat the purposes of it. The treaty is signed, and mutually ratified; the most vigorous measures are pursuing by the members of the alliance towards effecting the objects of the treaty, which are to punish a wanton insult and to cement an everlasting connection between the Mahratta State, the Company and Nizam.

Impressed with these sentiments of the present favourable situation, which, unless prevented by the powerful hand of Heaven, cannot fail of answering all our wishes, I have resolved to embrace the leisure which

the adjustment of the affairs of this Government allow me and have determined to go to Madras, for the purpose of conducting the war against Tippoo in person.

As the affairs of that Presidency are equally entrusted to my control and I am impressed with an anxious wish for the prosperity of the Company's affairs in every part of India, and no less desirous to prove the sincerity of my intentions, with the help of Providence, to circumscribe the dangerous power of Tippoo, and to perform the duty of a friend to the Mahratta State, as well as a member of the alliance so happily concluded between us, I have determined on this step, and will leave Calcutta as soon as a proper vessel can be prepared for my conveyance.

I set out convinced of the steady attachment of the Mahratta State, who have hitherto given proofs of it too strong to admit for a moment a thought contrary to enter my breast, and flatter myself you will consider my exertions in person to have sprung from the desire with which I am impressed to prosecute the war to a happy and honourable termination by personally taking the field; and in consequence, you will adopt such measures as may answer the objects I have so much at heart, and which you, by your exertions hitherto fully evince are equally your wish to effect.

To

Nana Furnaweesse

(Of the same tenor and date.)

**No. 171**—Malet reports the defeat of a body of the enemy's force at Dharwar and asks Chamier to keep him informed of the transactions of Buchajee Raghunath at Madras.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—JOHN CHAMIER.

*Poona, 8th November 1790.*

It has been signified to me by Behro Punt, the brother of Buchajee Ragonath deputed by this Government to reside with General Medows that, he, Buchajee Ragonath, has reached Madras and had audiences of the Acting Governor and the Nabob. I beg leave through you to request that the Board will keep me particularly informed of every transaction of that Minister during his residence at your presidency as the knowledge thereof will be essentially necessary to me here.

On the 31st ultimo a body of about 2,000 of the enemy with 4 guns moved out of the town of Dharwar toward the post established by Pursaram Bhao for cannonading that place, but was driven back with considerable loss of men and 3 of their guns by a part of Capt. Little's detachment

and a detachment of Mahratta foot by whom and by a body of Marratta horse they were pursued with considerable execution to the town-wall. The loss of our detachment on this occasion was ten killed and fifty-nine wounded; amongst the first are two Subadars, amongst the latter Lieuts. Wynne and Maxwell, one Subadar and one Jummadar.

No. 172—Malet communicates to Abercromby the requisition by the Poona Durbar of two battalions of native and five hundred European infantry to assist in the reduction of Dharwar.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—ROBERT ABERCROMBY, GOVERNOR OF BOMBAY.

*Poona, 10th November 1790.*

It is now sometime since this Court intimated to me an intention of making an application to you for a body of infantry to assist in the reduction of Dharwar. The application has now been officially made with a request that I would communicate it. The Durbar requisition states two battalions of native and 500 European infantry and in the event of not being able to supply that number as large a proportion of it as can be spared. For your further information in determining on this point I beg leave to refer you to Capt. Little's letters stating the strength of the place and its garrison, the latter amounting to at least 10,000 men. The Mahratta army before the place exclusive of Capt. Little's detachment must, I presume, after allowing for detachments, amount to 15,000 men of which the greatest proportion is cavalry. I have been officially informed by the Durbar that the Bhao's force in cavalry alone stands on the Durbar records at 22,000 so that my estimate cannot be thought a framed one, and it is certain that great numbers of foot have lately been entertained by Bhao and levies have been making here with great activity for some time past. Two of the battering guns and one mortar have been drawn out of town, and the two others destined for this purpose, I am told, will be drawn out today or tomorrow after which they will proceed without delay to the place of their destination, where, it is thought, they will arrive in 15 or 20 days from the time of their departure. Though I cannot on this information from the Durbar lay any great stress on the punctuality of execution, yet to prevent the smallest appearance of failure on our part I yesterday entered into a contract for 650 pack bullocks to be ready by the 12th and have the honor to enclose copy of it, and as I hear that by the time the bullocks are ready the battering cannon will be on the move, I shall instantly despatch them to Jeyghur, the place destined for the disembarkation of your reinforcement being the same that Capt. Little's detachment landed at, with instructions to wait further orders—and as, I presume, it will be high time for your reinforcement to leave Bombay after the battering cannon have moved hence, I shall transmit you immediate

intelligence of that movement and at the same time write Capt. Little or Mr. Uthoff or any other proper person to proceed instantly to the place of disembarkation to regulate the conveyance of the stores etc. of the detachment. In the interim I am assured that orders have been already sent to the proper officers to give your troops a suitable reception and expedite their passage through their districts and I have applied for letters to the same purport to send you to be put into the hands of the Commandant of the detachment to prevent all possible ground for cavill or misunderstanding. I beg leave to point out to your particular attention that the assistance of the reinforcement at present under demand extends only to the reduction of Dharwar after which its employment will be at your option regulated by the circumstances that may then exist.

**No. 173**—Malet relates the inspection of guns by Hiern and makes certain observations on the conduct of the war.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 12th November 1790.*

I have the pleasure to acquaint your Lordship that I have received the order to be sent to the Commandant of our troops to be delivered to the amil of Jeyghur, and this afternoon is appointed for Capt. Hiern's inspection of the battering guns.

I have not yet received the promised answer relative to the Peshwa's taking the field in person, nor has the intended reply to Tippoo's proposal of sending a Vackeel here been communicated to me, the delay of which may perhaps be owing to the expectation of the reference made to Nizam Ally Khan on that subject.

I was very happy to learn from the enclosed accounts of the strength of Bhao's army that it so much exceeds what I had estimated it at in my letter to General Abercromby, and as, of course, the Bhao would call in his detachments on the approach of any large body of the enemy, there is every reason to suppose that after the junction of the Bombay reinforcement, Tippoo will not be able to send a force equal to cope with it or so to divide his force as at once to oppose our two serious attacks from Coimbatore and Amboor and the separate attacks of the allies without endangering the safety of either of his divisions. But this inability to divide his force will, I presume, greatly rest on General Medows's entering or threatening the Ballaghat after Tippoo's quitting Coimbatore.

Since writing the above I have received Capt. Hiern's report of the guns. The people who attended Capt. Hiern seeming averse to his inspecting the contents of the tumbrils he did not insist on it, satisfying

himself with a sight of some of the balls that were shewn him, nor did he examine the inside of the guns having no instruments for the purpose.

In consequence of Capt. Hiern's opinion of the 36 lbs. I have recommended to the Minister changing it for another 24 lbs. iron gun, which would be more easily managed and prove more efficacious. The people who shewed Capt. Hiern the guns said they were ordered to move in a day or two.

I have this day received a message from the minister stating that another letter has been received from the Raja of Tanjore in which he represents that, for the purpose of sundry communications he wishes to send a Vackeel to this Court and for that purpose begs this Court to procure him permission from the Governor of Madras to send a proper person here, agreeable to which I am desirous to grant a letter to the Governor of Madras. This accounts for the Minister's late silence on the subject of the Raja, as I make no doubt that the present idea of sending a Vackeel is in consequence of the suggestion of this State in answer to his former letters. I shall weigh well my reply to the Durbar's message and communicate it to your Lordship by the earliest opportunity.

I have great satisfaction in acquainting Your Lordship that I have just received an order from the Durbar for Rs. 60,000 on account of the Bombay detachment.

**No. 174**—Malet sends intelligence of the despatch of battering guns for the reduction of Dharwar and of an order to the Amil of Jeyghur for the reception of the reinforcement sent by Abercromby from Bombay.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—ROBERT ABERCROMBY.

*Poona, 14th November 1790.*

Since my last address of 10th instant all the artillery engaged for the siege of Dharwar by this Government has been drawn out and examined by Capt. Hiern whose report I enclose; also an order to the amil of Jeyghur for the friendly reception of the reinforcement required to be sent from your Presidency. The 650 pack bullocks, mentioned in my last to have been contracted for, will proceed toward Jeyghur tomorrow, and I hope arrive there in 8 days. The battering guns made a short movement this day and I am assured will proceed tomorrow, but as I do not apprehend they will reach the place of their destination in less than 20 or 25 days, permit me to suggest the regulation of the dispatch of your reinforcement thereby, as I am of opinion that its arrival in the army a little after the guns would be preferable arriving before them; in the latter case they would be in a disagreeable state of indispensable inactivity, whereas the eclat of so respectable a force joining after the

opening of the batteries would probably have considerable effect in depressing the besieged and encouraging the besiegers. I do not imagine that the march from the place of disembarkation to Dharwar would require more than 10 days. I have written Capt. Little on the subject of sending Mr. Uthhoff to Jeyghur to arrange the conveyance of the stores etc. and a bazar for the accommodation of the reinforcement.

I have also to request you will favor me with the prices of the military stores mentioned in a late address as soon as convenient. I have the pleasure to acquaint you that on the 12th instant I received an order from the Durbar for Rs. 60,000 on account Capt. Little's detachment.

**No. 175**—General Medows reports having been joined by Col. Maxwell and also the movement of the enemy in his neighbourhood.

FROM—GENERAL MEDOWS.

*Camp near Caveripattam, 17th November 1790.*

Having marched seven days successively, after having crossed the Cavery, I take the first opportunity of a halt, to acquaint you with our present situation. We are now within fifteen miles of Colonel Maxwell to whom I have this morning sent five squadrons of dragoons and orders to join us here, which I conclude he will do today or tomorrow. The enemy looked at him a few days ago, but not liking, I believe, his judicious position, nor our being so near, declined an engagement. We saw the enemy ourselves the day before yesterday about twenty miles off, on his return from Colonel Maxwell, pitching his tents, just as we were come to our ground, after a long fatiguing march through the grass of Tapoor; but no sooner had we fired three guns, as a signal to Colonel Maxwell than he immediately struck his tents again and proceeded up the Ghauts by the Oodeadurgam Pass.

P.S.—Since writing the above Colonel Maxwell has joined.

**No. 176**—Malet reports to the G. G. the expectation of Behro Punt of reward from the British Government, and his suggestion to extract the greatest service from Behro.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 19th November 1790.*

I am told that 132 head of cattle were captured by the besiegers on the 11th instant. I find that notwithstanding my objections to the largest of the battering guns the partiality for it here is so great that they have not thought proper to exchange it, alleging that though a little crooked it carries very straight. May it in this be emblematic of their politics. It may not be improper to acquaint Your Lordship that Behro Punt has not dropped his expectations of experiencing the bounty of your

Government. I have hitherto thought proper to urge the necessity of his giving me in the conduct of his Court good ground for procuring the gratification of his expectations, observing that as to the alliance it was proposed by the Minister himself, and as to the execution of the terms of it, certainly no claim has hitherto appeared on your Lordship's generosity. I have not, however, scrupled to use the latitude granted to me by Your Lordship to keep alive a sanguine hope of gratification at the close of the war or at any period of it in which the conduct of this Court may enable me to plead his merit with your Lordship, and this mode will, I hope, be more productive of service than fruition which of this kind amongst these people is more apt to produce desire than satiety.

The dissensions between the Mahratta Chiefs in Hindostan engage a large share of the attention of this Government and must, I presume, be the source of much domestic uneasiness happily, perhaps, for their neighbours.

The battering train is this day advanced 10 miles on its way to Dharwar.

**No. 177**—Abercromby issues general directions for the guidance of Col. Frederick who is appointed as the Commander of the detachment.

FROM—ROBERT ABERCROMBY, GOVERNOR OF BOMBAY,

TO—COL. FREDERICK.

*Bombay Castle, 18th November 1790.*

Having resolved to increase the detachment of the forces of this Presidency destined to act in concert with the army of the Mahratta State, and confiding in your ability, zeal and circumspection, we have appointed you to command it. You will, therefore, proceed with the second regiment of Bombay Infantry, the 9th Native battalion, a portion of artillery to complete the company commanded by Captain Thompson, to Jeyghur, a Mahratta fort, situated a little to the southward of Fort Victoria, where you will be received by officers under that Government, who will conduct your detachment to Dharwar, before which place the Mahratta army is encamped, and where you will join the detachment under Captain Little, and take the whole command of the Bombay troops.

You will bear in mind as the very first object of your instructions that you are sent to assist the officer of another State, and are, therefore, implicitly to obey such requisitions as he may make to you, and on no account whatever obstruct, or interfere with, the measures he may project, however injudicious they may appear to your judgment. At the same time you will assist the Mahratta Chief with your advice, whenever it is acceptable to him to receive it, and we strongly recommend to you to correspond constantly with Mr. Malet, the resident at Poonah, that you will consult with him in every case of difficulty and pay as much deference to what



he may recommend, as though it came enforced by our commands. You will also correspond with us through the resident as often as circumstances may render it necessary.

We cannot too strongly inculcate on your part, an unremitted vigilance in restraining your people from committing anything that may be offensive to the tenets of the religion or obnoxious to the manners and customs of the State with whom they are acting as auxiliaries; in particular, that you inflexibly discountenance the slaughter of bullocks without the sanction of their officer.

As the Mahratta army is always attended by a Bazar, your detachment will provision themselves, but lest they may find a difficulty in procuring provisions on their first landing we have judged it necessary to victual them for twenty days from the day of their embarkation for which time they are of course to receive no batta. Captain Little as well as Mr. Joshua Uhthoff the latter paymaster and Commissary of stores and provisions to the detachment, are furnished with clear and circumstantial regulations for the field which they will make over to you. It is not necessary therefore to prepare then expressly for your notice. We shall just observe that the basis on which they are constructed is, that no accounts of expenditure of money will be received by Government, but through the paymaster, nor a single payment sanctioned, but what shall be made by that officer according to the forms prescribed for his guidance.

We shall admit of your making no charge under the appellation of secret service, unless you satisfy the resident at Poona of the necessity of such disbursement, and that it comes recommended from him.

You will be furnished by the Commander in Chief with the necessary instrument for holding General Courts martial, to whom you will refer all proceedings of such for his approval of the sentences.

**No. 178**—Malet communicates to the G. G. his plan for the employment of Bhau's army after the reduction of Dharwar, his proposal for the formation of another army by the Poona Durbar and the opinion, he gave on the subject of Tipu's proposal of sending a Vakil to Poona.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 26th November 1790.*

My last respects were dated the 22nd. By my late correspondence Your Lordship will have observed my urgency to prevail on the Minister to adopt the measure of leading the Peshwa into the field as highly conducive to the completion of the objects of the Confederacy and in my address of the 15th instant I communicated to your Lordship what had passed on the Durbar's intimation of its being resolved that the

young Peshwa should not take the field. To the official language urged on that occasion I ceased not through the channel of Behro Punt to point out to the Minister the evasive procrastinating appearance of his measures and to contrast them with the vigorous efforts of your Lordship in the general prosecution of the war and your general exertions on behalf of this State in particular, nor did I omit such arguments arising from national dignity, personal reputation, or party spirit as presented a prospect of stimulating him to energy and decision and to make a more agreeable arrangement for the conduct of the war than had been communicated to me the 13th instant. I strongly reprobated the delay in the equipment of that force so pointedly stipulated to be in readiness for action after the rains and proposed as the siege of Dharwar could not be raised in prudence or policy that a separate army should be formed and might be employed in penetrating the enemy's country toward Bangalore or Seringputtum in concert with which I ventured to suggest that the centre Carnatic army might regulate its motions and that the Nabob would have no objection to co-operate with an equal force. I added that after the reduction of Dharwar, Pursaram Bhau might remain in command of the army already intrusted to him and make a separate invasion of the enemy's territories by the way of Bednore or leaving a body sufficient with our force for the siege of that fortress, might immediately commence his incursion. By this plan of operations I observed that the enemy's attention would be most completely distracted, his country ruined, his resources exhausted and he be reduced to the inevitable necessity of suing for peace on such terms as the allies might think proper to prescribe before ensuing rains, so that the grand object of all wars a speedy and honourable peace would be effected with a comparative small expense; that another great benefit of such an arrangement would be that all jealousy and misunderstanding between Hurry Punt and Parsuram Bhao might be avoided and an emulation substituted thereto by separate commands, while by the Peshwa's proceeding in person with the former to the north-eastern confines of the enemy's frontier, the Nabob's desire of a meeting might be easily gratified, the objects of the Confederacy be forwarded and immediately after the interview, if the Minister should so resolve, the young Peshwa might on the combined armies' entering the enemy's country, return towards Poona.

In reply to these instances I have been given to understand that the general arrangement of the army and its command shall be reconsidered and the result communicated to me.

In answer to my enquiries relative to this Court's sentiments on Tippoo's proposal of sending a vackeel here I was desired to give mine to which in the spirit of what I wrote Capt. Kennaway under 22nd instant, I observed that I thought the messengers who brought the letter might for the present be dispatched with a general answer that the proposal had been submitted to the consideration of the allies and that a definite one would be given

on the arrival of their determination. I observed also that I should expect your Lordship's commands for regulating my definitive answer, but in the meantime requested the Court would inform me of what appeared to it a proper answer as I doubted not but that it must have received the sentiments of His Highness the Nabob, to which I received for answer that the Nabob had desired time for deliberation in giving his sentiments and in the interim the Minister begged my opinion on the following answer to the proposal, "That there are three powers concerned in the present war and that if Tippo would, as a preliminary, agree to treat on terms that should be satisfactory to them all, no objection would be made to his sending a vacceel".

Tho' this language has certainly a fair appearance yet am I of opinion that it is calculated principally to collect the state of our feelings as to the prosecution of the war, since from a very credible and confidential quarter I am informed that advices have reached this Court and gained entire belief that great straits and difficulties have arisen to our affairs by the late operations of Tippo, while I, in conformity to the constant tenor of your Lordship's instructions and convinced that the appearance of want of firmness must be prejudicial to our interests, carefully avoid all show of precipitation and on the strength of your Lordship's commands of the 31 ulto. have not scrupled (tho' without making use of your Lordship's authority) to convey to the Minister my conviction that should the smallest apprehension be entertained of the enemy's ascendancy which is not the case, not only would your Lordship support the alliance in person at the head of a large detachment from the Bengal army the draft from which has not yet equalled the force lent to our allies, but that the inexhaustible resources of the British Empire would be called forth to conduct a war so justly and so unavoidably undertaken to a conclusion honourable and advantageous to the Confederacy. I have on this principle repeated my wish that the previous answer above-mentioned may be transmitted to Tippo, and that on receipt of your Lordship's sentiments I will reply fully to the proposed answer of this Court. I shall transmit General Medows such information of these circumstances as may enable him to act consistently with them in the event of any advances being made to him by the enemy, either seriously or insidiously.

**No. 179**—Malet reports the appointment of Mahadajee Behere in command of the main army and pays tribute to Capt. Little's services on the eve of his supercession by Col. Frederick.

FROM—C. W. MALET,  
TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 29th November 1790.*

Since my last address of the 26th I have not received any intimation from the Durbar of how far it means to acquiesce in my proposal as to

the mode of treating Tippo's advance to a negotiation or of what measures are intended.

In answer to my instances on the subject of this State's main equipment I have this day been informed that Mehdajee Punt Behre has been appointed to command the army now under orders to assemble and will take the field the 1st December. From this appointment I am led to conclude that the conduct of the war is meant to be continued to Parsuram Bhao as I have always understood Mehdajee Punt to be inferior in weight and dignity to that Chieftain. This arrangement leaves me little room to hope the Peshwa's taking the field in person, tho' I confess that in the failure of that measure I prefer it to that of Hurry Pundit's being entrusted with the command.

Yesterday it was signified to me by the Durbar that the vessels of 'Col. Frederick's detachment were seen in the offing of Jeyghur the 20th inst. so that I presume the detachment must ere this be on its march to Dharwar, which is not 70 coss from the Ghaut of Amba by which the troops will ascend from the Kokan. I cannot in justice to the conduct of Capt. Little pass over his approaching supercession without expressing to your Lordship in the warmest terms my lively sense of the prudence, economy and spirit with which he has uniformly discharged the duties of his situation under circumstances of great delicacy and some difficulty, and so sincere is my conviction of his merit on this occasion that in addition to my former recommendation of his allowances abstracted from the necessary difference of rank being put on the same footing as Major Montgomery's, permit me to hope the honor of being the channel of conveying to him your Lordship's approval of his conduct while in command of the detachment.

**No. 180**—A detachment of the Nabob Nizam Ally Khan's force reduced the fort of Cummum on the 16th ultimo.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—

*Poona, 2nd December 1790.*

A detachment of the Nabob Nizam Ally Khan's forces reduced the Fort of Cummum on the 16th ultimo.

**No. 181**—Capt. Riddel reports desertions on account of the scarcity of provisions.

FROM—CAPT. RIDDEL,

TO—COL. FREDERICK.

*4th December 1790.*

It is with much concern I address you as Commanding Officer on so painful a subject as that of desertion. The 2nd of this month four sepoy

were returned deserted, the 4th three, and this morning the alarming number of a Naigue and thirteen sepoys are absent without leave, six of them old soldiers, and men who had served at Mangalore. It is the opinion of my European and Native officers that the difficulty of procuring provisions is the sole cause of the men deserting; the Honble. Company make an ample allowance of provisions for their soldiers, which ought to be regularly served out of them, but in countries abounding in plenty, in order to ease the Company of the expence of carrying and purchasing provisions, an allowance of three rupees a man per month has been substituted; situated as we are, the allowance is by no means adequate. I am sensible how little it is in your power to procure supplies and shall therefore submit the following proposal to your consideration that the men in consequence of the dearness of provisions, be allowed an additional rupee batta, and that one month's batta be now advanced them. Such an act, I hope, will convince the soldier that his wants, when real and reasonable, will at all times be attended to. Soldiers when impressed with such an idea must no doubt serve their employers with fidelity and gratitude.

**No. 182**—In consequence of the G. G.'s taking the field in person, Hari Pant is appointed to the command of the Second Maratha army; but Malet communicates to the G. G. the expedient he intends resorting to to induce the Peshwa to assume the command.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 6th December 1790.*

At a visit I paid the Minister on the 5th, I recapitulated everything that has already been communicated to your Lordship. on the subject of urging the Peshwa to take the field. To which the Minister replied that an answer had been already given to what I had advanced on the point, but as the communication I had now made of your Lordship's resolution to take the field in person, placed matters in a new point of view, he would reconsider the affair and let me know the determination of the Durbar the next day.

In reply to my intimation of the reports circulated of the intrigues carrying on with Tippoo, he firmly and with an appearance of candour assured me that no deviation should take place on the part of this Court, insisted that he had made known to me the only proposal that had been received and begged to know whether it were preferable to act so or to suppress any advances that might reach him. He likewise repeated that Behro Punt had previously communicated of its being resolved for the present to send the indefinite answer I had proposed to Tippoo, which should be dispatched in a few days, the delay, I presume, must be in expectation of the Nabob's opinion on the measure.

On the 5th I was likewise favoured with two letters from Col. Frederick complaining loudly of the obstacles that had prevented his moving from the place of his disembarkation from the time of his landing which I conceive to be about the 23rd ultimo to the 3rd instant the date of his last letter and requesting my assistance to send him Rs. 12,000 without which he saw no prospect of being able to proceed. Your Lordship will easily conceive my concern at so unexpected a delay which I am endeavouring to remedy by the pecuniary aid for which the Colonel has so pressingly applied. Since his arrival at Sungmisheer he had applied to the Mahratta aumil for money for his immediate occasions, received 3,000 Rs. for his note on me and had a promise of 2,000 more.

I have this instant received a message from the Minister acquainting me that the reasons already communicated to me still operated in prevention of the Peshwa's taking the field in person, but that in consequence of the Governor General's resolution to take the field the Durbar had determined that Hurry Punt should command the army of this State now under orders to assemble, and as from the change in the Command and the additional number of forces that would attend him some delay beyond the time allotted for the preparation of Mahadjee Punt would necessarily occur in his equipment, the time fixed for his being in readiness should be communicated to me as soon as possible.

In reply, without noticing the circumstances of still declining to lead the Peshwa into the field, I have urged him to let me know as soon as possible the time in which Hurry Punt will be ready, the route he means to pursue, the place where he proposes a junction with our forces, what communications have been or will be made to the Nabob relative to the junction of a body of his forces, and how far the command of Hurry Punt is to affect that of Pursaram Bhau.

Finding every argument that I have hitherto been able to use with the Minister ineffectual to prevail on him to lead the Peshwa into the field I have it now in contemplation when the command of Hurry Punt is firmly established to try the effect of an expedient, and under pretence of the perfect confidence which the Minister reposes on that officer and on the plea of my extreme reluctance to remain inactive here while Your Lordship and all the Chieftains of my nation are in the field, request his acquiescence in my attending him, since from Hurry Punt's confidential situation at this Court and the great advantage he will have in being so near all the principals of the allies, every point of consultation or negotiation will be conducted with much greater facility by him than by a tedious reference to this place. This expedient will certainly alarm the Minister for his personal share in the conduct of the war and peace and may have a good effect in producing my object of the Peshwa's taking the field. While the only objection to putting it to the test that has hitherto occurred to me is that should the obstacles to the Peshwa's entering the lists be so great as to render even this expedient ineffectual,

the alarm of that would be conveyed to the Minister by the prospect of the whole management of the war and peace being drawn from his control, might either induce him to put an absolute negation on my intention or by some illicit means to traverse and embarrass the appointment and operations both military and political of Hurry Punt. Without losing sight of these difficulties I shall pursue or drop the idea as from circumstances it may appear advisable or inexpedient.

No. 183—Frederick sends intelligence of desertion from the 9th battalion and his success in putting a stop to it by paying each man a gratuity.

FROM—CHARLES FREDERICK,

TO—ROBERT ABERCROMBY.

*Sungameshwar Camp, 6th December 1790.*

Alarmed at the very extraordinary desertion from the 9th battalion a Naique and twenty sepoy having gone off in 3 days, I made every possible enquiry into the cause, the more particularly so, as I understood they were mostly old soldiers, and I find it is the unanimous opinion of the officers, both European and Native, that it is caused solely by the utter impossibility there is of the men's feeding themselves upon their batta money at the present enormous price of provisions, and that if something was not instantly done in all probability we should lose the greatest part of the battalion, if not all. At the same time I received an application from the Captain of that battalion, a copy of which I have the honour to enclose you.

Troubling for the consequences that might attend a matter of so very serious a nature, I consulted all those officers in camp whose knowledge and experience was sufficient to give weight to their opinion; they all agreed on the absolute necessity of something being done but what that something should be was the question, some proposed an augmentation of batta; this I thought Government would not approve for fear of its being hereafter quoted as a precedent, others advised victualling the battalion, but the expence of this would have appeared so enormous, I could hardly hope for your approbation. I therefore determined as a medium way, and the least exceptionable or burthensome to the Hon'ble Company, to order each man a gratuity of 4 pilee\* (or one Rupee worth) of rice, the whole of this expence amounts to only Rs. 700 and as it has hitherto succeeded, not a single man having gone off since, I flatter myself I shall be honored with something more than above approval of my conduct, having equally consulted the good of the service, and the interest of my Hon'ble masters.

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\* Paylee : a measure of corn equal to four seers,

I changed my ground four days ago to this place, which is only a short mile from where I was before; I wished to have gone about 5 miles further, but Parsuram Punt objected to it so strongly, that I could not do it, for he said if I left the riverside, by which he would lose the advantage of water carriage he could not answer for feeding us, and he is on all occasions so positive with me, I have no choice left.

I have the satisfaction, however, to inform you I have received advice from Mr. Malet of his having forwarded to me Rs. 12,000 on two camels with six horse men; I therefore instantly gave orders for our march, and we shall move at day break tomorrow to meet it. Our difficulties are all now, I trust, at an end and I do not foresee any more delays between this and Dharwar. If the Honble Board knew what I have felt for those which have already happened they would not only acquit but pity me, and lay the whole blame at the door of Pursaram Punt where alone it is due.

The detachment continues healthy, and in high spirits, and the gratuity I took the liberty of giving to the sepoy seems to have succeeded, for the desertion is stopped.

**No. 184**—Carnegie writes to Malet to make as good terms as possible for the pay of Col. Frederick's detachment and starts an enquiry into the failure of his provisions.

FROM—D. CARNEGIE,

TO—C. W. MALET.

*Bombay Castle, 9th December 1790.*

It should appear by a passage in your dispatch to us under the 10th ultimo that the President had in his personal correspondence, communicated to you his ideas on the extent of the reimbursement he judged reasonable the Marattas should make the Company for the additional detachment lately furnished them. The Governor General in Council's instructions to us have simply inculcated a compliance with any requisition from them to that effect, even at the price of the Company bearing the whole expence. We would, therefore, trust the business wholly to your negotiation, in full confidence that your zeal will actuate, and your ability enable, you to make the best terms for our employers that you can engage the Minister to assent to.

We shall in a few days reply to your application respecting the model in request by the Peshwa.

We felt with signal regret for the embarrassment which Colonel Frederick has had to encounter, and have set on foot an enquiry into the cause of the extraordinary failure in the quantity of provisions ordered for his



detachment. We trust, however, that his difficulties through your prompt and active exertions, will have in this totally sub sided.

The resources for this Government obtained through the negotiations of Mr. Duncan, and on which we may actually depend extending to no greater supply than two lacs monthly, and as heavy drafts from the army may be shortly expected, every rupee you can raise for Colonel Frederick and the Presidency at an exchange not more disadvantageous than 110 Benares for 100 Bombay Rupree will be highly acceptable to us.

No. 185—Malet reports the detailed conversation he had with Nana on the subject of dispatching a powerful army for the invasion of the enemy's country, the presence of Tipu's agents in Bagalkot and the Peshwa's taking the field in person which was vehemently pressed and solicited.

FROM - C. W. MALET,

TO - CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 9th December 1799.*

I signified to the Minister my desire of discussing with him in person the subject of the Peshwa's taking the field and in consequence I received a visit from Behro Punt on the 30th which I soon discovered was meant to obviate the disagreeable necessity that he assured me the Minister would be under of subjecting me to a personal refusal.

From this topic Behro Punt proceeded to the measure, mentioned in my address of the 26th ultimo, of dispatching a force with all possible expedition consisting of not less than 15,000 horse and 5,000 foot under the command of Mahdajee Punt Behere to join an equal force of the Nabob's, which, with some light guns, should proceed direct through the enemy's country and effect a junction with one of our armies. Without quitting my object of the Peshwa's taking the field I desired to know the shortest possible time for the preparation of this equipment, which B. Pt. could not reduce within a month. In which time added I, the Peshwa may also be ready to move, which, in short, was my primary object, and in failure of it I had only to lament my ill success to demand the immediate discharge of this Court's engagements and to complain of the backwardness hitherto shown on that important point.

To obviate the tendency of this language to criminate delay in penetrating the interior parts of the enemy's country, B. Pt. then proposed Parsuram Bhaou's quitting the siege of Dharwar and immediately proceeding into the heart of the enemy's country leaving a body of about 7,000 horse to straiten the quarters of the garrison. I replied that this proposal appeared

evasive, and that by the division of Bhaou's force both the object of straitening Dharwar and penetrating the enemy's country would probably be rendered ineffectual. I begged to know if Bhaou's penetrating the enemy's country with such a force would be of equal detriment to the enemy as the reduction of Dharwar, and if so, I asked why so much time had been lost and our reinforcement so unadvisedly required ; I remarked that the shortest possible time for assembling the new army was one month in which I hoped the conquest of that fortress would be effected and Pursaram be set at liberty either to join the projected invasion or to make a separate one by the way of Bednore ; but if the place was not reduced in that time, to prevent the loss of the great effect that might be expected from Bhaou's invasion in concert with the one farther to the eastward composed of the Peshwa's and Nabob's joint troops, I would advise his leaving 4,000 good horse and 8,000 foot with all the heavy artillery under the command of Col. Frederick with instructions to that Officer to prosecute the siege with all possible vigor, observing that the reduction of so considerable a place would at once furnish a barrier to this state and give perfect security to the troops employed on more distant expeditions.

Behro Punt seemed to think this force inadequate to the reduction of Dharwar. I replied that if 7,000 Mahratta horse could confine the garrison ; surely the force that I had proposed, joined to the respectable little army under Col. Frederick, was equal to the siege. But that at all events as concerting with the Nabob a junction of troops for the invasion of the enemy's country would at least take up 20 or 30 days, I begged that the issue of Col. Frederick's efforts might be looked for during that time, in which, if the guns and ammunition sent hence proved equal to the service and were intrusted to our people, as I had strongly advised, I had little doubt of its answering our most sanguine hopes in the fall of the place to the infinite terror and distress of the enemy.

I strongly marked the reports that daily reached me of the arrival of letters and the conduct of intrigues, nay, of an agent of the enemy being still actually harbored by the Rasta family in Baugal Cotah,\* that tho' relying on the wisdom and good faith of the Minister I might not give weight to all the stories that were circulated, yet did I, through Behro Punt, take that opportunity of cautioning the Minister of being less careful of his honor than I was delicate in calling it in question and I most particularly requested that he would not by giving ground for the verification of the reports that prevailed, place me in a state of serious responsibility for having relied too severely on his truth and consistency.

This part of our conference ended in my desiring Behro Punt's communicating the whole that had passed to the Minister and particularly that I still hoped the Peshwa would take the field to which I desired an answer without delay, as also to my suggestion of an answer to Tippo's proposal.

\* Bagalkot, in the south of the Bijapur District.

At taking leave B. Pt. requested me from the Peshwa to procure him the model of the largest ship in the Royal Navy in compliance with which I have applied to the Bombay Government.

On the 1st instant Mehdiagee Punt entered his tents with two small guns and a small body of horse and foot. And on the 2nd I received the following message from Behro Punt, " That he had communicated the particulars of our last conference to the Minister, who in consequence of the numerous and almost unsurmountable obstacles that presented to the Peshwa's taking the field in person, requested I would no longer press a point with which he could not comply and which would in fact be attended with great and indispensable delays and at last fall short of those real benefits which I seemed to expect from it ; that what had passed between me and Behro Punt relative to the equipment of another army to act with an equal force of the Nabob had been deliberately considered and in consequence resolved that 15,000 horse and 5,000 foot should be assembled with all possible expedition under Mehdiagee Punt on the banks of the Kistna, which being joined by an equal force of the Nabob's should march with the utmost dispatch through the enemy's country to effect a junction with one of our armies and afterward proceed directly to the attack of Seringpattun, that to compass this with the utmost celerity the Minister had become personally responsible for immediate payment of the sums requisite for the equipment, the preparation of which he had in the most peremptory manner ordered Hurry Punt, whose province it is, to accelerate and not to exceed one month from the present day, 2nd December, to its being ready on the Kistna ; that the siege of Dharwar should be continued and if it fell Pursaram Bhaou's subsequent operations should be directed by the emergency and circumstances of the times.

And on these points I was desired to write Capt. Kennaway as the Minister would to the Nabob. As to my communication relative to Tippo's agent being detained in Baugal Cotah the Minister positively disavowed all knowledge thereof, and added that I might rest assured of being regularly informed of everything that came to his knowledge, and that though he could hardly suppose that Rasta had taken such a step without his privity, yet I must know that no consequence could arise from it but through him, while he had promised me that nothing should be negotiated without my consent, agreeable to which he had resolved to return the previous answer suggested by me to Tippo's proposal of sending a Vackeel by which means an opening would be left for any future communication that might be approved of by the allies. I was also informed that to prevent all cause of dissatisfaction to the Nabob, Pursaram Bhaou's designs against Bhadur Bunda had been dropped and that he (P. B.) had been instructed to go in person to meet Colonel Frederick on that officer's approaching his camp and to treat him with every mark of confidence and attention.

Having on the day that I received this message been honored with Your Lordship's letter of the 7 and 8 ultimo, I resolved to take advantage of the determination announced in it of your Lordship's taking the field in person to make it the ground of one more effort to prevail on the Minister to lead the Peshwa into the field and accordingly sent an immediate answer to the foregoing message from Behro Punt. That I had with much concern received his signification of the difficulties attendant on the Peshwa's taking the field, that from the moment the Minister had resolved on the war he had resolved on the encountering of difficulties and that, the only way of putting an honourable and speedy end to them was by doing it with vigor and alacrity, that since the receipt of his message I had received letters from your Lordship for the Peshwa and Minister announcing your resolution to attack the enemy in person which resolution would, I hoped, produce a like one on the Peshwa's part. To this public language I gave B. Pt. to understand that though your Lordship's letters were couched in that spirit of delicacy and regard for this Court by which they have been always distinguished, yet he could not but conclude that the extreme backwardness of the allies to support the gallant exertions of Genl. Medows had been the real cause of your now proceeding to support that officer on whom your Lordship had formerly devolved the single burthen of our part of the war, in the firm conviction that the whole weight of it would have been diverted from falling on him by the exertions of the allies, disappointed in which reasonable expectation, rendered doubtful of the future by a prospect of the this Court's past conduct and by the unpromising state of the preparations of the allies at the Dussera, Your Lordship had not been able to justify to your feelings, suffering Genl. Medows to remain longer singly exposed in a contest the preparations for which had been made on the above dependencies and had thereon resolved to assist him in the honourable labour of humbling a prince whose power and disposition rendered him dangerous and obnoxious to his neighbours and to the whole of Hindostan. This language strongly urged reduced Behro Punt at length to the necessity of privately assuring me that added to the numerous political and domestic causes that militated against the Peshwa's taking the field, others of bodily indisposition and of a particular nature of the Minister operated with still greater force in bar of the measure. To this objection I reminded B. Pt. that I wished not to lead the Peshwa into the dangers or fatigues of an actual campaign and that compliance with my wishes would only extend to an easy excursion to the Kistna from whence the invading army might be detached with the eclat that would be given to the expedition by the Peshwa's presence and support, after which should the Minister think proper, he might return with no more inconvenience than he would suffer from one of those oblatory excursions which he so often makes. I have received B. Pt.'s promise to make the most of this new position to prevail on the Minister to comply with my wishes in which I am fully as much interested on account of the Nabob's gratification as from my hope of executive

benefit; nothing could have been more apropos than the arrival of your Lordship's letter to give force to this new effort, the effect of which I am now waiting with the utmost anxiety, but whatever may be the issue I hope the point of view in which I have put your Lordship's resolution of taking the field and which was suggested by your Lordship's instructions thereon will meet your approval.

On the late reagitation of the Jinjera affair new advances were offered to make me a pecuniary consideration for my good offices, and on my subsequent unexpected success in prevailing on Ballo Meah to relinquish his hereditary claims for an adequate compensation in land, depending on the considerable service thereby done this Court in effecting a point it has so long pursued in vain in a manner that removed from it all obloquy, I requested the Minister (in lieu of any favor he might be desirous of conferring on me personally) would convince me of this sense of my good offices by attaching 2,000 horse to either of our armies to be paid by the Government further to promote this object. I enlarged on Your Lordship's conduct in the march of Col. Frederick's detachment to the assistance of Parsuram Bhao and to strengthen it still further I assured Behro Punt personally that I would, if gratified in this point, make it a plea for procuring on hand some mark of your Lordship's bounty to him, But having hitherto had no reason to hope success in this object and as it will become unnecessary in the event of the march of the combined force mentioned in the former part of this address, permit me to suggest to your Lordship the allowableness of recognising the abovementioned pecuniary mark of this Court's sense of my good offices and converting the same after a proper interval to the gratification of Behro Punt's expectations which at this season might perhaps be inconvenient to our finances.

No. 186—Sending intelligence of a meeting between Nana, Hari Pant and Rasta, Malet relates in detail his conversation with Nana on various subjects, e.g., the answer to be given to Tipu's peace proposal, Hari Pant's route, and the Peshwa's assumption of the command.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 11th December 1790.*

On the 6th night I despatched on horseback Rs. 12,000 in specie to Col. Frederick which will, I hope, reach him this day and enable that officer to pursue his march without further interruption to Dharwar. I have not heard from Col. Frederick since the 3rd instant, but by letters from Capt. Little's detachment have the pleasure to acquaint your Lordship that Gujundur-Ghar surrendered to a detachment from Pursaram Bhaou's army on the 2nd instant, a fortress in the Doab that, in point of strength and importance ranks amongst those next to Dharwar.

On the 8th instant a consultation was held by the Minister, Hurry Punt, and Behro Punt, at the close of which, Rasta was admitted and Behro Punt retired. On the conclusion of the consultation with Rasta, the Minister and Hurry Punt went to see a new tent which had been made for the Peshwa. I mention these circumstances to your Lordship merely to introduce my surmises on the occasion, viz., that it has been resolved to make the utmost use of the announcement of Your Lordship's resolution to take the field and my urgent requisitions that the Peshwa should do the same to terrify Tippto to a coincidence with the views of the Court whatever they may be; that agreeable to this resolution I think it probable that the language held to Rasta may have been, that studiously as the Court has endeavored to lighten the distresses in which his client Tippto is involved, his (Tipu's) hesitation to comply unreservedly with the views of this Court will render further forbearance impracticable, that evident ruin now threatens him by the Governor General's resolution to take the field in person, a measure that urges forcibly on the Peshwa to do the same, in the ruinous consequence of which there neither can nor will be any reservation; that he, Rasta, may communicate these circumstances to his client and in the interim of his answer, modes will be taken to evade compliance with my instances and those of Nizam Ally Khan, but that should not Tippto on receiving this last and most essential proof of this Court's indulgence accede unreservedly to its views, this Court will no longer delay to use the simple means it possesses to let him feel the full force of the Confederacy.

The visit of the Minister and Hurry Punt to the Peshwa's tent (amongst people who never move nor speak without design) which in itself seems a circumstance of no significance may have originated in two motives, one to impress more strongly on Rasta the impression of the ultimate resolution of the Peshwa to take the field held up in terrorism to Tippto; the other to furnish the news-writers a paragraph that may still give ground for an hope at the Nabob's Court that that measure may ultimately be adopted at His Highness's solicitations.

On the 9th instant I had the very great satisfaction of learning from Genl. Medows and the Madras Board, the General's junction with Col. Maxwell after a series of such movements by the General as must have given the enemy the most pious cause of alarm and have taught him that no interval of leisure to turn his arms in force to any other quarter will be granted him. While his constantly retreating must be attended with the necessary consequence of dispiriting his army and exhausting his resources, of course weakening him for the ultimate contest to which he must be exposed for the preservation of his capital or some other place of importance that it may be thought proper to attack. He has, I am told, issued pressing orders through his dominions to collect horses and to promote this object directed that merchants entering his territories who bring one or more horses shall have indulgences while those who

bring none are subjected to impediments in their progress, expedients more descriptive of distress than of the probability of relief from them.

On the evening of the 9th I received the following communication from the Durbar :—

“The Nabob's answer relative to Tippo's proposal has been received to this purport. That he (Tippo) should write whether he meant to treat on terms agreeable to all the allies to which an answer would be given, that this was the Nabob's opinion, but that the Peshwa might write what should appear proper through Rasta.”

It was added by the Minister that as this answer was received and I had given my sentiments an answer would be sent to Tippo.

Hurry Punt Tautea will enter his tents on Friday the 10th December and having assembled 4 or 5,000 men will proceed toward the Kistna where it was determined that he should arrive in slow marches for the purpose of the troops under orders to assemble joining him in 38 days from the time of his entering his tents, that his force was to consist of 20,000 horse and 500 foot with 10 guns with which he should cross the Kistna near Baugelcota and wait in the Doab the junction of Mohabut Jung and some Chieftain from the Nabob of equal rank with Musheer-ul-Mulk with a force equal to the above, that after the junction the combined army should cross the Tumbudra in the neighborhood of Adoni but in the enemy's territory, wait the arrival of one of our armies and after its junction proceed as on a consultation of the allied Chieftains should be resolved on.

That after Pursaram Bhao. had reduced Darwar his operations should be regulated in concert with Hurry Punt.

That my sentiments of these measures were requested, that on our reducing the Durbar's proposals to a point, the Durbar might write the Nabob and I Capt. Kennaway in concert.

To which I replied, that as the Durbar's signification of sending an answer to Tippo did not specify whether agreeable to the mode proposed by me or the Nabob, I begged to be ascertained on that point. That as to Hurry Punt's dispatch I still retained the hope that the Peshwa would take the field in person and as to the time appointed for his preparation and march I could not but observe that the greatest speed would be tardy when judged of by the stipulations of the treaty.

As to Hurry Punt's route, he should, in my opinion, to avoid detriment to the Nabob's country, proceed direct to Gooty when it might be hoped that a force of the Nabob's equal to his would be ready to join him, that as to the junction of our force the proposal of Adoni was so distant from reason as to be unanswerable, but that by the time the proposed equipment could be assembled at Gooty I would procure from your Lordship such a point of junction as should be unobjectionable to all parties.

That to this purport I was ready to write Capt. Kennaway, but that as to the appointment of a person of a certain rank I must beg leave to decline having anything to say thereon as it would appear singularly ill-timed in me after my fruitless attempts to prevail on the Peshwa to put himself on a footing with your Lordship and the Nabob. I also took this opportunity of taking my first step in the expedient mentioned in my last address, by desiring to know whether an officer of so high rank and so perfectly in possession of the Minister's confidence would be entrusted with plenipotentiary powers to enable him, while Your Lordship and the Nabob were advanced so near the scene of action, to negotiate ultimately with you and His Highness, and if he is not to suggest that he should, as it will be indecent and a source of great delay, have to refer negotiations from two principals on the spot to the third who had thought proper to remain at so great a distance from the scene of action.

Since writing the above I have on the 10th received the following reply from the Minister—that the answer proposed by me would be given to Tippoo's proposal, that the alteration in the place of junction of Hurry Punt's and Nabob's forces should be changed from the neighborhood of Baugelcota to Gooty, that information would be expected from me after that junction as to the junction of one of our armies.

That no difficulty should arise as to the rank of the Nabob's commander and the full compliment of his quota only be insisted on.

That Hurry Punt's powers would be absolute in the progress and operations of his army, but that in all matters of treaty and negotiation he would refer to this Court.

To the communications the Minister added another in reply to my perseverance in urging him on the Peshwa's taking the field which he begged might be received as private and confidential and rather as the ground of a communication to your Lordship on my conviction of its verity than as matter for communication. But as the whole is intimately connected with the materials requisite for your Lordship's information, I must sacrifice punctilio to duty in transmitting it as nearly as possible in the very words it was conveyed to me from a written memorandum taken by my Vakeel from Behro Punt as the language of the Minister.

I had said the Minister professed myself his personal friend and on that plea requested him on all occasions to treat me with confidence and cordiality, that agreeable to this request he would no longer wave the disclosure of his most secret motives which he should not do to any other person in my situation as faithful observance of the treaty was all that could be asked or that he need urge. I complained, he said, that after an intercourse of good offices for four years he refused to gratify me in a request founded on the good of this State and the general benefit of the alliance, but after learning that his reluctance to adopt that measure proceeded from bodily infirmities of such a nature as to be concealed from his friends, I should cease to complain, and after this communication





To the other points I have replied that if this Court has received the answer it pretends from the Nabob relative to Tippo's proposal I have no objection to its being blended with mine as there is nothing discordant in them nor that precludes the adoption of any sentiment that may hereafter be received from your Lordship, whose opinion, I have told this Court.

I have told the Minister that I will communicate what has passed on the subject of this Court's equipment and its route to Capt. Kennaway and endeavor to procure Your Lordship's sentiments as to the place for effecting a junction of an army of ours with that of the Peshwa and Nabob.

As to Hurry Punt's powers I shall resume the subject as occasion may direct ; what has already been said on it seems to have had a good effect.

It has occurred to me that should Your Lordship be able to dispose of all the force now employed from the Carnatic better than by dividing it and sending a part of it to join in, at all events, the doubtful operations of our allies, the force under Col. Frederick and Major Montgomery amounting to 1 regiment of Europeans, 5 battalions of Native infantry, 12 guns and near one and half Company of artillery might be formed into a distinct brigade to form a part of the allied army and commence its march with it from Gooty. But on this subject your Lordship's judgment may be benefited by Capt. Kennaway's opinion and that of his Court ; I have not yet mentioned it to this Durbar but will, before my next address. Should it be adopted it may not be unnecessary to remind Your Lordship that if Col. Frederick's service had been merely occasional for the reduction of Dharwar, he might have been able to join Genl. Abercromby at Tellicherry, whose present force is, I apprehend, unequal to any considerable operations.

No. 187—Malet communicates to the G. G. intelligence on various subjects, such as (i) the separation of Capt. Little's two battalions, (ii) the supply to Capt. Little of regular accounts of acquisitions made by the Maratha detachments in the conquered countries, and (iii) Col. Frederick's difficulties.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 17th December 1790.*

Since my last address of the 13th instant the disinclination of this Court has been signified to me of separating Capt. Little's two battalions from Parsuram Bhaou's army in prosecution of my idea of forming a distinct brigade to attend the joint force of this State and Nizam Aly Khan in the projected invasion of the enemy's country instead of looking

to the junction of one of the Carnatic armies which the Minister has signified to me will be a necessary part of the plan of the combined attack, but as my advices from Genl. Medows mention the incorporation of the two Carnatic armies into one and as the conduct of the allies hitherto has given us no ground to rely on their fidelity or exertions in future I humbly presume that there will be no necessity to make any change in the plan of operations after the junction of the two Carnatic armies till the actual advance of the proposed combined force of the allies into the enemy's Country shall have convinced you of their sincerity, before which, I am afraid, sufficient time will have elapsed for the receipt of Your Lordship's sentiments on the proposal.

I have not yet received an answer to my remonstrances against Gungadur Rao Rasta's accompanying Hurry Pundit whose equipment I am sorry to say proceeds very slowly.

Your Lordship will have observed in former letters the inefficacy of my frequent instances on the subject of Capt. Little's being furnished with regular accounts of the acquisitions of the Marratta detachments by whom, I doubt not, contributions have been levied in the rich spice and sandalwood countries into which they have penetrated that will go very far to reimburse the expense of their equipment. Assurances have within this day or two been repeated to me that Bhao agreeable to instructions from hence has ordered the account to be prepared and given to Capt. Little with all speed. This assurance on which I am sorry to say I can place no dependance has, I presume, been produced by the idea that it may operate in favor of the Peshwa's Vackeel's demands of the same nature on his joining Genl. Medows for whose Camp I find he set off from Madras the 1st ulto. The Minister has assured me that Capt. Little's application to Bhao for 30 Pioneers has been complied with some time since for the purpose of preparing fascines etc., by the time of Col. Frederick's arrival. Also that three of the battering guns sent from hence have been ordered to be made over to our troops for the purpose of forming two attacks, one to be conducted by the Colonel, the other by the Bhao.

My last letters from Capt. Little's detachment mention the capture of Zerree, a fort about 40 coss from Dharwar on the river Walla which has good ditch and a few guns, by Bunna Bappo's party and that the fort of Sadasew Gurh or Carwar was expected to fall to the troops of Rallapa, a Zemindar who had been exiled by Tippo and has now attached himself and his adherents to the Mahrattas.

I was sorry to find by a letter from Col. Frederick dated the 10th instant that he was still very near the place he landed at and that the amildar of those parts had given him as great cause to complain of want of assistance and misconduct as he had to Capt. Little. I have endeavoured to convey a proper idea of such conduct to the Minister and hope it will not pass

1790]

# REPULSE OF LITTLE'S ATTACK

251

unnoticed. In the interim the Colonel will be extricated from all further difficulty by my supply of money and I hope after all the delay he has met with reach Dharwar nearly as soon as the battering guns from hence.

No. 188—Malet refers to the unhappy incident of the 13th and the progress of Capt. Little towards recovery.  
FROM—C. W. MALET,  
TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Poona, 20th December 1790.

On the 19th I had the pleasure to learn by a letter from Col. Frederick that he had moved and meant to proceed with all possible expedition, so that I hope his speedy arrival will soon do away every ill consequence of the affair of the 13th, in which the failure in the complete execution of the object proposed seems to have arisen more from the disorder of our allies after carrying the town than from any want of courage on the part of our troops or from the superior exertions of the enemy. By another letter I am told that Capt. Little is in a very fair way, but Lt. Forster's wound is thought dangerous.

Be pleased, my Lord, to accept my acknowledgements for your attention to my application on behalf of Capt. Little, who, I have reason to think had no other share in the affair of the 13th than to execute the Bhau's orders, which as our troops led the attack and covered the retreat he seems to have done with courage and discretion.

No. 189—Kenraway communicates to G. G. Azimul Umara's suspicions of Hari Pant.  
FROM—CAPT. KENRAWAY,  
TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Hyderabad, 21st December 1790.

Meer Abul Cossim says the Minister's uneasiness arose from the circumstances of the appointment (the account of which is previously detailed) of Hurry Punt to the command of the Mahratta army, since he was of opinion that that Chief would rather interpose his good offices between Tippe and the allies than be instrumental in carrying on the war with vigor against him. He then asked me if keeping in mind the Minister's and Nizam's suspicions with respect to Hurry Punt and the opportunity he would have of exposing the Nizam's army to such a direct attack on the enemy as might render a peace necessary, I would recommend

the junction. I answered it was a point the Nizam and Minister could only properly decide on, that if they had any grounds satisfactory to their own minds for suspecting a likelihood of Hurry Punt's acting in a treacherous manner it would, I conceived, be sufficient to justify the Nizam's declining to agree to any junction of his troops with the Marratta forces under his command, but as far as I could judge the plan from a simple view of it appeared to me as good a one as could be adopted".

**No. 190**—Malet communicates his conversation with Nana on the subject of Gangadhar Rao Rasta's accompanying Hari pant, the report of Bhau's intriguing with the Commander of Kōpul and Tipu's overtures for peace.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 24th December 1790.*

I proceeded to express my deep concern on hearing that a member of the Rasta family was to accompany Hari Punt to which the minister replied with the most positive assurances that I might place the firmest reliance on his faithful adherence to the articles of the alliance from which no personal affections of any individual of this empire, either had or should ever induce him to swerve. He added that he doubted not extraordinary reports calculated to raise suspicion frequently reached me, but cautioned me against admitting the credibility of rumours in preference to facts and urged the progress of the Maharatta arms in proof of the efficacy and sincerity of this court's conduct. With all due allowance to the merit of Parsuram Bhao's operations I observed that the main army of this State was to have taken the field at the Dussera from which day three months had now elapsed during which the whole of the enemy's force had been exerted against General Medows, that when at last an army was assembling instead of its being headed by the Peshwa in person, the command was devolved on Hurry Punt, who was to be accompanied by Rasta (the professed enemy of the alliance and avowed partizan of Tipu) as his principal coadjutor and adviser, that tho' the Minister might be able to answer for the conduct of that Chief yet after the open and, I might say, contumacious part already taken by that family in favour of the enemy of his State, association with Hurry Punt now would give but too much room to conclude that the past behavior of his family was sanctioned by the Minister's approval and might reasonably be expected to shake that reliance which the Minister was so desirous should be placed by your Lordship on his sincere attachment to the alliance. After much conversation the Minister consented to reconsider the measure with Hurry Punt and let me know his answer, repeating at the same time his assurance of inviolable fidelity to his engagements, tho' in the prosecution of them he was not so lavish of words or professions as others might be.

He resumed the subject of Musheer-ul-Mulk's having pretended that a person had been apprehended carrying on an intrigue between the Killadar of Copul and Parsuram Bhao, said that Bhao had positively denied the truth of the imputation and very warmly insisted on a full investigation of the slander, observing that allowing every shot fired from Mohabut Jung's batteries against the fort carried a message from the Bhao, the operation of the shot would not be much affected. How then would the pretended intrigue after he had already withdrawn at the Nabob's desire his former pretensions as signified to Mohabut Jung relative to Copul and Bahadur Bonda. To this communication from the Bhau the Minister added that he saw the affair in two points of view, either that the killadar had taken this method to sow dissension between the Peshwa's and Nizam's commander, or it was contrived as a pretence for raising a siege in which Mohabut Jung had hitherto scarce made any progress.

With some hesitation and previous apology the Minister asked me if I had received intelligence of any overtures having been lately repeated by Tippto to our Government. I replied I was ignorant of any since those made to General Medows and long ago communicated to this Court. He then asked if in the event of overtures being made information thereof would be communicated to me. I replied undoubtedly, as he might understand from what had passed on the former occasion.

I asked the Minister if any proposal had been made by this Court for the Peshwa's meeting the Nabob at Punderpore. He declared not. Little else material passed at this meeting except the repetition of my constant instances to hasten and invigorate the Court's measures.

Your Lordship will have collected from my late letter that the very reasonable hope of your taking the field in person having a material effect on the councils of this Durbar has not been groundless, for since the annunciation of that resolution the force of the army ordered to assemble has been increased, the command of it has been changed to the second officer in the State and the positive denial that had been given to the Nabob's and my requisitions of the Peshwa's taking the field had been qualified by the introduction of a conditional compliance that, let it rest on what contingency it may, has certainly an appearance of respect for Your Lordship's example.

I do not think that Hurry Punt's camp yet contains more than 3,000 men, horse and foot, with 5 pieces of cannon, but I am assured he will march in three or four days at farthest and that his army will be completed on his march as is the custom in the equipments of this State. After the stress laid by the Minister on keeping his indisposition secret, I need not suggest to your Lordship the necessity of attending to his wish as its reaching him that I had divulged it, might furnish grounds for his reproaching me with breach of confidence, however little real occasion for putting it on that footing.

**No. 191**—Malet communicates to the G. G. his plan for strengthening Abercromby's force for a diversion on the Malabar Coast, and the exchange of letters with Nana on the subject of Rasta's accompanying Haripant and Col. Frederick's delay in the Kokna.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 27th December 1790.*

Permit me, My Lord, to request your orders whether after that service I shall instruct Col. Frederick to join Genl. Abercromby on the Mallabar Coast, to continue to act with Pursaram Bhao or to join the allied army destined for the invasion of the enemy's country by the way of Gootye.

By my last advices from General Medows it appears that the centre army, originally meant to make a diversion by penetrating the enemy's country towards Bangalore is now incorporated in the main army, by which means and the inequality of General Abercromby's force to attempt anything considerable, all advantage of diversion from our own armies is at an end. This circumstance leads me to suggest to Your Lordship if the present force of the main army will admit of it and if a more eligible mode of employing its strength should not occur, to garrison Polcautcherry from it and to dispatch Col. Hartley with the Bombay troops to join General Abercromby on the Mallabar Coast to which, should it be thought proper as abovementioned to join Colonel Frederick's detachment, I presume with all deference and submission to better information that such an army might be formed as would enable General Abercromby to make a very formidable diversion in that quarter and greatly promote the operations of the Carnatic Army.

On the 26th I received a message from the Minister intimating that he had considered well my objections to Gungadur Rao Rasta's accompanying Hurry Punt ; that in reply he had to repeat the assurances already given, that even admitting the existense of personal affection in that Chief hostile to the alliance, it neither could nor should have any effect, that, however, he knew of no such affections, but was ready to receive demonstration of any that had reached my knowledge, in default of which he could not think of setting aside that Chief's intended attendance on Hurry Punt.

I replied that the Minister well knew that my object, far from prying into the actions of the members of this State since my arrival here, had been directed solely to the increase of the amity of the two Goverts, that were I inclined to employ my time in that way the restrictions laid on my actions and the strict observation kept over my conduct effectually prevented me ; that, however, the circumstances of that family's conduct of which I had to complain on the present occasion were so notorious as to preclude all necessity for the information of spies or the collection of secret intelligence to convey the most perfect conviction of its disposition, that

for my studious avoidance of interference in the smallest matter foreign to my Ministry whose relation to this Court was merely domestic, I referred the Ministry to my whole conduct through a five years' residence, but that in a measure in which not only the welfare of this Court but the interests and consistency of the alliance were closely connected, I should deem myself highly wanting to those interests were I to suffer its adoption without my utmost opposition ; that the least evils of the measure were great and obvious distrust and dissatisfaction to the other branches of the Confederacy, but that its benefits were to me unfathomable and I feared, inexplicable ; that the Minister's argument of indefeasible right in this Court to employ its own officers, though incontrovertible as to right, unfortunately involved a sacrifice of prudence by reference to right for the vindication of an appointment originating in wrong, for that I did not deny the right to but the expediency of the appointment. In a word, I begged the Minister to reconsider the affair and if in his wisdom he should still determine on a measure supportable only on the captious exercise of a right I should only have to lament the latent reasons that may have suggested it in opposition to obvious expediency.

In answer to my representations to this Court on the subject of Colonel Frederick's delay in the Kokan I have received for answer that the original cause of delay was the detachments' having neither money nor provisions ; possessed of either the Colonel might have proceeded without obstacle as was evinced on his moving on my supply reaching him ; that unprovided for so unexpected a predicament, no orders had been sent from hence to remedy it till known from my representations ; that from the first orders had been issued to give all possible aid in the conveyance of the stores and baggage of the detachment which had been executed ; that during the detachment's unexpected stay the Amildar had supplied it with everything as well as the poverty of the country would permit and even violated the customs of the country in giving him horned cattle for the use of the Europeans ; that if in these supplies his charges had been exorbitant, steps should be taken on proof thereof to give me satisfaction. I was very happy to find by the Colonel's last letter that he and the Amildar parted good friends and that he had surmounted the difficulties of the Ghaut so long ago as the 15th inst. I doubt not but he has ere this reached Dharwar, my last intelligence from whence is enclosed. Should this important place fall soon, I mean much before the time proposed for the junction of the Mahratta and Nabob's armies near Gooty and before I can receive your Lordship's orders relative to Colonel Frederick's future employment, it occurs to me that he might march to assist in the reduction of Copul if the Nabob will furnish battering cannon, but as I know not how far the prosecution of this idea would be deemed advisable by Captain Kennaway, shall take no further steps in it till honored with his sentiments, nor can I pretend to say, when I advert to the unaccountable and to us unintelligible modes of thinking and acting of our allies, how far it would



be desirable to this Court or how far eligible to attend to its desires, in the event of its being approved of by Captain Kennaway. As I observe that gentleman has signified to your Lordship his disapprobation of my sending copies of my addresses for your Lordship to the Board at Calcutta through him for previous perusal, I beg leave to acquaint your Lordship that I assented to his wishes on that subject in my letter of the 24th instant of which, not having then thought a copy necessary, I now enclose one.

**No. 192**—Major Montgomery describes the scarcity in the fortress of Kopul.

FROM—MAJOR MONTGOMERY,

TO—CAPT. KENNAWAY.

*Camp before Kopul, 30th December 1790.*

The force here by the junction of Row Rambah, Joraver Jung, Kader Khan and other Chiefs is now considerably augmented and troops lately arrived appear to be of a very superior quality to those before under Mohaubut Jung's command.

The people in the fort appear to be distressed for provisions as their families have been coming out for these two or three days and not being suffered to pass by Mohaubut Jung's advanced posts remain in a very distressed state under the walls of the place.

I have not yet heard of the heavy guns having crossed the river which I anxiously expect and shall then immediately apply to Mohaubut Jung to facilitate their arrival here as soon as possible.

The hope of the guns arriving here soon has induced me to remain here until now, although my health is still in so bad a state that I have not been able to rise from my back this four or five days; as I now find however that fifteen or twenty days must elapse before their arrival. I shall proceed to Paungul as soon as my strength will permit.

An additional proof that the garrison must have nearly exhausted their stock of provision, they are now observed to have daily recourse to their magazine in the upper fort which is their last resource.

**No. 193**—Malet communicates to the G. G. his visit to Haripant on the eve of his departure and the news of the surrender of Cannanore and of Col. Hartley's victory over Tipu.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 31st December 1790.*

On the 29th I paid a take leave visit to Hurry Pundit on his departure in command of the army now assembling at which I exhorted him by such

arguments as I thought most likely to have an effect to prosecute the object of his equipment with vigour and dispatch. He in reply professed the warmest attachment to the present confederacy and the firmest resolution founded on his own affections and the injunctions of the Minister to prosecute the objects of it against the common enemy. He acquainted me that he should march in two or three days and meant to proceed with all possible expedition to the south, not only for the benefit of the alliance but to get into a better country for forage than that between Poona and the Kistna. In reply to my enquiries as to the force of his army, he assured me that though stated at 20,000 horse and 5,000 foot it would certainly amount to 25,000 cavalry. A short time must explain the sincerity of his professions and the truth of his assurances.

In Captain Kennaway's letter of 21 to your Lordship I observe that Musheer-al-Mulk has expressed some signs of diffidence in the disposition of Hurry Punt. In whom, my Lord, after what we have seen are we to place confidence or from what quarter to expect fidelity? For my own part I can perceive no alternative but that of making the best use possible of bad instruments, and though from certain temporising traits in the character of Hurry Punt and other circumstances that from views to family aggrandisement may lead him to some degree of coalescence with the Rasta faction, points that are undoubtedly highly exceptionable in his present employment, yet am I of opinion that his ancient and hitherto uninterrupted connexion and dependance on the Minister, added to the real interests of his state will prevent his commission of any actual or overt act of treachery. At all events the Nawab has no reasons now to be more distrustful of his conduct than during the late war waged by His Highness and this State against Tippo when the Mahratta part of the allied army was commanded by him; and let his inclinations be what they may, I heartily accede to Captain Kennaway's opinion that they will be very little to be apprehended when joined by the Nabob's force and ours, should the views of His Highness's part of the army be less exceptionable than those of the Mahrattas. On the other hand, there are certainly advantages in Hurry Punt's appointment arising from his weight of character and the largeness of the force that he will command, and any failure in exertion on his part will, I hope, be corrected by the influence of our forces should a junction be effected, while Pursuram Bhaou's continuing to act separately secures us an active diversion in that quarter the effect of which, must, I think, be very sensibly felt by the enemy after the fall of Dharwar.

On the 30th instant I was honored with Your Lordship's letter of the 14th containing the very pleasing intelligence of your safe arrival at Madras (13th inst.) on which I beg Your Lordship to accept my hearty congratulations, with letters announcing the same to the Peshwa and Minister, on the delivery of which I shall not fail again to urge the latter to qualify the contingent hope he has given me of the Peshwa's taking the field in person.

On the same day I received private intelligence of Cannanore having surrendered to General Abercromby, an event that if it proves true, has happened most opportunely to assist the impression of Your Lordship's arrival in the Carnatic both on our friends and enemies.

In addition to the confirmation of the capture of Cannanore this inst. arrived, I have received by a private letter from Bombay the very pleasing and important intelligence of Colonel Hartley's having gained a complete victory over Tippoo's army on the Coast of Mallabar commanded by Hussun Ally Khan and reduced the forts of Tricalore and Furruckabad.

This government has made some advances to me to send some presents of curiosities to the Honourable Company and his Majesty in return for those presented to this Court some time since from the Honourable Company.

**No. 194**—Kennaway reports to the G. G. the Nizam's strong objection to uniting his army with that of the Mahrattas and His Highness' desire of acting singly and co-operating with the centre army under Cornwallis.

FROM—CAPT. KENNAWAY,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Paungal, 1st January 1791.*

Meer Abul Cossim waited upon me the 29th with the draft of an answer in which the Nizam requested your Lordship would point out some plan for his operations in order that they might co-operate with, be protected by, and ultimately concentrate with those of our army or that an additional aid of our troops might be granted him on the same terms as it had been lately afforded to the Peshwa to enable him to act with confidence and spirit independent of any immediate reference to our or the Peshwa's motions. I returned the draft and expressed my opinion that it would be preferable and much more satisfactory to your Lordship if his Highness instead of dwelling on the points above recited, would engage at once in a vigorous and forward prosecution of the war, that your Lordship had twice given your opinion for an intimate coincidence between his and the Peshwa's operations which was assuredly the safest mode that could be adopted, since the order and equipment of Tippoo's army would, I conceived, render it hazardous for that of this State to act separately, and the distance at which ours was removed would prevent our affording his Highness's any assistance in case the enemy should move in full force against him, an objection which could only be removed by his Highness's or the Minister's marching, in which case the resources of this State would necessarily be called forth in such a manner as would not leave much room for apprehension on the score of Tippoo's superiority; he left me

to report the conversation to the Minister and the following morning I had the satisfaction to receive your letter of the 20th ultimo ; delicate as the point was, I felt little hesitation in determining so far to depart from the tenor of your Lordship's instructions, enjoining me to confine myself for the present to general assurances with regard to your intentions as I thought would be absolutely necessary to relieve the Nizam from the uncertainty he was in, what measure it would be proper for him to pursue at this juncture concerning which I was myself really at a loss how to advice him with any arguments likely to make an impression. Meer Abul Cossim came to me in the evening and informed me that the particulars of the preceding day's conversation had been stated to the Minister, who still objected to the idea of an intimate co-operation with the Maharattas and recommended that the army under Assud Ali Khan which now amounted to twenty thousand men should be joined by an additional reinforcement of our troops with the junction of Dara Jah's army or a part of it, would be able to act firmly and confidently on its own bottom ; Meer Abul Cossim added that to the moment we were conversing together not a word either of the plan I had mentioned and recommended on the authority of Mr. Malet as having been approved of by Balajee Pundit or of the answer that was intended to be given to the Nizam's letter had been communicated by the Peshwa's Vackeels, that the Nizam and the Minister still entertained an unconquerable aversion to acting with the Maharattas, which all the arguments which I had used had not abated and probably never would, while the treachery of Holcar in the last war in which the two States were engaged against Tippoo was fresh in their memory : since it was but natural to suppose that as Holcar acted the base part he did with impunity, Hurry Pundit might do the same, in reply to which I repeated my arguments for the Nizam's or Minister's moving in person at the head of His Highness's army, and penetrating into the heart of the enemy's country by such route or in pursuance of such plan as they might resolve on if they preferred it to the plan proposed, which I thought they might undertake with confidence without the aid of any additional reinforcement of our troops, since it was your Lordship's intention that one of our armies should penetrate into the centre of Tippoo's dominions from the Carnatic which would help to cover and protect their operations, but that this intention must be inviolably confined to the Nizam's and the Minister's breasts.

Meer Abul Cossim assured me that this intention of your Lordship's the intelligence of which was so extremely seasonable, would greatly facilitate the adoption of a final plan for the zealous and speedy execution of which I recommended that part of Dara Jah's army should immediately be ordered to join Asud Ali Khan and that what I had imparted should be confined to the Minister and himself : he enquired if your Lordship had returned any answer to the propositions about a body of the Nizam's

Cavalry acting with the Company's forces, which I said you had not, and that I apprehended the difficulty of engaging to supply them with provisions was an obstacle to any determination being come to on the subject.

I was happy through the means afforded me the same day by a letter from General Medows to have it in my power to acquaint Meer Abul Cossim for the Nizam's and Minister's information with the result of Tippoo's late overtures for negotiation which I did nearly in the words of the General's final answer namely "that he declined making use of any powers he had, your Lordship being arrived on the Coast and that you would in every particular, as he would have done, act in concert with our faithful allies."

Meer Abul Cossim returned to me yesterday morning and after expressing the great satisfaction which the Minister had derived from the conversation which had passed the preceding evening which, he said, removed all the difficulties that the direction of the late central army had occasioned, requested to be informed on two points which were necessary for the Nizam's proceedings to be made to co-operate with those of your Lordship. First the time when you supposed the body of our forces designed to penetrate into the enemy's country from the Carnatic would pass the Gauts, 2nd in the vicinity of what place you would wish the Nizam's army should approach towards them: I replied that your Lordship had not acquainted me with those particulars, but that I would submit them to your consideration. Meer Abul Cossim added from the Minister that should a place not far removed to the southward be appointed for an approximation of the Company's and the Nizam's armies, the latter of which would be implicitly guided by your instructions, and should your Lordship be at the head of the first he had no doubt of prevailing with the Nizam to accompany the latter, that the two armies being near to each other would be attended with the greatest advantages to the war and would probably draw the Maḥratta army, the commander of which in such a situation would have no opportunity of acting improperly. In the same way I suggested the difficulty there would be in subsisting three or even two such armies if they were near each other, to which he replied that a distance of 14 or 15 coss or even more might be left between them.

Want of time preventing my making a proper translate I have the honour to enclose a Persian copy of a letter received yesterday by the Minister from Rajah Barramul giving an account of an attack which had been made by the troops under himself, Assud Ali Khan and Mahommed Ameen Arab on the pettah of Gunjycottah, a hill fort where Tippoo has assembled a considerable force and the reduction of it is extremely to be wished for previous to the Nizam's army advancing further to the southward.

(i) Extract of an intelligence from Rajah Barramul, camp near Gunjycotah, the 22nd Rubbi ul sanee or 29th December.

7,000 irregulars and 1,500 horse belonging to the Rajah of Sholapur are arrived at Piapelly the Talook of Emmanaik situated about 6 coss to the north east of Gooty and are actively employed in reducing the districts of Piapelly, Gunjy-cotah and Timury in concert with the disaffected polygars of those places.

Mahommed Ameen Khan Arab Bahadur having sent a jassus to Bangalore for the purpose of intelligence, he proceeded as far as Husure which is 18 coss from the former place. In Husure is the habitation of Yeswunt Row Chauhan, who has many relations in Mahommed Ameen's cavalry. The spy went to the said Yeshwunt Row, who understanding from whence he came, forbade his proceeding farther on account of the danger which would attend it. Yeshwunt Row's horse having been killed in action was the reason of his having left Tippoo's Camp. The jassus was a witness to 4,000 Infantry 2,000 Peons and 2 Guns marching from Bangalore and of their arrival at Cowrieconda or Coodyconda on their route to Belcotha for the purpose of proceeding either to Gooty or Gunjycotah. This party was attacked and defeated by the Zemindar of Coodyconda and the lesser Balapore with about 12,000 men. The jassus further reports that all the country about Sera and Roydroog has been ravaged by the incursions of Mahratta horse.

**No. 195**—Malet informs Nana of the overtures made by Tipu to General Medows and suggests that Tipu's offers were designed to sow dissension among the allies.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 3rd January 1791.*

Hurry Pundit marched the 1st instant about two miles. The Minister, at an audience that I had the 2nd instant of the Peshwa to deliver your Lordship's letter announcing your arrival at Madras, assured me he would move on in two or three days, previous to which he promised to give an answer to my representations relative to Rasta's going with Hurry Punt.

On the 2nd I was honored with a letter from General Medows of the 10 ultimo giving cover to copy of a letter that had been received by the General from some of Tippo's Ministers. From the style and manners of Tippo's advances there is, I think, some reason to apprehend that, added to his hope of the possibility of its producing beneficial consequences in the stay of negotiation, he may have had an insidious design, by making advances about the same time to two of the contracting powers, of sowing distress and suspicion in the confederacy and in this view I think it not impossible that the knowledge, which by my letters to your Lordship of

the 24th ultimo you will have observed the Minister then possessed of some correspondence having taken place, may have been conveyed hither by Tipu himself. To prevent, however, any ill consequences of such a communication I propose this afternoon to acquaint the Minister similar overtures to those made here have been proposed to General Medows, who has replyd with a general reference to the expected arrival of your Lordship in the Carnatic and I shall accompany this intimation with a request that he will favour me with his opinion on the reception, that should be given by your Lordship to this proposal.

(i) Extracts of letters from Camp near Dharwar, received in Poona, 3rd January 1791.

24th December..... We approach the fort but don't make much impression, there are many desertions from the enemy.

26th December..... The battering guns arrived yesterday from Poona. The fort of Roydroog\* has been taken from the enemy by the Jumkundy Dessay on the part of the Mahrattas. Captain Little extremely well, Lieutenant Forster very indifferent.

28th December..... Colonel Fredrick, Major Sartorius, Captain Bailie arrived here this morning and are to reconnoitre tomorrow. The detachment is expected to join the 1st or 2nd.

The Europeans\*\* are come over to us from the enemy and the Bhau wants to take some or all of the batteries before the reinforcement arrives. Robertson, one of the deserters from the enemy, says he knows the most advantageous points for attacking the troops without the fort and the fort itself, which he is to show the Colonel tomorrow—

Ragonath Rao Coorundwarree\*\*\* is to set off in a few days with 7,000 horse to the South.

**No. 196**—Kennaway communicates to Cornwallis the Minister's reassurance of hearty co-operation with the G. G. and his determination to send the generals to whatever place Cornwallis might fix upon.

FROM—CAPTAIN KENNAWAY,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Paungal, 4th January 1791.*

I have acquainted the Minister of the pointed manner in which Balajee Pundit has desired any correspondence having been carried on between Parasuram Bhao and the Killadar of Kopul and at the same time

\* ..... A fort of strength and importance.

\*\* ..... Three Commanders of Corps.

\*\*\* ..... A near relation of Pursuram, of approved courage and enterprise.

represented how incumbent on him it was to state the grounds ; on which he has informed that the same answer had been given to him by the Poonah Minister and Pursaram Bhao and that the Nizam's representations on the subject had originated in the information of two intercepted messengers whose declarations he conceived corroborated by the overtures which were made about the time of their seizure to Mohabut Jung for the purpose of inducing him to give up the siege.

Before I submit my opinion on the idea mentioned by Mr. Malet of Colonel Frederick's detachment proceeding to assist in the siege of Kopul after Dharwar shall be reduced, I should wish to know what impression is likely to be made by the arrival of the battering guns in Mohabut Jung's camp. The troops already there are more than adequate to the duty they have to perform and if the guns are found to answer, the only difficulty that I conceive, will remain is the want of an engineer Officer, the supply of which from Colonel Frederick's detachment or any other quarter would, I should suppose, certainly tend to facilitate the reduction of the place.

The Minister has again assured me that as soon as the necessary particulars can be ascertained of the time when and the route by which your Lordship proposes a body of our forces shall penetrate into Tippoo's country from the Carnatic, the army under Asud Ali Khan, Mahomed Ameen and Raja Baramul (the two former beyond comparison the best and most active officers in the Nizam's service) shall proceed to whatever place your Lordship may appoint and their present station be taken up by Mohabut Jung's army which he will be ready to support in person. So late as yesterday no intimation, he informs me, had been received from Balajee Pundit of the plan for the invasion of the enemy's country by the united armies of the two states mentioned by Mr. Malet to your Lordship the 26th November and stated in his address of the 3rd ultimo to have been approved of by Balajee Pundit, who promised to write on the subject to the Nabob, desired Mr. Malet to do the same to me and assured him that Hurry Punt had been directed in positive terms to have the force necessary to act ready on the Kistna by the 2nd January, which circumstance and that of the avowed reluctance entertained from the first by this Durbar to an intimate co-operation with the Mahrattas considered, I submit to your Lordship and Mr. Malet whether it will not be equally fruitless and embarrassing to press them any longer to agree to it.

A sunnud, I am informed, has been granted to the son of Shums-ul-Umrah, a boy about twelve years old, confirming him in the rights and possessions lately held by his father and every intention of injury from the followers of the deceased towards the Minister appears to have subsided. I enclose a translation of papers of intelligence received yesterday by the Nizam from the camps of Asud Ali Khan and Hafiz Ferid-u-din.



(i) Extract of an intelligence from Hafiz Ferid-u-din. Camp Kurpa (Cuddppa), 1st January 1790.

A hundred Zemindars of the Radge Hutley and other Taluks of Gurrum-coondah (called Curram conda in Rennell's Map) having deputed a vackeel to obtain Cowle from Hafiz Ferid-Uddin, twenty-one Cowles were accordingly sent to them with the above Vackeel accompanied by 200 foot belonging to the Zemindar of Nussoom, 100 foot of Mahomed Solyman Khan's Rassala, 25 horse of Syf-ul-Mulk's and 100 of his own for the purpose of taking possession of Gurrum Coondah and Rachouttee.

Intelligence was received the 21st Rubbi-ul-Sani or 28th of December of the Zemindars of Radge Hutlay, and other places having expelled Tippoo's garrison from the fort of Serring Tarah and taken possession of it; that Tippoo on hearing this news had deputed 6,000 foot, 3,000 horse and two guns who had attacked and killed 30 of the Zemindars and resumed possession of the fort near which his troops remained three days, when the zemindars assembling 12,000 foot fell upon them in the night, plundered their baggage, took the two guns and re-established themselves in possession of the fort.

**No. 197**—Extract of a letter of intelligence from Hafiz Farid-uddin.

*Camp, 8th January 1791.*

Mohabat Khan, an ancient Jagirdar in the Taluk of Kurpa who had long since been expelled by Tippoo, has now by the aid of the Nizam's troops recovered possession of his jagir and expelled Tipoo's people from its fort, a place of strength situated twenty-four coss from Kurpa. Allum Khan, another jagirdar of that quarter, has followed with like success the example of Mohabat Khan.

Two thousand foot belonging to the Zemindar of Chitteil are encamped at the distance of four coss from Sidhout, where the above Zemindar in person with four thousand more foot was expected in a day or two on his way to join the Nizam's forces.

The detachments of Hafiz Ferid-u-din's troops formerly sent under the command of some Zemindars with cowles have invested the fort of Rachouttee so closely that it is expected to surrender in a day or two.

On the 3rd January the fort of Boodwil situated between the forts of Cummum and Sidhout was taken possession of by the Nizam's troops, in consequence of which the communication between these two places is now completely open and secure.

No. 198—On the recall of Major Montgomery Andrew Read is placed in charge of the English detachment and is warmly received by Dara Jah.

FROM—CAPT. ANDREW READ,

TO—CAPT. KENNAWAY.

*9th January 1791.*

I enclose herewith a copy of a letter from the Honourable Board at Fort St. George directing me on the recall of Major Montgomery to take charge of the detachment for the present, the desire it contains of paying particular attention to your requisitions and of constantly corresponding with you as also the orders of the Board for my scrupulously inspecting all charges. I have infinite pleasure in assuring you that those injunctions most perfectly accorded with my own inclinations.

Major Montgomery delivered over charge of the detachment to me yesterday and left Camp for Ellore.

I, this afternoon, had the honour of being introduced to his Highness Darah Jah who received me in the politest manner, having sent one of his Sardars to conduct me to the presence and on my taking leave presented me with a Khelat, of which, if you think it necessary, I beg you will acquaint Government. He, with a seeming wish that the service might go expeditiously and prosperously, has given orders that the guns shall be sent upon the hills in such a way as I direct. To-morrow morning I shall therefore begin and with all possible expedition get one battery finished which will commence firing a day or two before the principal battery is begun.

I have no doubt but that the Nabob will render every assistance in his power. He informed me that the three guns from Paangul were expected to arrive in camp in two days.

No. 199—Kennaway reports the conversation that took place between him and Mir Abul Kasim on the proposal of the joint invasion of Tipu's country by the Poona and Hyderabad armies.

FROM—CAPT. KENNAWAY,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Paangul, 11th January 1791.*

On the 9th instant I received a visit from Meer Abul Cossim who acquainting me that the Mahratta Vakeels were to attend the Minister that evening to communicate for the first time the particulars of the plan for a joint invasion of the enemy's country by armies of the two States, requested from the Minister my sentiments on what answer should be given. I took this occasion of repeating your Lordship's opinion for an

intimate co-operation, which I added it was not likely you would depart from, being satisfied in your own mind that neither of their armies acting separately would be a match for the enemy, should he advance in force against them. He again mentioned the Nizam's and the Minister's objections founded on their suspicions of Hurry Punt's disposition and the instance of treachery in Holcar's conduct last war, to which I answered as before that it was impossible for me to judge how far such suspicions were justifiable or proper. Meer Abul Cossim replied that a plan of operations separate from the Mahrattas would probably be determined on, but that any assistance being afforded to it by a diversion of our troops would depend on the direction in which it was made and on the army by which it was to be effected being instructed to keep near to that of his Highness, to which I replied that as in proportion as the two armies advanced in their operations they would necessarily approach nearer to each other. Our conversation at length closed with my advising that an answer to the Mahratta Vackeels should be delayed for two or three days by which time perhaps I might be able to give a clearer and more decisive opinion than I was at present able to do, my object in which was that being in daily expectation of hearing from your Lordship on the subject of the proposal of the Poona Durbar for the junction of a body of our troops with the allied army and for a place being fixed on for that purpose the knowledge of your sentiments on these particulars will be of considerable advantage to me in forming my own on the points in discussion here.

**No. 200—A.** Read reports the setting up of a battery on the south hill to open fire on the fortress of Kopul.

FROM—ANDREW READ,

TO—CAPT. KENNAWAY.

*Camp at Kopul, 14th January 1791.*

The guns arrived in Camp two days ago ; the battery on the south hill will be ready to open on the fort tomorrow morning ; it will consist of one 32, one 18, one 14 pr. Those guns will I hope silence the cannon on that side of the fort in two or three days, which is absolutely necessary before the construction of the battery on the west hill is attempted, which otherwise would lay exposed to the whole guns on that side within point blank distance.

The guns that are arrived, and which you must have seen, are very heavy and it will be immense labour carrying them up the hills, the assistance of a considerable part of the detachment, it appears to me, will be necessary on this service, which when demanded by the Nabob, I shall readily grant and that if any expense is incurred on this head, I hope it will appear a necessary one for the public service.

I am much obliged to you for the communication of Colonel Hartley's success over the enemy. I directed the particulars being put in Persian which was sent to Darah Jah and who permitted me to fire a royal salute on the joyful occasion.

**No. 201**—Malet exposes the hollowness of the Nizam's aversion to co-operating with Haripant and penetrates into the deeper motives of the Nizam. He also takes advantage of the question of the admission of Ali Riza, Tipu's envoy, for pressing the Peshwa's advance to the Kistna.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 14th January 1791.*

Most heartily do I hope that the season of expectation of the effect of the Nizam's guns on Copul will be short. Should Capt. Kennaway signify to me his wish of the English from Col. Fredrick's force proceeding to assist in the siege of Copul, it may, I conceive, be easily complied with, as there are one Major and two Subalterns of that corps with the Colonel.

Musheeral Mulk's disavowal of intimation having reached the Nabob from this Court of the intended equipment from hence is so very extraordinary that I questioned Behro Punt concerning it, who assured me that, notice had been given to the Nabob and tho' it might not have reached him when my last letters were dispatched, it certainly would in a day or two after. For my own part I cannot conceive how any cavil with people less inclined to dispute than act, can have arisen on this head on the pretences of ignorance since Capt. Kennaway in his letter of 21 ulto. to your Lordship particularizes the intelligence of the intended measure that had been communicated to the Nabob, tho' he observes not officially but, which in its transmission to the Mahratta Vackeel, must have been, I presume, for the Nabob's information.

Your Lordship will, I doubt not, have observed that while the Nabob's Minister could find the smallest pretence to allege an excuse for his Court's conduct or that of the Marrattas he has not been slow to use it, whence the long train of solicitude that has been expressed for a co-operative plan. Your Lordship will have experienced no small surprise on finding that when at last this State has come forward with an offer of junction and cooperation, His Highness should as suddenly have changed his grounds, and notwithstanding your Lordship's opinion enforced by Capt. Kennaway's representations, declined co-operation on pretences which with all possible deference to his Highness are highly unbecoming him to use or us to admit and which I fear are very foreign to the real motives by which his Highness's counsels are influenced and might perhaps be sought

for with some success in the principles of action assigned to Musheer-al-Mulk in Capt. K.'s letter of 15th October, viz. "The Minister, whether it be to the antipathy which he and Ballajee Punt bear each other and consequent aversion in him to acting with the Marrattas, to a jealousy of them more immediately interfering with the Nizam's conquests if made by cooperating with them than when acting separately and at a distance, to a greedy desire of obtaining speedy possession of the Cummum and Curpa countries, to dislike to Mohubat Jung's being entrusted with the command of so large a force as it will be necessary to send, strongly opposes me." These, my Lord, I say, are more likely reasons for the Nabob's unconquerable aversion to acting with the Marrattas than the extraordinary ones adduced from Holcar's baseness in the last war and the natural suppositions deduced from these that Hurry Punt might do the same in this. I am very sorry, my Lord, to be reduced to the necessity of scrutinizing such language. The base part alluded to was the conduct of a separate intrigue by Holcar with Tipu. Hurry Punt at the time commanded the army; Holcar was one of the Chieftains of it. Is it fair, my Lord, to fly to the conduct of Holcar, instead that of Hurry Punt himself for grounds of judgment of Hurry Punt's future conduct? Admit that Holcar acted treacherously, but let it be remembered that Hurry Punt did not. Besides, my Lord, the Nabob when he used this argument could not have been ignorant of its futility. (For he knows that) Holcar is one of the great feudatory chieftains of the empire far above punishment, none of whom are interested in extending the Brahmin or paramount Power, consequently would gladly have checked its progress when practicable, with additional stimulus of personal advantages. Hurry Punt's predicament is very different. He is a Brahmin, an immediate servant of the Peshwa's Government and an hereditary dependent of the Furnawees family, consequently interested by every tie to promote the object of the Brahmin Power and of the views of his immediate superior, the Minister Nana Furnawees to whom his fidelity through the most trying times has been unimpeached and tho' in the late intrigues in this Court he may have shown some tendency to coalesce from motives of family interests with the powerful house of Rasta, yet, as I have mentioned in a former letter, I do not conceive that that tendency can so far supercede the more powerful double influence above described, as to admit of his entering into any positive measures unsanctioned by this Court or the Minister, his superior. At all events the Nabob's objections to this Chieftain are conjectural but the evils of insisting on them, would, I apprehend, be real. And, my Lord, I believe, we should experience difficulty in finding unobjectionable characters amongst our allies. I am decidedly of opinion that it is more advisable to admit his appointment with a good grace, than by cavilling at it involve ourselves in a most serious difference with the Minister his superior, for surely his Highness could not expect to treat the third principal person in this empire disgracefully with impunity.

Your Lordship is not now to be informed that I have no partiality to Hurry Punt but that on the contrary I have objections to his military and political character.

Tho', my Lord, you will have learned from my letter of 24th November that the idea of a body of this State's forces marching to join a body of the Nabob's and then proceeding to unite with one of our armies was in adoption of a proposal made by me and from my subsequent letters of 6 and 11 December that the increase of the original force and change of the commander was in consequence of your Lordship's taking the field in person, yet am I so exceedingly apprehensive of drawing on myself the smallest responsibility for his Highness's conduct, watchful as I perceive he is for excuses, or of incurring the blame of checking the execution of those warm professions with which he has at all times but particularly of late given us much ample ground for hope, that tho' I certainly think Hurry Pundit entitled to the respect of being waited for could the sincerity of the two Powers to effect a junction be depended on in the completion of a plan proposed to this Court by your Lordship's representative, yet will I take upon me even to advise the previous march of the Nabob's forces to join your Lordship and endeavor to obviate and do away any ill-will that this Court may feel or pretend to feel should the Nabob's force proceed to join your Lordship without waiting for Hurry Punt's junction, on the plea that the emergency required promptitude and the march will be more easily effected in two divisions and that no difficulty can be apprehended in the Maratha army's pursuing the same tract that had been previously passed by the Nabob's troops and I trust that his Highness will have so much regard for the consistency of the confederacy as to account to this Court for the previous march of his force in the most conciliatory manner. But should not his Highness think proper to accede to this reasonable expectation, I shall conclude that his counsels are influenced either by pique at the Peshwa's not taking the field in person by the vicious motives above assigned to Musheer-al-Mulk hitherto, or by a studied design agreeable to the system of evasion hitherto practised of traversing the cooperative plan by which your Lordship may be ultimately deprived of its benefit.

On the 13th instant I received a visit from Behro Punt the object of which was to acquaint me that a letter had been received by Rasta from Aly Rezza (one of the Chieftains that signed the first letter to General Medows) who had reached Chittuldrug, the purport of which was that on the return of the former Ambassador sent to this Court, Tipu had learnt the necessity of regulating his wishes for peace by attention to the views of all the members of the confederacy, that he had dispatched him, Ali Rezza, to this Court and that he begged passports might be sent for his advancing to Poona. I, in reply to B. P.'s application for my sentiments on this proposal, asked if any letter had been received from Tipu himself, observed that the letter above mentioned seemed vague and

deficient even in the primary point of ascertaining whether Tippo had assented to the indispensable preliminaries of treating on terms agreeable to the Confederates, and begged, conformable to the substance of your Lordship's last commands which I had previously communicated to this Court, that I might be favored with a sight of the letter and with a copy of it for your Lordship's notice. Behro Punt replied no letter had been received from Tipu but that probably Ally Rezza was charged with letters, that the letter received was deficient in ascertainment as to agreeing to treat agreeably to all the confederates and that it had been sent to camp for Hurry Punt's perusal but should be submitted to mine on return, till which time I have declined giving any sentiments. But in reply to the queries with which B. P. studiously endeavored to collect them and to the assurances he gave me that should the Vackeel be admitted, the Minister would not take the smallest step without my knowledge and advice, I replied generally that I knew of but one objection to the admission of a Vackeel by this Court whenever the commencement of negotiations might be deemed advisable, the Peshwa's remaining at Poona while the other Principals were in the field and so much nearer the spot, and begged him to reverse the case and apply it to your Lordship and the Nabob.

I observed that that objection could be easily removed by the Peshwa's moving to the Krishna and a mark of respect might be shown to the Confederates by its being put on the footing of compliance with their wishes to give eclat to the conduct of the war and thereby promote the negotiations for peace ; in which had he not force most amply to support his own interests, on what could we depend with greater confidence than the stipulations of treaty and the good faith of this Government in the discharge of them? In a word that I doubted not that by the Peshwa's advance to the Kishna and thereby forming a Congress with the Nabob every shadow to this Court's admission of a Vackeel from the enemy would be removed and in that light I most strongly recommended it, observing that the Minister had told me he had lately found benefit from medicine. To this Behro Punt started several objections against a meeting with Nizam Ally Khan which I endeavored to obviate and in the event of that being impracticable observed, that even the measure of advancing to the Kistna would, I doubted not, be highly satisfactory to your Lordship and the Nabob by evincing a spirit of compliance and a desire of promoting the views of the Confederacy which would certainly weigh in favor of this Court's object of receiving Vackeels from the enemy whenever negotiations might be resolved on and the necessary satisfaction given to the other members of the alliance. As to the forms and mode of conducting them, it will occur to your Lordship that this measure of Ally Reza's journey toward this place must have been adopted by Tippo subsequent to the failure of his application to General Medows, and that it must have originated in other grounds than the ostensible pretence of the communication made to Tippo by his former Vackeels, in a word, that it has been

brought about by the under correspondence carried on from the first through Rasta.

Hurry Punt was upward of 40 miles from hence yesterday. I am told he will, if the convenience of forage permit, halt two or three days to collect his force at Siddha-tek, about 20 miles further on.

The Minister has acquainted me that since the capture of Roydroog the Mahratta Thanas have been established in the Purgannas of Hurrehur, Waswaputtun and Bilghey, the latter in the district of Bednore.

No. 202—Malet communicates to G. G. the news of a party of Marathas being surprised near Roydrug and the Nizam's resolution to make the operations of his army independent of those of the Marathas.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 17th January 1791.*

Nothing occurs to add to the enclosed account of affairs at Dharwar than that a private letter from the same quarter mentions that a party of Mahrattas had been surprized in the neighbourhood of Roydroog and suffered some loss and that the Pindarries of Bhaow's army in their irruptions toward Syringputtun have taken eight or ten elephants beside other booty.



Frederick's complaints, all cause for which I have been endeavoring to prevent ever since the measure of applying for his detachment was resolved on. But your Lordship is not now to learn that in the conduct of the alliance, patience and forbearance are as necessary toward our friends as vigor and execution against the enemy.

**No. 203**—Andrew Read reports that the batteries were opened but they could not produce much effect on account of the gun carriages breaking down.

FROM—ANDREW READ,

TO—CAPT. KENNAWAY.

*Camp Kopul, 19th January 1791.*

The batteries opened on the fort the 16th in the morning and that a few hours firing silenced every gun opposed. Early in the day, the 18 pr. from the badness of its carriage became useless, the 32 pr. from its axle tree breaking in the afternoon and the next day that of the 28 pr. also giving way rendered it unserviceable. All possible means were used to repair those damages but for want of wood, iron and other necessary materials which could not be immediately supplied more delay was occasioned than could have been wished for and we were not able to use the 18 and 32 until yesterday afternoon (as yet the 28 pr. is not repaired) by which time the garrison had repaired their embrasures and other damages. In our endeavours again to silence their guns, the two carriages again broke down and are now under the hands of the workmen and I hope will soon be repaired, the 17½ pr. could not be laid to have effect from her carrying no particular direction, she is now dismounted and her carriage to be fitted for the 18 pr. I have great hopes that all these damages may be repaired in the course of to-day and to-morrow to enable us to commence again, I hope, with better success.

On my first introduction to the Nawab I thought it my duty to request that wood, iron and charcoal &c., might be ready so as to repair in the night any damages sustained during the day; his own wishes in this respect have not been fulfilled, but from what he told Lieut. Binny to-day, whom I sent to speak of that and of other things which I deemed necessary. I hope his orders will be more particularly attended to and that we shall yet command success.

I assure you that every assistance which the detachment can afford shall most cheerfully be furnished. I have sent all the European artillery men and Lascars to the batteries as well as artificers to assist in making any necessary repairs and hope that in my next I shall be able to give you a more favourable account of our operations.

I am sorry to inform you that Darah Jah has been indisposed for some days past.



On the 9th December the Minister acquainted me he should transmit an answer agreeable to what I had advised to the overtures from Tipu received here 21st October and as Ally Reza's letter is dated 8th December it follows that it can have no relation to that answer, the only one that has been given with the knowledge of the allies.

But notwithstanding this letter of Ally Reza being palpably an assumed answer to an imaginery or at least an unauthorized communication, it does not contain any positive assurance as to the grand Point of treating agreeably to the three contracting Powers, nor is his authority clearly defined, nor even his being at Chittuldroog from a comparison of circumstances clearly ascertained.

On a full consideration of these points I have to request the Minister's sentiments on the letter in question and for his information beg leave to refer him to his own opinion relative to the Governor General's treatment of the reference made to him of Tipu's proposals by General Medows and to the opinion of the Governor General received on the 18th, "I should wish it might be agreed in future between the confederate Powers that if overtures be made from Tipu to one of them, the Party to which he may address himself should require specific propositions from him and refer them to the Allies for their sentiments before any answer is returned", which is perfectly in concert with the opinions above referred to of the other two contracting Powers, and agreeable to which it appears to me that whenever specific propositions from Tipu properly authenticated shall be received, it will be full time to take notice of them.

**No. 205**—Malet favours the idea of a triple junction of the allied armies at Bangalore or in the neighbourhood of it and receives Nana's assurance for every kind of assistance in the reduction of Dharwar,

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 21st January 1791.*

On the 18th I was exceedingly concerned to learn from Lt. Davidson the death of my worthy friend Mr. George Forster whose well-known and valuable character too strongly speaks the magnitude of his public loss.

By the enclosed copy of the letter furnished me by the Durbar from Ally Reza to Rasta and my reply, your Lordship will perceive that your instructions arrived most opportunely for the regulation of my answer to Ally Reza's proposal. On my signification of your Lordship's wish that in future all copies of overtures from the enemy may be mutually communicated, the Minister applied for those of the late correspondence

with Tippo with which I declined complying, observing that this Court had hitherto furnished me with none nor even asked my advice on the answers given to Tippo's agents nor on the subsequent overtures till upward of a month had elapsed, nor had then given me a copy of the answer said to have been transmitted and that your Lordship's proposal on this head had been made on your entering the scene of action to obviate in future all possible contradiction or obscurity. In the course of these matters and my reply to Ally Rezza's proposal I have been necessarily led to give this Court to understand, that the overtures to General Medows were from Tipu's Ministers.

I am happy that your Lordship's sentiments relative to Rasta's attending Hurry Punt have been complied with.

As it seems probable that the necessity of your Lordship's waiting for the necessary supplies from Bengal may give time for Hurry Punt's advance to Gooty, the place appointed for the rendezvous of the Mahratta and Nizam's armies, before the approach of the Nabob's force to join your Lordship should be rendered necessary by your penetrating the Mysore country, I sincerely hope the copy of my letter to your Lordship of the 14 Inst. and your Lordship's sentiments relative to Hurry Punt conveyed in your letter to Captain Kennaway, will enable him effectually to do away the Nabob's pretended objections to acting with that Chief and to prevail on his Highness without any discovery of so exceptionable a disposition to prosecute the plan (certainly good if sincerely adopted) of his and this State's joint force approaching to meet anybody your Lordship may appoint for that purpose, and as it appears by Captain Kennaway's accounts that the influence of the Nabob's arms has already extended to Gurrum Coonda, which place is not very distant from Bangalore, it may, I think, be supposed that that place, Bangalore or the neighborhood of it, would be advisable for a triple junction on this point; however your Lordship will have the benefit of Captain Kennaway's sentiments assisted by the local knowledge of the Nabob's Ministry.

In consequence of my warm remonstrances to the Durbar on the deficiency of the Bhau's preparations for assisting Colonel Frederick in the vigorous prosecution of the siege of Darwar, a list of the supplies sent to the Colonel by the Bhau was sent me, the Minister has repeated his assurances that the Bhau has been repeatedly and most strongly enjoined to give every assistance to the Colonel that he may require, but which from the habits and ideas of the people will necessarily fall short of our expectations. From the Colonel I am happy to learn that some progress had been made in the siege. I hope, my Lord, that Colonel Frederick's good sense will enable him so far to benefit by the good advice given him by General Abercromby previous to his leaving Bombay as to perceive that harmony with the Mahratta Chieftain is so necessary to the accomplishment of the object of his expedition, to which I shall lose no opportunity

of being instrumental by the interposition of my good offices with both parties. I am happy in acquainting your Lordship that at present there are no symptoms of ill humor.

I had great pleasure in forwarding to Captain Little your Lordship's approval of his conduct. His merit interested your Lordship in his recovery and I am happy in acquainting you that he is perfectly well of his wound.

In my communication to this Court of your Lordship's proposal that the Chiefs at the head of the armies of this State should correspond with your Lordship, I have extended it to the hope of a general correspondence between the heads of the respective armies of the allies, but in the prosecution of which, permit me to submit to your Lordship circumspection in your communications and a cautious degree of credit to those you may receive. I am at present endeavoring to engage a respectable person to attend Hurry Punt as my agent who will be instructed to exert himself on all occasions to convey every information to your Lordship that he may be able to collect and appear worthy of your notice. My last hircara left Hurry Punt's army the 19th at Siddhateyk; his force then consisted of about 7,000 horse and foot with 7 guns and one howitzer. He was to proceed to-morrow toward Punderpore where it was said, he would again halt.

**No. 206**—The upper works of the fortress of Kopul are demolished and Read is sanguine of the speedy fall of the place.

FROM—CAPT. ANDREW READ,

TO—CAPT. KENNAWAY.

*Camp Kopul, South Hill battery ;  
23rd January 1791.*

I cannot doubt that had it been in your power to have procured us better guns they would have been sent. I have, however, the satisfaction to inform you that the guns of the fort are in a manner again silenced and that the battery on the south hill has answered my wishes so far as to demolish the upper works in such a manner as to open a clear view of the cross wall which, should I find it absolutely necessary to breach, I hope I may succeed in.

Imam Bux has this day been got up the first hill and I hope Litchmy may be got up to-morrow, truck carriages (upon four limber wheels) have been constructed for the double purpose of saving the other carriages and being more easily dragged up. Artificers are employed constructing some on the same principle to serve in the batteries in case of any of those we have, becoming unserviceable those will be ready before they are wanted.

I most sincerely hope your wishes may be gratified by the early fall of this fortress. I have been obliged to employ large parties from the detachment in constructing the batteries and dragging up the guns; necessity requires this, although I believe Darah Jah does everything in his power, but without such assistance we should not have been able to get up the guns. A working party will be employed to-night in constructing the principal breaching battery in the west hill which I hope will be ready to open on the fort, the 26th in the morning and am not without hopes of effecting a breach with the guns on small carriages even should the others fail.

As soon as time will permit, I shall endeavour to regulate the days of dispatch from hence so as to fall in with yours from Paangul. I am much obliged by your information on that subject.

As Darah Jah has empowered me to give what directions I may think necessary in carrying on the siege I have moved my tent to the batteries that I may be at hand to give the necessary orders and prevent delays.

**No. 206A**—Nana, giving an account of the vigorous prosecution of the war by the Poona Court, repudiates certain statements made by the Nizam and points out the difficulties in the way of the Peshwa's taking the field in person.

FROM—BALAJEE PUNDIT,

TO—THE NIZAM.

*Poona, 23rd January 1791.*

By the blessing of God the intimate friendship and good understanding subsisting between the two States are firm and lasting and the heavy and important charge of the counsels and plans of both Governments depend on your Highness. Therefore how can it be supposed that due consideration for the prosperity of both will not have due place in your deliberations? The English in respect to this war, after making due preparation and resolving on entering on it, demanded the alliance of your Highness and the Peshwa's Governments, both of which out of regard to a friendship and strict union with them agreed to this request. It is agreed by treaty "that in the rainy season an army on our part consisting of 25,000 men should enter the enemy's country. Notwithstanding this agreement double the number stipulated on your part with warlike apparatus arrived in the Doab and you in order to support your detachment left the City and repaired to Paangul which rendered it incumbent on the enemy amply to supply and garrison his forts. Our victorious leaders giving way to the impulse of their courage pushed forward and reduced the enemy's country from the Kistna to the south side of the Tungbudra

with Guljendergar, Harponelly, Cummum, Bangeanpelly and other strongholds : the agreement indeed was to the effect that during the rainy season the districts and forts of the Doab should as far as possible be taken possession of, how could there have been a verbal agreement that they should positively be conquered during that season ? Such an agreement it must be supposed could never have existed (with respect to that part of your Highness's letter where you say) " it would be necessary after the rains to advance with an army properly equipped to the southward of the Tungbudra ". Having this design in my heart Purseram Bhao did not (at first) erect his batteries against Darwar but the enemy having early strengthened that fort in a very effectual manner stationed a strong garrison with the necessary apparatus in it for its defence and afterwards sent Budlurul Zeman with a strong force to reinforce it : Purseram Bhao with his army environed it day by day and three or four times engaged Budr-ul-Zeman in battle giving him defeat upon defeat and taking some of his guns and other things, the particulars of which will have reached you from the newspapers. Although Parsuram did not erect batteries still from daily encircling the place and frequently engaging the enemy it became in fact besieged ; if now Purseram Bhao quits the place for any other undertaking leaving a small party to blockade it such a step would tend considerably to weaken the awe and tremor necessary to be kept up. Mr. Malet has also represented against it : on which accounts the dispatch of battering guns and infantry was resolved on. Forts which are strong can only be quickly gained by the treachery or the distress of their garrisons.

In respect to the enemy's being employed against the English and our assisting him therein, how can this observation of your Highness apply ? Your Highness also writes " that hitherto the whole burthen of opposing the enemy and expenses of the war have fallen to the share of the English, the first part of this observation is very true ; but even should the confederates direct their armies to advance on three sides at the same time still the choice of engaging the enemy would not be in the hands of our Commanders, but with him who would attack according as opportunities offered whichever army he liked ; with regard to the latter part of the observation they (meaning the expenses of the war) appear to fall equally on the three confederates ; the English know very well and it is therefore needless to describe minutely the comparative number of horse, foot, etc., employed by them and by us in the war.

the war or called on us to assist in consequence? If they were to give us information of such a nature and we were to disregard or neglect it, there would then be room for reproach.

The treaty we have made in the present undertaking with the English has been carefully attended to and held inviolable, nor will any deviation be ever made from it.

That the treaty concluded through my mediation between your Highness and the Peshwah renders it incumbent on either party to comply with the request of the other even tho' such request or compliance should be thought improper only leaving the whole responsibility of the good or bad consequences of it on the party who make the request is very true: by the favour of God from the first rise of the Peshwah's, my Master's power to the present day the excellent advice and wise plans which have proceeded from your Highness and the commands which you have issued have assuredly at all times been attended to and complied with without scruple. Your Highness also from the first day to the present has approved of and adopted the representations from this quarter in a manner that is too well known to you to require being enlarged on.

The Peshwah's taking the field in person for the purpose of aiding and encouraging the advanced army is certainly advisable, but in that case it will be necessary to keep back some Chiefs, troops and apparatus to protect him and to send the remainder to attack the enemy; by such a plan how will it be possible to chastize in the wished for manner such a vicious enemy as we have to deal with; besides the planet Venus being set, is for the present another objection to it. If we send all the force and apparatus for our two Governments, it is certain the enemy will be worsted and beat in the manner he ought and that the earnest wish of the English in regard to being eased of part of the burthen of the war, will thereby be accomplished. As the command of the forces and military apparatus of the Peshwah for some years past has been entrusted occasionally on service to Hurry Pundit a fortunate moment was fixed on in which he entered his tents and will now be expeditious in making the necessary preparations to advance by constant marches. Chiefs of high rank of both our Sarkars with large armies have invaded the enemy's country and are busily employed in conquering his country and forts; exclusive of whom the above Pundit with a large army has been dispatched to harass and distress the enemy, and if your Highness also makes earnest and proper exertions to distress him it is probable the erring foe will not be able to continue to oppose the English but soon be thrown into disorder and dismay without any chance of success and that the wish of the English to be eased of part of the burthen of the war will be effected; the upright conduct, good faith, constancy, firm disposition and earnestness to perform their engagements with fidelity which are



displayed by the English Chiefs are such as never have appeared among other potentates.

If the force and apparatus as already stated of our two heaven-gifted Sarkars advance and act with vigour and effect the English will be pleased with our conduct and on a principle of justice will not find fault, they will be firmly satisfied, applaud the connection and the services of the confederacy and this important business as it has begun well will be brought to a favourable issue leaving the three confederates in peace and security with that profit and advantage they ought to have. The particulars have been stated to Govind Row Kishen who will represent them to your Highness. I am hopeful you will continue to honour me with your kind letters. What more can I say?

No. 207—Kennaway communicates to the G. G. the answer he suggested to be given to the Maratha Vakil's proposal of a junction between the Nizam's army and Haripant's and also reports the fall of the fortress of Rachoutee.

FROM—CAPT. KENNAWAY,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Paangul, 24th January 1791.*

On the 22nd, I waited on his Highness and delivered to him your Lordship's letters mentioned in my former address. The Minister was present and every appearance as well as whatever reality of displeasure His Highness entertained towards him has entirely subsided which has been brought about chiefly through means of the Begum most confided in by the Nizam and by whom Shums-ul-Umrah was heretofore chiefly patronized.

His Highness acquainted me that the Peshwa's Vakeels were to attend him the next evening to deliver Balajee Pundit's answer to his letter of the 27th November with the purport of which I requested to be early informed. Meer Abul Cossim accordingly waited upon me with the letter itself this morning a translate of which as soon as it can be made shall be forwarded to your Lordship.

In answer to the proposal at length brought forward by the Peshwa's Vakeels for a junction between the Nizam's army and that under Hurry Punt against which the same aversion appears to subsist as ever, I have proposed that the Poona Durbar should be informed, the Nizam's army was already assembled at Gonjycotah, that on the arrival of Hurry Punt at Gooty so short a distance would remain between the two armies that all the advantages of an actual junction might be said to be secured and that from those several places the operations of the two bodies might

commence agreeably to such a plan as could be determined in sufficient time to be communicated to Hurry Punt on his arrival there. So far from any delay to be apprehended on the part of the Nizam the possibility of which is supposed by Mr. Malet His Highness seems anxious to receive such information from me respecting your Lordship's pleasure on the points stated in my letter of the 1st instant as may enable him to direct Assud Ali Khan, Mahomed Ameen etc., to move forward. The Zamindar of Rachoutrie has surrendered his fort and a correspondence has been some time on foot with the Zamindar of Gurramcoonda who is only prevented from doing the same by the enemy's garrison stationed with him.

From Captain Read's letter and from private accounts I still hope that Kopul will shortly be brought to terms. As soon as it is reduced Darah Jah's army will be directed to march towards Gunjycotah to see if anything can be done against that place and for the purpose of supporting Asud Ali Khan's army and facilitating its being properly supplied with provision etc., on its moving southward.

P.S.—I have just received a note from Meer Abul Cossim informing me of the surrender of Munny Moorg to a detachment of Asud Ali Khan's army, that it is a place of consequence and situated about 40 coss from Gunjycotah, he does not mention in what direction, but I imagine to the westward.

No. 208—Capt. Read reports the preparations made for opening the battery against Kopul.

FROM—CAPT. ANDREW READ,

TO—CAPT. KENNAWAY.

*Camp Kopul, South Hill Battery, 28th Jan. 1791.*

In my letter to you of the 23rd instant I mentioned my hope of getting Litchmy up the first hill next day and of being able to open the breaching battery the 26th. To accomplish the first our utmost exertions have failed. She is so excessively heavy and the opening of the battery delayed until to-morrow, it was difficult indeed getting the guns up and a delay was occasioned by being obliged to carry the 32 Pr. down from the South hill to supply the intended place of Litchmy on the west. One truck carriage is finished for the 18 Pr. on which she answers very well—others are preparing with all expedition for the battering guns, in case of necessity.

Litchmy is again put upon the tank battery and so soon as Sultan Shahy's truck carriage can be finished she also will be placed there. Those guns will be of much use in diverting the attention of the besieged.

**No. 209**—Kennaway communicates to the G. G. the answer he suggested to Mir Abul Kasim on the subject of the proposal for peace made by Ali Reza.

FROM—CAPT. KENNAWAY,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Paangul, 28th January 1791.*

Soon after Meer Abul Cossim left me, I received a note from him enclosing for my information a copy of Ali Reza Khan's letter to Annund Row Rasta which he informed me had just been sent to the Nizam by Balajee Pundit and his Highness's opinion requested concerning the reply that should be given to it: translate of the letter is enclosed. As my sentiments were not asked I merely acknowledged the receipt of the letter and desired whatever opinion his Highness might give should be communicated to me.

Meer Abul Cossim came to me again yesterday evening and acquainted me that having repaired from my house to the Minister the preceding evening he found the Mahratta Vakeels assembled there, and that the letter in question was the subject of conversation in the course of which they appeared anxious to impress the necessity of an interference on the part of the Peshwa and the Nizam in favour of Tippoo and the Vakeels being received, that after their departure the Minister had sent a copy of the letter to his Highness requesting to know whether an immediate answer should be given to the reference or whether I should first be consulted and that he had at the same time sent another copy to me, also that it was apparent the letter must have been received a considerable time before its communication to the Nizam was determined on: that his Highness's answer to the Minister's note directed him to send Meer Abul Cossim to me to learn my opinion on the subject which I gave nearly in the following terms, that the Nizam's answer to the former reference was equally applicable to the present one, that I thought the present was not so favourable a juncture for a negotiation as that which we might soon expect seeing the change that would in all probability be brought about ere long in the enemy's affairs by the reduction of Dharwar and Kopul, by General Abercromby's operations and by those your Lordship is about to enter on in concert with the Nizam's and the Peishwa's armies and that the result of those prospects ought to be waited for before any negotiations was agreed to; that I therefore submitted two opinions to his Highness; 1st, that Ali Reza Khan should be informed the allies would not make peace with his master without full and ample compensation for whatever losses they had sustained and whatever expenses they had incurred through his means, which as it was probable he would not at present be disposed to comply with, there could be no use in a Vakeel being sent; 2ndly, that if his master was seriously bent on peace and would

previously engage to comply with all the just demands of the Allies even though they might be deemed to bear rather hard upon him, in that case there would be no objection to his Vakeels proceeding and the proper passes would be sent him accordingly. Independent of the reasons for my opinions above recited the following consideration also weighed with me. I think it may be taken for granted that the Mahrattas are strongly disposed to favour the cause of Tippoo and that if, peace and the negotiation for it depend upon them the Company and the Nizam will suffer by it, a truth which I believe his Highness is pretty sensible of ; besides, I should hope the situation of affairs will never render it expedient for your Lordship to negotiate with the enemy till he has abandoned the Carnatic, his depredations in which to the utter neglect comparatively speaking of the other parts of his dominions he has probably conceived would be the most likely method of his power of engaging us to concur with our allies in agreeing to an accommodation, an expectation of his disappointment in which must, I should conceive, operate greatly to our advantage in the adjustment of any terms that may afterwards be discussed.

(i)—Ali Reza Khan to Ananda Row Rasta.

My desire of an interview is not to be expressed, I therefore proceed to express my wish to you that you inform me of your health and prosperity. At this time Abdul Gunny Khan and Gulam Hussain Khan (Tippoo's late Vakeels at the Poona Darbar) having received their dismissal from you repaired to the Assud Elahy Presence, and from their report it is understood that no negotiation will be entered into without the participation of the other confederates and that whatever is wished to be done must be done with all three, on which account I have been dispatched to negotiate and am arrived at Chitaldroog. If you will send me passports I will wait upon you and disclose many friendly communications.

(ii)—The letter proposed by the Nizam to be written by the Poona Ministers to Ali Reza Khan.

When the English chiefs of the Company on account of Tippoo's breach of treaty in the instance of his attack on the Rajah of Travancore determined on war and requested the confederacy of the Peshwah and the Nizam who, for the purpose of recovering their own rights, were induced to comply therewith, treaties were concluded on terms of strict union by the three illustrious Sarkars. This being the case, how can the war be brought

to a conclusion without satisfying the minds of the English who are the principals in it and the other confederates mentioned in the treaties? It is evident that the confederates cannot be satisfied otherwise than by the removal of the cause of disturbance and obtaining ample compensation for all losses sustained and restoration of all unjust usurpations made since the time of Hyder Ali Khan to the present day during which injustice has prevailed and the practice of it continues daily to increase. As the quenching of the present flame depends entirely on the above conditions, consider maturely that until such time as a compliance with them is firmly impressed on Tippoo's mind there can be no good purpose answered by your coming. I therefore write you that whenever Tippoo firmly resolves on making the above cessions to each of the three illustrious Confederates you will first forward information of the same from him in writing in a clear and positive manner that the confederates being made acquainted with the particulars their ultimate wishes may individually be ascertained and afterwards Tippoo made acquainted with them. Then friendly endeavours on your behalf may be serviceable to you.

**No. 210**—Kennaway requests the Nizam to appoint a chief of distinction to the command of his army and communicates to the G. G. his opinion of certain chiefs in the Nizam's service.

FROM—CAPT. KENNAWAY,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Paangal, 31st January 1791.*

His Highness read to me his answer to the reference made to him from Poona concerning Ali Reza Khan's application in the form of a letter to be returned by the Peishwah's Ministers which he signed in my presence and directed that I should be furnished with a copy of it, translate is enclosed for your Lordship's information.

A draft was also read of a letter proposed to be written to Rajah Barramul (of late more commonly known by the title of Tedge Wunt) directing him to correspond with your Lordship on your entering the enemy's country, furnish you with every information in his power and be directed in his operations, as far as circumstances would admit of, by your advice. I suggested the necessity of instructions to a nearly similar import being added in respect to Hurry Punt in order that the motions of the three armies might to a certain degree be regulated by each other and at the same time expressed an earnest wish that some Chief of superior rank could be placed in the important command. Rajah Barramul is an Officer of the Minister's Russala and extremely confided in by him. He is clever, active and intelligent and although of rank much inferior to Assud Ali Khan and Mahomed Ameen Arab, the utmost harmony subsists between them, yet though I have expressed a wish of some other officers being sent, I scarce know whom I would propose if the question were

put to me, so extremely few are the Omrahs of this state in whom rank and ability are to be found united. Mahomed Ameen and Assud Ali Khan though otherwise on good terms will not serve under each other, an objection which the appointment of Barramul who is considered by them as the organ of the Minister's commands was intended to remove, which it has successfully done. It would be unsafe at this juncture for the Minister to move, Shums-ul-Umrah's death by which I hoped it would have been facilitated having in its consequences rather operated against it; nor can Mohabut Jung who would be a very proper person be called away from Kopul till the place has surrendered. No decisive answer has yet been given me on the subject by the Minister, but I expect to hear from him concerning it before I shall have occasion to address your Lordship again.

No. 211—Azim-ul-Umara points out the inexpediency of his personally assuming the command.

CONVERSATION BETWEEN AZIM-UL-OMRAH AND CAPT. KENNAWAY'S MUNSHY.

*31st January 1791.*

The Minister observed that there were many serious apprehensions, with the nice nature of which I was not acquainted, in respect to his going to command the army in person; I said I was in general acquainted with the difference of parties here and the interested suggestions of people who lay in wait for opportunities of misrepresentations: he replied "no, what I allude to is a secret only known to the Nizam and myself and except to Meer Abul Cossim I have imparted it to nobody; necessity induces me to tell it to you; after desiring me to swear not to communicate it to any person besides Captain Kennaway and that nobody should know of it from him as its being divulged might be very prejudicial to affairs, to satisfy him I swore as he desired that I would acquaint no one but my Master; he began to describe the particulars of the secret from the first in the following manner viz: that after the death of Shums-ul-Umrah it happened that on account of indisposition he had not for twenty days attended the Nizam's Durbar of which I must have been acquainted, that during the interval some interested people with a sinister design represented certain things to His Highness, that is to say Govind Row Kishen who, notwithstanding the kindnesses and favors he himself had shown him, had independent of him sent a petition to His Highness importing that Balajee Pundit had written something which he would relate in a private manner, requesting that he might receive a written assurance from His Highness that the subject should not be made known to anybody: His Highness eager to know the subject ordered him to be admitted to a private audience in which on the part of Balajee Pundit

he stated that a suspicion was entertained of Azem-ul-Umrah on two accounts and of His Highness also for having approved of them ; one of which was that such a connection with the English never had subsisted, and now that so firm a union and friendship was brought about with them what was the drift of it ? The other with what view the connection with Sindia had been made closer than formerly and requested a satisfactory answer to them ; His Highness observed that an answer to them was not to be comprised in two words but would require a volume ; that he would at another time mention particulars to him : accordingly Govind Row Kishen was admitted to a second private audience in which his Highness gave him such answer as he thought applicable. He (the Minister) added that the day he went to the Durbar His Highness related the above particulars to which he answered that His Highness was master and he his slave and that he had committed the fault of forming a connection with the English : after this the Minister addressing himself to me said that his view in the fault laid to his charge was that fortune being inconstant, the life of man not immortal, it was therefore the duty of a Minister to form such a system as might be necessary to establish the Government of his master on a firm and lasting foundation from generation to generation and impress posterity with a grateful remembrance of his wisdom : also that the English who have established a mighty power on a firm footing in this country by thinking gratefully of the connection with a Chief of such weight, illustrious name and numerous forces as the Nizam and being induced to assist each other in time of need may remember him as a person of great judgment ; that exclusive of the above he had no other view ; that he is certain Balajee Pundit would never break with this Sarkar as he is a considerate person and a lover of his ease. As the Peishwa's taking the field in person, a measure full of advantages was sacrificed by him to his convenience and thereby the interest of his master wholly disregarded, how will he break through old fixed rules subsisting with Tipu's Sarkar, a measure that is pregnant with innumerable dangers to him. The Minister continued that the connection with Sindia who is a mighty Chief and Master of 50,000 horse was also not void of advantage ; that when occasion should occur for its being made use of, His Highness' descendants might be benefited by it.

As during an absence of twenty days from the durbar short-sighted people had brought forward many suppositions and ideas to His Highness, in case of being at a distance and people producing a change, who would have the power of removing it and preventing such an interruption in the operations of the present war as it might be impossible to overcome ? Besides he observed in the event of his going in person who was here to manage the dispatch of money and necessary supplies from wherever they might be in proper time to the advanced army as will be done by him : for the present his going, he said, was not advisable.

**No. 212**—Malet communicates to the G. G. a heated discussion that took place between him and Nana on the deficiency of Haripant's army, on his tardy advance and especially on the delay in forwarding ammunition for the siege of Dharwar.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona 31st January 1791.*

I shall now give your Lordship the substance of what passed between me and the Minister at the interview of the 28th.

In answer to my enquiries concerning Hurry Punt's progress and my intimation of having heard that his force was still very deficient, he replied that he had reached Punderpore, 60 coss hence, that a very few of the Mankurries or select troops who had stayed in Poona now remained and that he expected his whole force would be complete in 15 days from that time. In answer to my query as to the future route of this army, he said that no answers had yet been received from Nizam Ally Khan to the applications from hence for the Nabob's sentiments thereon, whether Hurry Pant should advance and have a meeting with the Nabob or by what route he should proceed to form a junction with the Chieftain appointed to command the Nabob's forces, which he desired me to mention to Captain Kennaway. Observing that this language had a strong tendency to produce all the evil consequences of rendering the proposed junction of the allied forces null and ineffectual by furnishing this Court an excuse for the non-advance of Hurry Pant till satisfied with respect to the Nabob's quota, I endeavoured to lay the foundation of a specious mode of accounting for the Nabob's force previously advancing to join a body of our forces from the Carnatic by remarking that as the Nabob's forces were advanced near Gurramconda whence Bangalore was not very distant, it seemed probable that his Highness's quota might join from thence. He replied that he did not understand that exclusive of Zamindarree people of those quarters the Nabob had collected any force nearly equal to the proposed quota for joining the Company's force from the Carnatic, to which I replied that I had been informed that a very large force of the Nabob's own troops was assembled under Mahd. Ameen Arab, Asudally Khan, Hafiz Ferid-ul-Deen and Raja Baramal. He said time would show. While on this subject I signified to the Minister that my latest advice from Madras contains accounts that the direction of the former operations was changed and that it had commenced its progress to the north whence I was led to conclude that some change of measures had been adopted in favour of the proposed co-operation with the armies of the allies, from which conclusion I inferred the necessity of the speedy completion of Hurry Punt's force and expeditious march toward Gooti; for I am by no means a friend to the meeting of the Nabob and Hurry Pant. Your



Lordship will observe that this intimation of the movement of the army North is in prosecution of the mode that in my address of the 7th inst. I told your Lordship I should adopt, of accounting for the difference between your Lordship's plan of operations and that pursued by General Medows.

From this subject I proceeded to the principal object of my visit by asking the Minister if he had received any intelligence from Dharwar and on his answering none of consequence, I communicated him Col. Frederick's account of the cessation of the fire of his battery as contained in his letter of 21st instant. I described as strongly as I could the very disgraceful state to which our force was reduced by the silence of our battery, the advantage thereby given to the enemy, the great addition of labour and expense to be necessarily incurred by recommencing the battery against a repaired breach after sacrificing so many lives and throwing away so much ammunition. I enlarged on the discreditable appearance of such a deficiency in preparation to the power of this state after his, the Minister's, expressed assurances to me of preventing it and after his even declining acceptance of my offers of supplying his wants, to which he had replied that they had plenty and that he had taken effectual means to prevent deficiency. I reminded him of my pressing solicitations to inspect the ammunition etc. sent from hence previous to its departure, to which his constant answer had been that I might rely on him; I begged him therefore to recollect that by my dependence on him my credit was at stake with my countrymen and I submitted to his generosity as the ruler of a State and to his feelings as a man how consistent it was with either to endanger my credit with your Lordship and my countrymen in the course of my endeavours to promote the general cause of the confederacy and the particular advantage of this State.

Your Lordship will easily conceive that this language was not used without warmth, but your Lordship can have no conception of the sangfroid with which the Minister heard what I advanced, when, without showing the smallest consciousness of misconduct, he coolly replied that in the measures of this great and mighty State the delay of a few days was thought of very little consequence, that in the present case knowing the stress laid by us on promptitude, he had wished to avoid delay, but that he had been disappointed in his expectations of ammunition from Goa, nor did he scruple to add, from Bombay, hinting at the same time that I was not unacquainted with his failure from the latter place. By which he had not only confirmed the intelligence I had previously received of the late smuggling of shot from that place, but discovered that the person who had been engaged therein had most probably accounted for his failure in the completion of his contract by my detection of the practice and intelligence of it to Bombay, though, in fact,

I was totally ignorant of it till I heard that about 10,000 shot had been bought, which I did not mention to the Bombay Board till the 27th instant. At all events I thought proper to remark to the Minister the precariousness and the unworthiness of such a mode of procuring the supply of his wants in preference to the open and certain one I had offered him ; in answer to which he had recourse to the important and dignified plea of cheapness. He said that on learning the deficiency in camp, supplies had been sent from hence which must have arrived or be on the eve of arrival, that further supplies were expected from Goa and that an application had been made to me for shot which should likewise be sent to the army. The mention of an expectation of a supply from Bombay at this period of the siege again roused my admiration which I expressed, when the Minister with his previous observation of the insignificance of a few days gave me to understand that such is their mode of proceeding and if it was not agreeable the recall of the detachment was at my option. This, my Lord, was a severe trial of that patience which I have been learning for these five years past ; I will not attempt to express what I felt. It is sufficient to say that I suppressed it and replied that as the detachment was furnished on this Court's application, it should be recalled the instant its desire to that purpose was signified. This drew on some palliation of the above speech by a general assurance from the Minister that every effort should be made to supply the deficiency that had happened ; that the Bhau should be written to to explain the causes of delay to Colonel Frederick and I was requested to write to the Colonel to the same purport to which, seeing no other mode of avoiding innumerable evils, I assented and have the honour to enclose copy of my letter. I enclosed the disagreeable subject with repeating to the minister that my credit and the honour of the detachment were in his keeping.

I should not have been so particular on so unpleasant a topic but from my wish to convey, if possible, a clear idea of the extraordinary genius and unexampled selfishness of a court with which not only your Lordship in particular but the British Nation in general will have so much to do as long as our empire in the East shall exist.

I next entered on the business of Aly Raza's letter and in reply to the Minister's expressions of inclination to receive him, repeated my sentiments that the letter in question seemed to my mind a very insufficient authority to proceed on his admission, and observed that agreeable to the sentiments of Nizam Ally Khan, the Governor General and the Minister himself, it would be high time to take notice of any advance from the enemy on his acceding in a formal manner to the previous article of treating in concert with the three contracting Powers when each might propose its preliminaries. I begged to know if the Nabob had been consulted on the subject, the Minister replied he had and I told him I should likewise communicate what had passed to your Lordship. I took this opportunity of repeating

what I had so often said before as to the great case to negotiation and benefit to the confederacy that will be derived from the Peshwa's taking the field in person, observing that it might be made an excursion of pleasure and utility without danger or trouble. The Minister replied that as to the absence of danger or trouble no difference would on that account take place in the preparations, should the measure be resolved on, as it was the part of a wise man in hunting an hare to provide for encountering a lion, but that the practicability, as he had, often told me, rested on his health. For my own part I am very much inclined to think that all obstacles would be removed by any signal advantage gained by your Lordship over the enemy and by your Lordship and the Nabob insisting, if judged advisable, either that the negotiations shall be conducted at a place convenient, as for instance, Bijapore by a congress of delegates, or that if the Peshwa wishes to receive the enemy's Vackeels he shall, for the benefit of conducting the negotiations, advance to a convenient distance from the other contracting powers:

As in the event of your Lordship's penetrating the Balla Ghaut and bending your course toward the enemy's capital the procural of provisions will necessarily become an object of great importance, permit me to suggest to your Lordship the expediency of the establishment of a magazine at Cannanore from whence supplies may be escorted by the Coorgs to Periapatum in case of our having previously occupied that place from whence, I imagine, convoys might be easily conducted to a camp in the neighbourhood of Syringputtun.

As this Court will receive the most constant and circumstantial accounts of every occurrence in the army from Buchajee Ragonath, permit me to hope that your Lordship will cause me to be regularly furnished with such intelligence as you may judge necessary for putting my information on a footing with that of this Court. I have hitherto been much indebted to Gen. Medow's punctual communications, but must relinquish the hope of their continuance on your Lordship's taking the command of the army.

## SECTION 5

*Second stage of the War—Cornwallis commands in person—Fall of Bangalore and Dharwar  
(February—April, 1791)*

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No. 213—Kennaway objects to the appointment of Raja Tejwant to command the Nizam's army and suggests the Minister's son as being the fittest person.

FROM—CAPT. KENNAWAY,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Paungal, 3rd February 1791.*

On the 31st ultimo Meer Abul Cossim waited on me from the Minister to represent in reply to my request for an Officer of superior rank being sent to command the army intended to co-operate with your Lordship, if essential service from that army was my object, it could not be placed in better hands than it was in at present ; that Rajah Teidge Wunt was not of that subordinate station which I seemed to conceive, that he had acted in commands of considerable trust and that the Minister was persuaded your Lordship would have every reason to applaud and be satisfied with him. I replied that real service undoubtedly was my first object, that I had no sort of objection to Teidge Wunt as to abilities, but that I wished that those advantages should be combined with and set off by the rank of superior commander, since in the same manner as a general derived eclat from a numerous and respectable army so the army drew consequence and

weight from a distinguished character being placed at its head, an arrangement that was more immediately necessary in the present instance as His Highness's army was intended to co-operate with those of the Company and the Peshwah, the first commanded by your Lordship in person, the 2nd by Hurry Punt, one of the most considerable officers of the Mahratta State. Meer Abul Cossim endeavoured to answer my arguments by alleging that Teidge Wunt's army was only to be considered as an advanced division of the forces under Mohabat Jung who would be directed to take the command as soon as Kopul was reduced and that the Minister, as very cogent reasons did not obtain against it, would assume it himself. I replied that Mohabat Jung's being able to take the command depended on contingencies of a nature which rendered the period so uncertain that it could not properly be argued on, that the juncture required dispatch and that with respect to the Minister's going I had, when the idea was first mentioned, stated my objections against it. He then repeated the names of several Chiefs, but not one against whom objections of the nature described to your Lordship in my last did not apply. In the course of the part of the conversation I took occasion to mention the name of Musheer-ul-Dowlah, the Minister's only son, who, tho' deficient in the necessary experience for such a trust, possesses the other requisites and is the only person I could think of, after mature deliberation that comes any way near the description of the person wanted. Meer Abul Cossim (on my mentioning his name) agreed with me in my favourable opinion of him, but added he had no conception that his father could so far overcome his affection and parental solicitude as to be able to bring himself to part with him, that, however, if I would break the subject to Musheer-ul-Mulk it should receive his support. I sent my Moonshy in the evening for this purpose when a conversation passed, the first part of which is detailed in the enclosed translate of the Moonshy's written report; after it had proceeded thus far he mentioned from me the only person I could think of for this command; on hearing his son's name the Minister paused some time to recollect himself and started objections the nature of which proved the truth of Meer Abul Cossim's opinion and are not of sufficient consequence to be detailed to your Lordship. Meer Abul Cossim came to me the next morning (the 1st instant) when I had little difficulty in convincing him how weak they were and how much my proposal being agreed to would redound to the reputation of the Nizam's Government, to the Minister's credit and to his son's advantage. Meer Abul Cossim said he was satisfied of it himself and would try again what was to be done; on his taking leave I desired to attend his Highness that I might request to know what information he chose I should communicate to your Lordship in consequence of my representation on this subject at my last interview.

I waited on his Highness accordingly last night when I briefly recapitulated the necessity which struck me and my reasons for desiring that the command of the army at Guniycotah should be placed in superior

hands ; his answer was not decisive or particular ; nor did I wish that it should be, and I received an early dismissal for the purpose apparently of his discussing the subject with the Minister after my departure, with the result I am not yet acquainted but apprehend it will have been determined one way or the other, and that no further obstacle will occur to final directions being given to the Officer in command to communicate and advise with your Lordship on your entering the enemy's country.

**No. 214**—Malet gives an account of the operations of the Mahratta army in Sonda and reports the opening of batteries at Dharwar.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 4th February 1791.*

Having demanded a conference with the Minister to make known to him the contents of Syed Saib's letter and the answer given to it by Mr. Cherry that business was dispatched at a visit that I paid the Minister yesterday afternoon. He heard the letters explained with attention but without making any remark, begged to be furnished with copies on a deliberate consideration of which he would give me his sentiments. I pointed out to him the fair and candid mode of your Lordship's proceeding, the prohibition of all further intercourse that did not include the general intercourse of all the contracting powers ; I remarked to him the invidious and disingenuous conduct of Tippo in the different style of Moyeen-ul-deen's letter to your Lordship and that ascribed by this Court to Ally Rezza, since in this letter a vague mention is made of the three contracting powers but in the former tho' of a much later date no notice whatever is taken of them, and assured the Minister that by the same rule that your Lordship was resolved most faithfully to discharge the engagements of the Confederacy, you expected a similar return from the other members of it.

The assurances given me at our late meeting of the dispatch of ammunition had been verified ; Col. Frederick's battery had been again opened with two additional guns, the Minister observed that to prevent a like deficiency in future several camels laden with ammunition had been sent from hence to Dharwar since our last meeting. He also acquainted me that an armament equipped from Gheria had transported a body of 2 or 3,000 men to the South of Sounda where they had made a descent, taken the fort of Seepee Ghur and established Thanás as far as Onore, and that a body of Tippo's troops that had advanced toward Sounda had been forced to retreat by Bannia Bappoo, the Mahratta commander in those parts. He also told me that intelligence had reached him of a French ship of force having for some time past taken up her station in the offing of

Bombay, a little to the south of that port, and asked if I had received, any account of it or of the arrival of an agent from Tippo named Goutum Pundit at Pondicherry. I assured him I had heard of neither, but would make enquiries relative to the former of the Bombay Govt. He wished to know if a person from Tippo could proceed through the Carnatic to Pondicherry without the knowledge or permission of our Govt. I replied that I did not know but conceived it might easily be effected in disguise.

On the 1st instant I received a note from the Durbar for 35,000 payable in Parsaram Bhous' army on account of Capt. Little's detachment.

My address of the 27th Nov. will have fully explained to your Lordship the origin of the proposed plan of cooperation and that of the 14th ulto. will, I hope, have thrown some light on the objections of His Highness the Nabob whenever a body of the Peshwa's or His Highness's cavalry joins your Lordship. I hope that instead of burthening your Lordship with providing for their payment and subsistence, they will be able to effect one of the greatest benefits of their junctions by keeping open a secure communication with the army for the banjarries by whom Indian armies are supplied.

**No. 215**—Kennaway reports the lengthy conversation that went on for several days between him and Mir Alam on the subject of Tejwant's appointment and the prompt despatch of four or five thousand horse whenever requisitioned by the G. G.

FROM—CAPT. KENNAWAY,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Paungal, 7th February 1791.*

On the 4th Meer Abul Cossim came to me from the Minister and acquainted me that there were insuperable objections as well of a private as a public nature to his sending his son to command the army, that he was not unmindful of opportunities to comply with my wishes to the extent even of proceeding himself or getting the Nizam to move, but that the only mode he could think of to gratify me in the present instance was that Mohabut Jung should proceed to take upon him the command and his place at Kopul be supplied by some other officer which, if I chose, he should be desired to do at the same time, stating that Teidge Wunt possessed his entire confidence and he thought was the best person that could be fixed on for the service this army was designed for and that if I had any objection on account of his inequality of rank compared with that of your Lordship's, the objection might be obviated by your corresponding with him thro' your Parsian translator, in which I replied that I could on no account advise Mohabut Jung's quitting Kopul since thro' his personal influence alone it chiefly was that sufficient material to enable the siege to

go on at all was procurable, that I had done my duty in stating in the plainest terms the nature of the necessity I conceived there was for an officer of higher rank being sent, but that if one of this description was not to be found I saw no help for it and should make no further objection to Teidge Wunt.

The force under the command of this Officer previous to the junction of some parties of cavalry which have lately marched from hence, Meer Abdul Cossim stated, consists of seven thousand foot, fifteen thousand horse and about twenty four guns. I proposed to him that it should be immediately augmented by the drafts of two or three thousand cavalry from Mohabat Jung's army from which they could very well be spared and by about fifteen hundred horse under Hushmat Jung, a natural brother of the late Rukn ud Dowlah, who is to proceed from hence in a day or two to reinforce the troops of the Sholapur Raja and to save the delay of a reference hereafter that instructions should be given to Teidge Wunt to comply with any requisition from your Lordship for four or five thousand horse, should you deem such an aid necessary for the advancement of the common cause. Meer Abdul Cossim said he could not give any answer to these propositions till the Nizam's pleasure was known concerning them, that they should be submitted to him the same evening and the result be communicated to me the next day.

He returned to me on the 5th and informed me the Nizam had agreed that Mohabut Jung should be directed to dispatch to Teidge Wunt's camp what cavalry he had with him belonging to Shums-Ul-Umrah's Russalah and Hussain Khan Guttalah which united consisted of about two thousand and that Hushmat Jung should also be directed thither on the first intimation he should receive of Teidge Wunt being about to advance to the southward which he might do in the course of two days, as Gooty in the vicinity of which the Sholapoor Rahaj was did not lie about fifteen or twenty coss from Gunjycottah. In reply to my request that Teidge Wunt might be directed to comply with any application from your Lordship for four or five thousand horse, the Nizam, he said, had observed that as Teidge Wunt's entire force would be directed to join your Lordship and be at your entire disposal what occasion could there be for any aid being limited to a particular number since, so small a body as four or five thousand horse could do no good but by being separated from the main body might endanger the safety of the whole; to which I replied that his Highness might be perfectly satisfied your Lordship would not make the requisition without considering it in all its consequences with respect to the safety of the Nizam's army in as great and probably in a greater degree than if it regarded the Company's: that five thousand of His Highness's cavalry acting with nearly an equal number of the Company's and supported by our army might be deemed equal to treble or quadruple the number acting under different circumstances and that with respect to the Nizam's army joining your Lordship I apprehend it



might tend to embarrass you with regard to provisions, that at any rate I conceived it should be left to your Lordship whether Teidge Wunt should advance with the whole of his force including infantry and guns, which tho' perhaps good compared with the rest of his Highness's infantry, are such as your Lordship would not be disposed to place much reliance on; or that the troops be advanced with should be confined to cavalry. Meer Abdul Cossim replied that Teidge Wunt was at present plentifully supplied with provisions and would in all probability continue to be so as the country through which he would have to pass was disposed to assist him; at any rate that the cavalry could always supply themselves and would not be burthensome on this account to your Lordship and that the Nizam had expressed his opinion that only the cavalry should advance to join your Lordship leaving the infantry and guns at the station they at present occupied; I said I thought this point ought to be left wholly to your Lordship's discretion, since if you should advice that the country should be reduced as it was passed thro' the infantry and guns which you would not in any other case wish to encumber yourself with would be necessary. Meer Abul Cossim returned to me the 6th; he acquainted me that the Minister had not had an opportunity of consulting the Nizam on the points discussed between us the day before, but that there would be an objection to the separation of a party of five or six thousand cavalry from the main body since, such number being the amount stipulated to be paid for by the Company in case their services should be demanded agreeable to the treaty, if it was afforded gratis the Peshwah might upbraid the Nizam for having made the concession, and that as Teidge Wunt after his junction would be desirous of guiding himself by your Lordship's advice you could always point out to him that when the service only required a small detachment it would be absurd to employ the whole body. Meer Abul Cossim then proceed to state from the Minister a proposal at which I was equally distressed and surprized, namely that in order to guard against the possibility of the proposed junction being intercepted by the enemy the advance of the Nizam's army to join your Lordship's should be restricted to the condition of the Company's army moving to within twenty coss of it; to which I replied that hampered with such restriction it would be of no advantage to trust anything to your Lordship's discretion and that if the Nizam could not place an implicit confidence in your solicitude for the safety of this body of his troops equally with that of your own, His Highness had better trust the conduct of it entirely to his own officer and direct him to join and advance in concert with Hurry Punt, but that if it was not formidable enough to effect a junction with your Lordship in spite of opposition at five times the distance mentioned I confessed I could not see what good could be expected from it, and that if this disreputable restriction should continue to be insisted on I had only to observe, which it gave me concern to do, that a very difficult task would remain with the Nizam and the Minister to

account to your Lordship in a satisfactory manner for the inconsistency and duplicity of their late conduct and professions to me; Meer Abul Cossim left me to report the conversation to the Minister with a promise that I should either see or hear from him the following (this) day, but as the evening is arrived without my having done so I shall close my letter and must refer your Lordship to my next dispatch for, I hope, the sequel of this unexpected discussion.

As the communication with your Lordship will become precarious in proportion as you advance into the enemy's country I shall in future use the precaution of numbering my dispatches beginning with this letter by which means any miscarriage will be more readily detected, tho' I shall continue to send duplicates of all such as are anywise material as before.

No. 216—Kenraway reports to G. G. the Minister's assent to the junction of the Nizam's cavalry with the English army in accordance with G. G.'s requisition, and his intention to depute Lieut. Stuart to Tejwant's Camp.

FROM—CAPT. KENNAWAY,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Paungal, 10th February 1791.*

After closing my letter of the 7th instant I received a note from Meer Abdul Cossim acquainting me that the Minister had given up his proposal of limiting the junction of the Nizam's army with your Lordship to your moving to within 20 coss of it, that such junction, however, would be confined to the cavalry of Teidge Wunt's army which, tho' I wished to point should be left entirely to your Lordship's discretion, was my chief object, that instructions agreeably to my suggestion should be given to Teidge Wunt and delivered to me to forward directing him to correspond with Hurry Punt but in a separate letter from that concerning his correspondence with your Lordship, that Balajee Pundit would at the same time be desired to issue similar orders to the Mahrata Commander; that the drafts of the different letters have been approved of by the Nizam who had directed them to be written and had desired I would attend the following evening that he might deliver them to me with his own hands.

I attended His Highness at the time appointed and received the following letters. 1st, to your Lordship enclosing a duplicate of an order to Teidge Wunt to be forwarded by you directing him to communicate and advise with your Lordship. 2nd letter to the same Chief informing him of my having nominated a gentleman to proceed to his camp and

enjoining him on receipt of your Lordship's instructions to join you with not less than 15,000 cavalry and obey your directions concerning them; 3rd, a circular letter to Assud Ali Khan and other Chiefs with the army informing them of the nature of the orders which had been given to Teidge Wunt and 4th, a separate letter to that Chief directing him to correspond with the Commander of the Mahratta forces. The letter to Balajee Pundit desiring that the same directions might be given to Hurry Punt was at the same time delivered to the Agent of the Peishwah's Vakeels to be forwarded by them. On his delivering them to me he dwelt a good deal on the entire confidence he reposed in your Lordship's friendly and honourable intentions towards his Government, his sense of which he said he could not convey in a more striking manner than in the powers he had delegated to you over his army, nor could afford, he said, a stronger proof of his zeal for the cause in which we were mutually embarked than by furnishing your Lordship by means of a respectable body of cavalry with every assistance in his power to bring the contest, in spite of the enemy's deep laid plans to the contrary, to a speedy and successful issue.

Such an aid indeed will, I should hope, be of the most essential service to your Lordship in enabling you to baffle him in a part where he probably deems himself invulnerable to our attempts viz., that of having it always in his option to avoid risking a decisive action and, as I have not committed your Lordship in the smallest degree in regard to the pay and provisions necessary for the subsistence of this body or made any use of the latitude given me by your commands of the 18th, Your Lordship is left at entire liberty to act in these particulars as you may think proper and no other objections will, I hope, occur against your availing yourself of its services. Six lacks of rupees were, I am assured, lately dispatched to Teidge Wunt with injunctions to keep this sum in reserve till he should advance, independent of which his collections in the reduced districts cannot have been inconsiderable.

To afford your Lordship as accurate an account of the state and order of this army as can be procured on the spot, for the greater security and facility of your communications with its commander and to insure as far as possible a prompt and ready obedience on his part to such directions as your Lordship may think proper to give him it was that I determined in case the Nizam should testify what should appear to me to be an unequivocal desire to employ it in an effectual co-operation with your Lordship, to send a confidential person to Teidge Wunt's Camp. I have accordingly fixed on my Assistant Lieut. W. Steuart in whose prudence and circumspection I have a confidence which I have no doubt his conduct will confirm for this trust. He will proceed from hence the 12th instant and remain with the Camp after his arrival in which he will lose no time in notifying to your Lordship as long as you may deem his situation necessary or useful to you. He is furnished with a copy of the Cypher No. 11.

Mr. G. Mercer will act as my Assistant during Lieut. Steuart's absence.

*P.S.*—In consequence of Balajee Pundit's request to Mr. Malet as stated in the first paragraph of his letter to your Lordship of the 31st ultimo I earnestly recommended in my last conference with the Nizam that a clear and explicit answer should be returned to the Poonah Durbar's application for his Highness's sentiments concerning Hurry Punt's coming to Paangul instead of the ambiguous one which I was informed had been given, namely, "that Balajee Pundit should determine whether Hurry Punt's waiting on his Highness would be necessary, whether the Nizam sending a confidential person to communicate his sentiments to him on his arrival in the neighbourhood of the army near Gunjycottah would not be as well, or whether his being informed of them in writing might not suffice, and desiring that Balajee Pundit would in the mean time give him his opinion in order that the Nizam might regulate his own for Hurry Punt's guidance." I have proposed the Poonah Minister should be informed that Hurry Punt's coming here would occasion nothing but waste of time at a juncture when on account of the advance of the Company's troops dispatch was so necessary and when, therefore, it was advisable that the armies of the two States should proceed as far as possible to support and give effect to your Lordship's operations.

(i) EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM THE NIZAM TO BALAJEE PUNDIT.

As at this time by the aid of the favor of God Hurry Pundit Furkia on the part of Row Pundit Perdhaun intends to cross the Tungbuddra to enter the country on the south side of the Doab and the troops of the English Company also propose to advance, it is necessary that the allies should give and receive accounts of each other's occurrences respectively as well as communicate to each other whatever intelligence either may receive of the enemy and that this practice should be strictly adhered to : Rajah Teidge Wunt who is employed with my advanced army in the neighbourhood of Gunjycotah in punishing the obstinate and watchful belonging to the enemy for the abovementioned reasons has been written to that whenever Hurry Pundit Furkia with his forces shall have entered the enemy's country and advanced to within a short distance of my troops, he must communicate fully in writing to the said Pundit his own occurrences and what news he may hear of the enemy and that he must in the same manner keep the Commander of the Company's troops informed of these matters : The abovementioned Rajah will accordingly act agreeably to my orders ; do you also write to Hurry Punt to correspond constantly and fully with Rajah Teidge Wunt concerning all his own occurrences and as much news as he may be able to procure of the enemy.

(ii) FROM—THE NIZAM,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

As by the favor of God the friendship subsisting between me and the English Company (who are firm and true in their friendships) has duly increased and by means of our steady adherence to treaties it is now on so firm a foundation that nothing can shake or in the smallest degree lessen it, the planning the operations of the present war being a joint concern between us and the troops of both our Governments being busily employed in conquering the country, punishing the improper actions of the faithless enemy, it will be advantageous to us that the occurrences of each of our armies should be communicated to the others respectively; that they should advise with and endeavour to assist each other. It is for the above reasons you are written to by the pen of friendship to forward after the entrance of your victorious troops into the enemy's country the enclosed letter to Rajah Teidge Wunt Bahadur, the Commander of my advanced army who has reared the standard of victory in the neighbourhood of Gunjycotta and to keep up a regular correspondence with him concerning your own occurrences and those of the enemy. He (Teidge Wunt) will, agreeable to the orders I have given him in the above letter and in others exclusive of it, continually keep you informed of his occurrences and of such intelligence as he may learn of the enemy; he will also constantly consult and advise with your Lordship on whatever is to be done; whatever you may think proper you will write to him and he will without delay obey your directions and give me notice of them.

.. .. .

A letter to Raja Teidge Wunt directing to inform his Lordship fully and daily of your occurrence and of whatever intelligence you may learn of the enemy; to ask advice from and consult with the Governor General and duly obey the directions of G. G.

**No. 217**—Malet regrets the death of Yvon.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 11th February 1791.*

It does not appear that Hurry Punt had marched from Punderpore to the 7th inst.

I have this moment received letters from Col. Frederick. My concern at the failure of the assault is greatly increased by the little prospect there is of being able to prosecute the siege with the present apparatus. Your Lordship will recollect that Mr. Yvon who is killed is the person to whom I have been so long obliged for good and interesting information. My private letters speak highly of his gallantry and exertions.

No. 218—Kennaway communicates to the G. G. the Nizam's desire to take the field in person and his written remonstrance against the proposal of raising the siege of Kopal.

FROM—CAPT. KENNAWAY,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Paungal, 14th February 1791.*

I shall not take up your Lordship's time at present with entering into the question of how far the Nizam has deserved the character generally ascribed to him further than to observe that I think it has been rather exaggerated, that duplicity and intrigue are qualities inherent in the character of every nature ; exercised without the smallest compunction by them on all occasions where they think it concerns their interest so to do ; and that a very long reign with peculiar and difficult situations may have occasioned their being resorted to in the instance of the Nizam, in a greater degree than has commonly occurred with respect to any other native power that we have been connected with ; allowing it however, to be just in its fullest extent, the greater must be the surprise at the effect which the honorable and decided conduct of your Lordship's government has had of rendering him steady, who is notorious for wavering ; for whatever reason I may have had to complain of the procrastination and want of energy of his government, of his sincerity and firmness in the cause he has engaged in with us, I have never had grounds to entertain any serious doubt.

With regard to the conditional wish your Lordship has expressed that the armies of the two States should still be combined into one, I am humbly of opinion, my Lord, it would not be advisable after the manner in which I have already urged it and the reception my arguments have met with to press again, since even supposing they would be brought to agree to it, what is done with reluctance and such reluctance as has been discussed could never be expected to be done well. It will, besides, be the less necessary as Meer Abul Cossim assures me the cavalry of Teige Wunt's army will not be far short of 20,000, that of Herry Punt's as stated by himself to Mr. Malet will be near 25,000, and either of these bodies, I should hope, will be able to effect a junction with your Lordship in spite of opposition independent of each other. Nor do I think it is refining too much to consider in regard to the junction that after Mr. Malet's representations were successful in preventing Pata's attacking Herry Punt, his subsequent correspondence will rather tend to strengthen than remove your Lordship's doubts of the real of the Mahometan, and that for they may have hitherto resisted Tippoo's offers the same resolution may not stand the trial of such additional temptations as he may throw out when he reflects upon the determined style of your Lordship's answer to his application thro' Syad Sahab.

In reply to my communication to the Nizam of your Lordship's having left Madras he has expressed his readiness to move also, and Meer Abul Cossim came to me yesterday from the Minister to learn my real opinion on this point, stating that if he (the Minister) could be assured of meeting with your Lordship, it would have the consequence, he had no doubt, of being able to prevail on his Highness to march, but in this case the army under Mohabut Jung must be called away from Kopul and Teidge Wunt's advancing till his Highness should join him countermanded ; to which I have replied, I was of opinion that whatever measures were now adopted should have the support of Teidge Wunt's army and its proceeding for their object, that if His Highness could disencumber himself and move as lightly as Tippoo, or if he could move on by easy marches nearer to the frontier of the enemy's country without interfering with Teidge Wunt's or Dara Jah's operations I thought his moving in either of these cases might be serviceable, but that I could not without first consulting your Lordship say anything of the possibility of your meeting him, that the season was now too far advanced to rest for the adoption of any plan connected with the prosecution of the war upon the uncertainty of a reference and that I had seen too much of the tediousness of His Highness's marches to think that they were calculated for any military operation ; Meer Abul Cossim left me and the same evening I received a note from him informing me that he had reported the conversation to the Minister : that what the Minister had said in reply respecting the Nizam's marching he would communicate to me in person, but that in regard to the siege of Kopul he (the Minister) had observed it was necessary, seeing the little probability there was of its being reduced, that it should at all events be relinquished ; and that this measure would conduce to the support of Teidge Wunt's army instead of operating against it ; to which I returned a written reply that to abandon the undertaking after such pains and expense had been employed upon it and at a time when there was room for expecting success would be very improper ; but that if the march of Dara Jah's army to Gunjycotah was deemed indispensably necessary it could only be resolved on with propriety in two ways ; 1st, to let Dara Jah consult with Captain Read and learn from him the probability of the fort's being carried by storm or not in a short time and to determine continuing before it or not some days longer accordingly ; 2nd, as the stock of provisions in the place must now be extremely reduced and it was likely its entire exhaustion would in a short time occasion a voluntary surrender to direct Dara Jah on his moving being determined to leave the infantry of his army behind him for the purpose of turning the siege into a blockade.

Meer Abul Cossim has sent me copies of the letters from the Nizam to Balajee Pundit, translates of them are enclosed. He had before acquainted me that consistent with the friendship subsisting between the two States Hurry Punt could not be abruptly forbidden coming here but that enough had been said to point out that it was not advisable. It is needless for me

to observe to your Lordship that the second of these letters contains a very undue assertion on the part of the Nizam viz., that his Highness had learnt from your Lordship's letter to me that you were desirous of being joined by his and the Peishwa's armies of which I shall not fail to point out the great impropriety at the first opportunity, tho' the letter I understand having been dispatched I see no mode of its being now corrected and I am the less disposed to cavil at it as its contents in other respects are such as I desired.

I have the honour to inclose a copy of such memorandums as I thought necessary to give Lieut. Stewart for his guidance. He was nine coss from hence yesterday and expects to reach Gunjicotah by the 20th of the month. I likewise enclose extract of a letter I have received from Kopul under date the 8th instant.

No. 218A.

FROM—THE NIZAM,

TO—BALAJEE PUNDIT.

I heretofore acquainted Govin Row Kishen that Hurry Punt might come here with a few attendants and learn what I thought was adviseable to be done ; or that on his approaching near to the place I could let him know in writing or by deputing a confidential person to let me know which of the three modes would be most agreeable. As I have not yet received an answer and understand from Capt. Kennaway that the time draws near that the Company's forces after being joined by Lord Cornwallis will again enter the enemy's country, as my army is already at Gunjycotah. and Sidout and the advance of the Peishwah's army to support the Company's necessary, I therefore inform that if Hurry Pundit's attending the presence is proper let him send on his army and that there may be no delay in his so doing repair either with only a few of his people or if from his coming here any inconvenience should be apprehended inform me which of the other two modes you prefer and let Hurry Punt and his army advance with all speed, when after arriving in the neighbourhood of my army he can be advised of what is necessary to be done. At all events the advance of his army at this time without delay is necessary.

(b) At this time I understand by means of a letter from Lord Cornwallis to Capt. Kennaway that his Lordship left Madras the 28th January, that he was met the same day by General Medows, that day following he reached the camp 10 coss from the fort, that it was his intention to march towards the enemy's territories with all expedition about the third after his arrival in them, that he was desirous, that the advanced armies of mine and the Peishwah's Government under Rajah Teidge Wunt and Hurry Punt should move forward to join him as therefrom advantage



to the war would speedily be effected. On which account orders have been sent to Rajah Teidge Wunt Bahadur that as soon after his Lordship entering the enemy's country as he shall deem the junction of my army with his own advisable and shall write the Rajah to that effect he with his cavalry shall join his Lordship accordingly. Do you write to Hurry Punt to advance by quick marches to the neighbourhood of mine and Lord Cornwallis' army and let Hurry Pundit inform me which of the three modes proposed respecting his coming here he has determined on, ANY delay at this time would be very improper.

*Memorandums for Lieutenant Steuart proceeding to the Nizam's army near Gunjycotah.*

To acquaint Lord Cornwallis immediately on your reaching the camp with your arrival, to concert with Teidge Wunt the means of facilitating a correspondence with his Lordship through the channel of Zamindars disaffected to the enemy or by such other mode as may render it most secure and to furnish his Lordship as soon as possible with an account of the strength and condition of Teidge Wunt's force in infantry, cavalry and artillery.

To be particularly assiduous in your endeavors to procure Teidge Wunt's prompt compliance with such directions as the Governor General may think proper to send him directly or furnish you with for his guidance so that no disappointment may occur to his Lordship in any plans he may form connected with it.

To avoid as much as possible committing yourself by giving an opinion on doubtful points; and on such in general as you have not first obtained the Governor General's sentiments upon.

To furnish his Lordship with every information you can collect regarding the state of the country and disposition of the inhabitants between the Nizam's and our army and with every particular you can obtain relative to the situation of the enemy and any detachments from his main army, also with the progress of the Mahratta force under Hurry Punt and to cultivate by every possible means in your power the strictest harmony between him and the Nizam's Commander.

To report to his Lordship and to me as soon as you can obtain the necessary information; the likelihood of his correspondence with Calcutta, Poonah and this place being carried on in a safe and more expeditious manner through you by means of the Nizam's dawak than by the circuitous one of Madras; as well as if you think it would answer to station a dawak from here to Teidge Wunt's camp for the above purpose on the Company's account.

To conciliate the good will of the Nizam's Commander and the principal officers of his army by every proper attention and civility in your power.

To take advantage of any seasonable opening that may occur, which you will find no difficulty to bring about, of letting Teidge Wunt understand that in case the Governor General should require him to join with his cavalry, it is not the intention of the Durbar that he should trust to his Lordship for any part of the pay or provisions necessary for their subsistence and to ascertain and report to his Lordship as soon as you can the state of his military chest and the mode by which he proposes or has the regular means of subsisting his troops on their moving forward.

To continue your survey of the country as you go along for which you will draw the allowance prescribed by Mr. Deputy Secretary Fombelle's letter to me of the 8th October 1790 from the date hereof. It is hardly necessary to add that you cannot be too guarded and circumspect in your pursuit of this object particularly in taking observations of places.

It may be great service hereafter that you should endeavour to ascertain during the time you may be absent the value of the districts which have been reduced by the Nizam's arms in the quarter to which you are going as well as of any others that may eventually be brought under subjection with the amount that his officers have at any time collected from them.

No. 218B—Siege of Kopal continued.

FROM—CAPT. A. READ

TO—CAPT. KENNAWAY.

*Camp Kopal, 8th February 1791.*

Captain Read desires me to acquaint you that since my last we have been going on pretty well and that daily some pieces of the wall are coming down, yet it is so excessively strong that less impression is made upon it than might have been expected; but considering that we have brass guns and that it is dangerous to exceed 50 rounds a day and all other contingencies included he entertains little doubts of making a breach to get in, but it will require longer time than could be wished for the reasons you have already been acquainted with. The 32 pounder carriage is this evening again become unserviceable, but fortunately another is nearly finished for her as well as a spare one for the 28. The 18 comes down from the south and goes to the west hill to-morrow to assist the breaching. A battery is prepared for her, excepting only a platform and the trees are not as yet cut, though it is hoped by to-morrow night they will. The touch holes of the guns are getting very large indeed and it's feared will require a bushing ere long particularly the 32, 24 and 18; the 14 is so far gone that she cannot be fired again until repaired; half the powder coming out at the vent, these and other difficulties must be surmounted if possible; they come thick at times, and as we have very well got the better of them hitherto Captain Read anxiously hopes that we shall continue to do so. Litchmy has proved

of infinite more service on the bank of the tank than could have been expected as she is placed against the wall of the lower and mud forts. The guns of the fort are mostly directed against her and of course there is less annoyance to the west battery.

**No. 219**—Malet informs the G. G. of the Peshwa being present at an entertainment given by Rasta.

FROM—C. W. MALET ;

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 14th February 1791.*

Though the circumstance appears insignificant, it may not be unnecessary to acquaint your Lordship that the Peshwa was present yesterday at an entertainment given by Rasta. Much attention has lately been paid to Mahadjee Sindia's connexions here and I deem it unfortunate that at this critical and eventful period your Lordship should for some time have been deprived, by the accident that has happened to Major Palmer, of the able ministry of that gentleman, for discovering the probable objects of the large part of the force of this empire now in that quarter; subsequent to the accommodation of the Mahratta claims on the Rajput princes.

**No. 220**—Kennaway reports to the G. G. the Nizam's determination to proceed to the frontier on the 12th March and his strong opposition to raising the siege of Kopul.

FROM—CAPT. KENNAWAY ;

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Paangal, 17th February 1791.*

Meer Abul Cossim waited upon me the 15th and soon after he was seated I took a copy of the second letter from the Nizam to Balajee Pundit in my hand and remarked that it contained an assertion which I wished to know from him how I could answer for to your Lordship. He said that the part did not require to be pointed out to him as he well knew what it was I alluded to, which had been inserted contrary to his inclination, that the letter was a private one and imported to me in confidence and not for your Lordship's public notice. That there was no other way of accounting satisfactorily to Balajee Pundit for the Nizam's earnestness to co-operate with your Lordship in preference to the Mahrattas which was the reason of its being inserted. I told him this might be very true, but that a deviation from truth in one instance generally involves the transgressor in a much greater labyrinth than that which he is desirous to avoid as was evident on the present occasion, since as Balajee Pundit in consequence of

what the Nizam had written would naturally inquire of Mr. Malet the reason why your Lordship should convey a wish respecting the motions of the Peshwah's army through me in preference to him, that gentleman would be under the necessity of explaining to him that the assertion was a fabricated one. . I did not press the point further, for he seemed so conscious of the impropriety that had been committed and expressed in such a candid manner his regret at the Nizam's and Minister's aversion to an intimate concert with the Mahrattas which made such shifts being resorted to necessary that I was glad to relieve him by changing the subject.

He proceeded to inform me that the Nizam determined to move in the manner suggested by me, that is by easy marches nearer to the frontier of the enemy's country and that the 12th March was the lucky day fixed on for his proceeding without interfering with Teidge Wunt, but that orders had been dispatched to Mohaubut Jung to raise the siege of Kopul and repair towards Gunjycotah leaving the infantry of his Rasalah and 500 horse to blockade the place. I stated in reply the various evils which this precipitate measure would be productive of and the discredit it would bring both on the Nizam and the Company's arms and how inadequate the force intended to be left was to the service it was designed for, which I requested he would represent to the Minister in the strongest light. Soon after he left me.

In answer to what had passed concerning Kopul I yesterday received a note from Meer Abul Cossim forwarding a letter the Minister had received from Anoop Ram which stated the extreme hardness and solidity of the walls of the fort and the little likelihood there was of their being destroyed, to which he added from the Minister, that if after reading this letter I should still press the continuation of the siege it might be persevered in a week or ten days longer ; I returned a written reply with which I forwarded a translate of the enclosed extract of a letter I had just received from Captain Read under the 11th instant, that under no circumstances without the Commanding Officer of the Company's troops being previously consulted was I of opinion that the siege ought to be raised, that the relinquishment of it would embolden every little fort to resist to the last extremity, whereas its reduction would be attended with consequences directly the reverse, that the Nizam's marching, if it interfered with the siege going on, would, I was convinced, be as productive of regret to your Lordship as it would of satisfaction under different circumstances, that I requested the supply of shot required by Captain Read might be immediately granted and that the Minister would enable me to set your Lordship's mind at rest on this subject and free Captain Read from the doubt which the orders sent to Mohaubut Jung would undoubtedly occasion to the probable detriment of the service he was employed on. I had written to Captain Read the preceding evening to inform him of what had passed that he might be prepared to obey Darah Jah's orders

requesting at the same time that in the event of his being directed to give over he would previous thereto state his objections if such he had, on the strength of any appearances that may have recently occurred tending to encourage a well grounded expectation that perseverance for a short time longer might carry the point, to Darah Jah in writing.

In the evening I waited on the Nizam to deliver your Lordship's letters already mentioned. I took this opportunity of repeating the different arguments I had used against the siege being raised in so precipitate a manner and was well supported by the Minister in consequence of which His Highness agreed to dispatch immediate orders to Darah Jah to suspend the execution of the instructions which had lately been sent to him till he and Captain Read could transmit their opinion what prospect there was of their endeavors being successful. He at the same time complied with my request for 500 shot for the 32 and 28 and gave orders for their being dispatched the next (this) day. I sent off an express to Captain Read immediately on my return from the Durbar to inform him of the result of this conference, in the course of which the Nizam observed that the resolution to abandon the siege had not been adopted on light grounds but in consequence of a firm persuasion that the presence of Darah Jah's army would be necessary at Gunjycotah on the advance of Teidge Wunt to join your Lordship to secure the country which had been reduced in that quarter and keep open the communication with Teidge Wunt's army.

After reading your Lordship's letter his Highness was very inquisitive to know when, I thought, you would enter the enemy's country and what would be the first object of your Lordship's operations. To be on the safe side I told him I conceived your passing the enemy's boundary would not be later than the 20th instant, but I did not think it proper to disclose for the present the object that would first engage your attention.

I have just received a letter from Mr. Uhthoff giving an account of a failure in an attempt to storm the breach at Darwar the 6th instant.

**No. 220A—Kopal walls bombarded.**

**FROM—CAPT. A. READ,**

**TO—CAPT. KENNAWAY.**

*Camp Kopal, 11th February 1791.*

Half the west wall is so much shattered as to leave little doubt of its soon coming down ; there are now remaining 545 shot for the 32 pounde and 617 for the 28 ; as those are the guns we principally must depend upon, am in dread lest the shot run short before the wall is brought down. It is indeed an excessively strong work and could you influence

His Highness the Nizam to procure 300 shot to be sent off for the 32 pr. and 200 for the 28 by coolies if not expended they may accompany the guns who will at all events require some time after the place is taken to repair them and indeed I should think the garrison the best place for them to be left in.

**No. 221**—Malet tries to remove from the minds of the Mahratta Court all apprehensions of distress and embarrassment in G. G.'s army and uses all his powers of persuasion to quicken Haripant's progress, so as to bring about his junction with the army of Cornwallis.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 18th February 1791.*

I had the honor to address your Lordship on the 14th inst. and on the 15th was favored with copy of Capt. Kennaway's letter to your Lordship of the 7th, but hope that after what has lately passed on the subject of His Highness the Nabob's co-operation he will not adhere to the reserved mode of conduct mentioned in the latter part of Capt. K's letter. On the same day I remitted to B'bay the amount of the bill which in my address of the 14 I mentioned having drawn on Calcutta for 25000 and am happy to learn by letters from Mr. Paymaster Uthhoff of the 11th inst. that my supply of specie had safely reached camp and that he was in cash for every probable emergency to the middle of April, to which I shall this day make a respectable addition by transmitting him an order granted me yesterday by the Durbar on Parsaram Bhou for 50,000 Rs. on account of that part of Col. Frederick's detachment which formerly composed Capt. Little's. The late frequent supplies from the Durbar on this account has reduced the balance to a very small sum.

I on the 16th announced to the Minister your Lordship's resolution to penetrate the Ballaghaut in the direction of Hosur and Bangalore in prosecution of the plan concerted by this Court with me. I have, in prevention of any bad effect of previous intelligence of your Lordship's plan having reached the Minister from any other quarter, signified to him that as the accomplishment of the original co-operative proposal with Col. Maxwell's army was prevented by that army's junction with Genl. Medows, some difficulties had necessarily arisen with the circumstances of which I had not thought it necessary to make this Court acquainted, till their conclusion in your Lordship's ultimate resolution marching in person with the whole army to co-operate with the promised quotas of the allies, by which means as far as human wisdom could insure success, an honourable and advantageous termination of the present war must be gained by the early

and unreserved submission of the enemy to the conditions of the Confederates.

I urged the Minister therefore on every plea of *personal fame, national renown, and political expediency* to expedite the progress of Hurry Punt to effect the junction with your Lordship. I did not scruple to recapitulate the causes of complaint that had hitherto arisen in the conduct of the allies. I reminded him of our great exertions and particularly insisted on your Lordship's present resolution as the greatest of all and as the most incontrovertible proof of your unreserved devotion to the cause of the alliance; and while on one hand I observed to him that by a vigorous and prompt accomplishment of Hurry Punt's destination in forming a junction with your Lordship he had now an opportunity of expunging every trace of complaint that had hitherto occurred, I, on the other, cautioned him against the very serious cause of discontent that would arise to your Lordship, if after diverting the direction of our arms from the near access to Tipu's capital from the south leading in person our main army to a co-operation with the allies, you should be disappointed in that dependance which you had placed on the faithful execution of their part of it.

Influenced by the extreme importance of procuring the accomplishment of Hurry Punt's junction with your Lordship which must, I think, very soon reduce the enemy to the necessity of submission, I have not hesitated on so critical an occasion and of so great importance to the termination of the war to relax a little in the repugnance which I have hitherto shown to the gratification of Behro Punt's views to personal advantage by giving him to understand that the time is now arrived in which not only the fidelity of his Court but his personal profession of regard for the interests of our Govt. must be indisputably proved, and your Lordship's opinion of both unalterably fixed, that with the most friendly disposition toward him I wish most ardently for an opportunity of conveying the same to your Lordship by some signal instance of the friendship of his Government whose measures are so much influenced by him and have not a doubt but your Lordship's well-known munificence would be generously exercised to reward the author of so much benefit to both states.

I have not yet received an answer to this communication nor does my knowledge of the intricate views and the inexplicable wiles of this Court permit of my venturing an opinion on which to found an encouragement for your Lordship's hopes, but they will, I hope, be rested on a firmer base than the most solemn promises of our allies, whose operations however destructive to the enemy, will certainly always fall short of our expectations.

I have some reason to think that accounts have lately been received by this Durbar of such circumstances of embarrassment in our army by the neighbourhood of Tipu and his devastations in the Carnatic as to have

given rise to doubts of the practicability of your Lordship's penetrating his country and subsisting your army at any distance from our own frontier at this advanced season, when every kind of grain is gathered and when the country will soon be deprived of forage by the scorching heat of the Sun, but as this language tends to discourage the advance of Hurry Punt's army, I fail not, as occasion presents, to inculcate persuasion that your Lordship's residence at Madras has been effectually employed to remove all apprehension of this kind by the most ample provision of every thing that can put you above dependence on the precarious supplies of an enemy's country, and that while the cavalry of the allies will insure a safe access of Bunjarries with grain from all quarters, your artillery will open a way to the magazines of the enemy. In fact that after the junction of the allied forces the superiority of cavalry will necessarily reduce the enemy to that embarrassment which is now attributed to our army.

I was very sorry to learn from Mr. Uthhoff under date the 11 inst. that my not having heard from Col. Frederick since the 7 was owing to indisposition. He at the same time acquainted me by the Colonel's desire that it was now resolved to approach to the crest of the glaxis and descend into the ditch by a covered sap and that the Bhou had engaged to bush those guns whose rents had become too open for service in 15 days and to replace the requisite quantities of ammunition.

No. 222—Stewart arrives in Tejwant's camp and sends intelligence to Kennaway of the movements of Haripant's army.

FROM—LIEUT. STEWART,

TO—CAPT. KENNAWAY.

*Camp at Jemal Murro, 19th February 1791.*

I was received this forenoon at the distance of two miles from camp and conducted to my tent by Mundy Kooly Baig with 1,000 horse. Rajah Teidge Wunt invited me to visit him on my way thro' the camp, but when I had nearly reached his tents he sent me a polite message to my own with a promise to come to me in the evening which he accordingly did accompanied by Assud Ali Khan. A salute of twenty-one guns was fired on their entrance which they said was on account of my arrival.

I took an opportunity in the course of conversation which was chiefly confined to general ceremonious questions to inform Rajah Teidge Wunt that I had letters from the Nizam which I wished to deliver immediately, that I was anxious to acquaint the Governor General of my arrival in camp and to know what intelligence had been received of the progress of our troops, of Hurry Punt's and the detachments ordered from Kopul, in reply to all which he replied with a wish to defer business to another visit, that being already acquainted with the contents of the letters, to-morrow



would be a fit time to receive them, that he would forward my letter to the Governor General, who, he was informed, had ascended a ghaut but when and where he could not particularize, that Hurry Punt with 7,000 men was arrived at a place about 100 coss from hence on his way to occupy a station ten coss from Gunjycotah on the road to Gooty and that no accounts of the 8,000 horse ordered from Kopul had been received.

On taking leave Rajah Teidge Wunt and Assud Ali Khan expressed their readiness and that of the army on general terms to advance on receipt of the Governor General's orders for so doing and the former requesting my Moonshy might be permitted to attend him I sent him with instructions to procure the immediate dispatch of my letters to the Governor General; he returned with a promise from Rajah Teidge Wunt that people would be ready to carry it to-morrow with directions to the Zamindars disaffected to the enemy.

Unable at present to venture a conjecture on the probable number of troops here, I have much pleasure in acquainting you of a promise Rajah Teidge Wunt has made me to draw the whole out for my inspection. I apprehend he stated the Munkulla or Advanced army immoderately too high in reckoning 25,000 of it here, 20,000 at Sidout and 7,000 near Gooty.

**No. 222A**—Cornwallis approves of the appointment of Tejwant and asks Kennaway to direct him to join his army with his cavalry.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

TO—CAPT. KENNAWAY.

*Camp Palimmere, 21st February 1791.*

On the day before yesterday a letter was brought to me by a person of some consequence attended by a camel hircarah from Tippoo himself nearly to the same purport as that which was written to me by Syed Saheb and to which I shall give nearly a similar answer. In the meantime I have dismissed the bearer of this letter and his attendants and returned a khelat which he likewise brought for me, and as soon as I shall judge it expedient to dispatch an answer, I shall transmit it to you and Mr. Malet to be communicated to his Highness and to the Peshwa's Ministers.

The point which had been agitated respecting the most proper person for the command of his Highness's army at Gunjycotah must no doubt have been long since decided and you may assure the Nizam and the Minister that I shall upon all occasions in which we shall co-operate, treat the person who may have been placed in that station and the troops under his command with the most friendly attention.

I am perfectly sensible of your zeal and good intentions in proposing that the Minister's son should be invested with that command: but as an inexperienced young man would be incapable of conducting an army without the assistance of some of his subordinate officers and as it is not certain he would allow himself to be guided by those of the best abilities and most honourable principles I am inclined to think that upon the whole it would be most convenient for me that such a man as Rajah Teidge Wunt is described to be should remain in that command and you will therefore regulate yourself accordingly in case the subject should again come under discussion.

The Hircarras who are to convey this letter to you are likewise charged with one addressed to Rajah Teidge Wunt or Officer commanding his Highness's Forces at Gunjycotah, requesting that he will dispose of his infantry and guns in the manner that in his opinion will be most suitable to his Highness's interests, and that he will join me with his cavalry with as much dispatch as may be possible, in order to assist in preventing the part of this army that will be employed in carrying on the siege of Bangalore from enemy's attacks.

You will press the Nizam to enforce my request with positive orders from himself and you will explain to His Highness as I have done to the Officer commanding the army that the reason for limiting my request to cavalry is principally because this army is amply provided with infantry and artillery and that it is also a material consideration with me that the movement of the cavalry alone may be so rapid as to render it impossible for the enemy to obstruct our junction.

I have great pleasure in desiring you to inform his Highness that after having ascended the Moogly Pass I am now encamped on the western side of the ghauts with my whole army, artillery and horses, and that it is my intention to proceed on my march towards Bangalore on the 23rd instant.

No. 223—Malet offers strong opposition to the proposal of Haripant's visit to the Nizam and considers the best means of employing Bhao's army.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 21st February 1791.*

After the despatch of my last address of the 18 inst. I was honored with your Lordship's commands of the 1st and exceedingly rejoiced to learn your arrival in camp. In consequence of your Lordship's instructions relative to Col. Frederick's detachment I lost no time in writing him and the B'bay Board on the subject of which I have the honor to enclose copies as also of a subsequent letter of the 20th to the B'bay Board. In the interval

of receiving Co. Frederick's answer I have strongly urged the Minister to write Bhaou in the most peremptory manner to supply every thing that the Colonel may want for the speedy termination of the siege and in the failure thereof I have laid the foundation for the recall of our detachment by pointing out to the Minister that detriment instead of benefit must accrue to the confederacy by so fruitless an employment of so large a force.

I was exceedingly happy to learn the promising state of the preparations of His Highness the Nabob to join your Lordship with a body of cavalry and my joy was greatly increased on learning the measure was unburthened with any stipulation for the supply of pay or provisions. Since my last address my whole attention has been directed to the accomplishment of the object therein mentioned, of expediting Hurry Punt's march in joining your Lordship. Without troubling your Lordship with detail of what passed on this important and, I may say, decisive subject, I shall only observe that the Minister assured my Vackeel Noor-ul-Deen Hussein Khan on the 19th inst. that Hurry Punt would be ordered to proceed by successive marches to the Tumbudra, that in the interval of an indispensable halt there to complete his levies which had been unexpectedly retarded by the great dearth that prevailed throughout the country and the fatality that had for some time prevailed amongst the horses and horned cattle, a latitude should be granted him of visiting the Nabab whose cantonment would not be above a day's march distant in which his (H. P.'s) absence should be restricted to eight days after which he should without delay prosecute the object of his expedition. Much stress has been laid on the meeting with the Nabob, which is put on the footing of being indispensibly necessary to prevent dissatisfaction on the part of His Highness, but which from my conviction of the expediency of avoiding it, if possible, I have, strongly opposed and still oppose even for the short time above mentioned, to which it has been brought with difficulty ; and in my opposition I have ventured to say that I would engage to answer for the Nabob's not taking amiss Hurry Punt's sacrificing a ceremonious visit to him to the essential interests of the alliance by losing no time in his progress to the army without attending to the deficiency of three or four thousand of his quota which would not be felt in the potency of the combined army. On this subject I have assured the Minister of my readiness to write Capt. Kennaway that he may be prepared to make the necessary communications to his Court and have assented to the Minister's using my name in his letters to the Nabob on the subject. I have also observed to the Minister that after rejecting His Highness' wish that the Peshwa himself should take the field in person His Highness will have little gratification in seeing a secondary person. The knowledge of these points, will, I hope, enable Capt. Kennaway to prepare his Highness to decline in a civil way and on *principles of general benefit to which may be added strong exhortations to promote any offer which this Court may as a matter of course think proper to make of Hurry Punt's paying His Highness the compliment of a visit.*

The point of the previous junction of Hurry Punt with the Nizam's army has been mentioned by the Minister as a thing of course, in the completion of the co-operative plan to which, without taking any notice of the Nabob's resolution to avoid it, I have replied that His Highness's force is already advanced to Gunjycota and that should the interests of the alliance render its advance to join your Lordship necessary previous to Hurry Punt's reaching that place, I presume the measure will be highly laudable.

I have this instant received the following message from the Minister that in compliance with my instancy he has come to the resolution of immediately writing to Hurry Punt that it has been agreed with me that he shall proceed with all possible expedition to Gudwal where his army shall cross the Tumbudra and he, if he judges proper, may proceed to visit the Nabob 16 coss from Gudwal, observing that he must rejoin his army in eight days, that in the interim all those of his quota who have remained here shall join, after which he shall proceed direct to Gunjicota and from thence write to your Lordship, who, the Minister understands, will penetrate the Ballaghaut by the pass of Kurrupnaut and regulate his future operations in concert with your Lordship, that the most pressing injunctions have been sent to Bhaou to furnish every thing Col. Frederick may require for his approaches and that on the arrival of the Bhaou's answer there will be ground for an opinion as to the advisableness of prosecuting the siege. To this I have added that I soon expect Col. Frederick's opinion also and should it appear from both that the prosecution of the siege is unadvisable, I have repeated the proposal that I formerly made of Bhao's forming a junction with General Abercromby whose army joined by Cap. Little's two battalions and including the Travancore ones will consist of 10 battalions and 4 regiments E. I., constituting a force that might easily penetrate the southern part of the enemy's dominions while your Lordship kept the enemy's main force employed to the north-east; that at all events if the prosecution of the siege of Dharwar should not be found expedient, I would advise Bhaou's acting separately on the north-west in preference to his joining Hurry Punt which I perceive the Minister has a tendency. Since by his respectable force acting separately in the north-west, the enemy's resources will be cut off by the consternation into which his whole country will be thereby thrown, while Hurry Punt and the Nabob's force joining your Lordship will be fully equal to every purpose in that quarter.

On the subject of Hurry Punt's visiting the Nabob the Minister has declined my offer of Capt. Kennaway's good offices to obviate His Highness's dissatisfaction thereby discovering his own wish that it should, notwithstanding which I would still advise its prevention if practicable with delicacy by Capt. Kennaway, or at all events I hope that gentleman will insist on not more, than the 8 days stipulated being lost by it,—and in my answer to this part of the Minister's message, I have repeated my dislike of the idea and urged that it will be

highly indecent to attend to mere matters of dilatory ceremony when at this moment your Lordship is, I doubt not, engaged in the arduous task of reducing the enemy and here, my Lord, I cannot help repeating the hope mentioned in my last letter that your Lordship's own means by putting you above the want, will insure you the effectual assistance of our allies ; for on this I place much greater dependance than on their promises and professions.

As the Minister assures me that Hurry Punt marched 8 days ago from Bundacota toward the Tumbudra, I presume your Lordship will in future receive the earliest accounts of his motions from Capt. Kennaway.

### No. 224.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—CAPT. KENNAWAY.

*Camp Pallamanare, 23rd February 1791.*

I have halted here one day longer than I intended for an exact muster and accounts of bullocks, grain, stores, etc., etc., but I shall certainly move tomorrow and shall not hereafter lose one hour unnecessarily.

### No. 225—A. Read reports the impending fall of the fortress of Kopul.

FROM—CAPT. A. READ,

TO—CAPT. KENNAWAY.

*Camp at Kopul, South Battery, 23rd February 1791.*

I am still of opinion that the fort will fall, the wall being much damaged, and part from the top brought down ; every exertion in my power and in that of the detachment to make shall be made to reduce the place. The order on Annoop Ram shall be presented and the circumstance respecting the batta attended to as you desire. I shall this day make the request of Darah Jah to send people off to hasten on the ammunition though we have yet enough left to go on for 6 or 7 days in which time I doubt not but that the supply from Paangul will arrive.

In a letter to his Highness I acquaint him that as far as my judgement can direct me I am of opinion that the breach will be practicable if the guns

hold out in 12 or 15 days and I hope that this delay will make no material alteration on his Highness's operations elsewhere.

The guns that are here belonging to his Highness if they stand out this siege will then be of little or no use. Indeed from what I have seen of his ordnance altogether and knowing from a former letter of yours that he has none of iron, should we ever have any place of strength to besiege, I think that much time must be lost for want of proper materials. If with propriety an application could be made to Government for assistance in that way, there are plenty of guns at Masulipatam ready and I should fancy that 4 or 6 18 pounders with 2,000 shot per gun might soon be sent into the country his Highness intends to march for.

**No. 226**—The Nizam's Minister puts Cornwallis on guard against Tipu's overtures for peace.

FROM—CAPT. KENNAWAY,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Paungal, 24th February 1791.*

Your correspondence with Colonel Defresne the Commandant of Pondicherry, the substance of which I have communicated to the Minister in writing for the Nizam's information ; the Minister's observation to me on it was that Tippoo's reply to Colonel Defresne's intimation.....of your Lordship's answer, with a view of gaining time, would probably be that previous to his making any explicit overtures in behalf of the Company's allies he must be informed what their expectations were and that till they could be ascertained it would be proper that a cessation of hostilities should take place ; which the Minister requested I would mention to your Lordship to put you on your guard ; this I told him I would do, tho' there was no danger of your being moved from your purpose by such an attempt and that Tippoo would be soon too well acquainted with your Lordship's mode of proceeding to make it or any of a similar nature.

The Minister has acquainted me that the Nizam having fixed on the 12th of March for his proceeding was with a view to join and co-operate with your Lordship, but as such junction could not take place without your being previously advised with concerning it which would require too much time to attempt, the appointed day would only be strictly adhered to in the event of Teidge Wunt's army in the interim advancing to join you, in which case the Nizam would proceed to occupy the vacant station at the period aforementioned, that Hurry Punt having sent on his army towards the enemy's frontier was to repair to this place with about two thousand horse to wait on the Nizam and that preparations were making for his reception.

No. 227.

*Description of the Nizam's army near Gunjycotah.*

List of the Nizam's army near Gunjycotah received from a servant belonging to Raja Tiedge Wunt, 22nd February 1791.	Cavalry.	Infantry armed with muskets.	Infantry armed with Match-locks.	Field pieces.	Mortars.
Assud Ali Khan with .....	2,000	250	2,000	2	..
Of Syful Mulk's Ressala .....	500	..	..	..	..
Do. do. commanded by Ibrahim Khan .....	..	333	..	1	..
Belonging to Govind Kishen, who holds a Jagheer from the Nizam and the appointment of Vakeel on the part of the Peshwah at his Highness's Court .....	175	..	..	..	..
Belonging to Jewajee Nana .....	50	..	..	..	..
Do. Sindia Rao .....	75	..	..	..	..
Do. Hadjy Sultan .....	75	..	..	..	..
Silabut Khan with .....	300	..	..	..	..
Belonging to Jewan Khan .....	150	..	..	..	..
Do. Roshun Khan .....	150	..	..	..	..
Do. Siddee Abdulla Khan .....	350	900	..	4	..
Azem-u-din Khan with .....	100	..	..	..	..
Kurmur-u-din Khan (brother of Mahomed Azam Khan, the Dewan of Shums-ul-Omrah) with .....	350	..	..	..	..
Of Shums-ul-Umrah's pagah .....	500	..	..	..	..
Shah Baig Khan with .....	400	..	..	..	..
Ram Chundr Rajah with .....	400	..	..	..	..
Belonging to Rustom Row Pandrah .....	400	..	..	..	..
Do. Dawod Sahib Decany .....	150	..	..	..	..
Do. Azeez Khan .....	50	..	..	..	..
Balajee Kisho with .....	450	..	..	..	..
Belonging to Santajee Pandra .....	100	..	..	..	..
Meerum Saheb of the Minister's Ressala with .....	500	..	..	..	..
Belonging to Meer Jemaul-ud-din ..	100	..	..	..	..
Under various chiefs in small divisions of the Minister's Ressala ..	500	..	..	..	..
Azam-u-din Khan (son of the famous Ibrahim Khan Gardi) of Shums-ul-Umrah's ressala with .....	..	700	..	3	..
Abdul Rahim Khan, a Commandant of the Minister's Ressala with ..	..	372	..	1	..
Sunta Nair of Yemul, a Zemindar of the new conquered districts ..	..	..	800	..	..
Ragun-ap, a Nair of Mooncapar, a Zemindar of the districts lately conquered ..	..	..	150	..	..
The following chiefs of the Minister's Ressala :—					
Mihdy Cooly Khan .....	100	..	..	..	..
Rehim Baig .....	100	..	..	..	..
Hyder Ali .....	75	..	..	..	..
Lall Khan .....	175	..	..	..	..
Moorshid Newaz Khan .....	80	..	..	..	..
Luchman Sing 50 and Meer Azmatulla 75 .....	125	..	..	..	..
Total at Gunjycotah in Tiede Wunt's Camp .....	9,080	2,555	2,950	11	..

List of the Nizam's army near Gunjycotta received from a servant belonging to Raja Tiedge Wunt, 22nd February 1791.	Cavalry.	Infantry armed with muskets.	Infantry armed with Matchlocks.	Field pieces.	Mortars.
List of the Nizam's forces at Sidhout (25 cos about E. S. E. from Gunjycotta) under Mahomed Ameen Arab belonging to Tiedge Wunt's army received from the same authority as the former Shitab Rae .....	600	..	100	4	..
Of Syful Mulk's Ressala .....	300	..	..	..	..
Hafiz Ferid-u-din with .....	300	..	500	5	..
Mahomed Ameen Arab .....	538	250	..	2	..
Budr-u-Dowlah with .....	300	200	..	..	..
Mahomed ulawul Khan .....	75	..	..	..	..
Chimna Rajah .....	100	..	..	..	..
Sumba pan Rao Zemindar of Godwall .....	25	..	300	..	..
Jemaul Mahomed Khan with .....	..	2,600	..	2	..
Syed Omra Khan with .....	..	700	..	4	..
Russool Newaz Khan .....	..	600	..	..	..
Golaum Mahomed Khan .....	..	500	..	..	..
Meer Zein-ul-Abideen .....	..	400	..	..	..
Hadji Iniat ulla Khan .....	..	600	..	..	..
Golum Cadir Khan .....	..	500	..	..	..
Hun Wunt Rao Zemindar of Nursa-poor .....	..	..	500	..	..
Shubha Rao .....	..	..	2,000	..	..
Shirumpa Nair .....	..	..	2,000	..	..
Dowakir Nair, Zemindar of Pullool churroo .....	..	..	300	..	..
Total at Sidhout ..	2,238	6,350	5,700	17	3 or 4 mortars.

List of the Nizam's Troops at or near Gooti from the same authority as the foregoing—

With Hushmut Jung 600 horse and 900 foot.

With Rajah of Sholapoor about 5,000 men.

Abstract of the army intended to advance to form junction with the Company's troops immediately on receipt of Lord Cornwallis's orders to the effect—

Cavalry at Gunjycotta as per above list .....	9,080
Cavalry at Sidhout as per above list .....	2,238
Cavalry at Gooti belonging to Hushmut Jung as per above list .....	800
Cavalry belonging to Shumsul Umrah's rressala at Kopul, which previous to my leaving Paungul I was informed had been ordered to march to this place amounting to .....	1,200
Cavalry belonging to Hossain Khan Gutalla at Kopul, ordered in the same manner as the foregoing amounting to .....	800

N.B.—Exclusive of the above many other reinforcements are said to be coming from Kopul, Paungul and other parts of the country. The cavalry here appear to be a very respectable body. Of the infantry I can say little at present except that the Matchlockmen attached to zemindars receive very little pay, are only collected on emergency and then for a short period. They seem to be a bad kind of Militia. Assud Alli Khan lost by desertion 500 of his since I began this account. I understand from Tiedge Wunt's servant that Essa Khan with a Detachment of not less than 1,000 horse is in the Rachoutee Districts; he is not in the above statement but will be injured after soon.

GROEME MERCER,  
Acting Assistant.



No. 227A—Cornwallis asks Stewart to urge Tejwant to move with the utmost speed.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—LIEUT. STEAURT.

*Camp at Moluaggle, Mugly Ghaut, 25th February 1791.*

It gave me great pleasure to find by Captain Kennaway's letter that his Highness had consented to your joining the army under the command of Rajah Teidge Wunt, where I am convinced that you will render essential service.

I propose unless I should meet with any interruption from the enemy that may occasion delay, to be at Bangalore on the 6th or at farthest the seventh of next month. You will therefore encourage the Rajah to move as expeditiously as possible and take every means of communicating with me during your march and as we can correspond in cypher you will explain to the Rajah that it will be safer that everything relative to his route should be conveyed through your channel.

I enclose to you a letter to Rajah Teidge Wunt.

No. 227B—Cornwallis informs Tejwant of his arrival in the vicinity of Bangalore and requests him to proceed with his cavalry only with the utmost speed.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—RAJA TEIDGE WUNT.

*Mugly Ghaut, 23rd February 1791.*

I lose no time in acquainting you of my arrival by the way of Moguly and Pulumnair Gaut near the borders of the enemy's country belonging to the Talook of Bangalore with a powerful army of infantry and experienced cavalry, with a very ample train of battering cannon and that having at this time by the favor of God thus reached the borders of the enemy's Country I intended to take the fort of Bangalore, and for this purpose I am determined to advance by constant marches with the victorious troops and artillery of the Company. My mind is inexpressibly bent on the preservice of the friendship, connection and firm union subsisting between the Nizam and me.

With respect to the junction of the Nizam's troops famous for bravery and courage there is no doubt but their daring exertions will be advantageous before Bangalore where nothing short of victory can be looked for: and in the present business of besieging forts the service and exertions of your cavalry joined with the experienced horse of my Government will be the means of effecting numberless advantages.

Without loss of time for these reasons I write to you to bring your cavalry with you without any delay and make me happy with a meeting. The fame of the courage and bravery which will be united on this side will spread the advantages of our union throughout the world. As the distance is not great between Jemaul Murroo near Gunjycotah and the march of my army towards Bangalore, it is certain that a junction between your cavalry and my army, also happy meetings between you and me may be effected without any apprehension or difficulty. But as I have infantry, battering cannon and a most plentiful supply of military apparatus in readiness with me and as your bringing your infantry and artillery with you would be the means of retarding your constant marches, I advise you to leave them behind and to join my camp with your cavalry with all expedition. I am certain that you will on account of the numberless advantages of this plan and of the increase of reputation and fame for bravery and courage that will accrue to the Nizam's troops, join my army in the siege and taking of Bangalore.

**No. 228**—Stewart sends intelligence of the minute investigation made by him of the country between Jemal-Murro and Bangalore and of the early surrender of the fort of Sidhout.

FROM—LIEUT. STEUART,

TO—CAPT. KENNAWAY.

*Camp at Jemal Murroo, 25th February 1791.*

Teidge Wunt has done more in the way of enquiry than I have in as many days ; Nurhir Balajee whom he sent to me yesterday agreeably surprised me with copies of all the routes, watering places, jungles and hills between this place, Amboor-Gur and Bangalore of which, he said, he had left Persian ones with Teidge Wunt. He afterwards complained of Assud Ali Khan who, he said, as being acquainted with the country was consulted on every occasion ; that he had just then advised Teidge Wunt to depute two or three thousand horse towards Gut-Comnair provided the Zemindar of that place would defray their expense, join them with his forces and pay a Nuzzerana to the Sircar ; which mode, the Vakeel said he had told them as being inadvisable and likely to occasion distress to the country, it would be far better to send a large force at once who with the aid of the Zemindars (which the latter were ready to grant gratis) would be put in immediate possession of the whole of the districts and revenue.

From the above communications I am very glad to find arrangements are making and as the Vakeel is the only person admitted to the consultations and of course from whom I can hear of them, I do not wish to discourage his remarks ; at the same time I am sensible any improper eagerness or answer from me will soon put a stop to his visits.

Teidge Wunt sent for my Moonshy yesterday to tell him in addition to his reply to my last questions concerning Hurry Punt that he had just received orders from Paangul to send a proper route for the march of the Mahratta troops, the commander of which was previously to visit the Nizam. I took this opportunity to let Teidge Wunt know how much I trusted to the exertion of his abilities and foresight for a due performance of the many preparations he ought to make. In reply he desired I would be satisfied of his assiduity and believed that everything would be properly arranged for provisioning his army, which he again said he would, immediately on receipt of his Lordship's orders.

The surrender of Sidhout which Teidge Wunt daily promises me seems to be generally expected soon, an event that will no doubt strengthen the Nizam's hands in this quarter and enable him to employ a large body of infantry in some other useful enterprize."

**No. 229**—Malet reports to the G. G. the substance of his distussion with Nana on the subject of the quick march of Haripant and the junction of Parshuram Bhau with Abercromby.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 25th February 1791.*

My intended conference with the Minister on the 23rd having been prevented by his accompanying the Peshwa on an excursion into the country, I visited him the 24, presented your Lordship's letter of the 1st announcing your arrival in camp, informed him that previous to the 6th you had advanced two marches, thence taking occasion to remind him of the urgent necessity of his prompt accomplishment of this Court's share of the cooperative plan by the speedy advance of Hurry Punt, to which in terms of apparent sincerity he replied that he was so well convinced of the expediency of what I urged that in consequence of my late representations positive injunctions had been dispatched to that Officer to make the best of his way which should be occasionally repeated. In answer to my proposal for employing Parsuram Bhaou's cavalry to cooperate with Genl. Abercromby on the termination of the siege of Dharwar either by the reduction of that place or quitting it according to the reference, which that point is now under, to the Bhaou and Col : Frederick, he acknowledged its expediency, but started some difficulties in effecting it, observing at the same time that he had not yet determined whether Bhao should prosecute the plan proposed by me or march to join Hurry Punt, to which I replied that the joint force in cavalry of Hurry Punt, and the Nabob was fully equal to every purpose of cooperation with your Lordship ; while by Bhaou's taking the same part with Genl. Abercromby the enemy's resources already exceedingly straitened by the conquests of the allies,

would be so effectually cut off, that he would, in all human probability, either be reduced to the necessity of immediately submitting to the terms of the confederates, of traversing his own dominions before the superior forces or of taking post in some of his strongholds that would be equivalent to a conclusion of the war, for which he had already betrayed the greatest impatience and as a new proof of it I read to the Minister the letter from Col: Defresne and your Lordship's answer. (It may not be amiss to give your Lordship some idea of this Court's accurate intelligence to point out to your observation that in my address of the 4th inst. the very day on which your Lordship's answer to Col. Defresne is dated, I communicated to your Lordship the Minister's enquiries relative to an intercourse between Tippe and the Government of Pondicherry). The Minister repeated his acknowledgement of the probable efficacy of Bhaou's cooperation with General Abercromby, but desired further time to deliberate before he came to a resolution in which I see danger to the success of my proposal from certain expressions that dropt from the Minister of his desire to put Hurry Punt's equipment on such a footing as in its junction with your Lordship might convey a strong impression of this State's potence and that Officer's personal respectability.

I have this day received a letter from Condarao, my agent in Hurry Punt's army, dated from Coputsungum the 19th inst. 80 coss from hence, mentioning that the army at that time consisted of about 10,000 horse, about 2,000 foot, 10 guns and 3 howitzers and that numbers join daily. I have directed my agent in future to send copies of all his intelligence to me, to your Lordship's Persian Interpreter under cover to Capt. Kennaway, till Hurry Punt's progress shall have enabled him to dispatch direct to Mr. Cherry after which to send intelligence separately to Capt. Kennaway.

Appa Bulwant and Bappo Pansa, two Chieftains of consequence left this place a few days ago to join Hurry Punt, but I am sorry to say that some others appointed for the service are yet here,—Malhar Rao Holkar, son of Tukoji Holkar who has for some time past subsisted himself and his followers about 3,000 horse in an independent and rebellious manner in his father's districts, is said to be soon expected to pay his devotions to an Idol in the neighbourhood of this place. \*

**No. 230**—Camels loaded with ammunition arrive at Dharwar, but Malet is unable to ascertain the intentions of the Poona Court as to the future employment of Bhau.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 28th February 1791.*

Your Lordship and Capt. Kennaway will, I trust, have been relieved from the apprehension repeated in that gentleman's letter to your Lordship

\* That is Jejuri.

of 7th inst. of discordance between my instances to this Court and the Nizam's, who notwithstanding his expressions to Capt. Kennaway of dislike to cooperation with the army of this State, seems very wisely to have held a very different language to Ballajee Punt by expressing as warm a desire for cooperation of the Maratta army as we could have wished.

This Court has not yet signified to me its resolution relative to the future employment of Pursaram Bhau. Should Bhau after all be ordered to join Hurry Punt, I propose endeavoring to procure the liberation of Capt. Little's original detachment to join Genl. Abercromby thereby transferring it from the useless situation of attending the main Mahratta army to an effective one in General Abercromby and enabling the General in case of emergency to detach another Battalion to B'bay before the rains. But in this idea I shall be entirely regulated by the inclination of this Court.

I have this inst. received private letters from Dharwar of the 22nd mentioning that upward of 100 camels laden with ammunition from hence had arrived and more are expected from other quarters, but that there was still a deficiency of siege guns as well as of materials for carrying on approaches and that our battery had remained masked since the 7th inst.

I am much concerned to learn that added to the mortification of unexpected difficulties, much sickness prevails in the camp before Dharwar.

By letters just received from Hurry Punt's army I learn that he marched 76 coss the 21st and halted the 2 following days and my advice does not notice when he meant to march again.

**No. 231**—On the receipt of the G. G.'s letter requesting Tejwant to join him at Bangalore, Steuart urges Tejwant to march expeditiously.

FROM—LIEUT. STEUART,

TO—CAPT. KENNAWAY.

*Camp at Jemal Muro, 2nd March 1791.*

A letter dispatched on the 23rd ultimo from headquarters on the top of Moguly Caut, 20 coss east of Kolar is just arrived from the Governor General to Rajah Teidge Wunt desiring him immediately to advance with the whole of his cavalry (leaving artillery and infantry behind) to form a junction with the Company's army at Bangalore which place his Lordship is determined to besiege.

I waited on the Rajah instantly requesting him to march to-morrow; in reply he assured me with much seeming joy and earnestness that he would not sleep till he had recalled all detachments and taken measures for

setting out without delay. I urged my point by the obvious reasons of the cavalry detachments being able to join in a day or two on the road and pressed a short march or the sending a tent and some troops two coss from camp. My arguments were vain, however, he pledged himself that no reference to Paangul or any fresh order to quicken his motions was necessary.

The hircaras inform me that the Governor General has both armies with him in high spirits, that grain sells at 16 seers a rupee in camp, that the neighbouring polygars are in our favour, that Tippoo is at Bangalore and that his late attempts to send a Vakeel to his Lordship was thwarted.

No. 232—Kennaway communicates to the G. G. the evasive attitude of the Nizam's durbar in respect of hastening Tejwant to join him (the G. G.).

FROM—CAPT. KENNAWAY,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Paungal, 4th March 1791.*

Immediately on its receipt I sent to inform the Minister that you expected to invest Bangalore by the 12th and wished that Teidge Wunt should be directed to move towards you, which I desired he might be instructed to do without waiting for any further requisition. Meer Abul Cossim came to me in the evening and desired to know if your Lordship had specified by what route you wished the Nizam's army should advance. I told him you had not, as that was a point which it was not to be supposed you would take upon yourself to prescribe in, and its determination properly belonged to Teidge Wunt himself. He said it was necessary that Teidge Wunt should be consulted about it previous to his advancing and that the preparations necessary for his march should be arranged, that Bangalore lay at the distance of near a hundred coss from Gunjycotah (I informed him that measured on the map it was only seventy); that it had been expected your Lordship would have moved nearer in order to facilitate the junction and that the Nizam's army in such a long march would be exposed to great risks from the enemy's attempts; Meer Abul Cossim's first question surprised me and these remarks, the drift of which was but too apparent, would have excited my indignation had I not sufficiently experienced the acts and evasion of the motives not to be astonished at any shift or inconsistency they can be guilty of. I replied I was totally at a loss how to reply to his observations, that the point of distance with every other point relating to Teidge Wunt's advance after having been fully discussed His Highness's order in consequence had been issued and delivered to him by Lieut. Stuart and a letter had been actually

written to your Lordship by him expressive of his readiness to conform to the Nizam's order, that a few days after the delivery of your commands to me of the 12th your Lordship would receive my dispatch of the 10th February and in all probability send off an express for the army to join you immediately after your receipt of it and thus circumstanced I left him to judge what your sentiments would be after what has passed on the subject; if instead of the prompt compliance engaged for by this Durbar and promised by Teidge Wunt that Chief should inform you he had received counter orders from the Nizam to those which had been originally given, that however 'altho' in your Lordship's plan for the operations of the campaign support from the Nizam's army formed a very material feature, yet I thought the Minister had better determine at once and inform me for your information what you had to expect than continue any longer to make professions that were not to be depended on. He observed that if the cavalry advanced from Gunjycotah before Darah Jah's arrival, the conquered districts would be left unprotected and asked what I advised concerning the siege of Kopul being raised. I said Mr. Steuart had informed me he was of opinion the infantry of that army was sufficient to take care of the country, and that in respect to Kopul I thought the time, mentioned by Captain Read as likely to determine its fate one way or the other, should be allowed to elapse, but that orders might be sent to Darah Jah to march at all events at a prescribed day. He asked me if it would be proper to inform Hurry Punt of the communication I had made, I told him I thought it would and that it might be urged as a reason to that Chief to expedite his march and give up his intention of visiting the Nizam; that I was further of opinion Teidge Wunt should be immediately written of the orders he might expect to receive from your Lordship in order that he might be prepared to comply with them. Meer Abul Cossim left me to report our conversation to the Minister and did not return till to-day. I had in the interim luckily received from Lieut. Steuart a copy of two different routes between Gunjycotah and Bangalore by one of which the distance was ascertained to be 60 and by the other 69 coss of which the country for 20 coss was in submission to the Nizam. A translate of it I immediately sent to the Minister and Meer Abul Cossim has informed me it was of great service to him in convincing Musheer-ul Mulk of the groundlessness of his apprehensions, adding from the Minister that Teidge Wunt would, as was at first determined, move to join your Lordship the moment he received your commands so to do, that in the meantime he would be reinforced with the greatest part of the cavalry at present with Mohaubut Jung, who had been directed to detain with him for carrying on his operations against Kopul with leisure no more than his own Rasalah, the Ellore detachment, the parties of two or three other Chiefs and some irregulars attached to him by the Nizam, that Hurry Punt had been informed of your Lordship's wishes respecting the advance of Teidge Wunt's cavalry and urged to

expedite the march of the Mahratta army to Gunjycotah, but that for the reasons before stated, his visit to Paangul could not be expected to be expressly declined.

As the conversation, tho' satisfactory compared with our former conference, had proceeded thus far, without any notice being taken on the part of Meer Abul Cossim of my request that orders might be sent to Teidge Wunt to advance without waiting for further instructions, I demanded what reply I was to give to your Lordship on this head. He said he was not prepared to answer the question then, but hoped he should be able to do it in a day or two, repeating that not a moment's delay would occur in Teidge Wunt's moving on his receiving your commands so to do. I again urged the necessity there was that these commands should not be waited for, that Lieut. Steuart had represented the particular anxiety of Assud Ali Khan and the readiness of Teidge Wunt to march and that there was a further necessity for it as the army from having been stationary so long wore the appearance of a cantonment rather than a camp.

I have the pleasure to inform your Lordship that the fort of Sidhout surrendered to a detachment from Teidge Wunt under the command of Mahomed Ameen Arab the 28th ultimo and the Killadar and his party have entered into the Nizam's service. The acquisition of this fort is a very important one, as it tends to put the conquest of the other parts of the Kudapa country on a secure footing.

*P.S.*—Since writing the above I have received a letter from Lieut Steuart informing me of Teidge Wunt's receipt of a letter from your Lordship written from the head of Moogly Ghaut the 23rd ultimo desiring him to join you at Bangalore with all his cavalry, in consequence of which I immediately sent my moonshy to the Minister to desire fresh instructions might be sent to him to march accordingly and to suggest that this requisition from your Lordship might be made an excellent plea to decline receiving Hurry Punt's visit as it renders the speedy advance of the Maharatta army indispensibly necessary. My moonshy is this instant returned and reports that the Minister acquainted him that information similar to what Lieut. Steuart has written me had been received by him from Teidge Wunt which information he had sent to the Nizam whose answer he expected every moment; that in regard to Hurry Punt he had always objected to his coming here, but as Balajee pressed it he thought it could not be prevented; that the Nizam's late correspondence with Hurry Punt had been submitted to me (which was true), from which it clearly appeared that it was not sought for from hence; that if my motives for desiring to prevent his coming arose from any apprehension of what he might effect (which my moonshy denied) I might rest satisfied, since whatever passed should be communicated to me and no inducement could alter His Highness's determination for an earnest prosecution of the war. The conversation was here interrupted by an order from the Nizam for the



Minister to attend him and I shall lose no time in informing your Lordship of the result the moment it is communicated to me.

**No. 233**—In spite of arguments and written remonstrances by Stewart, Tejwant cannot be induced to break ground at an earlier period than the 11th March.

FROM—LIEUT. STEUART,

TO—CAPTAIN KENNAWAY.

*Jemal Murroo, 4th March 1791.*

I have been constantly urging Teidge Wunt to obey his Master's and his Lordship's orders by an immediate advance ; but finding that verbal arguments at our meetings had no effect and that hints were thrown out respecting the protection of the new conquests and impossibility of settling all demands on so short a notice. I resorted this morning to a written report stating the glaring disobedience of orders he was going to be guilty of by delaying after such repeated injunctions, timely notice and his own declaration, the letter to his Lordship transmitted through me, to march towards Bangalore. In consequence of this he revoked the above hints telling me they were only private considerations, but no persuasion of mine would induce him to fix an earlier period for breaking ground than the very tedious one mentioned in my address of this date to the Governor General copy of which and of Tudge Wunt's reply to his Lordship's letter is enclosed for your information.

Assud Ali Khan, I am informed, is the most in want of pecuniary aid that an application has gone to the Minister supported by Teidge Wunt for his having a loan in lieu of some of the new conquests and that several other Chiefs have presented claims which are to be arranged here by Teidge Wunt who is just now preparing accounts for the purpose of issuing a month's pay to his army to-morrow.

Your exertions would be assiduously used to finish what you have so ably begun to effect which nothing appears to be wanting but the most strict injunctions for a liberal use of money and a punctual observance of his Lordship's orders ; without these little good can be expected from this army.

**No. 233A**—Stewart communicates to Cornwallis Tejwant's preparations for marching from Jemalmuro on the 11th inst.

FROM—LIEUT. STEUART,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Jemal Murroo, 4th March 1791.*

Your letter to Rajah Teidge Wunt from Moguly and Palumnair Gaut arrived here on the 2nd instant, intelligence of which I immediately

communicated to Captain Kennaway urging his most zealous endeavors to procure the strictest injunctions to hasten Teidge Wunt's motions. I beg leave to assure your Lordship my exertions on the spot are incessant to secure a prompt compliance with your directions; and though Teidge Wunt after I had nearly expended all my arguments pledged himself in the most sacred manner to march from hence on the 11th instant, I shall continue to press the necessity of an earlier day and not allow, considering the strict nature of the Nizam's orders and pressure of the time, the propriety of any delay whatever. Sensible of the pernicious consequence of any I am particularly full on this subject in my correspondence with Captain Kennaway but more with a view to prevent them in future than of removing the present unexpected one for which, permit me to say, the nature of the discipline, the various accounts to settle and novelty of the enterprise are, if any palliation can be admitted, some small excuse.

I am happy to acquaint your Lordship that Rajha Teidge Wunt seems to be very busily employed in making preparations, that he has enjoined the different Chiefs to lighten their baggage, offered them advances in cash on account for their present wants and issued orders throughout the camp for marching on the day mentioned in the enclosed translate of his reply to your Lordship's letter.

I see no objection to Teidge Wunt's immediate advance that money in compliance with the numerous demands of the different Chiefs cannot remove and shall therefore continue to urge liberal profusion at this time as the height of economy.

No. 233B—Tejwant promises to march towards Bangalore either by way of Rachoutie or Comarcalwa on the 11th inst.

FROM—RAJA TEJWANT,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

4th March 1791.

I have received your kind letter acquainting me of your march from Muck and Pulumnair Gaut towards Bangalore and desiring the cavalry of the Sarkar to join with all expedition. Immediately on receipt of the said letter I issued the orders of march and sent directions for the rest of the detachments employed in different quarters in conquering the enemy's districts the whole of whom by the favor of God will arrive here in two or three days. On the 6th of Rejjib (agreeing with the 11th March) I will without doubt or falsehood set out and by constant marches for you. Two roads leading towards Bangalore have been fixed on, the first by way of Rachooty and the second by Colmar Culwa; whichever of these may afford the most plentiful supply of gram and water will be chosen. Favor me till we meet with accounts of the occurrences in your camp.

**No. 234**—Malet reports to the G. G. his efforts to expedite the advance of Haripant by comparing the former's slow march with the utmost expedition of his Lordship.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 4th March 1791.*

I enclose Col. Frederick's sentiments relative to the probable fate of Dharwar, which your Lordship will perceive corresponds very nearly in point of time with the period which in my letter of 27, I had suggested as a proper limitation for his remaining before the place. I need not attempt to express to your Lordship my extreme anxiety on this very critical and important object and the unceasing importunity with which I urge the Minister to promote its accomplishment by forwarding the supply of the requisite materials, thereby to preserve our honor and his own. As in the accounts of the attempt of the 7 ultimo, to storm, stress has been laid on the failure of the Bhaou's part on that occasion, permit me to request that your Lordship will look on that failure as susceptible of some palliation.

I have confined my late instances to the Minister on the subject of Hurry Punt's advance to a simple representation that the co-operative plan was finally agreed on by this Court in the appointment of Medajee-punt Behere the 30th November with an engagement that he should be on the Kishna with 55,000 men in one month, that this arrangement being changed in favor of Hurry Punt, it was officially communicated to me on the 9th December that he should be on the Krishna at the head of 25,000 men in 38 days from the 10th December, on which day he entered his tents, and this short statement I have closed with an observation that, while, since your Lordship's departure from Calcutta on the 5 December, you have drawn cavalry from the province of Oude, infantry, cattle and stores from Bengal, marched the main Madras army from the southern confines of the Carnatic, reassembled it with its reinforcements of men, stores and cattle in the neighborhood of Arnee and actually marched on the 4 ulto. for the purpose of a new invasion of the enemy's country in concert with the allies, the promised army of this mighty State that should have been assembled in October did not on the 23 ulto. exceed 10,000 men and was not advanced 100 coss from Poona. After the various arguments that I have at different periods used, this plain statement of facts ought to have some weight and promises are not wanting that it shall.

Some applications have been made to me by Sindea's Vackeel at this Court for information of the progress of any negotiations for a peace, with which I have declined compliance by a general reference of the

Vackeel to his Master's intimate friend the Minister and to your Lordship's representative with the Sindia himself.

**No. 235**—The Nizam writes to various Chiefs to join Tejawant quickly.

FROM—THE NIZAM,

TO—RAJA TEIDGE WUNT.

*5th March 1791.*

At this time the dispatch which you sent to my beloved son Azem-ul-Umrah enclosing the letter you had received from Lord Cornwallis has been submitted to me and the contents of it clearly understood. Separate orders are now sent to you directed to Hushmut Jung Hafiz Ferid-u-din, Gopaul Row, Abdul Keriem Beg, Roy Sitab Ram, Rossul Newaz Khan and other Sirdars within 12 coss or 15 coss, which you will forward directing them to join you with all expedition at Jemaul Murroo where they will remain. You with your cavalry and Musheer-ul-Dowlah, Shitab Ram and Hafiz Ferid-u-din will in the mean time hold yourself in readiness and after assembling the troops abovementioned which are to remain at Jemaul Murroo you will effect your junction with Lord Cornwallis. Further particulars will be communicated to you by my direction by Azem-ul-Umrah.

**No. 236**—The surrender of Kolar and Ouscotta.

FROM—LIEUT. STEUART,

TO—CAPTAIN KENNAWAY.

*Camp Jemaul Murroo, 6th March 1791.*

Nurhir Balajee informe me he has just now received intelligence from Ghut of the quiet surrender of Coolar, Nursapore and Huscotta to the Company's arms on the 1st instant, the authenticity of which, I hope, will be confirmed in a day or two.

**No. 237**—Muhammad Amin Arab is expected to join Tejawant the next day.

FROM—LIEUT. STEUART,

TO—CAPTAIN KENNAWAY.

*Camp Jemaul Murroo, 7th March 1791.*

One of my own hircarrahs is just now returned from Ghut Gonnair with a letter from Mr. Wm. Macleod to the Zemindars of that place translate of which I enclose for your information.

My hircarrah confirms Nurhir Balajee's intelligence as stated to you yesterday and informs me that Ragoo Nykul Nair having collected great supplies of grain and cattle was only prevented from joining his Lordship immediately by a desire to raise more troops which he expected to accomplish in a day or two.

Teidge Wunt still talks of the 6th Rejib as the day of his march in spite of all my remonstrances for a earlier period.

Mahomed Ameen Arab with the Killadar of Sidhout and a large detachment are expected here to-morrow at farthest, being now only five coss from hence.

- (i) Macleod urges the zeminder to assemble with the army of the Polygars at Ouscotta and join Cornwallis.

FROM—MACLEOD,

TO—RAGHU NYKUL NAIR.

*Kolar, 1st March 1791.*

The Governor General will march to-day from Kolar to Huscotta. Two letters are just now received from Mr. Steuart along with an arzee from you which his Lordship not having time at present has detained the Hirkarras to return with an answer to. The letter from the Governor General sent thro' you to that gentleman has not been acknowledged, you will be expeditious in procuring and in forwarding its answer.

His Lordship desires that you will without loss of time assemble the neighbouring Polygars and join agreeably to your engagements the army at Huscotta where it will halt for you to-morrow: that you will all be assiduous in collecting grain, cattle and troops and that you will bring Lalla Luchmi Ram with his supplies of grain along with you to the army. His Lordship will give further directions on your arrival. You will acquaint Mr. Steuart of the receipt of his two letters; be expeditious in transmitting any others that may come from him and enjoin your Vakeel at Jemaul Murroo to be extremely attentive in transmitting in safety letters to and from this army.

- (ii) Extract of a letter from Lieut. Steuart to Capt. Kennaway.

FROM—LIEUT. STEUART,

TO—CAPT. KENNAWAY.

*Jemal Murroo, 7th March 1791.*

I have ordered the Sirdars Hafiz and Hushmut with the Sholapore people to join here instantly as I am resolved to go from hence on the

6th of Rejib. Camel men have been dispatched with orders of the most positive nature on the above head.

I have urged Teidge Wunt by the most flattering arguments I could call up, to be alert and I do believe he is so; the camel men are actually to my knowledge already gone to Hafiz and Hushmut. Teidge Wunt again pledges himself in the most sacred manner to break ground on the 6th of Rejib.

### No. 238.

FROM—TIPU SULTAN,  
TO—ANANDARAO RASTA.

*Delivered to Malet, 6th March 1791.*

After compliments all is well here. Rejoice me with news of your welfare—Ally Ruzza and Sirree Nouaz have been despatched hence to make known to you and the Peshwa certain friendly matters, who having reached Chittuldroog remain there in expectation of an escort and passports that they may wait on you and make known to you particulars. By God's blessing friendship between this Sirkar and the Peshwa will increase daily. Always write me of your welfare.

**No. 239**—Malet communicates to G. G. the receipt of a letter from Tipu to Rasta and estimates the effect of the co-operation of a large body of cavalry with His Lordship on the fortunes of the war.

FROM—C. W. MALET,  
TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 7th March 1791.*

On the 6th I was favored with a visit from Behro Punt at which he delivered me copy of a letter said to be from Tipu to Rasta and to have been received here on that inst. On B. P.'s delivering it to me I observed that the same application had been long since made by Ally Rezza in a letter which both the Nabob and myself had advised a similar answer being given as that which had been uniformly given by your Lordship to the repeated applications of the enemy, but conformable to which I had not yet been advised of any answer having been given. At all events the Minister, possessed of the Nabob's sentiments, of copies of your Lordship's late answers to similar applications and after the verbal communication to me of his own opinion perfectly in unison with your Lordship, could not now be at any difficulty for an answer to this new proposal. Behro Punt observed to me that reports were circulated

of negotiations being on foot between your Lordship and Tippu. I, in reply referred, him to your Lordship's letters that had been faithfully delivered to this Court and to your Lordship's present operations, remarking that I should long since have been reduced to a lamentable state of suspicion and distrust were I to adopt reports as the standard of my confidence in the Minister's good faith. I can clearly discover that it is a grand object of this Court's present act to *draw the approaching negotiations into the channel of its own management*. Enquiries were made relative to the Nabob's advanced Corps at Gunjycota, its force and destination. I replied that I understood it to consist of about 15,000 horse and that as its advance was in prosecution of a plan of co-operation (in the execution of this Court's part of which Your Lordship concluded Hurry Punt would likewise have been ere this at the same place) Teydge Wunt's movements could of course be regulated by those of your Lordship. He enquired concerning the Nabob's intentions to move, and asked my opinion of its taking place. I replied that disappointed as I had frequently been in the promised movements of this Court and its officers, how could I possibly venture an opinion as to His Highness' intentions. He said Hurry Punt's meeting with the Nabob was determined on and with an appearance of confidential advice strongly urged me to write Capt. Kennaway to prevent as far as possible all delay in Hurry Punt's stay. If His Highness is really well inclined to support the professions of co-operation with your Lordship which he has lately so warmly made and on which it is so palpably for his interest and honor steadily and vigorously to persevere, the present crisis presents the best possible opportunity, since in so doing he will have to urge against any suggestions of jealousy on the part of this Court that the faithful discharge of his cooperative plans with your Lordship is in strict observance of the late arrangements with this Court, so that under the sanction of faithfully discharging the plan of co-operation that originated here, he will in fact have it in his power to establish his own honor and interest in the prosecution and termination of the alliance by a close concert with your Lordship on the firm basis of good faith and which this Court as above mentioned will have no possible cause of complaint by His Highness' zealous adoption of its plans. His prompt and vigorous cooperation with your Lordship will in all human probability give him the merit with your Lordship and our nation of contributing most effectually to the early and honorable termination of the war, in prevention of the attempts of this Court to become the arbitrators of its continuance and conclusion.

In a word, my Lord, I should look on the war as virtually ended on hearing that 18,000 of the allied cavalry, from whatever quarter they come, had joined your army and had proved their resolution to act up to the emergency as they would at all times make you master of your supplies from our own or our allies' country, while those of the enemy would soon become precarious in his own exhausted country. I am

informed by a person who has frequently travelled the road that from Bangalore to Seringputtun is only 24 coss and thence to Periaputtun at the top of the Coorg Pass only twelve coss. When I advert to the vast prospect of honor and gain that will be opened to any body of cavalry that might join your Lordship, I am sanguine in the confidence that their exertions might be gained, even should the genius of the Court to which they belonged be narrow and temporizing.

At my meeting with Behro Punt I signified to him that as by my last letter from Dharwar I had great reason to hope its reduction in less than a month, I meant at all events not to recall Col. Frederick's detachment in that time and strongly urged him so far to enforce the Colonel's supplies for carrying on his approaches as to prevent, being added to the discredit of easing seige, the dissatisfaction to your Lordship of that necessity having been caused by the repeated failure of this Court's supplies.

I am of opinion that your Lordship's directing the tardy equipment and advance of Hurry Punt to be strongly mentioned to the Peshwa's Vackeel and the extraordinary deficiency arising therefrom in the cooperative engagements concerted with me in the latter end of last November in the manner mentioned in my last address, it might have a good effect here as in promotion of my object of accelerating Hurry Punt's progress, I hold forth here your Lordship's great surprise as expressed in your letters to me at the extreme difference of the promises and performances of this Court and for Mr. Cherry's guidance in making these representations I now send him the dates of the leading points relative to the co-operative Plan which may be said to have been extracted from my advices.

By a letter received yesterday from Lieut. Davidson at Nagpore dated 18 ultimo I learn that Ragojee Bhosla had assented to supply the Peshwa 5,000 horse for the present war.

**No. 240**—Azim-ul-Umara orders Tejwant to march on the appointed day.

FROM—AZIM-UL-UMARA,

TO—RAJA TEIDGE WUNT.

*7th March 1791.*

His Highness was pleased to give clear and repeated orders that you march putting your trust in God on the 6th Rejub or 12th March, the day you have fixed on to join His Lordship with whom your junction is most necessary, will tend to the success of affairs and to the accomplishment of the promise given. You will have received the order directed to Hafiz Ferid-u-din and Hushmut Jung who must already or will soon have joined you, but even should they not have done so, it will at all events be proper to march a coss or two on the day appointed;



the Nizam's orders to them on the subject are repeated and sent to you to be forwarded.

**No. 241**—The Nizam sends positive orders to Raja Tejwant to begin his march on the 12th instant and Kennaway solemnly assures the Nizam of the G. G.'s care for the safety of the Nizam's cavalry.

FROM—CAPTAIN KENNAWAY,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Paungal, 8th March 1791.*

The most positive orders have been sent to Rajah Teidge Wunt to begin his march the 12th instant on which day the Minister assures me he will march 5 coss and afterwards proceed by rapid marches of from 12 to 15 coss a day till his junction with your Lordship is effected. I shall immediately forward a copy of your Lordship's letter to Mr. Malet whom as well as General Abercomby and the Bombay Board I have kept informed of your progress as far as Mol Wagul on the 25th ultimo. A letter I received from Mr. Malet yesterday of the 28th informs me that private letters just received from Bombay mention General Abercomby's having marched northward from Billipatam the 15th ultimo. The Governor of Bombay had applied to Mr. Malet to purchase for the use of General Abercomby's army 1,000 draft bullocks which that gentleman by his reply seems apprehensive he shall not be able to procure in any reasonable time.

It may be proper to inform your Lordship that to remove the apprehensions entertained by the Nizam of the risk His Highness's cavalry would be exposed to from the enemy in the march from Gunjycota to Bangalore which I have had no small difficulty to combat, I have constantly assured your Lordship would be as solicitous for the safety of the Nizam's troops as of your own, and that as by the means of Lieut. Steuart and your intelligence of the enemy you would have the earliest information of his designs, you would be able, in case any thing was intended against Teidge Wunt, to facilitate the junction by a movement of a division of your army.

The Minister informs me that Hurry Punt is expected to arrive at Edgheer in four days, six days after which he may be expected here; that Balajee Pundit had been written to agreeable to my suggestion that his (Hurry Punt's) visit to the Nizam had better be delayed to a more convenient season, to which he had replied that consultation about the prosecution of the war was not the sole object of his errand as there were other points necessary to be advised about, but that his visit would be limited to eight days. The period of the Nizam's march will not be determined till his arrival. I am afraid the chance of carrying Kopul by force is against us; which from Mr. Malet's

dispatch to your Lordship of the 28th seems likely to be the case and in a greater degree with respect to Dharwar.

**No. 241A**—Intelligence about the siege of Kopul.

FROM—CAPT. A. READ,

TO—CAPTAIN KENNAWAY.

*Camp Kopul, 3rd March 1791.*

The balls from Pangul are not yet arrived, though daily expected; people have been sent off by Dara Jah to expedite their arrival. Four days have been taken up in bushing the 32 Pr.; the 28, 24 and 18 are also much in want of it; the wall requires a great deal of battering, indeed more than at first I could have imagined. However it is daily decreasing and I beg leave to assure you that not a moment's time shall be lost in our operations that I can prevent.

**No. 242**—Palmer congratulates Malet on the friendly disposition of the Poona Court to the alliance.

FROM—MAJOR PALMER,

TO—C. W. MALET.

*Agra, 8th March 1791.*

It will be sufficient for the present to inform you that the Patel continues to cultivate the friendship which subsists between him and our Government in every mode that can be desired of him and indeed it is obvious enough that his new situation will induce him to strengthen and improve his connection with us by every means in his power.

Although our friends to the southward have not done all that was incumbent upon them, I confess they have done more than I expected and think have not a little supported and benefitted the common cause. I do not doubt that Lord Cornwallis's speedy progress and success will confirm and increase the disposition which they have manifested to act cordially and faithfully in their engagements and to obviate the difficulties and anxiety to which in other circumstances you will be exposed.

**No. 243**—Kennaway informs the G. G. of repeated injunctions sent to Tejwant to march expeditiously and of the Nizams' intention to send an army under Hushmat Jung to Guramconda to keep the communication open for sending supplies to Tejwant.

FROM—CAPT. KENNAWAY,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Paungal, 10th March 1791.*

Meer Abul Cossim has just been with me and in reply to my repeated representations to the Minister of the necessity there was, that Tejwant

Wunt should be enjoined in the most positive terms not to delay commencing his march in earnest beyond the 12th instant, has assured me that two or three letters have been written to him by the Minister subsequent to that of the 7th, that at the time appointed whether the detachments of infantry to be left at Jemaul Murroo arrive or not, the most positive order to push on would be repeated to him to-day. I requested a copy of this order might be given me for your Lordship's information and if it arrives in time shall transmit it by this dispatch. He requested me from the Minister to acquaint your Lordship that after the departure of Teidge Wunt it is the Nizam's intention to advance a detachment of 3,000 Cavalry and about 7,000 infantry under the command of Hushmut Jung, a brave high spirited Officer (natural brother to the late Rukkun-u-Doulah) to Gurram Coonda in order to keep open the communication for supplies etc., with Teidge Wunt's army, which for the present would be attended by about 7,000 grain bullocks but that a great number in addition had been stipulated for, I think he said, 10,000 to follow which would be serviceable to your Lordship's army; that as Teidge Wunt would make very rapid marches the Minister hoped he would join your Lordship in six days from the day of his setting off, and that the force which would be forthwith assembled at Gunjycotah under Hafez Ferid-u-din would amount to near 20,000, of which, however, the greatest proportion would be infantry.

He acquainted me that the 14th instant had been fixed on as the lucky day for Hurry Punt's arrival, that by his coming then no time would be lost by it as he would only have to pass those days of the Hooly here which would have required his halting elsewhere, that to convince him of the necessity there was for his using dispatch in sending on his army, a copy of your Lordship's letter of the 21st ultimo to Teidge Wunt had been sent to him for his perusal, that the Minister conceived he had with him about 10,000 horse, but he (Hurry Punt) had acquainted the Nizam they amounted to 4,000\* which His Highness might satisfy himself of, if he chose, by ordering a muster when they cross at Kalacheboutra Ghaut, which is about five coss from Raychore.

**No. 243A**—Tejwant is again enjoined to march without delay.

**EXTRACT OF THE NIZAM'S MINISTER'S LETTER.**

**TO—RAJA TEJWANT.**

*10th March 1791.*

“Therefore on the 12th of March you will, agreeable to your own appointment, assuredly march without waiting for the arrival of Hushmut Jung, Hafez Farid-u-deen or the detachments which have been ordered to join you from Darah Jah's army.”

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\*Kennaway later corrected this figure to 14,000.

"Putting your trust in God you will, from the 12th of March on which you begin your journey, by long marches, effect your junction with Lord Cornwallis and consider this order as equivalent to an hundred."

No. 244. Malet communicates to G. G. his suspicions of the designs of the Maharattas on the intimation of Bhao's readiness to cooperate with General Abercromby.

FROM C. W. MALET,

TO CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 11th March 1791.*

By a letter dated the 5th received yesterday from Mr. Ulthoff I understand that Bhao is pushing toward the force by rap. His letter also contains the following part: "Ballajee called on me this morning with a proposition from the Bhao for Genl. Abercromby to embark at Onore or some port in the Sunda district and penetrate the enemy's country by way of Bednore, when he would furnish him with 8 or 10,000 horse. I asked if this came from Poona? He said not; but that the Bhao would immediately engage on his part, if any one was warranted to engage on ours."

Having (as your Lordship knows) long since proposed this very cooperation to the Minister without having yet received any answer on the plea of none having been received to the reference of it to Bhao, Ballajee's mention of it to Mr. Ulthoff appears to me to be either an efficient attempt to found a merit on the strength of something that he may have heard on the subject at Bhao's or to have an invidious object of diverting Genl. Abercromby (by the hope of the proposed junction) from objects that may be more immediately beneficial to the Co.'s interests to others more agreeable to the views of this Court, while by the adoption of the cooperation not having been mentioned to me, it may, should the policy of this Court so suggest, be ultimately discovered by this Govt. as unauthorised by its authority, possibly as Ballajee says that it is not from Poona. I have mentioned these points to Mr. Ulthoff and, to put him still further on his guard, have added that this very cooperation has long been in agitation, but that however desirable, it should not, in my opinion, be permitted to lead Genl. Abercromby into the smallest deviation from the grand object of cooperation with your Lordship, which I conceive to be the basis of his plan. But that if his prosecution of it could be made exactly agreeable to the Maharattas so much the better; whereas if the penetrating the upper country by the Coorg pass or any other south of Bednore was more eligible for the General it certainly should be adopted, since if the Marhattas are sincere in their desire of a cooperation they can much more easily join Genl. Abercromby after ascending in

the direction convenient to him than he could accommodate himself to their convenience or what is more likely, their wonderful attention to their own interests, unless, as already observed, it should luckily so happen that the convenience of both parties led to the same point. The idea of the General's coming by sea also has to me appearance of a crafty design of thereby carrying thus the Maratha conquests to meet ours as far south as possible, since the General's appearance with such an armament on any part of the coast would probably render the whole country an easy conquest to the Marratta parties that would move down by land as the General moved up by sea, whereas should he move himself by land, the country, I am given to understand, would afford very ample present contributions, not to mention the future important advantages that may be derived from being possessed of it, either in negotiating a peace or after the conclusion of it.

I have just learnt from the Durbar that Hurry Punt has approached very near the Nabob's cantonment and that after his meeting in which no time will be lost, he will immediately cross the Tumbudra near Curnool.

**No. 245**—Lieut. Steuart submits a description of the state of Tejwant's cavalry and informs Cornwallis of the difficulty of ensuring a speedy junction.

FROM—LIEUT. STEUART,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Camp Guram-Chirlah, 12th March 1791.*

Teidge Wunt marched two miles with his numerous cavalry this morning, but as no intelligence has been received from Hushmut Jung on whose arrival at Jemaal Murroo our further advance depends I cannot venture to hint the probable time of our moving from hence. I attended the Rajah on the march and have no hesitation in saying he commands the best cavalry I have seen in India: they are very respectable not only on account of the excellence of the horse and equipment of the men but the character of their Chiefs, many of whom are much more famous for military enterprize than for rank or family; the best proof of money for present wants having been supplied the Raja is in the ready obedience of the whole to move without prevaricating for advances or arrears due to them. Tho' the Chiefs have, agreeably to Teidge Wunt's orders, sent away their families and useless lumber, I am sorry to observe the immense baggage and carriage (mostly bullocks) in this army: the buzzar is already extensive, tho' many of the bunjaras with droves of grain bullocks are dispatched for large supplies to accompany the army.

Your Lordship's orders for me to encourage Teidge Wunt to move as fast as possible and your opinion as timely communicated to me, "it is also a material consideration with me that the movement of cavalry only may be so rapid as to render it impossible for the enemy to obstruct any conjunction," have enabled me to urge Teidge Wunt to advance

with the utmost expedition to Bangalore; however, I am sorry to say, that in addition to the above obstacles of baggage and grain bullocks, there appear to be others against a speedy junction. I shall continue to urge the necessity for one and insist as far as possible on the bazar and other encumbrances being immediately reduced.

I am of opinion that it is possible Teidge Wunt, after making short marches and many halts in spite of my remonstrances and after the arrival of the enemy between your Lordship and this army, will apply to me for advice, and that the only answer I shall give him then will be to leave his grain bullocks, bazar and useless lumber in the strongest fort near him under a detachment of the Polygars' foot and to advance with his cavalry to join your Lordship with all possible speed. He has agreed to detach a strong advanced guard of cavalry for the sake of security and intelligence and says he will also employ the Polygars in front of the above guards, and take means to communicate with your Lordship. I have ventured to give the answer I would give in the above predicament solely with the view of being honored with your Lordship's commands concerning the propriety of it and instructing how to act in case of the perverse delays of Teidge Wunt in any other situation. In answer to my arguments for rapid movements and the quotation of the above extract of your letter, he assured me to-day in my tent (but I do not credit him entirely) that he would only halt one night between Gut Connair and Bangalore, and that if Tippoo should (as he was sure he would) come between, he was ready and determined to fight him. I approved of the former, but requested he would relinquish all idea of the latter by adopting rapidity; at the same time, My Lord, from the view I have had of this army I, by no means, think it unequal to oppose Tippoo's whole cavalry.

Anxious, My Lord, to act in everything agreeably to your wishes I take this early occasion to solicit your Lordship's instructions which will no doubt reach me before we arrive near Gurramcoonda.

**No. 246**—Haripants' visit is postponed to 23rd instant and Kennaway protests against the absence of Amin Arab from Tejwant's army at the critical hour.

FROM—CAPT. KENNAWAY,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Paungal, 13th March 1791.*

I am sorry to acquaint your Lordship that Hurry Punt having determined to pass the Hooley at Gudwaal on account of a celebrated Pagoda there has postponed coming to Paangul till the 23rd instant.

The absence of Mahomed Ameen Arab from Teidge Wunt's army at this juncture is exceedingly to be regretted and the moment I received the account from Lieut. Stuart I went to the Minister to remonstrate

against it. He replied that the Arab's determination to proceed hither was contrary to his express injunctions that, however, his absence would not at all interfere with Teidge Wunt's advance and that he would rejoin the army before it reached Bangalore.

I have the honor to enclose an extract of a letter I have received from Captain Read.

**No. 246A**—A. Read craves permission to make a last attempt on Kopul and communicates his opinion on the proposal of blockading the fortress.

FROM—CAPTAIN A. READ,

TO—CAPT. KENNAWAY.

*Camp Kopul, 7th March 1791.*

I cannot form a hope of seeing the breach practicable so soon as the time mentioned in my letter to His Highness as it has been necessary to bush the 32 Pr. since ; the 28 Pr. the workmen are now at work upon and the 18 must undergo a like repair before she can be fired from. Those circumstances and another still more distressing make me less sanguine in my hope of success than hitherto ; that is, the guns in general have become almost unserviceable ; the 32 Pr. is now so large as to require a 42 lb. shot and the others so much out of order, that it is scarcely possible once in five times to hit the breach with them the distance not 500 yards. The shot are not yet arrived from Paangul ; when they do I have only to hope that a last effort may be permitted us.

In answer to your question respecting the siege being turned into a blockade it is my opinion that 4 or 5,000 of the Nabob's irregulars may fully accomplish that purpose with an active careful man at their head. Might I presume to offer an opinion in the event of the siege being turned into a blockade it would be that the guns might remain where they at present are, as much time would be lost in removing them and they are not fit to be carried elsewhere ; besides, in the event of the blockade not succeeding and it become necessary to resume the siege, the guns may be repaired where they are and occasionally used to prevent the garrison repairing the damage done to the wall, which in my opinion is the only vulnerable part of the upper fort, and at any rate to accomplish a blockade a party must be stationed on the hills where the guns now are.

**No. 247**—Nana directs Haripant to march expeditiously to join Lord Cornwallis.

FROM—BALAJEE PUNT NANA FADNIS,

TO—HURRY PUNT.

*Poona, 13th March 1791.*

The Rt. Honourable the Governor General, Earl Cornwallis having taken the field in person against Tipu and ascended the Ghauts, you

will therefore cross the Tumbudra and advance and communicate the same to the Governor General who will also write to you the cooperative plan of the junction of the three confederates. After the junction, consult together and conduct the operations of the war in union and concert.

A letter to this purport was formerly given to Mr. Malet who sent it by the way of Madras ; but Lord Cornwallis having ascended the Ghaut, delay in its arrival with him may have arisen ; this second letter is therefore given at Mr. Malet's desire.

No. 247A—Nana directs Parsuram Bhau to cooperate with General Abercromby.

FROM—BALAJEE PUNT, NANA FADNIS,

TO—PARSURAM BHAU.

*Poona, 13th March 1791.*

General Abercromby, Governor of Bombay, being in the neighborhood of Tellicherry will ascend the Ghauts with his army toward Bednore when you and he effecting a junction will proceed toward Seringputtun. This plan has been concerted with Mr. Malet who has written the said Governor accordingly, who will, on commencing his march write to you and you will write to him.

No. 248—In order to guard against surprise, Steuart employs thirty harkarahs and advises Tejwant to take steps for procuring intelligence.

FROM—LIEUT. STEUART,

TO—CAPT. KENNAWAY.

*Guram-Chirlah, 14th March 1791.*

*(11 p. m.)*

I have the honour to enclose for your information copy of a letter from the Governor General the contents of which will only tend to excite our further exertions to expedite the advance of this army. I communicated to Teidge Wunt such parts as appeared necessary, particularly in respect to intelligence, and in talking of guarding against a surprise I referred him to the fortunate circumstance of the full moon with the view of removing any useless apprehension. I pointed out all the steps that appeared to me necessary to be taken for intelligence and left him after receiving an assurance that he would besides using, other means, detach his Mahratta horse 10 or 12 coss in front with the Polygar's people whom he had summoned to join him at Comar Calwah for the purpose of getting notice of the enemy.

Having now ascertained in the most unequivocal manner Teidge Wunt's rule of giving no pay or reward to hircarrahs for news and of his throwing ..



this expense on the Zemindars, I have, exclusive of my own jasuses and the indent on Capt. Read for 8 or 10, ordered 30 more to be hired and though you left this part to my prudence I do not conceive myself authorized by you to go to that degree of expense. I have only to observe that considering them no less necessary for the public service than for my own credit in the trust you have placed in me I shall be very ready to defray it if you disapprove of such increase and beg leave to assure you nothing will prevent me from hiring more should occasion as is likely, appear for them.

(i) Cornwallis urges Raja Tejwant to move with the utmost celerity.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—LIEUT. STEUART.

*Pascatta, 2nd March 1791.*

I received with great pleasure your letter dated the 19th ult. and I request that you will assure Rajah Teidge Wunt and Assud Ali Khan that the readiness which they expressed to join me with the cavalry of their army has given me the greatest satisfaction.

It would have been very desirable that the junction should be effected before we commenced the attack of Bangalore, but the state of my provisions and the apprehensions that the enemy would destroy all the forage in the neighbourhood of that place, put out of my power to wait for that event, especially as from the uncertainty of our communication the period cannot be precisely ascertained. You will recommend to the Rajah to move with the utmost celerity until he approaches Bangalore when it will be necessary that he should use circumspection, be very much upon his guard against a surprise and take every possible means of obtaining intelligence of the enemy's situation and of communicating with me, for which latter purpose you will send off Hircarrah after Hircarrah with cyphered letters.

I will in the same manner give you all the information I can and do everything that depends upon me to secure your junction.

(ii) Macleod asks the Nair Zemindar to join the army with troops and supplies.

FROM—WM. MACLEOD,

TO—RAGOO NYKUL NAIR.

*Huskotta, 5th March 1791.*

Your people are arrived. The army will march from hence to Bangalore the 7th instant. Four letters from Mr. Steuart have been received to which answers will be sent hereafter. At present a letter from the

Governor General to that gentleman accompanies, this which you will forward to him without delay, and procure a speedy answer. Send Lachmi Ram who is employed in your neighbourhood in collecting gram and cattle quickly to the army. An order was before issued for your collecting troops and bringing them with you to the army without delay ; they are not arrived yet. It is necessary that you should be expeditious in coming with your troops and supplies.

No. 249—Tejwant halts again and refuses to move till the 16th instant, in spite of importunities.

FROM—LIEUT. STEUART,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Goorum-Chirla, 14th March 1791.*

Having last night received notice of Hafiz Ferid-u-din's arrival at a place 12 coss from hence, I urged Teidge Wunt in vain by message and by letter to summon him here to-day and to march towards your Lordship tomorrow..

This morning I had the happiness to receive the accompanying packet from Captain Kennaway with a Persian copy of the Minister's orders to Teidge Wunt which I lost no time in requesting him to obey. I also expressed a wish for a speedy interview to obtain information for your Lordship of the length and number of the marches he intended to make between this and Bangalore. In reply he declared he could not move till the 10th of Rajab (the 16th instant) and that at the distance of seven or eight coss from hence he would acquaint me of what might be proper for your Lordship's information in respect to the route etc. Unwilling to permit a silent disobedience of his Master's orders or a march of seven or eight coss I drew out a paper stating the opportunity he was affording the enemy by halting here, in spite even of his receipt of injunctions to the contrary urging him to march immediately and declaring that long marches could not mean less than ten or twelve coss. In answer to which he sent me a letter to your Lordship (translate of which is enclosed), begged for God's sake I would allow him one day exclusive of this to settle his money concerns in the districts, for which purpose all the amils would be here immediately and promised to make marches of ten coss as twelve would be too many for him. I referred him again to his orders saying I could not approve of any delay ; but as he had by this time actually written to the Minister that he would not move till the 16th, I desisted from troubling him further.

I shall continue to urge thê necessity for long and constant marches and not allow of any delay on the road for further directions from your Lordship on any other pretence, however I humbly beg leave to express

my opinion that Teidge Wunt's anxiety may be more effectually eased by the receipt of constant intelligence of the enemy from your Lordship with your advice than by any other means and that should your Lordship be able to ascertain the enemy is at a distance, I shall hope to prevail on Teidge Wunt to push on in a rapid manner.

**No. 250**—Malet reports to the G. G. the discussion that took place between him and Nana on the subject of the slow progress of Haripant, the siege of Dharwar and the junction of Bhau with Abercromby.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 14th March 1791.*

Pursuant to the intention mentioned in my last address of the 11th instant to take advantage of the intelligence of your Lordship's having ascended the Ballaghaut, I, at a visit that I paid the Minister the next day, communicated that important event, observing that from your Lordship's vigorous and candid conduct hitherto, he might judge of your future measures; I expressed my concern that Hurry Punt's progress at this very critical and important period had not been such as to give your Lordship that prospect of immediate junction which was presented by the advanced situation of the Nabob's troops under Raja Teydge Wunt, but that as your Lordship had summoned that officer to join you immediately, I hoped you would find his cavalry adequate to such service as might offer till the junction of Hurry Punt, in which after so much time already lost, I trusted no further delay would be admitted on any consideration, not even for the meeting with the Nabob, as the importance of its being effected at the present most critical juncture superceded every other consideration, and as I doubted not that your Lordship would, immediately on learning Hurry Punt's approach, claim of him the discharge of the cooperative engagements concerted by me with this Court. I begged the Minister to favor me with another copy of the letter lately furnished me to his address to be sent to your Lordship as having dispatched the former by the way of Madras, another copy might reach you quicker and with greater safety through Capt. Kennaway. The Minister expressed much wonder and joy at your Lordship's ascent of the Ghaut, the news of which had not reached him from any other quarter. He warmly protested that it had for some time been his primary object to expedite Hurry Punt's progress, expressed concern at and attempted to excuse his delay, said, he must now be so near the Nabob that the interview could not be prevented, but that he would repeat his instructions to hasten his passage of the Tumbudra, and approach your Lordship's army, the necessity of which he assured me he felt the full force of. He

concluded this part of our conference with a promise of a further copy of the former letter sent to your Lordship by Henry Punt.

I next drew the Minister's attention to the state of affairs at Dharwar which I described at a length that it would be tedious to recite to your Lordship with. The sum of his reply was that he would not attempt to detail his own chagrin and disappointed hopes; that the letter had been so frequent that he would no longer venture to give any more; he would less appoint any time through exertions were still making. I asked where the shot was that had been furnished him by the Bombay Govt. He said some of it had been landed, but that he had been so much disappointed in his conveyance as well as procural of ammunition that he could not tell me where it was or when it would reach camp: that during this disagreeable state of affairs relative to Dharwar he had procured answers from Bhaou on the alternative of his joining Genl. Abercromby or Hurry Punt, that he preferred the former and had even consented to raise the siege of Dharwar to effect that important object at this critical period and had sent a route for Genl. Abercromby by following which in his ascent of the Ghauts a junction might be easily formed. To all this I replied that as there were yet some hopes of the arrival of the ammunition about this time and as in that case the issue of a regular approach could not, by my advices from Col. Frederick, be long in deciding, I advised that on its arrival (if within a few days) it should be communicated to the Colonel and the Bhaou be guided by his sentiments as to the expediency of a last effort. This was assented to. I applauded much Bhaou's decision in favor of joining Genl. Abercromby and begged a copy of his route which was read to me, but observed that the General's equipment of artillery made it absolutely necessary that the route for his ascent of the Ghaut should be left entirely at his own option, for as the Maharatta cavalry were already above the Ghaut, no difficulty presented to their joining the General, wherever he might be able to penetrate, while in the event of the Bhaou's being delayed a few days in expectation of the issue of another effort against the fort, I strongly recommend the detachment of at least 7 or 8,000 horse under a leader of distinction to join the General. By a prompt execution of the double cooperation with your Lordship and Genl. Abercromby the enemy would be completely straitened and in all human probability the war brought to a speedy and honorable termination.

The Minister observed that should not Dharwar fall, he meant to blockade it and intended leaving a part of Col. Frederick's force for that purpose, the remainder to proceed with Bhaou. I replied that the Colonel's return to Bombay with his part of the detachment was indispensable, and begged his route might be fixed as far as possible to the north to prevent embarkation, and that as in the approaching junction of Bhaou and Genl. Abercromby Capt. Little's two battalions could answer no efficient purpose by remaining with him, I would

acquisition to the force of Genl. Abercromby's army, I strongly recommended their dismissal by the Bhau for that purpose on his approaching the General. The Minister, finding the destination of Col. Frederick unalterable, said he would fix his route and communicate to me, and that the disposal of Capt. Little's battalions must be referred to Bhau; but however he may decide now, I am of opinion that Genl. Abercromby will be able to convince him on meeting, of the expediency of their being incorporated in his army, in which event as Mr. Uthoff's paymastership will cease, I propose giving him the same delegatory powers as have been given by Capt. Kennaway to Lt. Stewart from my conviction that General Abercromby would avoid infinite trouble and very great danger of misunderstanding by the use of so eligible and well informed a channel of communication.

I enclose extract of Col. Fredrick's last letter and am very sorry to accompany it with Mr. Surgeon Cruso's opinion that he is in considerable danger.

I mentioned to the Minister the circumstance of General Abercromby being mentioned in the letter to Bhau to ascend in the quarters of Bednore and necessarily to proceed towards Seringputtun as not conformable to the latitude agreed on for the Genl.'s operations, to which he replied that it was inserted merely of course but that full instructions agreeable to our last conference would be sent to Bhaou and that no control was meant on General Abercromby's movements.

**No. 251**—Kennaway reports to the G. G. his conversation with the Nizam's Minister on the subject of Haripant's visit to Paungal and the application by Read for more shot.

FROM—CAPT. KENNAWAY,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Paungal, 15th March 1791.*

In regard to the slowness of Hurry Punt's motions no arguments have been left untried by me to induce the Nizam and the Minister to assist in quickening them. Some letters of the correspondence between this Durbar and Hurry Punt having been shown to me which, if they failed of proving that his visit to Paangul had been discouraged in the positive manner I desired, (the reason assigned for which I mentioned in my address of the 14th ultimo) certainly tended to show that it had not been courted: of which nature is the style of a letter dispatched to him the 9th instant of which I requested a copy and enclose a translate of it for your Lordship's information; an answer to this letter in which Hurry Punt says he will certainly be here but takes no notice of any other part of it was received to-day in consequence of which he will I am assured again be written to. The cause of his delay at present as

me by the Minister is his not having been joined by the troops he is in expectation of, concerning which he (Hurry Punt) has preferred many complaints to Balajee.

By a letter I have received from Captain Read under date the 10th instant, I am informed that most of the troops ordered to repair to Gunjycotah had either actually marched or were to do it the next day; that he had bushed his 28 Pounder which now throws with greater certainty than before; he requests that a thousand shot for the 28 and 32 lbs. in addition to the 500 already sent may be dispatched to him and that the casualties of the detachment of artillery may be filled by fresh men being sent: on those points I lost no time in applying to the Nizam and the Board of Madras. In a letter of the 28th February, Captain Read suggested the idea of from 4 to 6 iron 18 lbs. of which there were abundance at Masulipatam being granted to the Nizam for the purpose of being employed in any future siege. I submitted the proposal to consideration of the Board and in the event of its being complied with, recommended the guns being sent to Angole from whence they can be easily transported to camp, should Gunjycotah, as is probable, be the next object against which the efforts of the detachment will be directed.

The firmness of Nanajee Row Salunkeh (native of Bellary) the Killadar of Kopul, is ascribed to the circumstance of his family being in Tippoo's confinement at Bangalore, which it may be of use that your Lordship should be acquainted with.

In my dispatch to your Lordship of the 10th the number of horse which Hurry Punt declared were with him was written by mistake four instead of fourteen thousand.

**No. 251A**—The Nizam writes to Haripant to come to Paungal lightly equipped on the 14th inst. and to send his army ahead if the visit is postponed to the 23rd inst.

FROM—THE NIZAM,

TO—HURRY PUNT.

*Paungal, 9th March 1791.*

His Lordship's summons to Teidge Wunt having accordingly arrived, the Rajah will have marched agreeably to orders with an intention of joining his Lordship by long marches the 12th March. I am informed by the Polygars that His Lordship would reach Bangalore the 4th March, that on the 28th February he took Colar which is only 20 coss from that place and pushed on. It was reported to me that you had fixed on the 14th or 23rd March for coming here, on these several accounts I postponed my march. If you having sent on your army purpose coming here lightly equipped on the 14th or 23rd aforesaid, it is very well: but if it is your

intention first to wait on me and afterwards send on your army, in this case, let the 14th be the day since should there be any delay in the arrival of your forces with Lord Cornwallis the agreement is departed from. Should you fix on the 23rd March for waiting on me and not send on your army till it is done, the whole month of Rejib (till the 5th April) will expire at this place and Lord Cornwallis will have reason to blame you and also us in that your delay was occasioned by our being the object of your attendance. Thus circumstanced it is utterly inadvisable that you detain your army and fix on the 23rd for your visit ; but after having dispatched the difference of a day or two more or less in the period you fix on for coming here will be of no consequence. Observing what the juncture requires I have been induced to be thus particular with you.

**No. 251B**—Steuart requests Kennaway to use his influence with the Nizam's Court for expediting Tejwant's march.

FROM—LIEUT. STEUART,

TO—CAPT. KENNAWAY.

*Guram Chirlah, 16th March 1791.*

I beg leave to refer you to my address to his Lordship of the 12th instant for the predicament which at that time I thought possible to happen, namely, short marches and many halts, and which now appears to be Teidge Wunt's intention to adopt, with a wish that your further exertions may be successfully used in effecting a different mode of advance.

The age of the Moon which with this army ought to be a very great advantage, I hope, will still assist the many other arguments I have stated for celerity. If the advance of the army is to depend on the health of the Chief, delays may be numberless. I therefore beg to recommend the removal of these objections to your speedy exertions as no arguments of mine will effect anything. Hafiz Ferid-u-din arrived here yesterday with his detachments from Sidhout and Hushmut Jung is expected to-morrow by the circuitous route of Bangyanpally. The former has sent me the following message viz., Teidge Wunt pretended to be waiting for me ; I was ordered to march with my infantry and came 25 coss in three days ; had I been ordered with my cavalry only, I would have been here in one. He (Teidge Wunt) is acting in a ridiculous and destructive manner by halting here with cavalry only instead of joining Lord Cornwallis as I would have done in four marches, the latter part of which I shall tell Teidge Wunt is the opinion of the public at large. I am happy to acquaint you Assud Ali Khan is perfectly recovered from his trifling illness.

No. 252—Tejwant again puts off his march on the ground of Assud Ali Khan's illness.

FROM—LIEUT. STEUART,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Guram Chirlah, 16th March 1791.*

I am extremely sorry to acquaint your Lordship that Teidge Wunt after promising to move the 16th instant (this day) and by long and constant marches to join you and after I had sent a translate in Persian of your advice for him to move with the utmost celerity ordered a march of only 3 coss ; I remonstrated in vain against such a measure but, my Lord, guess my surprize when at near 12 p.m., even this order was revoked in consequence of the slight indisposition of Assud Ali Khan. My arguments were instantly renewed with fresh vigour to point out the folly of waiting to see the effects of sickness especially in a Chief who, if he recovered, would not, like the dilatory Mahomed Ameen Arab, make short stages in our rear ; however they were well answered by the Rajah's declaring that he certainly would be sick himself in a day or two and that on such occasion he must and would halt. He assures me he will make up for this breach of promise to your Lordship by doubling the distance of his march to-morrow. My endeavors and remonstrances shall not be wanting to counteract as far as possible the perverse obstinacy of Teidge Wunt, but it is now equally incumbent on the Nizam to enforce obedience to his orders as it is on Teidge Wunt to obey them ; unless I am supported by the former it is almost in vain to expect that my arguments will have effect when his orders have failed.

I have the honour to enclose for your Lordship's information copy of my letter of this date to Captain Kennaway.

No. 253—Tejwant marches to a distance of only three miles and a half from Guram Chirlah.

FROM—LIEUT. STEUART,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Piddadunloor, 17th March 1791.*

The army marched  $3\frac{1}{2}$  miles S. E. from Gcoorum Chirlah this morning and tho' Teidge Wunt blamed his Quarter-masters before me for not going further I have reason to believe they did not act contrary to his private directions, as on my pointing out how easily the flags could be advanced to the intended ground, he promised to make up the difference by going eight coss to-morrow but would not stir farther to-day. I attended him and Assud Ali Khan on the march during which they were busily



employed in arranging the army agreeable to a plan Teidge Wunt showed me, which is to serve for the order of battle of march and of encampment.

I cannot give your Lordship any information respecting our future motions as the Rajah will not take advice or finally determine on that subject till he reaches Comar Calwa. My endeavors agreeably to your Lordship's commands shall not be wanting to induce him to move with celerity.

**No. 254**—Haripant decides upon a plan for the movement of his army in consultation with the Nizam.

FROM—CAPT. KENNAWAY,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Paangul, 17th March 1791.*

Hurry Punt took leave of the Nizam last night and proceeded on his march this morning. Meer Abul Cossim who has just left me informed he will proceed nine coss to-day and join his army, which his arrival will necessarily occasion to halt two days more, to-morrow; that the country between it and your Lordship having been reduced and properly settled, the march of his troops through it would be productive of much mischief, and also that after your Lordship's junction with the Nizam's army you would probably advance towards Seringapatam, for which reason it was Hurry Punt's intention to detach his troops under the command of his son Luxman Rao by way of Gooty and Sera, in which route they would be joined by Pursaram Bhao and eventually meet your Lordship at the enemy's capital; that Hurry Punt after sending on his army would remain in the vicinity of Gooty and attend the Nizam on his marching from Paangul or conform to any other plan different from what is above detailed which your Lordship in the interim may point out to him. The shroffs of this Bazar at the Nizam's desire have advanced him two lacks of Rupees for the pay of his troops and the greatest cordiality appears to have been preserved in the intercourse between him and the Durbar. The Minister acquainted me about a month ago that Hurry Punt would halt at Gooty, but I did not think there was sufficient authority for the assertion to mention it to your Lordship—he informed me the day before yesterday that Hurry Punt after sending on his army would return himself to Paangul, which I pointed out the ill consequences of, and entreated it might be prevented; this to a certain degree appears to have been done, though I should not be surprised if it were still to happen in case the Nizam's moving should not take place. His Highness seems less bent upon it at present than he has lately been and I imagine his final determination respecting it will be entirely regulated by the likelihood there may be of its ultimately leading to an interview with your Lordship.

I have repeatedly enquired concerning the contents of a letter which, on the Minister's authority, I acquainted your Lordship had been received

from Tippoo by Hurry Punt, but do not understand that any communication had been made on the subject of it, which the Minister endeavoured to account for by observing that whatever views favourable to Tippoo Hurry Punt may have brought here with him, those views had probably been changed, or suspended by the taking of Bangalore, and by his seeing how sincerely the Nizam's inclinations were fixed to the cause he had engaged in with us.

Mutual assurances and professions of their being determined to do everything to strengthen the friendship between the two States have passed between them and several trifling differences which had subsisted have been discussed in a conciliatory manner. Musheer-ul-Mulk was near six hours in the tent yesterday morning and he visited the Minister yesterday and likewise Meer Abul Cossim after receiving his dismissal from the Nizam this evening. He sent me a complimentary message this morning on his being about to march and has requested I would communicate to him whatever accounts I received from your Lordship.

No. 255—Col. Frederick dies, Cornwallis advances to Colar and Ouscota, whereupon another representation is made to Nana for expediting Haripant's advance.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 18th March 1791.*

I took the liberty (knowing it would have a good effect) of expressing as from your Lordship's letter your great surprize on asending the Ghaut to find that Hurry Punt had not advanced within reach of your correspondence, that disappointed and concerned thereat you had been obliged to write only to the Commander of the Nabob's advanced army and had sent the copy of your letter to be shewn to the Minister as equally applicable to Hurry Punt had he been within reach, and while on one hand I expressed your Lordship's surprize at Hurry Punt's not being advanced according to agreement, I referred him to the letter to Teydge-Wunt for the advantages to be expected from a prompt and vigorous co-operation, nor did I hesitate to acquaint the Minister that the responsibility of any inefficiency in the co-operative plan would now rest with him.

I was fortunately enabled to give additional weight to this language by the apropos arrival of Capt. Kennaway's despatch containing intelligence of your Lordship's advance to Colar and intention of reaching Ouscota the 1st or 2nd instant and as Teydge Want was to proceed on the 12 instant to join your Lordship, I apprehended that unless Hurry Pundit made great haste he would lose all share in the honour of conquering Bangalore.

To convince the Minister that these expectations were not too sanguine I read to him Tippoo's letter received by your Lordship the 18 ultimo,

and your answer, and pointed out to him the despondency of the former and the honourable firmness of the latter.

After hearing all that I had to say the Minister was candid enough to acknowledge that your Lordship had cause of complaint tho' it had been his endeavor to prevent and should now be to remove it, that in answer to his late pressing orders to Hurry Punt he had received that day a letter dated the 11th in which he had promised to be with the Nabob in six days and that his army which was considerably increased should proceed across the Tumbudra, which intention he would stimulate by the dispatch of new orders after our conference.

The account I gave of your Lordship's advance to Ouscota, which was the first he had received, seemed to engage his attention much and he was inquisitive relative to the state of your provisions and supplies of which I told him your own store and the country had hitherto amply supplied you, but that the junction of the allied cavalry had undoubtedly formed one of your dependencies for the removal of all inconvenience of that kind.

I reminded the Minister that he had not yet appointed the route for the return of Colonel Frederick's detachment which he promised to do. He told me that two men had arrived in Bhaou's camp of 50 others (23 of whom were English taken at Bednore) that had made their escape from Cubbar-Droog,\* one of Tippoo's forts, that after getting out they had separated and the two he mentioned were Natives.

I was exceedingly grieved on my return from the Minister to receive letters from Darwar of the 13th communicating the death of Colonel Frederick the preceding night. It was, however, some satisfaction to learn by a letter from Major Sartorius who is a very respectable man and a good officer that he had assumed the command of the detachment in which I shall strongly recommend to the Bombay Board his continuance to conduct that part of it, destined to return to the Presidency, as his late experience and knowledge of these people certainly render him more fit for the charge than any other officer that can be put from Bombay. Mr. Uthhoff writes me under 13th that 1,300 shot for the 22 and 24 lbs. and 200 for the 36 had arrived in camp that Sounda the capital of the province of that name had fallen to the Maharattas who had overrun the whole Country of Bednore, Simoga and Anuntpore.

**No. 256**—Raja Tejwant makes a march of fifteen miles more.

FROM—LIEUT. STEUART,  
TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Camp Yeldorty, 18th March 1791.*

The army marched 15 miles south from Pedda-dun-loor this morning and that tho' Comar Calwa is only nine coss from hence I have

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\* A fort near Seringapatam used for keeping state-prisoners.

great doubts of being able to prevail on the Rajah to go so far as that place to-morrow.

Upwards of 1,500 of the levies refused yesterday to join from Goorum Chirlah until they should receive some written vouchers from Teidge Wunt, who told me on the march to-day that their business was settled and they would be here in a few hours. He has desired me to acquaint your Lordship of his progress and to express his anxiety to hear further of you and of the enemy.

**No. 257**—Steuart sends to Kennaway intelligence of the capture of Bangalore on the 12th inst. and of two other fortresses.

FROM—LIEUT. STEUART,

TO—CAPT. KENNAWAY.

*Camp Yeldorty, 19th March 1791.*

I have the honour to enclose for your information copy of a letter of the 9th instant, which I have just received from the Governor General.

The Zemindar of Ghut has written by this conveyance to Teidge Wunt and his Vakcel here that Tippoo entered Bangalore in the night, hanged the Killadar Peer Mahomed and his Dewan Raja Ramchandra with the effects of whom he immediately fled to his camp at Gemjerie, 3 coss south of the fort; that our troops attacked him during his retreat with success and that the Governor General took possession of Bangalore on the 12th instant. Of this part of the news the above Zemindar writes that one of his servants was a witness. He also mentions that 10,000 of our troops with a large army of Nairs had taken the forts of Mirden-pilly and Nujen-Goor and are now encamped at Mysore; the truth of this I hope will soon be confirmed by letters from his Lordship.

Teidge Wunt engaged to march to-morrow but unless he is more strictly enjoined by the Nizam, my exertions, tho' they are incessant, will have little effect in inducing him to advance rapidly; he has halted to-day in spite of his Master's orders and my numerous arguments without giving even a plausible reason for his conduct.

**No. 257A**—Cornwallis urges Tejwant to join him without loss of time.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—LIEUT. STEUART.

*Camp near Bangalore, 9th March 1791.*

I have not at present an opportunity of entering into the particulars of our situation. It is sufficient to say that we are reduced to difficulties

for grain and forage from the villages having been burnt for several miles round us by the enemy's horse. I must, therefore, desire that you will press Rajah Teidge Wunt to move on and join me at this place with all possible expedition.

**No. 258**—Kennaway communicates his opinion on the causes of the delay in Tejwant's march to Bangalore.

FROM—CAPT. KENNAWAY,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Paungal, 20th March 1791.*

Since my address to your Lordship of the 15th instant I have been extremely concerned to find by Lieut. Steuart's letters that the orders I procured being sent to Teidge Wunt to move with expedition had failed of their effect and I have both in writing and thro' my Moonshy verbally exhausted every argument I could think of to the Minister (dissembling as far as possible the resentment I felt at such glaring deviation from the most solemn promise) to induce him to send fresh instructions to Teidge Wunt and to reprimand him severely for his past conduct : as yet I have received no satisfactory answer to my representations, to which I am sorry to say I am but too much inclined to suspect he cannot have acted as he has done without the sanction of the Minister's authority and that the latter has been induced to countenance the delay either from a wish to be assured of your Lordship's success against Bangalore or of the detachments of cavalry from Dara Jah's army and of Mahomed Ameen Arab's having joined previous to the advance of the Nizam's army, If it is owing to the absence of Mahomed Ameen who after remaining only two days at Paangul set off on his return the 18th instant, the delay will be the less to be regretted on account of the very respectable character that Officer bears and the great use he may be of to your Lordship both before and after the junction is effected. It is, however, a vain attempt to think of fathoming the probable motives of an unsteady, irresolute and artful man. I wish, I could, with any confidence, assure your Lordship that I am satisfied in my own mind that his views, in the procrastination we have to complain of, are not to avail himself of any feasible plea that may occur for declining the attempt altogether.

I am concerned to add that letters from Kopul mention the death of Colonel Frederick on the 12th instant.

*P.S.*—Since writing the above I have received a note from Meer Abul Cossim in which he calls God to witness that Teidge Wunt's delay is not owing to choice or design but to causes, which Lieut. Steuart having been a witness of, has probably communicated to me, that it has happened contrary to the Nizam's and Minister's wishes and been productive of great uneasiness to them, that Teidge Wunt has already been enjoined to quicken his motions and shall be written to again as I desire and a copy be sent to me for my information.

No. 259—

FROM—LIEUT. STEUART,

TO—CAPT. KENNAWAY.

*Camp Okriddipilly, 20th March 1791.*

Teidge Wunt at 4 o'clock this morning received a letter from Isa Miyan from Alinoor, 10 coss West from hence, confirming the report of our capture of Bangalore, which I trust will be more fully ascertained in a day or two by a letter from the Governor General.

This army will march to-morrow.

No. 260—Apprehending Tipu's attack, Tejwant desires that Cornwallis should march 15 or 20 coss north to facilitate the junction.

FROM—LIEUT. STEUART,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Camp Okriddipally, 20th March 1791.*

The army marched five miles south from Yeldorty this morning.

Teidge Wunt is extremely anxious that your Lordship should pursue Tippoo 15 or 20 coss north from Bangalore in case of his coming against this army with infantry and cavalry; but declares if the enemy sends only his cavalry there will be no occasion for your Lordship's moving as the army will be sufficient to cope with them. I have made use of every argument I can think of to convince him that our Lordship's advice for the utmost celerity was given for the purpose of rendering it impossible for the enemy to take steps to prevent the junction, have requested him again to lighten his baggage that he may move quick and thereby avoid all the enemy's cavalry and have told him that as to the infantry he could never think of being molested by them if he followed the Nizam's orders and your Lordship's desire for celerity. In reply, without appearing satisfied with my arguments, he advised me to write to your Lordship from myself regarding your pursuit of the foe, if he comes this way with infantry and horse and to mention that he (Teidge Wunt) was coming on whether you advanced to meet him or not, but that if you come, one forced march to join you, of 15 or 16 coss will be sufficient on his part. I said it was my duty at all times to send translates in cypher of what he wished to communicate to your Lordship, but on his refusing to have his name in the request I declined writing from myself, observing that your Lordship most undoubtedly would do what might be proper to favor the junction; I refused in this manner, my Lord, because I thought

that my giving him any prospect or idea whatever of your advancing might induce him to halt improperly here at once instead of advancing rapidly as he is ordered to do by his master and your Lordship. I am extremely sorry I cannot by any means prevail on him to make long marches or to free the camp of encumbrances; I still expect much aid from Captain Kennaway's exertions at Paangul. We had yesterday pleasing accounts of your Lordship's having taken Bangalore on the 12th instant, which I am eager in a high degree to hear confirmed.

**No. 261**—General Abercromby succeeds in ascending the Periaputtan Ghaut and Malet requests the Mahratta Court to issue orders to Bhao for cooperating with the General.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 21st March 1791.*

The last Bombay Gazette announced the accomplishment of the General's design of ascending the Periaputtan Ghaut and on that authority I have announced it to this Government and urged its dispatch of express orders to Pursaram Bhoa to act accordingly either by marching to the south himself in case of raising the siege or detaching a strong body of cavalry, should the hope of success detain him longer before Dharwar. The time of the General's ascent seems admirably in concert with your Lordship's. This Government granted me on the 20th instant a passport to buy and export by sea free of customs 500 bullocks and I hope to dispatch between 1 and 200 in a day or two to Fort Victoria to be embarked thence to Cannanore, as I observe the probability of a want of provisions at Cannanore.

Understanding from the sentiments of the Bombay Board that the absolute necessity of the detachment at that place may be extended to any time before the rains or end of May and it having been intimated to me by the Durbar on the 20th inst. that the detachment may proceed by land so far north as Fort Victoria, I shall regulate my instructions to Major Sartorius accordingly, keeping in view the desirableness of reducing Dharwar, the absolute necessity of his arrival at Bombay in the time prescribed, allowing for the embarkation from Fort Victoria.

**No. 262**—In spite of persuasive arguments, Steuart cannot expedite Tejwant's movements.

FROM—LIEUT. STEUART,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Camp Yempilly, 21st March 1791.*

I am extremely concerned to acquaint your Lordship that Teidge Wunt marched only three miles south from Okriddepilly this morning

and that I have no sort of confidence in his declarations of being even more expeditious than he has hitherto been unless Capt. Kennaway should be able to prevail on the Nizam to oblige him (Teidge Wunt) to obey orders.

Arguments here are not attended to and my endeavors tho' constantly exerted to hasten his advance have no effect whatever. I informed him to-day that I had acquainted your Lordship daily of the nature of our progress ; it was time for me to ascertain and to let you know why it had been so slow ; instead of giving me an answer he sent me a letter to your Lordship, by which it appears he wishes your Lordship at all events to favor the junction by deputing a detachment of sufficient force to cope with the enemy to the distance of two days' journey from Bangalore, the time, place and final route I am promised in a day or two for your Lordship's information. I shall not trouble your Lordship with all the arguments I have used to prevent this application ; it may be sufficient to say, my last was, that he was lessening his military character or the bravery and spirit for enterprise of the Nizam's cavalry in the eyes of the world by calling aid so unnecessarily.

*P.S.*—Mahomed Ameen Arab is expected in camp in a day or two.

(i)

FROM—TEJWANT,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*21st March 1791.*

By the favour of God the advanced army has reached as far as Yempilly. I am determined from this time also to reach you by constant marches. Tho' the enemy has no power to think of this quarter yet you are also well acquainted with his wiles and deceit and that he will not be backward in seeking opportunities. Therefore, I write you in the way of counsel and should you approve of it, I think it would be proper for you to depute a detachment two days journey towards this side in order that we may form the junction—the detachment deputed to be sufficiently strong in itself to beat the enemy. should he think of attacking it.

**No. 263**—Steuart expresses his indignation at Tejwant's intention to halt at Yempilly until the receipt of intelligence of despatch of a detachment by Cornwallis to Chintamanipet.

FROM—LIEUT. STEUART,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Camp Yempilly, 22nd March 1791.*

After I had dispatched my address of yesterday to your Lordship hearing that Teidge Wunt determined to halt here to-day I recalled the cossid



and acquainted the Rajah as that was the case it would be needless to forward his letter, In reply he said he would alter the date; but, My Lord, guess my astonishment this morning when having sent it to get this day inserted instead of yesterday in order that the words "from this day to reach you by constant marches" might be more consistent he openly threw off the mask under the pretence that Tippoo being now near Bangalore instead of thirty coss from it, he might alter the Nizam's orders for the mode of advance of this army and that he was determined either to halt near this or under the protection of hills and jungle or near Rachootie until he should receive further orders from the Nizam or hear of your Lordship's being willing to depute a detachment to Chinta Mani Pait, two days' journey from Bangalore, to favor the junction. At this timely juncture I received letters from Captain Kennaway mentioning his success in procuring orders from the Minister to hasten Teidge Wunt, to whom I lost no time in representing with all the arguments I was master of, the disgrace and impropriety of halting for any reference whatever. He replied that tho' he was only an accountant, yet he was ready to die in his master's service and if he should hereafter be ordered to join you at all hazards of fighting the enemy, he would obey, but that the Minister having made use of an allusion in his last letter which he interprets to mean "business is transacted by a knowledge of circumstances on the spot," he cannot think of altering his above-mentioned determination. I shall not intrude on your Lordship's time all the arguments I have used to expel his unworthy fears. It may be sufficient to say that I am sanguine in my hopes of Captain Kennaway's further success at Paangul, that I shall invite the Rajah to my tent this afternoon for the purpose of deliberately explaining at large the different parts of a remonstrance I have drawn out of the likely pernicious and disreputable effects of his intended conduct, and that I shall constantly communicate with your Lordship any occurrences here and transit to you as soon as Teidge Wunt determines on the mode of his above-mentioned application for a detachment to come to Chintamanipet; a translate of his letter is enclosed. A knowledge of your Lordship's being inclined to comply with such a requisition may be of great consequence in hastening the junction.

No. 263A—Tejwant's excuses for delay.

FROM—TEJWANT,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

22nd March 1791.

By the favor of God the advanced army has reached as far as Yempilly. My intention to join you is fixed. After my arrival here, I learnt that the enemy in addition to five thousand horse formerly deputed has now sent

ten thousand infantry and six thousand more horse towards Curram Coonda and that hereafter he intends leaving some troops in your quarter, to come here in person with cavalry and artillery to oppose this advanced army. If the enemy come only with horse he will be punished ; but if with artillery, etc., we shall have skirmishes ; I can fight in that manner with his horse. If the enemy comes with infantry and guns, I should have infantry and guns too. You are also well acquainted with the wiles and deceit of the enemy, and that he will not be backward in seeking for opportunities. Therefore in the way of counsel I write you to send a detachment of infantry and guns from your army to Chinta Munny-pait (called also Chinta Wunny pait) and to inform me of the particular day on which it will reach that place that the advanced army may also arrive there on that very day and afterwards join you. Acquaint me of whatever you may think adviseable that I may act agreeable thereto. For the present I shall wait the arrival of your answer at Yempilly.

No. 264—Pointing out the G. G.'s greater freedom of movement on account of the fall of Bangalore, Kennaway repeats his request, to the Nizam for the advance of Tejwant's army.

FROM—CAPT. KENNAWAY,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Paungal, 22nd March 1791.*

I waited on the Nizam last night and repeated my request that the army might be directed to advance with confidence, that the surrender of Bangalore the 12th instant reported by the Zamindar of Ghaut would leave your Lordship at greater liberty than ever to attend to the Nizam's army and that its junction would now probably be the first object of your attention.

I have said more on the likelihood of your Lordship's making a move towards Teidge Wunt than perhaps I otherwise should have done, from having received a copy of your letter to Lieut. Steuart of the 9th inst., from which I apprehend that you may be obliged to fall back from Bangalore, on account of the scarcity of grain and forage which you have already experienced, to Colar or Goorumconda or such other part of the country as has not been destroyed by the enemy's horse, in which case the real cause of the movement may be concealed under the assumed one of its being intended to facilitate the junction of the Nizam's troops.

I have received from Lieut. Steuart a second letter from your Lordship to Hurry Punt who will be here to-morrow and is to be conducted the day following to the Durbar by the Minister.

No. 264A—Azim-ul-Umara points out the imperative necessity for Cornwallis to take every precaution to secure the safety of the Nizam's army and urges Tejwant to advance.

FROM—AZIM-UL-UMARA,

TO—TEJWANT.

22nd March 1791.

I have received your letters up to the 19th March to the following purport (the purport on account of its prolixity is omitted) which I understand and have laid them before his Highness the Nizam and in consequence of his orders sent them to Captain Kennaway for his opinion and advice. Captain Kennaway replied that he had three or four days ago in consequence of advices from Lieut. Steuart written a note to Meer Abul Cossim enclosing purport of a letter from Lord Cornwallis to Lieut. Steuart, in which note it is clearly expressed that Lord Cornwallis would adopt a proper plan for the junction of the Nizam's with his army, and also some time ago in consequence of Lord Cornwallis's letters that gentleman signified that Lord Cornwallis would entertain greater solicitude about the safety of the Nizam's than of his own and this being the case that there was no room for apprehension; that therefore orders should be sent to Rajah Teidge Wunt to proceed onwards by successive marches and that he had no doubt Lord Cornwallis would agreeably to what he had written to Mr. Steuart take the necessary precautions and by means of his intelligence of the enemy's motions be able, in case of his making any attempt, to follow him himself or send a division of his army after him; in short, that his Lordship would not omit any step or precaution which prudence might suggest. Meer Abul Cossim's letter in which Captain Kennaway's note is enclosed you will more clearly be informed of its contents. It is the custom of the English to express themselves with caution to be more explicit, every one is attentive to his own loss or advantage. The English nation have once or twice already carried on a war against Hyder and Tippoo the end of which was not answerable to their expectations. At present the Company have no other plan or object than by the junction of a body of cavalry to chastise the enemy or indeed to crush him altogether, such body at present is only forthcoming from this Sircar or that of Row Pundit Purdaun. From the latter on account of the delay of its march, the Company entertain little expectation, their hope is consequently from that belonging to His Highness. Therefore in regard to an object which comprehends evident advantages, how is it possible to suppose Lord Cornwallis will be careless or indifferent, that is to say, that to secure the junction of the Nizam's army with his own he will neglect the minutest precaution, since the conclusion of the war depends upon it. Do not listen to the suggestions of irresolute people, but putting your trust in God make such marches as are practicable for the baggage and bunjarees of your army and as far as possible avoid halts, since from your halting his Lordship will entertain

suspicious and the enemy by receiving intelligence concerning you be able to form a plan to prevent your junction. Therefore considering the favor of God as upon you by proper but successive marches be fixed on the object of effecting your junction.

No. 265—All remonstrances and persuasions fail to hasten Tejwant's advance.

FROM—LIEU. STEUART,  
TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Camp Yempilly, 23rd March 1791.*

It is with the most inexpressible concern I am under the necessity, after having argued against the measure five hours yesterday and remonstrated on paper on the cowardly appearance of his conduct in the eye of the world, of transmitting the enclosed translate of a letter from Teidge Wunt calling for a detachment of your infantry and guns to favour a junction, which ought to have been effected several days ago with ease and which may still be so. Tho' I do not entirely despair of Captain Kennaway's success in procuring further injunctions for the immediate advance of this army for which I shall still argue stereneously, yet, my Lord, I have thought it proper to take this opportunity for soliciting constant intelligence of the enemy's situation, an account of the detachment should you send any and the names of the particular places it may encamp at on its way to the rendezvous, also on what days.

No. 266—Kennaway makes a strong representation to the Nizam for Tejwant's advance.

FROM—CAPT. KENNAWAY,  
TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Paungal, 23rd March 1791.*

By means of such soothing arguments as I could think of, I have prevailed on the Nizam to allow the Minister and Meer Abul Cassim to write to Teidge Wunt. The doubts which have passed most in their minds and which I have had the utmost difficulty to overcome have arisen from their apprehensions that your Lordship may not make a movement with your army or part of it to favor the junction and a persuasion that Tippoo will make a bold and resolute attempt to obstruct it. To remove the former I have over and over again told them your Lordship would not neglect a single precaution in your power to effect the accomplishment of an object which you had so much at heart and was so essentially necessary to the success of the war, as the junction of his Highness' cavalry. That war and danger, enterprise and success were in their nature inseparable, and that if something was not risked in such a case as the present, on what occasion would it ever be justifiable? That the measures your Lordship would form to effect the junction must be and chiefly by those of Teidge Wunt's motic

entreated as they valued the principles of faith to their engagements or the Company's or your Lordship's friendship that Teidge Wunt might be directed to advance without delay, and that they would trust to your Lordship's prudence for taking such measures as were proper to secure the rest. Hurry Punt is arrived within three coss of this place and is to wait on the Nizam to-morrow.

**No. 267**—Cornwallis communicates to Lt. Steuart the news of the capture of Bangalore and his intention to march by one of the routes mentioned by Raja Tejwant, for effecting the junction.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—LIEUT. STEUART.

*Bangalore, 23rd March 1791.*

The fortress of Bangalore was taken by assault on the night of the 21st and I hope to be able to repair the breaches and in other respects to be ready to move from hence by the 26th or 27th instant.

My first object will be to form a junction with Rajah Teidge Wunt and I shall endeavor to regulate my movements in such a manner as to be able to accomplish it by either of the roads which are mentioned in the Rajah's letter.

In the meantime I must request that you will use every means in your power to convey daily information to me of the Rajah's motions and that you will explain to him that I cannot at present venture to write to himself on the subject in agitation as we have no means of communicating in cypher and our letters would be much exposed to the risk of being intercepted.

Tippoo still remains in this neighbourhood and I think it probable that whenever I move he will attend me with the greatest part of his army.

**No. 268**—Kennaway reports the change in Nizam's determination relative to Tejwant's advance and the discussion that took place on that subject.

FROM—CAPT. KENNAWAY.

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Paungal, 25th March 1791.*

The Nizam has just sent me a letter from Rajah Teidge Wunt stating that the communication with your Lordship was cut off and the country about Bangalore destroyed by the enemy's horse; that Tippoo had heard of the intended junction between your Lordship and the Nizam's army and sensible of the ruin such junction would bring upon him was determined at all hazards to oppose it; that the Pettah\* only of Bangalore was taken by your Lordship and that the garrison which had been amply reinforced by the enemy previous to your arrival was prepared for resistance, and thus circumstanced His Highness desired to know whether I continued of opinion that it would be safe for Teidge Wunt to advance till he should hear further from you as well as that you would take the

\* Town.

necessary measures to secure the junction, since if any accident should happen to his army from your Lordship's not taking measures to secure its safety, the responsibility would be mine. I replied that the inconveniences you must suffer from the ravages of the enemy's horse confirmed me in my confidence that you would take every possible precaution to effect the junction of troops by whose means only you would be able to put an effectual stop to it, and that I therefore desired they might be directed to advance, being willing to take upon myself the threatened responsibility so far as it was connected with the confidence I had in your Lordship's doing everything that depended on you, but that it would be impossible for you to resolve on such steps as were necessary to effect the junction till you were clearly informed of Teidge Wunt's resolution to march and of the stages of his route being finally determined on. Meer Abdul Gunny the Person the Nizam sent (Meer Abul Cassim being sick) represented that your Lordship's army being surrounded by horse, Tippoo might proceed against Teidge Wunt without your hearing of it, to which I answered that I did not conceive you would let your conduct depend on such a contingency after you were once acquainted when and by what stages the Nizam's army was proceeding towards you, and that I requested he would solemnly assure His Highness that I should consider any check his troops might receive detrimental in as great a degree to the cause we were engaged in as if it happened to a detachment of our own army.

Hurry Punt was conducted to the Durbar yesterday by the Minister whom he is to visit this evening and to attend the Nizam again tomorrow when I am to be introduced to him; he sent his Moonshy to me last night with a complimentary message which I have returned. The Minister informs me he (Hurry Punt) has received a letter from Tippoo the contents of which have not yet been communicated.

I had written thus far when Meer Abdul Gunny who took his leave at the end of the conversation above recited returned to me from the Minister to enquire if I thought Teidge Wunt should be directed to advance without waiting to hear further from your Lordship or remain at Comar Culwah till he should hear from you. I replied I was of opinion that he should fix on his stages, appoint a time for marching, acquaint your Lordship with the particulars and without deviating in the minutest point from them move on whether he heard from you or not; satisfied that from the information he should send, your Lordship would take such measures as depended on you for the rest. He said the Minister wished to know what was to be done in case any change in the present stage of circumstances to the southward should occur between such orders as I desired being given to Teidge Wunt and his receipt of them. I said it was impossible to provide for every change of events and that in any such contingency as he supposed, much must be left to depend on the prudence and discretion of the Officer who commanded,



received from Teidge Wunt dated the 22nd instant for my perusal and intimating that he would wait upon me himself in about an hour afterwards. The letter consisted of about eight sheets of country paper and as your Lordship may conceive from the conversations which have lately passed between him and Lieut. Stuart respecting the advance of the Nizam's army, was filled with minute details of the danger of the attempt unless your Lordship should send a division of your army to Chinta Manipet, of his having written you to that effect and of his determination to remain where he was till he should receive your answer, notwithstanding the orders he acknowledges to have received from hence to move on, his disobedience to which he excuses by alleging that when they were given, Tippoo was at a considerable distance from Bangalore and that his arrival in the vicinity of your army might induce his Highness to give others more applicable to the enemy's present situation.

The first question Meer Abul Cassim proposed to me after we began to converse on the subject of the above dispatch was what was my opinion of Teidge Wunt's plan and what I advised being written to him ; in reply to which I answered that I had all along entertained doubts of his being a proper person for the command, which the manner he had expressed himself in the writing now before us more than ever convinced me as well as that nothing in the point of advancing or not, ought to be left to his discretion, since if a man could so far give up his Judgment to his fears as to believe a report of Tippoo's having moved with his whole army, infantry, cavalry and artillery the distance of ninety coss in three days in order to arrive at Bangalore at a certain time and reason upon it as a fact as he had done, what trust or confidence could be reposed in his discernment on any other occasion ; that I therefore advised his being written to immediately either to inform your Lordship that in two days after the receipt of the Minister's commands he should push forward to join you at Bangalore by a prescribed route that you might take your measures accordingly or that within the same space of time he should proceed by two or more marches to Chinta Munny Pait which he (Teidge Wunt) had represented as being a stronghold, and only twenty coss from Bangalore, and there wait your Lordship's further instructions. I added to Meer Abul Cassim that these modes were expressive of my settled opinion for the Minister's information, that of the two I thought that the first was preferable and that on no account could I approve of the proposed halt at Yempilly. I sent my Moonshy in the morning to learn the result of Meer Abul Cassim's report of the conversation that had passed the preceding evening. The Minister himself was not visible, but Meer Abul Cassim summarily informed my Moonshy that the two propositions had been sent to the Nizam in writing who had signified in reply that Teidge Wunt should be directed to conform to them or not as he saw proper. To prevent if possible the dispatch of this order I drew out a written



representation which I immediately sent to the Durbar stating my objections at length to any option being left to Teidge Wunt after the unequivocal proofs he had given of a want of firmness, resolution, further than was expressed in the two modes I had proposed to Meer Abul Cossim in person ; that I should deem any discretionary power being conferred on him as an approbation not only of his present determination to halt at Yempilly but of his improper delays, and that should any orders be given him contradictory to those which I had seen and transmitted to your Lordship and to others which I had been repeatedly assured had been sent to him to move on, the Nizam's Government must be considered as responsible for any obstacles that may oppose themselves to a speedy termination of the war, from Teidge Wunt's continuing to evade a compliance with your Lordship's repeated applications to him to join you.

Meer Abul Cossim acknowledged the receipt of my note and promised to lay before the Minister as soon as Hurry Punt who was then with him should take his leave. I requested an answer to it twice in the course of the next day, and also yesterday, and thought this a proper opportunity of acquainting the Minister by way of gaining him to my purpose of the receipt of the friendly answer from His Majesty to the Nizam's letters ; with the same view I also informed him of General Abercomby's having gained the Periaputtun Ghaut which brought an advanced division of his army to within 25 or 30 coss of the enemy's capital. Meer Abul Cossim came to me yesterday evening with the unpleasing information of the order I had labored so much to prevent, having been dispatched, alleging from the Minister in excuse for his not being able to give Teidge Wunt positive and unqualified instructions to move, on the vicinity of the enemy's to your Lordship's army and the personal risk he should run if any check should be received by the Nizam's army in consequence of such instructions being given. I again endeavored to show how ill grounded the Minister's apprehensions were and how much satisfied I was that we had more to fear from Teidge Wunt's irresolution than from the enemy's attempt : I pointed out to him that decided advantage would result to the war from the junction of the Nizam's cavalry and how much ought to be risked where so great a prize was at stake. I desired he would again press these considerations with the Minister which he promised to do. Yet I am sorry to acquaint your Lordship that in such a state of alarm do Teidge Wunt's late advices respecting the enemy and your Lordship's situation appear to have left their minds, that I do not apprehend he will be directed to advance till he shall receive instructions of your being disposed to make a movement to favor the junction which being, I am afraid, the only chance we have left for effecting it, I sincerely hope the reduction of Bangalore may shortly enable you to engage for.

Hurry Punt's army have moved on and their depredations on the road have obstructed the regular arrival of the Dawk from camp these two or three days past, which I shall not be sorry for, if it has equally operated against the transmission of the objectionable letter already mentioned. Hurry Punt himself is indisposed which has prevented his waiting a second time on the Nizam, but I understand he is to attend to-morrow when I am to meet him. He has expressed a wish for the Nizam's moving which the Minister sent me word of and I have advised the Nizam's making a merit with the Mahrattas by complying with it.

No. 271—Kennaway communicates to Malet the news of the arrival of a detachment of troops near Muddy Murego and Tejwant's intention to join that corps under certain conditions for accomplishing his junction with Cornwallis.

FROM—CAPT. KENNAWAY,

TO—C. W. MALET.

*Paangul, 31st March 1791.*

I have received accounts from Lt. Steuart that one of his hircarrahs on the 26th had brought him intelligence of having seen three of our troopers at Muddy Murregoo 20 coss in front of the Nizam's cavalry. The troopers excused themselves from giving satisfactory answers to the queries of the hircarrahs by the fear of punishment from their officer if they should be communicative with strangers, but their report which agreed in every material point with a letter sent from the Zemindar of Ghaut, at whose pallum they then were, to his Vakeel in Teidge Wunt's camp, was that the Corps that belonged to the first regiment, Bengal Cavalry with six battalions of sepoys had ascended the Ghaut and would pass within 8 coss south of that place in their way to Bangalore. The troopers had been sent on before to provide forage and grain to go to the army at Bangalore from whence the detachment expected 4 more battalions to favor their junction. The Vakeel further informed Mr. Steuart that a delay of 6 or 8 days might probably take place in their dispatch. From this intelligence and the reports of his own hircarrahs as well as the Vakeel's cossids that Tippoo had sent no troops to the northward of Colar, so late as the 23rd instant, that he was not acknowledged in the country and that all the villages were in our favor, Lieut. Steuart immediately urged Teidge Wunt to seize so favorable an opportunity of effecting his junction with Lord Cornwallis and dispatched letters to the Commanding Officer of the detachment informing him of the situation and number of the Nizam's Cavalry, the anxious wish of his Lordship for a detachment from the Grand Army to favor it. He also requested a particular account of the strength of the detachment, their intentions and present situation and what halts

they would probably make on their march to Bangalore. On the 27th he was informed that the Detachment was commanded by General Musgrave to whose address or Officer Commanding he immediately dispatched letters of nearly the same import as the day before, but further informing the general of what he had heard respecting the likelihood of his halt near Muddy Murregoo for 6 or 8 days for the purpose of collecting supplies and enclosing an agreement which Teidge Wunt readily yielded in writing and under his seal to Mr. Steuart's representations. The purport of the engagement was that if General Musgrave with 6 battalion of infantry and a force of cavalry would approach near Muddy Murregoo and halt at the distance of not more than 5 or 6 coss from that place, the Nizam's troops would join him in 3 or 4 days from the day of receiving his answer agreeing to the said halt ; that if his force was not so large as above stated, he requested, the General would send him further information respecting it.

Two thousand Mahratta horse had marched on the 27th from Teidge Wunt's camp towards Gurram Coonda for the surrender of which negotiations were carrying on through Teidge Wunt, Mahomed Ameen Arab and Waly Mahomed, the late Kelladar of Sidhout, and whose reward from the Nizam, it was understood, Abdul Khadir the Kelladar of Gurram Coonda was anxious to make the standard of his own claims.

**No. 272**—Kennaway administers a sharp rebuke to the Nizam for giving Raja Tejwant much latitude in his movements and reports to the Governor General the conversation he had with Haripant.

FROM—CAPT. KENNAWAY,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Pangul, 31st March 1791.*

At a very short warning from the Nizam I attended the Durbar the evening of the 29th instant for the purpose of meeting Hurry Punt when his Highness introduced us to each other. Previous to any general conversation his Highness informed me aside that Hurry Punt had requested a loan of two or three lacks of rupees and a certain number of bunjaris for the accommodation of his army which he should as far as possible comply with. He then desired the Mahratta Commander and me to draw nearer to each other close to the Musnud for the convenience of discourse : after the usual compliments had passed Hurry Punt asked me if I had any late news from your Lordship. I told him I had not, that your attention was engrossed by the operations of the siege of Bangalore

which would probably prevent your writing till you had something material to communicate, that your Lordship had been extremely gratified to hear of the Mahratta army intended to co-operate with you having been entrusted to a Chief of his reputation tho' disappointed to find on your entering the enemy's country that he had made so little progress to join you, that you had frequently written to me for intelligence of his motions and that as the due execution of the plan which had been formed for the campaign with this and the Poona Durbar greatly depended on the advance of his and the Nizam's army. I requested to know when I might inform your Lordship he intended to proceed. The purport of his reply was that he should move from hence the 1st of Shaubaun or 5th of April. I enquired for your Lordship's information the strength of his army in cavalry; he said about twelve thousand. I reminded him of his assurance that it would amount to more than double that number which he said was very true, and that parties of horse to complete the number were daily gaining him: little more passed on business than what is above related; I mentioned General Abercromby's having obtained possession of the Koorg pass and its vicinity to Seringapatam and that I understood it as Balajee Pundit's intention that our army in that quarter should be joined by Purseram Bhow with a body of his cavalry which he said was the case, but in vague and general terms, and that he had understood the junction was to take place somewhere in the Bednore country.

Since my last my attention has been entirely employed in devising new arguments and placing old ones in the most striking light to get Teidge Wunt ordered on, without waiting for an answer from your Lordship I have not concealed my opinion of how fatal it would be to the cause in which the Nizam was embarked equally with the Company should your Lordship unhappily be obliged to relinquish the siege thro' any difficulties you may labor under, for forage or provisions owing to the enemy's superiority in cavalry which the Nizam had it in his power so effectually to prevent. I have pointed out how difficult, if not impossible it would be for your Lordship, engaged as you were in an arduous undertaking with the enemy in full force at hand and ready to take every advantage, to move to so great a distance as Chinta Manypet without abandoning your object and how unwise it was in the Nizam to afford Tejwant any countenance in making the request when he might with so much security advance to that place from whence you might be able to facilitate his junction without its materially interfering with your own operations and how incumbent on his Highness it was to direct him to proceed without allowing him any latitude to swerve from his orders on pretence of the enemy's motions or of any detachments of our troops being shortly to pass near him.

**No. 273**—Cornwallis expresses his indignation at Raja Tejwant's halt at Yempilly and desires him to move forward to the intended place of junction.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—LIEUT. STEUART.

*Camp Deonhally, 31st March 1791.*

I desire that you will acquaint the Rajah in answer, that nothing can exceed the surprize and concern which I feel at his resolution of remaining at Yempilly till he hears from me.

The reports which the Rajah received of Tippoo's having sent detachments to the northward were totally groundless ; when I understood that the enemy was moving in force to the north of Bangalore I marched on the 28th and falling in the rear of his army obliged him to retire to the westward. The road is perfectly clear of any considerable body of the enemy between this place and Gunjycottah and I am now moving towards the place where the Rajah desired the detachment might meet him. If he advances rapidly according to the Nizam's orders and his repeated assurances I will attend to the security of our junction, but if there are any more delays or excuses I shall proceed to the execution of my future plan of operations with my own army.

**No. 274**—The Nizam's Durbar fires a salute of 21 guns on the fall of Bangalore.

FROM—CAPT. KENNAWAY,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Paungal, 1st April 1791.*

With heart felt joy I communicated to the Durbar this morning the news of your Lordship's success against Bangalore and a salute of 21 guns has been ordered on the occasion. Though Teidge Wunt has signified his resolution to the Minister to march immediately to effect the junction with your Lordship, yet I have desired the most positive injunctions may be sent him to that effect.

Hurry Punt repaired to the Kistnah for the performance of some religious ablution the 30th ultimo and is expected back to-day.

**No. 275**—Malet communicates to G. G. Haripant's intention to detach a portion of his army to join Tejwant and the permission obtained for Major Sartorius to march to the shore opposite Bombay.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 1st April 1791.*

I have in the most pressing manner urged this Court to dispatch new orders to Hurry Punt to advance his army and in the event of his being

unable to join your Lordship, to make such incursions into the enemy's country as may endanger his supplies and interrupt his plan of straitening your Lordship's quarters.

The Minister has at length assented to my requisition of Major Sartorius's marching to the shore opposite Bombay in the event of his being detained to make another attempt on Darwar and that Officer has acquainted me that Bhao has signified to him his having received orders to take immediate measures for a co-operation with General Abercromby to which he intends paying every attention. At the same time he has expressed to the Major the utmost anxiety to take Darwar and offered him (the Major) the use of his trenches which are advanced to the foot of the glacis if he chose to make use of them in another effort.

This afternoon the Minister paid me a visit of condolence on the death of Colonel Frederick and expressed his sorrow on the event in very handsome terms to the memory of that officer. He assured me that Hurry Punt had written that he meant to detach his army to join Teydge Wunt on his (Hurry Punt's) proceeding to visit the Nizam and if it is true, it may be concluded that the Maharattas have ere this joined His Highness's advanced army and that the joint force will be emboldened to act with vigor and decision.

**No. 276**—The Nizam expresses joy on the fall of Bangalore and offers presents to Kennaway.

FROM—CAPT. KENNAWAY,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Paungal, 2nd April 1791.*

I attended at a full Durbar last night to congratulate the Nizam on the reduction of Bangalore, an event at which his Highness testified the most unfeigned delight which is not surprising from the light in which this acquisition is considered throughout the Deccan, as well from its real importance as from the pre-eminent title of Dar ul Sultanut or Capital of the Empire, words equivalent to the term of Dar in Khelafut by which Seringapatam is distinguished. The only regret, the Nizam said, he felt was that his army had not been sufficiently forward to participate in the honor of its fall. Hurry Punt was present and expressed his satisfaction which must necessarily have been great if, as the Minister exultingly whispered me, he had given it as his opinion that the siege would cost your Lordship six weeks or two months.

The Minister was very earnest with me before the Nizam came out to present a complimentary Nuzzer of gold mohurs, which I objected to doing, from my not having practised it on other occasions; he said that

none bore any proportion to this, and though the taking of the place was to be considered in the same light as if it had been obtained by the Nizam's arms yet he and the other Chiefs could not with so much propriety present theirs, which he was extremely anxious should be done, as would be the case if I set the example. Not wishing to discourage the earnestness he showed that this customary token of congratulation should be general through any backwardness of mine, on my going up to the Nizam I made him a present of the small sword I had with me and the Minister and others of the Durbar presented Nuzzirs in their own way. His Highness complimented me with a turra or knot composed of emeralds, brilliants and pearls for a hat or turban and examined a draft of a congratulatory letter for your Lordship.

I had some conversation with Hurry Punt in the course of which I endeavoured to discover of what he thought of your Lordship's idea of his acting separate or joining you. He appeared averse to acknowledge that any such had been mentioned to him and said his intention was to join you. His army is about sixteen coss distant on the road to Gunjycotah where I understand it will halt till he arrives : he has lately been joined by Appa Bulwant, with, I am informed, about three or four thousand cavalry. He said he understood from Purseram Bhow that it was his intention to march in person from Dharwar in prosecution of the plan which was mentioned to your Lordship by Mr. Malet.

**No. 277**—Cornwallis asks Kennaway to express his dissatisfaction to the Nizam on account of Tejwant's halt at Yempilly regardless of his Highness's orders and the G. G.'s requisition.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—CAPT. KENNAWAY.

*Camp Chikka Ballapuram, 2nd April 1791.*

I need not recapitulate to you the correspondence that has passed between Rajah Teidge Wunt, Lieut. Steuart and myself since the time that I ascended the Ghauts as Lieut. Steuart will no doubt have furnished you with copies of all the letters ; but after the communication contained in those from yourself and from Lieut. Steuart I must acknowledge that it was with the utmost astonishment and disappointment that I received on the 31st ult. Lieut. Steuart's letter enclosing a copy of the Rajah's letter conveying an account of the most absurd and unfounded information that he stated to have been received by him of the measures that Tippoo had taken to prevent the junction of his Highness's cavalry with this army and informing me that regardless of my requisition and of his Master's public orders he had determined to remain at Yempilly, a place not above the distance of two moderate marches from Gunjycota, until he should hear from me that I had sent a detachment of infantry and guns to meet him at Chintamanipet. As the Rajah must have had good grounds

to suppose that his letter would reach me at the critical period of my being engaged in the siege of Bangalore in presence of Tippoo at the head of his whole army, I am under the necessity of receiving the dilatoriness of his progress and his motives for writing that letter in the most disadvantageous light, and though I wish it to be done in guarded language I must desire that you will on this occasion express my dissatisfaction to His Highness and the Minister in the strongest terms.

You will state to them that after the most deliberate reflection upon the Rajah's conduct it has appeared to me that it can only be accounted for by one of the three following reasons. 1st, that his public orders have been counteracted by private instructions; 2ndly, that his Highness has entrusted the command of a large part of the force of the State to a man who is no soldier; 3rdly, that the Rajah has been actually corrupted by Tippoo's money. But you may assure them that my mind has immediately rejected all attention to the 1st supposition, though the impression that remains upon it of the probable existence of one or both of the latter causes leaves me little reason to hope that I can ever confide in the Rajah for giving me a hearty support in carrying on this war.

You will, at the same time, after desiring them to call to their recollection the openness and fairness of the whole of my public conduct toward His Highness, the vigor with which I have commenced the operations of the present campaign and the celerity and success with which I took my measures after the reduction of Bangalore to prevent Tippoo from disturbing the march of His Highnesses's Cavalry, lastly give them to understand that I will not tamely submit either to evident breach of engagement or to strong marks of deception and that in the present case unless instead of receiving frivolous excuses I shall soon see the most satisfactory grounds to expect the speedy junction of the abovementioned body of Cavalry I shall not waste time in waiting for them but proceed with this army to the execution of my own plan of operations without placing any further dependence upon their assistance.

Although, as I have already said, I do not believe His Highness to be capable of counteracting public orders by private instructions, yet as it is easy for him to oblige his servants to obey his orders when they are so near to his presence, he must in candor admit that I have a right to consider a failure on their part as equivalent to a breach of his own promises and that such a failure at this interesting period must unavoidably produce a change in the sentiments which I have hitherto entertained of his zeal and earnestness for the success of the common cause, and you may inform him that it will certainly induce me to make a material alteration in several parts of the general plan which were calculated to promote his Highness's particular interests and which I had, with pleasure, adopted in my own mind at the time that I was more satisfied than I am at present with the appearances of his conduct towards me.



**No. 278**—Cornwallis expects to reach Chintamanipet by the 8th April and urges Stuart to impress on the Raja the necessity of the utmost promptitude in reaching the place by that time.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—LIEUT. STEUART.

*Camp Chikka Ballapuram, 3rd April 1791.*

I am very glad to find that the Rajah had actually made two marches before he heard that I had moved to the northward and I trust that in the course of the following day he will have been further encouraged by your receiving information from Captain Read of my being at Deonally.

My intention is to march either to-morrow or the next day towards Gunjycotah and Chinta Manypet which latter place is only 3 easy marches from hence. I would not, however, wish to arrive at that place until the Rajah gets very near to it, as I think I more completely cover his march by keeping to the westward of his route between his detachment and the enemy.

As we both of us know in what direction to send our letters, intelligence may be transmitted in the most expeditious manner and when you state this to the Rajah and assure him of the perfect security of his march I must desire you to urge him in my name and in the strongest terms to make no unnecessary delay, as at this late season of the year the loss of a few days would probably be attended with the most mortifying consequences.

*P.S.*—To prevent further cavil you may assure Rajah Teidge Wunt that this army will be at Chinta Manypet on the 7th or 8th instant at farthest.

**No. 279**—Cornwallis conveys to Parsuram Bhao through Uththoff his plan of campaign.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—J. UTHHOFF.

*Camp Chikka Ballapuram, 4th April 1791.*

Having found by the arrival of two Hircarrahs in camp this morning on their way to Captain Read, the Commanding Officer at Amboor, with a letter to him from Dharwar that a communication had been very judiciously opened by that gentleman with Pursuram Bhow's army, I have thought it advisable to avail myself of the services of the same men to convey thro' you both to Pursuram Bhow and the Commanding Officer of our own troops a general knowledge of the situation of affairs in this quarter.

You may therefore inform them that the ordnance in Bangalore amounted to about 120 pieces of different kinds, that the magazines were so well provided with gun powder, lead and shot of all descriptions that I shall be able to draw sufficient supplies of all these articles from thence for my future operations, that my immediate objects are to effect a junction with a body of the Nizam's Cavalry and with a large reinforcement of troops and stores from the Carnatic which I had previously ordered to rendezvous at Amboor, to recruit my stock of provisions and to refit the train of heavy artillery which is to move with the army ; that I am in hopes of accomplishing all these purposes in sufficient time to enable me to forward and to reach Seringapatam in the latter end of this month or early in the beginning of next month and that it is my intention to use every possible exertion to reduce that place before the commencement of the rains.

**No. 280**—Instead of fulfilling the original plan of a speedy junction between Cornwallis and Haripant, a new proposal is made by the Poona Court for the movement of Haripant's army, and Malet denounces it in the strongest terms.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 4th April 1791.*

I was favored with a letter from Major Sartorius of 27th advising the commencement of his approaches on the preceding night, and of Bhaou's resolution to proceed in a few days with his cavalry to penetrate the enemy's country and co-operate with General Abercromby. A private letter mentions that during the first working night the trench had been advanced 170 yards without the loss of a man.

From a conviction of the necessity of supplying General Abercromby as promptly as possible with the provisions he seemed to be in want, I strongly recommended to the Bombay Board to dispatch to him, without loss of time, all the provisions they could possibly spare. I have been busily engaged and with considerable success in purchasing wheat, dall and ghee.

In consequence of my conviction of the necessity of previously establishing in the most decided manner the freedom of your Lordship's operations against the enemy by the junction of a body of cavalry, to give efficacy to any such junction with General Abercromby I have lately strongly urged this Court to change Bhaou's destination of joining the General, to an attempt to join your Lordship's by the way of Roydroog which place is in the Maharatta's possession and not above 60 coss from Bangalore. In answer to my most urgent instances on this point I received

last night the following message from the Durbar that letters of eight days had just been received from Hurry Punt advising that his "army as many as were assembled had during his visit to the Nabob crossed the Tumbudra, and after finishing his business with the Nabob in three or four days, he meant to proceed to dispatch that body to join the Nabob's advanced force of which Musheeral-Mulk had also expressed a strong desire". The Minister therefore proposed to me that Hurry Punt with the remainder of the army that would by that time be assembled or the whole, if letters from hence should reach him (Hurry Punt) previous to his having sent on the abovementioned troops, should march toward Chittuldroog and joining Bhaou in that quarter spread devastation through the enemy's country. Perceiving that this language was founded in palpable evasion I expressed surprise in the warmest terms that the Minister should attempt to pervert what I had proposed as an amendment of the original plan into a total annihilation of all plan, I observed that by such prevarication at so critical a season, all faith and mutual dependence between the members of the alliance must cease; that Hurry Punt's appointment to command the army had been specifically because your Lordship had taken the field in person; why then, after deviating so far in spite of my remonstrances from his original object (founded on the solemn engagements of this Court), to hold a useless conference with the Nabob with whom the Peshwa already had a Vackeel, why (I said) not proceed instantly to join your Lordship agreeable to his original destination which had been so positively announced to you and orders for that purpose forwarded for him through your Lordship in consequence of which you had twice invited him by letter to join? Or was I after all to conclude that the object of his expedition was to intrigue with the Nabob rather than to join your Lordship in the labor of supporting the common cause? I added that it had been agreed that Hurry Punt should join the Nabob's force and proceed together to join Lord Cornwallis whose decided advance had taken place accordingly, that if instead of so doing the Maharatta army now turned off (so near accomplishing the original plan) toward Chittuldroog, the agreement (on which Musheer-al-Mulk by Hurry Punt's own account now laid much stress) would be broken with your Lordship and the Nabob, and all confidence between the allies be at an end.

I expressed infinite concern that at a time when your Lordship had been 28 days before Bangalore combating alone the whole force of the enemy, we should be cavilling on the plans the faithful execution of which would ere this have decided the war. I insisted that instant orders should be dispatched to Hurry Punt enjoining him most positively (on pain of answering for failure not only to this Court but to the members of the alliance) to proceed to execute the cooperative plan intrusted to him agreeable to the orders so frequently issued and ultimately forwarded to him even through your Lordship, one of the principals of the alliance,

and that I should hold this Court responsible for any inconvenience or difficulty to which your Lordship had been or may be reduced by failure or breach of its agreements, while the Nabob would answer for his own conduct—adding that if my proposal relative to Bhau's directing his progress toward Bangalore by the way of Roydroog was inadmissible, that I insisted on his proceeding to fulfill the co-operative plan with General Abercromby that had been agreed to between this Court and me and in support of this language I communicated the important intelligence of the capture of the Peynt of Bangalore by storm on the 7th and of the opening of your Lordship's batteries against the fort on the 12th.

No. 281—Tejwant makes slow marches and intends to halt until the receipt of intelligence from Governor General.

FROM—CAPTAIN KENNAWAY,

TO—C. W. MALET.

*Paungal, 4th April 1791.*

On the 31st ultimo I transmitted to you copy of a letter dated the 23rd March from the Governor General containing the agreeable intelligence of the capture of Bangalore by assault on the night of the 21st; Teidge Wunt whom Lieut. Steuart immediately informed of its contents, expressed great joy on the occasion and after taking the advice of the other Chiefs gave orders for marching the next morning and sent a copy of his intended route to Mr. Steuart for the Governor General's information. On the 30th he moved four miles to Comar Calwah and the 31st nine miles more to within 2 coss of Perrapilly on the road to Gurramcoonda. Mr. Steuart here understood that it was Teidge Wunt's final intention to halt after making another march on the 1st instant till he should receive information of Lord Cornwallis having moved from Bangalore to favor his junction after which he promised to advance rapidly.

On the morning of the 31st he had received a letter from the Governor General dated the 24th ultimo in which his Lordship desired him to urge Teidge Wunt to move on and to assure him that when he approached the army, his Lordship would keep a watchful eye on Tippoo's motions and endeavor to secure his junction perfectly secure. As this was written previous to the receipt of the pressing solicitations which Teidge Wunt had made to his Lordship, for his making a movement towards the Nizam's army, and as Mr. Steuart had frequently expressed his despair of being able to prevail on Teidge Wunt to move expeditiously till he was informed that his Lordship had left Bangalore for that purpose, he was in great hopes of the Governor General's having already advanced towards Chintamanipet, of having little farther trouble to prevail on Teidge Wunt

to move on whenever he could with certainty inform him of that event having taken place.

Further accounts had confirmed his former information of a detachment under General Musgrave or some other officer preparing to ascend the Ghaut with the intention of joining the Grand Army.

**No. 282**—Haripant avoids an interview with Kennaway on account of the supposed dislike of the idea by the Nizam's Court. Alexander Read joins Tejwant near Mulwan.

FROM—CAPTAIN KENNAWAY,

TO—C. W. MALET.

*Pangal, 7th April 1791.*

Hurry Punt sent me word by Cunderow that he had it (interview) much at heart but that those Mughals, as he called them, would not like it and would be puzzling themselves to divine what it was for and I was glad of an opportunity to return him an answer to a similar import, adding in their style that everything depended on its season and that an interview of our hearts had already taken place.

I have a letter from Lieut. Steuart dated from Mulwan, 6 coss west of Gurramcoonda, the 2nd instant and one of the 3rd dated from Râchouttee, 17 miles and 3 furlong from Mulwan. Captain Read, Commandant of Amboor, had joined him and was to remain in Teidge Wunt's camp. His abilities and intimate knowledge of that part of the country will enable him to render the most essential services in effecting the junction which seems entirely to hinge on a place being appointed for it by his Lordship with information of the route he would pursue.

The Killadar of Kopul has made some overtures to Darah Jah for surrendering the fort, but they are not yet of a nature of much dependence to be placed upon them.

I have a letter from Mr. Cherry dated the 25th. The fort\* was carried with little loss on our side and great loss on that of the enemy, the Killadar by name Behadur Khan being killed. Major S. Kelly led the storm and Colonel Duff now commands the fort. The military stores found in it such as shot, powder, shells, grape, carbines are also in great abundance, another day's delay might have been very prejudicial as Tippoo had cut embrasures in the bank of a tank from which he would, with very heavy guns, two of which were found there, have effectually cannonaded our breaching batteries and commanded the breach. The assault began at 11 o'clock, by 12 all firing had ceased and the fort was ours.

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\* The fort of Bangalore.

**No. 283**—Dharwar surrenders, Haripant is urged by Malet to proceed to Gunjycotah and thence to hasten to join Governor General.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 8th April 1791.*

On the 5th I received the following answer from the Minister through my Vackeel to the remonstrance contained in my last, viz., that new orders should be dispatched to Hurry Punt to proceed without loss of time to Gunjycotah and from thence send forward to your Lordship the cavalry already collected and after assembling the remainder of his quah proceed with it himself to join your Lordship.

In the course of the discussion that preceded this arrangement, the Minister declared in exculpation of the delay of Hurry Punt's visit to the Nabob that he (Nabob) positively insisted on his waiting on him. The Minister also endeavored to convert your Lordship's letter to (Hurry Punt) him to join you into a latitude of acting where he pleased, which tending to establish an evasive licence I would by no means admit. In answer to my late proposals relative to the employment of Hurry's cavalry, I was assured that as Dargah was to be surrendered by 4 P.M., Hurry had been ordered to advance immediately into the heart of the enemy's country in such a direction as from his intelligence on the spot was to appear most conducive to the good of the Cause, by which, I am persuaded, will your Lordship or General Abercromby.

in the eyes of this State ; but whatever recompense they may meet with from these people, I hope the gallantry which has on all occasions distinguished the Officers and troops and the judgment and vigor of Major Sartorius in their late approach will insure him and the whole detachment your Lordship's approbation.

Having written thus far I had the inexpressible pleasure of receiving the news of the conquest of the important fortress of Bangalore. I have no scruple in now attributing the fall of Dharwar in a great measure to the conquest of Bangalore. I trust that the conduct of the Allies during that trying occasion will convey to your Lordship the whole scope and complexion of their politics and of the reliance to be placed on them and I hold myself entirely liberated from any mark of your Lordship's bounty on any member of this Government which I should gladly have done had their cavalry joined during the late arduous conflict.

**No. 284**—Tejwant does not move forward to Chintamanipet to join Cornwallis.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—CAPTAIN KENNAWAY.

*Camp Chintamanipet, 10th April 1791.*

Having this day received Lieut. Stewart's letter dated the 7th instant communicating to me Rajah Teidge Wunt's refusal to move forward in order to form a junction with this army according to his repeated promises and to the orders which I have been so strongly assured had been given to him, it is only left to me to execute the resolutions which I have already declared of pursuing my own plan of operations in the best manner I am able, without his assistance.

Being unwilling to make use of harsh expressions or to come to hasty determinations, I shall only at present further direct you to request of his Highness to advert to the uniform tenor of all my past conduct towards him and to consider within his own mind what my opinion must unavoidably be of the nature of his late behaviour to me.

**No. 285**—The joy of the Maratha Court on the fall of Bangalore is expressed by a salute of 25 guns.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 11th April 1791.*

The satisfaction of the Court on this great occasion (capture of Bangalore) was announced to the public by a salute of 25 guns. I now

wait the particulars of the siege and assault for which this Court has been very inquisitive and propose to myself the honour of detailing them to the Peshwa in person.

On the 9th inst. I had the pleasure to receive from the Durbar 9,000 Rs. in payment of the freight of the boats that transferred the native part of the late Col. Frederick's detachment from B'bay to Juyghur. And on the 10th I dispatched my first caravan of provisions for the B'bay Govt. consisting of 107 bullocks laden with ghee.

**No. 286**—"The Minister is a coward" says Kennaway.

FROM—CAPTAIN KENNAWAY,

TO—C. W. MALET.

*Paungal, 11th April 1791.*

I took great pains to enquire into the circumstance of General Medows' Dubash as the report had been mentioned to me by Meer Abul Cossim long before I saw it in the Bengal newspapers. I wrote about it to an intelligent friend at Madras from whom I heard in reply two or 3 days ago. He informs me the whole was a perfect falsehood. In respect to the Minister's letter and everything about him for he is as great a coward and if possible a greater than Teidge Wunt I am perfectly disgusted with his conduct and shall hail my delivery from this Durbar as joyfully almost as I could do from a person of the enemy.

I have this instant a letter from Mr. Uthhoff informing me of the capitulation of Dharwar and sincerely congratulate you thereon. The Kopul negotiation comes on—the Kelladar wants the same terms as Buddur Zeman, but as they had heard in Capt. Read's camp of the fall of Bangalore, his demands, I hope, will not be complied with.

**No. 287**—Exasperated at Tejwant's disregard of repeated orders, Kennaway demands his removal and reports to the Governor General the withdrawal of the Mahratta Vakils from the Court in consequence of maltreatment of one of their retinue.

FROM—CAPTAIN KENNAWAY,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Paungul, 11th April 1791.*

I am extremely concerned to find that in spite of the intimation from your Lordship of your intention to proceed to Chintamanipet, the place appointed by Rajah Teidge Wunt for the junction, and Lieut. Steuart's arguments to induce him to proceed agreeable thereto, there is still no prospect of his advancing. I have urged every motive I could think of to induce the Nizam to remedy the Rajah's misconduct by sending him



the most positive orders and have endeavored as far as lies in my power to develop the mystery of a conduct so inconsistent with the repeated orders already sent him, his disregard of which has left me in the disagreeable dilemma of either supposing the highest treachery and deceit in this Court or a more disreputable laxity than I have ever imagined in its Government which can thus allow its mandates in an affair of such moment to be entirely disregarded without immediate punishment being the consequence. I am still, however, inclined to hope that the first may not have extended to the sending orders contradictory to those of which I was furnished with copies, but that the gloomy and dispirited letters of Teidge Wunt and the false information he sent to the Nizam and the Minister of the enemy's motions have constantly induced them, in conjunction with their orders, to entrust him with a degree of latitude to act according to circumstances, a trust of which he has proved himself completely unworthy. Such is the belief even now of the Nizam and the Minister in his reports of the enemy and such indeed is their own duplicity and unsteadiness that my remonstrances written or verbal appear to have lost their effect. I yesterday represented in writing the necessity of Teidge Wunt's being removed from the command for his inattention to the orders, which to so late a period as the 9th instant I have been repeatedly assured had been transmitted to him by the Minister and that it should be entrusted to Mahomed Ameen Arab or some other Chief: the necessity of which and of immediate instructions being sent thro' me to his successor to move on without delay. I have again to-day insisted on as a proper satisfaction to your Lordship for his declining to attend to your instructions, particularly those of the 31st, as well as to prove that his perverse and inexcusable conduct has not been in consequence of an order from the Nizam. I have also written a letter to Hurry Punt informing him of the little likelihood there was of Teidge Wunt's moving for some time from Rachootie and urging him to be expeditious in proceeding to that place that the two armies might join and proceed to your Lordship together.

The Mahratta Vakeels, in consequence of a person residing in their lines having been seized by a dependant of the Minister who had some pecuniary demands upon him, marched to the distance of a coss from Camp yesterday and all the endeavors of the Nizam and the Minister have hitherto been ineffectual in inducing them to return. They have sent expresses to Balajee Pandit and Hurry Punt to acquaint them of the particulars of what has happened; of which I have not heard anything from the Durbar.

The breach at Kopul having been rendered thro' the indefatigable exertions of Captain Read nearly practicable, the Kelladar has made overtures of surrender the result of which, I hope, I shall be able to inform your Lordship of in my next dispatch.

By a letter I have received from Captain Williamson under date the 25th ultimo, I am informed he was on that day at Cuttack with 114 of the Vizier's elephants for your Lordship's army and expected to arrive at Masulipatam on his way to Madras about the 1st of May and by a letter from Ganjam that Lieut. Downie with 463 bullocks was a short distance behind him. Captain Williamson has with him a guard of two companies of sepoys and I have desired Mr. Steuart to submit to your Lordship his opinion of the practicability and safety of Captain Williamson joining you by this route in preference to that by Madras. In case they should not be able to join before the rains, I apprehend fodder will be more easily procurable here than in the vicinity of Madras.

**No. 288**—In spite of Kennaway's strong representations, the minister objects to Tejwant's removal and wishes to entrust Amin Arab and Assud Ali Khan with co-ordinate powers.

FROM—CAPTAIN KENNAWAY,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Paangul, 13th April 1791.*

Meer Abul Cossim waited on me yesterday morning and appeared convinced from the light in which I represented the contumacious conduct of the Rajah how necessary it was that the charge of the army should be taken from him. He informed me the Nizam desired to see me in the evening, but just before I was setting out I received a note from him intimating that the Minister was extremely averse to my proposal of shifting the Command : that the object I was most anxious about by the Rajah's resolution to march had been properly accomplished ere this, that the Minister would comply with my wishes so far as to make Mahomed Ameen Arab and Assud Ali Khan equal partakers of all responsibility in future and that he wished I would not insist upon the point in my interview with the Nizam ; to which I wrote in reply that I could not, consistent with my duty and the sense I entertained of the the Rajah's late behaviour or of my anxiety to guard against a similar mismanagement in future, be silent when so much was at stake that your Lordship could never place any confidence in the Rajah after what had happened or be satisfied that he had not acted from authority unless he was made an example of : and that the Minister's plan of dividing the responsibility among three Chiefs would probably create greater counter action than ever. I also sent my Moonshy to the Minister to satisfy him that I did not wish to act in opposition to him in the resolution I was determined to follow and to convince him how indispensable it was not only that my representation to the Nizam should proceed but that it should receive his support. When I attended his Highness I informed

him that Teidge Wunt notwithstanding the satisfactory contents of your letter of the 3rd had refused to march ; for, altho' he changed his mind afterwards and agreed to proceed yet his word had been falsified so often that no reliance could be placed upon it. I stated every other particular of his conduct in the fullest light, from all of which I was satisfied in my own mind that his Highness' fame, advantage and the success of future measures absolutely required he should be removed. I will not take up your Lordship's time in detailing the conversation which followed ; it was carried on without ill-humour ; my argument seemed to make an impression on the Nizam's mind and the Minister, tho' he endeavored to palliate the Rajah's conduct, yet his defence of him was weak and the subject terminated with my telling the Nizam I had fulfilled my duty to him as an ally of the Company and to my superiors in setting every particular before him and stating the remedy I thought necessary to the misconduct of which I complained to prevent the like occurring again and that the rest remained with him.

The Nizam acquainted me that Hurry Punt was proceeding by the route of Adoni towards Roydroog and that he would shortly send on his army to the neighbourhood of that place, where it would be joined by a detachment of about six thousand cavalry belonging to Purseram Bhow and that he (Hurry Punt) would afterwards return to Gooty or to this place. I represented that Hurry Punt's leaving his army was not consistent with the agreement entered into by Balajee Pundit with Mr. Malet and desired his Highness would do all in his power to prevent its being departed from.

The Mahratta Vakeels have returned to camp to which they were reconducted by the Minister in person and the dispute appears to have been satisfactorily accommodated.

I have the pleasure to acquaint your Lordship that the expenses of our Detachment there have been decreased by Captain Read's exertions since he came to the Command and by the reduction ordered by the Board of Madras in the establishment of the Commissary of grain and provisions upwards of four thousand pagodas per month.

**No. 289**—Haripant intends to halt at Kurnool and to dispatch the troops under his son Laksman Rao and Naro Pandit.

FROM—HARI PANT,

TO—GOVIND ROW KRISHNA.

*13th April 1791.*

I hear that you had left the Nabob's camp in disgust and that his Highness had entreated you and am much surprised at not having heard it from yourself.

According to my writing you represented to the Nabob my proceeding to Roydroog and sent me his Highness's permission. On that side there is delay. I have therefore dropt that route and will dispatch my troops by the route of Gunjycotah under the command of my son Luxmon Row and Narro Pundit who will march from hence on Friday, Shaban 10th, the 15th April. Make this known to his Highness and to Rajah Teidge Wunt, also to Captain Kennaway that he may wish Lord Cornwallis to settle the junction. They will march on Friday from the neighbourhood of Curnool. Send the intelligence that may be received from Rajah Teidge Wunt. Letters are received from Purseram Bhow mentioning that the surrender of Dharwar is negotiating and that the Peshwa's Flag will be hoisted the 29th of Rejib, 4th April on the fort. Thus this business is done. Purseram also writes that being now at liberty, he will advance toward Chittuldroog and desires me to do the same to join those and proceed together to join the English. Tho' this plan is good yet delay would ensue and I receive daily letters from Poona. Those of this day desire me to proceed to Gunjycota and send on my troops from thence. It occurs to me that my waiting at Gunjycotah with 2 or 3,000 men and my guns will answer no good end. Therefore I will halt near Curnool and send on my cavalry. Communicate this to his Highness. The new conquered districts of his Highness are in the route. Let the Talukdars be assured by his Highness that they will receive no molestation from the march of my Master's, the Peishwa's forces.

No. 290—Haripant sends his son Lakshan Rao to join Lord Cornwallis

FROM—HARIPANT ;

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*13th April 1791.*

To-day which is the 13th April I have encamped on the south side of the Tungbuddra at the distance of two coss from Kurnoul. A victorious army under the command of my son Luxman Row and distinguished Chiefs has been dispatched for the purpose of joining you. My son will proceed to your quarter by way of Gunjycotah. I hope you will send him constant accounts of your situation that he may regulate his march accordingly. He will likewise write you constantly of his progress and should any mischance or difficulty happen to him on the road you will move towards him and effect his junction with you. Constantly favour me with intelligence of your health, occurrences and plans.

**No. 291**—A salute is fired in honour of the junction of the Nizam's cavalry with the English army.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—CAPTAIN KENNAWAY.

*Camp Hodally, 14th April 1791.*

The junction between this army and the corps of cavalry commanded by Rajah Teidge Wunt was happily effected yesterday morning.

You will please assure His Highness that I feel the confidence which he has placed in me as a convincing proof that the fair and open conduct which I have always held towards him has made a proper impression on his mind and that I trust he will never have reason to think it has been misplaced. I yesterday fired a salute and conducted Rajah Teidge Wunt and the principal officers along the front of our line which was under arms and had afterwards some conversation with them at my tent and from the willingness which they expressed to act heartily and cordially with us, I have no doubt that they will greatly facilitate the success of our future operations and essentially contribute to bring this contest to a speedy and honourable conclusion.

**No. 292**—Tipu makes overtures of peace to Muhammad Amin Arab.

FROM—TIPU,

TO—MUHAMMAD AMIN ARAD.

*15th April 1791.*

By the blessing and unbounded favor of God and the Prophet millions of Mahomedans have been cherished and protected from the first rise of this state to the present time, and in the same manner as heretofore I entertain an earnest, sincere, and lasting desire of cultivating the friendship of the Nabob Nizam-ul-Dowlah Bahadur who is a Mussulman Prince, notwithstanding which the said Nabab has without cause engaged in the destruction of the inhabitants of this country and in the assistance of strangers. I am at a loss in what manner to account for his resolution in undertaking to render mankind wretched and can conceive no other consequence that it will be attended with than obliging the lower class of them to forsake their homes. As the comfort of mankind is at all times my desire I therefore inform you that I wish to send a confidential ambassador through you to the Nabob, to explain my views and satisfy him, which will necessarily be productive of ease and quiet to mankind and tend to strengthen and increase the friendship between the two states. You are acquainted with all circumstances and feel for the honor of the faith, certainly must desire it, and I have no doubt wish in a becoming manner for a cessation of the present troubles and the increase of friendship between the two Governments. Let this be communicated. The ease and comfort of mankind is my object. What more?

No. 293—Malet communicates to the Governor General the expression of sincere joy by the Peshwa on the fall of Bangalore and makes bitter comments on the Mahratta Cavalry.

FROM—MALET, C. W.,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 15th April 1791.*

On the 12th I had the pleasure to learn that 400 bullocks sent from hence for General Abercromby were embarked and dispatched from Fort Victoria the 8 inst. with all their drivers, etc.

I announced in full Durbar the principal occurrences of the capture of Bangalore as they had reached me, from the 5th to the 21st. The whole was received with great attention by the Peshwa, who in lively terms expressed his admiration and applause of your Lordship's conduct, adding that so rapid a capture of so strong a place by assault defended by so well appointed a garrison and in the face of the whole force of the enemy commanded by Tippu in person, with so small a loss on your side and so great a slaughter of the enemy clearly proved that Heaven favored your Lordship's wise and just exertions and propitiated the wonderful bravery and alacrity of your troops. I was assured congratulatory letters to your Lordship should be prepared without loss of time. On taking leave I was presented with a turra of emeralds which I shall hold as a deposit of the Hon'ble Company.

On the 14th I was favored with a letter from Major Sartorius of the 8th advising that the fort of Darwar having been completely evacuated was taken possession of by the Maratta troops the 6th inst.

From Meer Abul Cossim's communication to Captain Kennaway, it appears to me that the change of Hurry Punt's route communicated to me by this Court and strongly reprobated in my address to your Lordship of the 4th was (contrary to what I then thought) concerted with the knowledge of the Nabob's Ministry, tho' it does not seem to have been made known to Captain Kennaway till after Hurry Punt's departure. As Bangalore has now fallen tho' shameful to say, without the assistance of any of the allies, perhaps the Maratta cavalry, could their exertions be depended on, might be employed to penetrate toward Serra with great advantage for cutting off the enemy's supplies and securing them to your Lordship. But I confess that I have no confidence, loose and desultory as they are, that they would act vigorously or properly on such a service, my only hope of any of the allied cavalry being positively serviceable to your Lordship's progress (destructive they will always be to the enemy) is in their being under the influence of your immediate authority and of the example of your army and even then I shall be exceedingly happy if the vexations with which (if permitted) they will not fail to overwhelm your Lordship, do not almost cancell the merit of their services, for without a spark of

delicacy themselves, they possess a great advantage over that of other and construing the concessions of a generous mind into an acknowledgment of superiority, there is no end to their importunity or usurpations—with this spirit they will, if possible, convert the security of your Lordship's army into a shelter under which they may ultimately gratify their passion for spoil and sloth. So that my grand hope of the efficacy of a junction with them principally rests on its giving your Lordship so decided a superiority as at once to enable the allies to gratify their rapacity and at the same time open the whole country for the supply of your Lordship with grain and forage at least till your arrival in the neighbourhood of Seringputtun, when I hope, the opening of communication with General Abercromby will relieve you from reliance on them, tho' I apprehend General Abercromby's scanty numbers of cattle will render the employment of a large part of those of your Lordship's army necessary in the conveyance of supplies from his magazines.

• A report has reached me but without authenticity that on Buddrec-Zeman's quitting the neighbourhood of Bhaou's camp he had been attacked, completely plundered and himself wounded and made prisoner by the Marattas. In the present doubtful state of this report, breach of the articles of capitulation on the part of Budduru-Zeman is assigned as the cause.

Behro Punt has just signified to me that Appaji Ram, a person of consideration in Tipu's country, has arrived in Pursaram Bhaou's advanced camp and desired permission to proceed to the Bhao, but whether as a refugee or a deputy is not known.

## SECTION 6

### *Third Stage of the War*

*Cornwallis advances to Seringapatam and then retires  
to Bangalore*

*(April—June 1791)*

No. 294—Cornwallis announces his determination of marching to attack Seringputtum and requests Nizam Ali to advance with his army towards Bangalore.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—CAPTAIN KENNAWAY.

*Camp, 7 miles north-west of Molwog, 15th April 1791:*

The junction of the Nizam's cavalry in addition to the accounts I have received from General Abercromby of his being in possession of the top of the Coorga Pass and of his having taken measures for providing an ample supply of artillery, stores and provisions for this army, has determined me notwithstanding the lateness of the season to proceed immediately to the attack of Seringapatam, and as we shall certainly oblige Tipoo to remove his whole force from this quarter for the defence of his Capital, it has occurred to me that it might perhaps be agreeable to His Highness, and I therefore recommend to him to advance with the body of his army towards Bangalore.

If this proposal should prove acceptable to the Nizam you may inform him that I shall do everything in my power to facilitate the execution of it and shall with that view direct such of the Polygars as have taken Cowle from us to attend to His Highness' commands, assuring them at the same time that they may depend upon receiving the kindest treatment from him, and if his Highness should wish to attack Gurram Conda or any other of the enemy's forts, I shall order the Commanding Officer at Bangalore to supply him with such guns and ammunition as he may want for that purpose. His Highness will, perceive by this offer, how cordially I am disposed towards him and that I consider the interests of the two Governments to be so closely connected as to think it immaterial whose troops may occupy the conquered country. Indeed it appears to me that our sole object should at present be to reduce the power of an ambitious and an encroaching enemy and to secure to the members of the Confederacy a safe, honourable and advantageous peace.





Hurry Punt informs me that agreeably to the orders of the Peishwah he had sent on a respectable army properly equipped under distinguished leaders. In consequence of this, the Nizam had sent orders to Ruffiq-ul Mulk and other Chiefs at Gunjycotta to join the above army detached by Hurry Punt and proceed with it. I have advised Hurry Punt thro' Mr. Malet's Vakeel of the progress of Teidge Wunt's army and I should think it would be most advisable for Hurry Punt on his learning that your Lordship had moved south, to resume his late plan and effect a junction with Perseram Bhow by way of Raydroog, proceeding afterwards towards the enemy's Capital thro' a hitherto fine and unmolested country by the route of Sera.

The terms demanded by the Kelladar of Kopul, I am privately informed, were 1st, all public property such as artillery, firearms, papers, accounts, to be permitted to be carried away, and 2nd, that the inhabitants of the fort should be permitted to proceed with him; 3rd, 500 baggage bullocks to be furnished him by Dara Jah; 4th, that the agreement should be guaranteed by Captain Read, Munwar-ud-dowlah and Sadullah Khan; 5th, a party of cavalry to be furnished by Dara Jah to escort him to their Master's territories; 6th, that the infantry should be dismissed with their arms and accoutrements of which six articles the 3, 4, 5 were agreed to and those only partially. After some further discussion I understand they have been allowed their private property, including arms, and have in consequence engaged to deliver up the fort the 18th current.

**No. 297**—After the evacuation of Dharwar, the garrison is attacked by the Mahratta troops.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 18th April 1791.*

At my conference with the Minister he acquainted me that on the first day's march of Buddural Zuman Khan toward his Master's country, disputes had arisen between his people and the Marratta escort caused by Buddur's insisting on encamping at a greater distance from the Bhaou than his escort thought proper. Blows ensued and Buddural Zuman Khan who had mounted his horse (as the Minister says to make his escape) received two severe wounds and was conducted in that condition to the Bhaou who received him kindly and has ordered every assistance to be given him. In this confusion favored by the dusk of evening, some levies were lost on both sides. Everything that Buddural Zuman Khan had brought out of Dharwar was irrecoverably plundered and his people totally dispossessed. The Minister added that tho' this fray had been accidental, Bhaou had intended coming to an explanation with Buddural Zuman Khan for abusing the articles of capitulation by bursting many of the guns of the fort and rendering all the guns unserviceable.

I most sincerely hope that the junction of the allied Cavalry on which point the Minister continues to assure me the most peremptory orders have been repeatedly sent to Hurry Punt, will thus have relieved your Lordship from the embarrassment arising from the devastations of the enemy's horse by keeping them at such a distance as to insure a sufficient space for the forage of your army, thereby enabling your Lordship to prosecute the great advantages that have been already gained in such a manner as to terminate the war before the rains, since should the season elapse without the enemy's being brought to submit to the views of the Confederacy and should hostilities take place in the interim in Europe, the difficulties of the war might be increased should the French be able to throw in a body of men to his assistance. From the present appearance of things, however, the enemy's affairs seem desperate even should the approach of the rains render your Lordship's design of attacking Seringputtun, situated as it is on an island, impracticable, since, added to the very ruinous and expensive dismemberment of his Dominions, the remainder must soon be overwhelmed by the large bodies of the allied cavalry.

I am just favored with a letter from Major Sartorius of the 10th inst. by which I have the satisfaction to learn that Bhaou has severely punished many of those concerned in the affray of Buddural Zuman to whom he has restored such part of the plundered effects as could be recovered. He has also called in the assistance of Mr. Surgeon Cruso to take care of his wounds which do not appear to be dangerous. Major Sartorius took his leave of the Bhaou on the 9th and proposed beginning his march the 13th. The Major acquaints me that the Bhaou was for certain to proceed to the south in prosecution of the plan of joining General Abercromby on the 12th instant and that his force at a moderate computation will consist of 16 or 18,000 good horse, 6 or 7,000 infantry including our two battalions with the six field pieces, some of his own with one 18 and one 24 lbs.

**No. 298**—Kennaway is severely admonished by the Nizam's Minister for demanding Tejwant's removal.

FROM—CAPTAIN KENNAWAY,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Pangal, 18th April 1791.*

Yesterday I received a message from Meer Abul Cossim desiring I would send my Moonshy to him on particular business. He attended accordingly and the following is an extract of the written report he made me this morning of the conversation that passed. Meer Abul Cossim began with observing that the Minister, from the manner in which I persisted in urging Teidge Wunt's removal, supposed that Lieut. Steuart had been prevailed upon by Assud Ali Khan to write to me in his favor, and to effect his views had represented Teidge Wunt to Lieut. Steuart as a Mutsuddie\* and unfit for the Command, but that he (Assud Ali Khan) was not half so well qualified, that the Minister was extremely dissatisfied

\* Man of the clerical line, a politician, not a soldier.

at my persisting in my representations and had commanded him, Meer Abul Cossim, to wait upon me and express his sentiments on the subject, but that he, Meer Abul Cossim, thought it would be more proper to do it thro' the Moonshy ; that he had been directed by the Minister to ask me what fault Teidge Wunt had committed for which he ought to be dismissed ; that his conduct in obedience to the dictates of conscience and circumspection had been regulated by what he thought was for the advantage of the State he belonged to and that he was not a servant of ours that he should obey whatever orders he might receive from us ; that the alliance had been entered into by the Nizam out of friendship ; wherefore then this kind of dictating ? That Teidge Wunt would be disgraced if he was removed and his disgrace would rebound upon him which I seemed to approve of. In this, where was my friendship testified ? That what had passed had passed and matters were so regulated that business would go on successfully in future, but that my urging Teidge Wunt's removal should be desisted from hereafter.

My Moonshy summarily replied to this extraordinary discourse which I have stated at length to give your Lordship a proper idea of the character I have to deal with, that if the Minister would recollect a very few of the innumerable and repeated objections I had made against Teidge Wunt from the first both verbally and in writing, he would perceive my perseverance was not in consequence of the suggestion of any person, that my reason for still urging it was my attachment to the Nizam's Government and a wish that by Teidge Wunt's removal the disgrace of his conduct should be confined to himself and not spread to the Minister and the Nizam, which it would certainly do, if permitted to pass unpunished.

I read to him a copy of the Nizam's letter to Teidge Wunt by which he was directed to obey your Lordship's commands : that with respect to my approving of the Minister's disgrace in the proposal I had made, it was what I meant by that very proposal to guard him from, that I had done my duty in stating the necessity of the removal but should press it no further, and tho' I hardly could expect after what had passed that your Lordship would place any kind of confidence in Teidge Wunt, yet I hoped if he was properly admonished that he might, by due exertions, regain some part of your Lordship's good opinion. Meer Abul Cossim replied that a great part of what the Minister had directed him to state to me had proceeded from vexation and was not meant to extend farther than to ourselves and that he would report my reply without delay.

Mr. Malet's Vakeel informs me that he had communicated my intelligence of Teidge Wunt's motions to Hurry Punt, that Luxmon Row had received his dismissal and moved a coss on the 12th, halted the 13th, 14th ; marched 4 coss the 15th, halted again the 16th and moved on 4 coss again yesterday. His army, he says, consists of about ten thousand cavalry, fifteen hundred infantry and two guns : that the whole of the above force, however, had not yet joined Luxmon Row's standard, but that Hurry Punt was extremely assiduous in getting them off.

**No. 299**—Kennaway speaks in the highest terms of the services of Andrew Read.

FROM—CAPTAIN KENNAWAY,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Pangal, 21st April 1791.*

I should be wanting in justice to Captain Read if I were to avoid expressing to your Lordship my conviction that this important acquisition is to be entirely ascribed to his persevering and unwearied efforts which have so gallantly bore up against and at length surmounted obstacles of the most disheartening nature arising from the badness and scarcity of almost every material requisite for the siege of a common fort, much more so for that of so strong a place as he has employed against.

My satisfaction at this event has been in some degree abated by the circumstance of Captain Read having guaranteed to the brave garrison he has reduced the terms of the capitulation, because I am afraid it will be no more in Dara Jah's power than it has been in Pursaram Bhow's with respect to Darwar to prevent its being violated. I shall request Captain Read that he will on no account think of entering into a like engagement on any future occasion and shall immediately apply for the most positive orders being sent to Dara Jah to take example from the breach of faith in the Mahrattas to the gallant Buddrul Zeman and avoid bringing a like disgrace on the Nizam's Government. The detachment will be immediately directed to proceed to Gunjycotah.

**No. 300**—The rapid success of Cornwallis ending in the capture of Bangalore increases the ascendancy of the friends of the English in the Mahratta Court.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 22nd April 1791.*

On the 20th I dispatched instructions (with the approval of this Court) to Major Sartorius to send back the 9th battallion to rejoin Captain Little.

If Pursaram Bhao marched the 12th, as was intended, from Darwar it may be hoped if he loses no time in reducing some places in his route, that he will arrive in the neighborhood of Puttun about the same time as your Lordship, should that be your object after the junction of Teydge Wunt, and as Mr. Uthhoff carries with him 6 or 7,000 bullocks for General Abercromby, their junction will greatly facilitate the movements of the General's armies.

At a visit that Behro Punt paid me the 20th inst. to receive the intelligence of the accommodation of our differences with Spain and consult on the expediency of remanding the battalion to join Captain Little, he candidly assured me that your Lordship's rapid approach and capture of Bangalore, a place that in this country is highly reputed for its strength, under circumstances so peculiarly hazardous and trying, had been received with equal astonishment by our friends and enemies at this capital, with this difference that it had given an ascendancy to the

former over the opposite faction which, he hoped, would be attended with the most beneficial consequences. He assented without reserve to the warm terms in which I reprobated the temporizing, pusillanimous conduct of the allied cavalry and freely acknowledged that your Lordship's conduct while it raised the hopes of the alliance implied the severest censure on that of the other members. He scrupled not in strong language to express his own disapprobation of the dilatoriness of Hurry Punt's progress in which he assured me he thought with the Minister, who had more than once upbraided him by letter with the dilemma to which his delays had reduced him in answering my remonstrances both as to the number and progress of his army. He observed that as his own personal weight in the Peshwa's Durbar rested on the general success of the present war and particularly of your Lordship's arms, he rejoiced in the junction that I acquainted him would have been formed with the Nabob's cavalry about the 12th inst., which he trusted would soon be followed by the Peshwa's, but he seemed to think that the joint force of cavalry would not exceed 25,000 horse, the largest proportion of which he attributed to his own Government, but for executive service he laid the greatest stress on Bhaou's army which he estimated at upward of 25,000 good troops, horse and foot, including our two battalions. He asked me confidentially if any arrangements for a termination of the war had been concerted by Captain Kennaway with the Nabob's Ministry or any plan devised by your Lordship. I replied that he had already so fully experienced your Lordship's candour as to leave no room to think that any such negotiation could take place without an equal communication to both courts. In a word, my Lord, without taking upon myself to answer for Behro Punt's personal feelings on your Lordship's late success, I can venture to say that this Court is at present most strongly impressed with respect for the ascendancy that you have gained over the enemy which will be greatly increased by the accommodation of our disputes in Europe and which I trust, will be so completely kept up by your Lordship's subsequent operations as to prevent the influence of the arts by which, notwithstanding their professions, I doubt not, they will still endeavour to reduce your Lordship's operations and negotiations to dependance on them. Hitherto it may be said that how much soever the enemy has been distressed in his resources by the operations of the allies, the weight of our share of the war has not been lightened by the junction of one of their horsemen with any of our armies or the diversion of a single trooper of the enemy from us to oppose them.

Major Sartorius has communicated to me that the detachment had thought proper to decline acceptance of the sum of 40,000 Rs. which Pursaram Bhao had offered as a gratuity on the fall of Darwar and that by the desire of a committee of the Officers, he was induced to refer the affair to this court with a recommendation of it to my good offices to procure increase of the Bhaou's offer to 100,000 Rs., less than which would not be acceptable to the detachment whose wishes I shall do all in my power to promote.

**No. 301**—Captain Read desires to know the future destination of his Detachment and expresses his approbation of the meritorious services of the officers under him.

FROM—CAPT. A. READ ;

TO—CAPT. KENNAWAY.

*Camp Kopul, 24th April 1791.*

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your favor of the 5th instant acquainting me that you have permission from the Board to apply for two 24 pounders from Innacoondah, but that there were none at present at Masulipatam fit for field service. I am informed that there are many heavy guns mounted at Masulipatam and that timbers were only wanted to perfect them for field service and those I presumed might have been prepared for them in a few days. The future destination of this detachment will be early known to you and of course you will be a better judge than I can of the necessity of applying for battering guns, tho' I hope if there are likely to be any fortified places in our way they may be applied for as early as you judge proper and if you should think it fit again to apply for any being got ready from Masulipatam I hope that they may be of the same calibre with those at Innacoonda, as should one gun be disabled its shot may answer for the others. Your kind approbation of my endeavors to surmount the difficulties I have had to fight against is very obliging and I beg that you will accept my thanks for so flattering a testimony of your opinion of me, but the already uniform conduct of Lieut. Scott and Kennedy and the men under them as well as every other man of the detachment made my part of the duty light, more particularly when I had the friendly aid of such a man as Captain Dalrymple. I beg Sir, that you will take an early opportunity of making known my sentiments of the detachment to the Right Honorable Earl Cornwallis and if you please, to add that since I have had the honour of command, no disagreement whatever has occurred between me and the troops with whom we serve ; that I cannot say too much of Darah Jah's obliging attention to promote this good understanding, nor should I do justice to Aonka Jung did not I say that he has fulfilled the duties of his situation much to my satisfaction. On a visit to Dara Jah a few days ago, when he desired that Lieut. Scott and Kennedy might accompany me he requested my permission to present each of those gentlemen with a horse and pair of Shawls and 2,000 rupees to be divided amongst the artillery Company and lascars for their steady behaviour in the batteries. With this I was at last forced to comply for fear of giving offence and accordingly desired Mr. Steuart to divide the money among the men. A horse and a pair of shawls were sent to me with a request to present them to Mr. Conductor Nixon who had his share of the fatigues of the Batteries ; I have taken the liberty of soliciting Government and the Commander in Chief to continue to me the useful services of Lieut. Orr who acted as Brigade Major to the Detachment from Ellore to Rāngoindāpore

where Mr. Blair joined with the appointment of Brigade Major and Quarter Master from Government. Since that period Lieut. Orr has acted as Aide-de-Camp to the Commanding Officer and as such I have frequently found his services indispensable while the other staff of the Detachment were otherwise necessarily employed. I am anxious to hear of the future destination of the Detachment. I presume it would be loss of time continuing it before Behader Bundah where a party from the garrison of Copul may easily confine the enemy's garrison of that fortress within their walls, and force them in time to a surrender, tho' I think it is probable and from what I have heard am inclined to believe that the place will soon be given up. I am sorry to say that Dara Jah left camp for Raichore on the 21st instant, having long ailed, his surgeons who advised a change of air as necessary to his recovery. Permit me to request that you will make this known at Durbar. If it is at all probable that the Detachment may be ordered against the hill fort I need not acquaint you that mortars are of the greatest service could they be procured. I should imagine that one 8 and two 5½ inch would be a very moderate supply.

No. 302—Malet expresses his dissatisfaction on the arrival of Appaji Ram as Tipu's envoy in Bhao's camp.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 25th April 1791.*

With expressions of surprise at and disapproval of the intimation I have just received from the Durbar that on Appaji Ram's arrival in Bhao's camp and introduction to that Chief he had announced his being deputed by his Master, Tippu, for the purpose of sundry communication to this Court. In the course of what was previously made known to me relative to the arrival of this person, I have constantly expressed my disapprobation of a visit that appeared so mysterious and I shall this evening plainly tell the Minister that holding any intercourse with the said Appaji Ram is contrary to the mode that has hitherto been adopted and practised by the mutual agreement of the allied powers and tends strongly to destroy that confidence so necessary to the preservation of the concord and harmony of the alliance.

I was benefited by copy of your Lordship's letter of the 4th inst. to Mr. Uthhoff, to make known to this Court the abundance of military stores found in Bangalore and your Lordship's expectation of being soon



joined by a large convoy from the lower Carnatic by the way of Amboor, which intelligence was extremely grateful to me as I am strongly apprehensive that the respect of the allies for our Power will be so strongly blended with jealousy as to render all your Lordship's resources necessary to put you above the reach of those arts which they appear to me to be systematically practising to reduce your measures to a dependance on them, which spirit is strongly betrayed in Musheer-al-Mulk's letter to Teydge Wunt of the 22nd ulto. and in the recent reception of Appajee Ram by Pursaram Bhao.

I have this day written in very strong terms to Hurry Pundit on the subject of his tardy progress.

**No. 303**—*Kennaway communicates to the Maratha Vakils the progress of Lord Cornwallis and expresses the desirability of a junction between Haripant's and Bhao's armies.*

FROM—CAPT. KENNAWAY,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Pangul, 25th April 1791.*

Raja Tejwant has promised in his letter written subsequent to his joining to conform in every particular to your Lordship's pleasure which I am assured he has been, and will constantly be enjoined to persevere in: the Nizam has agreed to send him a supply of ten Lacks of rupees but the Minister wants to leave the task of remitting it to me; this I endeavored to decline at first, and suggested two or three modes, tho' I confess none of them were satisfactory ones, of his doing it himself, but as I see no likelihood of their being able to accomplish it here without our assistance and that if that assistance is withheld, the money will probably be left in as hopeless a way as the army it is meant to pay, I have agreed that it shall be received into our treasury at Fort St. George and sent to your Lordship by the first secure conveyance or after such other manner as you may be pleased to direct.

Previous to going to the Durbar I had desired that the Mahratta Vakeels might be appointed to attend in order, as I can place no confidence in the fidelity of any communication I may make to them thro' the Minister, that I might, in answer to Hurry Punt's letter to Govind Row Kishen, inform them in person of your Lordship's progress and that it appeared to me impossible, considering the lateness of the season and the time your Lordship had already lost in effecting the junction with Teidge Wunt, that you could make any move to favor that of the Mahratta army under Luxman Row which I accordingly stated to them, adding that from conjecture I supposed your Lordship would about this time be beginning

your march from Bangalore towards the enemy's Capital and that I mentioned these circumstances to them for Hurry Punt's information in order that he, on a review of them, might come to such resolution as he should think the most likely for giving effect to the operations of his army, either by pushing it forward to join your Lordship or such other mode as might suggest itself to him.

Govind Row Bugwunt the acting man with Govind Row Kishen assured me Luxman Raw's Cavalry amounted to twelve thousand and would arrive as to-day or to-morrow at Gunjycotah but that there were certainly doubts of its being able to join your Lordship without your assistance. I had before the Vakeels came in, stated my opinion to the Nizam that if such assistance was deemed absolutely requisite I thought, seeing the unlikelihood of your Lordship's being able to grant it, a junction had better take place between Purseram Bhow and Hurry Punt's forces which appeared to be what they both wished, as it would enable them, if your Lordship desired it, to join you in greater security or if they preferred it to employ themselves in the reduction of the Sera and Bednore countries to which quarter it is not unlikely that Tippoo will endeavor, if he has not already done it, to convey away his treasure and most valuable effects on your Lordship's moving towards Seringapatam. This opinion the Nizam gave the Vakeels when they applied to him for his commands in consequence of the information I had given them, but its adoption or the contrary will, I conceive, entirely depend on the manner in which Mr. Malet may dispose the Poonah Durbar towards it.

I have now to submit to your Lordship the motives of my conduct in this discussion. From your Lordship's letter to Hurry Punt in which you left to his opinion the two modes of joining you or acting separately, I imagine your Lordship's opinion inclines to the latter, in which opinion I conceive you will be confirmed after experiencing with the advantages some of the inconveniences (so well described by Mr. Malet in his letter to your Lordship of the 15th) which you will have to encounter from the Nizam's Cavalry which, however I cannot but think will fall short of those you would be embarrassed with from a body of Mahratta horse owing to their loose and predatory mode of conducting themselves. I conceive also that if Teidge Wunt with, I should suppose, at least, 18,000 cavalry was overcome by his fears of the enemy and hesitated to advance when your Lordship was no more than 20 or 25 coss from him, that the Mahrattas will not be behind hand with him in caution seeing that they have a far inferior force and are removed from your Lordship to four times the distance which Teidge Wunt was. I likewise imagine that the Nizam's Cavalry will be as many as you would wish to have with you; that the Mahrattas might be very usefully employed elsewhere; that the forage which they would consume at a season when this article is every day becoming more scarce might be attended with serious inconveniences; that it would be a great point to get the Detachment placed under Purseram Bhow of whose

zeal in the cause there is every reason to be satisfied, and that your Lordship by means of Mr. Uthhoff who is with him will be much better able to turn it to advantage.

Bahadur Bundah has not yet surrendered but is expected to do in a few days, after which the Detachment will proceed to Gunjycotah, the siege of which Hafiz Ferid-u-din has already been directed to commence.

**No. 304**—Malet expresses his indignation at the alteration in the plan of Hari Pant's movements.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 29th April 1791.*

I at a visit that I paid the Minister in the evening repeated in the strongest terms my remonstrance on the subject of the dilatoriness of Hurry Punt's progress adding expressions of surprize at the change which, I understood, had taken place in his latest destination of proceeding to Gunjicota in person, he having resolved to remain at Kurnool where he had levied a large contribution on the Nabob Runmust Khan. I told the Minister that were such instances of inefficacy, deviation, and uncertainty to occur in the measures of states weakly ruled or exhausted of men and money by long and unskilful wars, palliation might be admitted; but to what account was I to place such debility and fluctuation in the operations of a state so wisely ruled as this and in the prosecution of a recent war, the equipments of which by this State had hitherto been extremely economical, while the progress of its arms rendered easy by the total employment of the enemy's power against us had, I made no doubt, most amply reimbursed its expenses.

The Minister admitted the reasonableness of my complaint, expressed much concern at the cause of them, seemed mortified that Hurry Punt's conduct had reduced him to the necessity of having recourse to excuses and without entirely disavowing the intention of changing Hurry Punt's destination from proceeding to Gunjicota to remaining at Kurnool, said he would communicate something further to me on that subject.

I repeated in strong terms my disapproval of the admission of Appajee Ram in Bhaou's Camp. The Minister in excuse laid great stress on his (Appajee's) having come without a passport and without previous communication of his business, no particulars of which had yet reached him from Pursaram Bhaou, but that if I wished it, he would immediately send orders for his dismissal. I replied that his having no passport was irrelative to the propriety of his reception, that the act of receiving and communicating with him was wrong in my opinion and that at all events he should be immediately dismissed.

On the 26 I received the following message from the Durbar, " That the reason of Hurry Punt's remaining at Kurnool is that hitherto his army (owing to the great dearth in the country) does not exceed 13,000 horse, of which 10,000 have been detached by the way of Gunjicota, and it would not be proper for Hurry Punt to advance with only 3,000 horse to Gunjicota. If the advanced body of 10 000 can join Lord Cornwallis so much the better. But if his Lordship after the junction of the Nabob's forces should have advanced, then will the junction of the said 10,000 be difficult on account of the neighborhood of the enemy. It appears, therefore, to the Durbar that if the said body can join, so much the better ; or if it cannot, that order should be sent hence for it to march to the westward to join Pursaram Bhaou. And when Hurry Punt shall have increased his remaining force to 5 or 6,000, he also will proceed to join Bhaou, whose progress in the interim toward Puttun is to suffer no interruption in waiting for him. Mr. Malet's advice is desired on this communication, since as the former plan settled with him has not been carried into effect if he agrees, the above may be written to Hurry Punt ".

My Lord, conceiving that no possible good would be effected by acquiescing in the smallest degree in the Minister's proposal, considering at the same time that in the course of future negotiation it may be serviceable to establish the political delinquencies of the allies, I concluded my reply to the Minister's proposal with the following declaration, " That tho' I was sorry to observe that the councils entered into with me by this Court resembled in futility marks drawn on water, yet in justification of myself and in support of the interests delegated to my custody, I had to acquaint the Minister that the equipment of Hurry Punt had been resolved on specifically to join his Lordship the Governor General with an army of 25,000 men in the prosecution of a general cooperative plan ; that agreeable to this plan his Lordship had ascended the Ghauts, penetrated the enemy's country, taken one of his principal forts without assistance and advancing still further towards the allies, opened a secure passage for their junction. That if after such exertions the Cavalry of this Court failed in its stipulated junction on which his Lordship the Governor General had placed so much dependence, how could I venture to assent to an alteration in the execution of a plan by which his Lordship's operations had already and probably would be so much influenced. So far from feeling myself authorized to do so, I had now to repeat what I had before formally declared, that I should hold this Court and its chieftains responsible to his Lordship the Governor General for all breach and deficiency in the said cooperative engagements and for all the evils that have arisen or may arise therefrom to the Confederacy ".

I had the pleasure to learn from Capt. Little under 15 inst. that P. Bhaou had already moved about 30 miles south of Darwar and seemed resolved to proceed as expeditiously as possible. It is likewise satisfactory to be able to acquaint your Lordship that Pursaram Bhaou's exertions in the recovery of

the effects plundered from Buddur-al-Zaman have been very successful. I have not received any account either from Major Sartorius or this Court of the govt. property found in Darwar, tho' I have frequently applied to the Minister for it and a copy of the articles of capitulation. He declares neither has been received from Bhaou.

**No. 305**—Nana expresses concern and dissatisfaction at Hari Pant's delay and Malet proposes to the Maratha Court to direct the march of Hari Pant's army towards Puttun by way of Sera.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 2nd May 1791.*

Since my last address of the 29th ulto., I have been assured by Behro Pundit that the Minister had expressed much concern and dissatisfaction at the delays of Hurry Punt's progress and had actually written him to that purport transmitting the substance of my declaration with an intimation that unless some signal service was now soon effected by his army in favor of your Lordship's operations, he should hold him in the responsibility described in my last letter.

As I think it probable that Luxaman Rao will not have been able to join your Lordship after your junction with Teyge Wunt I have suggested as the most expedient future mode of employment for Hurry Punt's army that it should immediately penetrate toward Puttun by Sera as mentioned in my address of 15 ulto. with as large a convoy of provisions for your Lordship's army as can possibly be collected with the expedition that the emergency demands.

I have some reason to think that the Minister is really dissatisfied with Hurry Punt's conduct and that he has now converted his principal attention and expectations to Pursaram Bhaou's efforts, who I am assured has been positively ordered to advance with all possible speed to cooperate with your Lordship or General Abercromby as he should find most feasible and expedient. I received a letter last night from Major Sartorius of 27 ulto. advising that the 9th Bombay Battn. returned toward Dharwar on that day for its rejoining Capt. Little to proceed to join Genl. Abercromby, tho' Bhaou's rapid advance will probably expose the execution of this design to some difficulty and delay.

I forward from the Peshwa and Minister for your Lordship letters signifying the surrender of Darwar and Kooregul.

**No. 306**—Kennaway communicates to Governor General Hari Pant's plan for the movements of his army and the disorder in the country between Hyderabad and Masulipatam.

FROM—CAPT. KENNAWAY,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Pangal, 2nd May 1791.*

I have just had a note from Meer Abul Cassim informing me of Govind Row Krishna having received a letter from Hurry Punt written from a place seven coss this side of Gooty to the following purport : that the plan fixed on when he was here for his army proceeding by way of Sera appeared to him the most advisable on which account he had written to Luxman Row, that if he could effect his junction with facility with your Lordship by way of Comar Culwah to do it, but if not, to proceed, from wherever the letter should reach him, by the shortest route in the direction of Raydroog to which place he (Hurry Punt) should repair himself and after his junction proceed on, and if Pursaram Bhaou's army should march by Raydroog then he (Hurry Punt) would advance with him. Meer Abul Cassim adds, that by accounts from the Nizam's Officer at Gunjycotah, it appears that Luxman Row had halted two days at a place 10 coss to the southward of that station on account of the distracted state of the country in his front, and had applied to Hafiz Farid-ud-din for his interference with the Zemindars of the country to permit his proceeding with security, in consequence of which Hafiz had sent a small escort under the command of an Officer familiar with the country and its inhabitants to accompany and assist him.

Of about a hundred villages dependant on Kopul, Meer Abul Cassim informs me, the Mahrattas have established themselves in upwards of eighty, and Lieut. Binny acquaints me that they are in possession of the country to within a very few miles of the place. Captain Read informs me that the killadar of Bahadur Bundeh has refused to surrender the fort till operations have been carried on against it and terms granted him which he (Captain Read) thinks he never can obtain. One of these is his (Captain Read's) becoming guarantee for his protection ; another a title and Jagir, and a third a sum of money, the two last of which are said to have been offered by Purseram Bhaw on condition of his giving up the place to the Mahrattas.

On the question of the Commanding Officer of our Detachment becoming security on such occasions I shall be glad to receive your Lordship's instructions for Captain Read's future guidance ; I do not know if it can be withheld in respect to Bahadur Bundeh with any prospect of the place surrendering after its having been granted in favor of Kopul, but I shall weigh the matter maturely before I afford any encouragement to its being given.

I am sorry to acquaint your Lordship that 40,000 rupees in money and jewels which the Gomastah of Dwarka Dass's house had dispatched under a guard of ten spearmen from Masulipatam for the payment of the 4th kist of his engagement with your Lordship for the liquidation of the peshcush was plundered on the 16th instant on the road between Hyderabad and Masulipatam, the country adjacent to which has been for some time in a state little short of rebellion ; every endeavour of mine has and shall continue to be used with the Nizam to procure the Banker's redress, but the weakness of his Government is such, particularly at this time when the absence of the greatest part of his troops on service has been taken advantage of by the disaffected in every part of the country that I have no very sanguine hopes of success. One of his guns was lately taken by a refractory Zemindar at the distance of not above 20 coss from this place and depredations have been committed in the country, to within three or four miles of Hyderabad, for the protection of which place some additional troops from hence have been deemed necessary.

From some elephant keepers who are just arrived belonging to two elephants I sent with Lieut. Steuart which, I understand, were taken by the enemy's force I have had the satisfaction to learn that Your Lordship was within a few coss of Amboor the 18th, that Colonel Oldham's Detachment was expected to join your Lordship the day following, and that Tippoo to whom the elephants and their keepers were carried was 15 or 16 coss distant.

**No. 307**—Cornwallis advances from Bangalore and promises his utmost exertions to procure supplies for the Nizam's army.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—CAPT. KENNAWAY.

*Bussuntaporam, 3rd May 1791.*

You will please inform his Highness that I this day moved my heavy guns from Bangalore and have advanced six or seven miles from thence on my way to Seringapatam.

I am afraid we shall be greatly distressed for forage on our march and I have not had it in my power from a want of cattle to carry so much rice with me as I could have wished. I am, however, very apprehensive that the Nizam's troops will feel still greater inconvenience from a want of the latter article as they could not be prevailed upon when we were at Vencatagherry to send their bullocks to Amboor for a supply which I offered them to any extent they should please, giving them warning at the same time that I saw no probability of my being able after quitting our communication with that magazine to give them the smallest assistance.

Notwithstanding the vexation which this supineness and want of exertion on their part has given me, you may assure the Nizam and the minister that I shall spare no pains on the march to put them in the way of procuring as plentiful a supply as possible of every thing that the country affords.

**No. 307A**—The Nizam's cavalry shows itself to advantage in an encounter with Tipu's troops and wins Cornwallis's approbation.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—CAPT. KENNAWAY.

*17th May 1791.*

"You know that since his Highness's troops have joined this army I have had reason to complain that instead of giving the smallest assistance they have been a most intolerable burthen to us, I was however pleased with the alacrity they showed in the action of the 15th and I have reason to believe that if the ground had been more favorable for them they would have contributed to render the success of the day more decisive."

"As this is the first action of consequences in which the Nizam's troops and ours have acted together I have to present to his Highness the four field pieces that were taken from the enemy as a token of my personal respect for him and of my desire to comment and perpetuate the friendship that exists between us, and I have offered to put Rajah Tedge Wunt into immediate possession of them."

**No. 308**—Malet does not desire the junction of Haripant's and P. Bhao's armies but favours the idea of Bhao's proceeding alone to the south.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 4th May 1791.*

I mention agreeing in a great measure in opinion with Capt. Kennaway with respect to Hurry Punt's future movements because I mean that agreement to extend only to that Chieftain's penetrating by Sera, and because I should be sorry to see Parsuram Bhaou's destination of joining General Abercromby or co-operating with your Lordship embarrassed by the difficulties that I presume would arise relative to rank and command on his joining Hurry Punt not to mention the delay that would necessarily arise, as admitted by H. Pt. in his letter to Govind Rao Kishen, to the Bhaou's progress in waiting for Hurry Punt or vice versa,—which, should it happen, would be the more to be lamented



as by letters from Capt. Little of 22nd ulto. I learn that Bhaou was advancing with great rapidity in prosecution of the co-operative plan concerted for him here and had actually reached the North banks of the Tumbudra 115 miles from Darwar in eight days from whence Serringapottam is not above 75 coss distant, so that should your Lordship have been able to advance to that Capital agreeable to the hopes expressed in your letter to Sir Oakley of the 14th ulto. it may be concluded that Bhaou's movements, if not interrupted, will have been in excellent concert with your Lordship. And as to the reduction of Bednore the greatest part of that country and of Chittuldroog is, I am credibly assured, already occupied by the Maharattas under the commands of Bunnu Bappoo, a Chieftain of considerable activity, so that should Bhaou prosecute the plan on which he has set out, there is every reason to hope that the Bunjaries will be able to make good progress to the scene of action with very little risk from the north, while by the invasion of Hurry Punt's powerful army from the north-east toward Sera, their access would be likewise secured from that quarter; whereas should it be found expedient (after Bhaou's approaching your Lordship or giving General Abercromby the assistance of his Cavalry and conveyances to advance and reduce Periaputtun), that the Maharatta force should be formed into one great body, I conceive it would be then time enough for him to join Hurry Punt, while without discussing the inferiority of Hurry Punt's force to Tej Wunt's or the comparative merit of the mode of acting of the Nizam's and Maharatta cavalry, I hope with Capt. Kennaway that the very respectable body of the Nabob's cavalry which has joined your Lordship, will prove equal to every service that may be required of them.

As my correspondence with Major Sartorius was delivered to Capt. Little on the Major's returning to Bombay, he is possessed of all my instructions relative to Bhaou's operations and expediting his movements.

**No. 309**—Kennaway expects the early surrender of Gunjycotah, recommends the formation of a detachment for the siege of Gurramconda and submits to G. G. the recall of Imtiad-ud-dowla, the Nizam's nephew.

FROM—CAPT. KENNAWAY,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Paungal, 5th May 1791.*

I shall make the best use in my power of the inducements held out by your Lordship to prevail on the Nizam to advance though I am doubtful if any consideration will induce him to move at this advanced season of the year.

Some time would be lost in deliberation, more in preparation and the rains may be expected to set in the beginning of next month. A considerable part of his army is now employed under Hafiz Fariduddin in investing Gunjycotah which is not expected to hold out long, a dearth of provisions prevailing there to a great degree from its communication with the adjacent country having been for some time intercepted. The reduction of this place and of Gurram-coonda being objects of great importance, as the country from hence to Bangalore would hereby be laid open, I shall recommend a detachment being formed to attempt the latter place as soon as possible, and as Captain Read's corps would probably make part of it, I submit to your Lordship's consideration, the eligibility of a latitude being given to the Commanding Officer at Bangalore to supply him with such guns and ammunition as he may want for the siege in the same manner as if the Nizam were to move against the place. I have a letter from Captain Read of the 1st instant informing me that there were great hopes of the speedy surrender of Bahadar Bundeh, but he is afraid, not without his guaranteeing the terms, which I have told him he cannot well avoid, since if it were withheld after having been granted to the garrison of Kopul, the Killadar will naturally suppose that foul play was intended. Captain Read says he is certain he might grant it with perfect safety. Lieut. Binny informs me that they promised to give up the place the 3rd instant and in speaking of the strength of Kopul, to add that Mohiudin, one of the principal men belonging to that garrison, had acquainted him that for a period of eleven years which it had been in possession of Tippo and his father, they had annually expended near four lacks of rupees in strengthening its works.

I received a note yesterday from Meer Abul Cassim informing me by desire of the Minister that the sum of ten lacks of rupees intended for the Nizam's cavalry serving with your Lordship was ready to be sent off, but that the Minister expected I would make myself responsible for it from the time of its being delivered over to the officer commanding a detachment of four companies of sepoy which had been ordered from Captain Read's battalions to escort it till its arrival at Madras and likewise that I would request your Lordship to advance Tej Wunt two lacks and a half Rupees on the strength of the above supply. I returned for answer that it was impossible to undertake either the one or the other, the first for reasons too obvious to require my detailing to your Lordship and the last from your being already burthened with the arduous task of providing for the expenses of your own large army, with that under General Abercromby and from whence—not from the revenues of the Carnatic he was well acquainted with, but from the distant provinces of Bengal and Benares.

Meer Abul Cassim came to me in the evening with an original letter addressed by Tippo to Mahomed Ameen Arab and forwarded to his deputy at Pangtoor by a newswriter of Tippo's lately dismissed from

Kurnoul and now residing near Gooty. Copy and translate are enclosed. I proposed an immediate answer being given in the exact spirit of Your Lordship's replies to similar applications. Meer Abul Cassim pressed me again on the subject of your making an advance to Tej Wunt, I told him in reply that I would inform you of what had passed and of the Minister's request as soon as the money was fairly off.

Imtiad-ud-Doulah, a favorite nephew of the Nizam's and supposed to be very favourable to Tippo, has been abruptly recalled from the place to which he was dismissed for carrying on an improper correspondence with Tippo a short time before we marched from Hyderabad, as mentioned in my letters to Your Lordship of that period. Two reports which prevail concerning his recall are, 1st, that Hurry Punt in reply to the letter he received from him about the time he was here, advised Tippo to make overtures to the Nizam as well as to the Maharattas to which Tippo is said to have replied that the only person at this Durbar in whom he could confide was in disgrace; in consequence of which Hurry Punt is supposed to have requested his restoration. The other which I think the most feasible is that Shumsul Umrah recommended it to the Nizam just before his death to counterbalance the power and influence of the Minister whose interests clash with the Nizam's nephew, and I shall be more disposed to think so if the answer I have suggested is given to Tippo's application to the Arab. When however to the naturally depraved and intriguing characters of our allies are combined the circumstances of Hurry Punt's unexpected visit to Meer Abul Cassim and the doubtful explanation which was given me by the Minister regarding Tippo's letter to Hurry Punt it will be difficult to consider the extraordinary solicitude which is discovered for Imtiadud-dowlah's return without suspicion.

I received a letter from Mr. Malet's Vakeel with Hurry Punt without date in which he informs me that Luxman Rao had halted at Comar Calwah and that it appeared to be Hurry Punt's intention to join him by successive marches, the Kelladar of Gooty having refused to surrender. My Hircarah who left him the 30th describes the country from this to camp to have been entirely destroyed by the Maharatta army, he sent me a verbal message that Hurry Punt was to move six coss the next day with a view of joining his son and proceeding to Bangalore. Mr. Uthhoff informs me, under date the 25th ultimo, 11 miles south of the Tumbuddra, they had it in camp that he (Hurry Punt) was to proceed by way of Sera and that Parsuram Bhou was to march four long coss the next day.

I have the pleasure to inform you that by a letter from Girdar Dass at Masulipatam it appears he had recovered 20,000 Rupees of the sum mentioned in my last to have been plundered on the road between that place and Hyderabad by the fortunate escape of some of the money carriers.

No. 309A—Extract from the reply directed to be given by Mahommed Ameen Arab to Tipu's letter.

FROM—MUHAMMAD AMIN ARAB,

TO—TIPU SULTAN.

*15th April 1791.*

At all events your request to send a confidential ambassador might only have been agreed to while the affairs of his Highness could have been adjusted with you separately. Now that engagements of the same tendency have been entered into by the three states, an inattention to any of these engagements and a preference to the affairs of His Highness over those of his allies His Highness cannot, from a regard to his engagements and his firmness to the faith of treaties which is the distinguishing feature of his character, agree to. But whenever you are sincerely disposed to adjust difference and make compensation for the injuries sustained from you by the three Sircars now and previous to your time and should be desirous of doing it in particular through his Highness, there will be no objection. First transmit an engagement in writing to this effect to the Presence that the just rights of the three Sircars shall be restored to them and they shall be fully indemnified for the losses they have sustained now and before, that his Highness obeying the dictates of a forgiving disposition may receive it with kindness and after you have pledged yourself for performing such necessary conditions of peace, transmit them to his allies for their consideration.

No. 310—Bahadur Bindah surrenders.

FROM—CAPT. KENNAWAY,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Pangal, 7th May 1791.*

I have just received a letter under date the 3rd instant from Captain Read acquainting me that the enemy's garrison had marched out of Bahadur Bundah that day when the Nizam's troops took possession of it. The terms which Captain Read found himself obliged to guarantee, before the Kelladar would surrender, are that the garrison should be permitted to carry away their private property and go wherever they chose; others were demanded, but these Captain Read would have nothing to do with; the Detachment was to proceed to Cunneckerry the 5th instant.

**No. 311**—Cornwallis directs Tejawant to distinguish his cavalry by some mark and to detach a body of horse for repelling the attacks of Tipu's light horse.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—RAJA TEJWANT.

*8th May 1791.*

The army having now reached the open country I consider it as a duty which I owe to the interests of the common cause and to the honour of His Highness the Nizam's arms to call upon you to bring the large body of cavalry under your command into activity that it may assume that degree of superiority over the enemy to which it is entitled both by its numbers and by the zeal and spirit of its chiefs and by that means contribute in the manner which was intended by his Highness to promote the success of the campaign.

As Tippo has on all occasions since the commencement of the war carefully avoided an action with British armies of very inconsiderable numbers, and in particular could not venture to attack this army when a large part of it was employed in carrying on the siege of Bangalore, there is not the least probability that he will now hazard a battle with the strongest army that was ever brought in the field against him. It therefore falls to the share of the infantry to proceed with the artillery according to the plan which has been settled to attack Seringapam and it is the duty of the cavalry to overrun the country, to cut off Tippo's communication with his capital and to prevent the approach of his small detachments of light horse to disturb the troops that will be employed in the siege.

To answer these purposes I desire that you will immediately detach a body of his Highness's cavalry of any number that you may judge advisable and under the command of such chiefs as you may think best qualified for executing the service into the open country to the north west of the present encampment with orders to drive the enemy's small parties from the neighbourhood of the army and to intercept every thing going to or coming out of Seringapattam on the roads leading to it from Corapatam and Trenaganga.

Tippo was by the last account at a great distance from hence with the main body of his army and there is no reason to believe that there is at present any considerable body of his cavalry near our front, but whatever the situation of the enemy may be the detached corps should leave its heavy baggage with the army and move into the country as lightly equipped as possible which will enable it either to avoid with facility any detachments of the enemy that may be furnished with infantry and guns or to attack them with success if a favourable opportunity should offer, and if it should at any time be pressed by superior numbers it will find perfect security in falling back to the army.

I shall order further detachments to be made as the army advances and I think it right at the same time to state to you that it is only by their own activity and exertions that it will be possible for the cavalry under your command to procure forage for their horses or subsistence for themselves and that to continue as hitherto has been the practice to encamp with their followers close to the rear of the line of Infantry would certainly occasion general distress to the whole army and to the cause in which we are engaged.

I must likewise request that you will take effectual measures to restrain the troops under your command from insulting or forcing sentries belonging to the English Regiments and to oblige not only the cavalry but also the baggage and followers to remain in the situations which are allotted to them by the general order of march.

I am persuaded you will see the necessity for using your utmost authority to prevent a repetition of both these irregularities when I inform you that by the rules of the English discipline it is the duty of a sentry to put any man to death who attempts to face him upon his post, and that exclusive of the great inconvenience which has been experienced from the multitudes of the cavalry and their followers who have broke in upon the line of march of the columns of our infantry and artillery, the English troops are exposed to great danger and have already suffered considerable loss by the similarity of appearance of His Highness's and the enemy's cavalry which renders it impossible for the officers and soldiers of our army to distinguish the one from the other and which enables the enemy to mix with the stragglers of the Nizam's cavalry and to watch for favourable opportunities to attack individuals on the line of march or upon their arrival at the new encampment.

I cannot help on this occasion expressing my regret that I have not been able to prevail upon you to comply with my repeated request that you would be pleased to order His Highness's cavalry to wear some mark by which they could be known by each other as well as by us, being persuaded that such measure would be attended with many advantages in carrying on our operations together, but in order to avoid confusion it is absolutely necessary that on all marches they should preserve the stations that are allotted to them.

**No. 312**—Tejwant does not supply the promised quota to Capt. Dallas and his foragers and followers cause embarrassment to the march of the army.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—RAJA TEJWANT.

*10th May 1791.*

When I yesterday took leave of yourself and Assud Ally Khan I felt a degree of confidence that my representations had made some impression

on you. I have, however, now the mortification to find that I was totally mistaken, for instead of 3,000 men under some chiefs of character it has just been reported to me by Captain Dallas that there were not thirty more than 200 of your troops of inferior quality sent this morning to join him, and notwithstanding your repeated promises to the contrary our line of march was never more crowded and embarrassed than this day by your numerous foragers and followers of every description who ought to have marched and foraged on the left flank of the cavalry where the country was in many places very open, but who as usual were hastening forward to fight with our guards for the few bundles of straw which we had been able to save from Tipu's horse and which are so necessary to preserve the existence of the bullocks that are drawing the heavy artillery to Seringapatam.

I have the highest respect for His Highness Nizam Ali Khan, your master, and I am convinced of the sincerity of his disposition to fulfil his engagements in the most honorable manner. So much backwardness, therefore, on your part to concur with the troops under your command in measures that are absolutely necessary to promote His Highness's interests as well as those of the other confederates greatly surprises me, and it will render it incumbent upon me to state to His Highness the disappointment I have experienced in having hitherto received no kind of support or assistance from the numerous body of cavalry which from his anxiety to act with vigor against the common enemy he was pleased to put under my directions.

**No. 313**—The Nizam complains of the occupation of all the villages dependent on Kopul by the Marathas.

FROM—CAPT. KENNAWAY,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Pangal, 10th May 1791.*

A supply of near twelve lacks of rupees for the use of Tiedge Wunt's troops was dispatched from hence the 8th instant to Gunjycotah from whence it will proceed to Madras and be forwarded to the army by such opportunity as the Board of Fort St. George may approve of.

I have mentioned your Lordship's proposal relative to the Nizam's advancing to which no reply has yet been given, nor do I imagine from the manner in which it was received that any thing will result from it. Captain Read was this day ordered to proceed towards Gunjycotah and a detachment will, I hope, soon be formed of which his corps will compose a part for laying seige to Gurramcoonda.

Meer Abul Cassim waited on me the 8th instant and complained in very bitter terms from the Minister of the great injustice of the Maharattas in their having possessed themselves of almost all the villages dependent on Kopul while the Nizam's troops were employed in the laborious and expensive task of reducing the fort. He said the Minister was desirous of receiving my advice before he would direct the Nizam's troops to possess themselves by force of a district which by the reduction of the only place of strength in it has been so fairly conquered but was so unjustly kept from them. I replied that any violent measures should by all mean be avoided, that their cause appeared to me to be a good one and capable of being supported with such forcible arguments as would, I had no doubt, induce the Maharattas to do His Highness justice. A conference was accordingly held the following day with Govindrao Krishna on the subject and I had this morning the pleasure to hear from Meer Abul Cassim that he (Govindrao Krishna) seemed to be convinced of the justness of the claim and had promised to write to Balajee Punt concerning it. Meer Abul Cassim, however, requested I would transmit information of what had passed on the subject to Mr. Malet in order that it might receive his support when it comes to be discussed at Poona.

**No. 314**—Tejwant replies to the G. G. by saying that ever since the junction the Nizam's Cavalry had put on a distinguishing badge and adhered to the plan of movements agreeable to the advice of Steuart.

FROM—TEJWANT,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*10th May 1791.*

Since the day His Highness's forces joined the English army they have worn the distinguishing badge, as Your Lordship requested and the cavalry under the command of His Highness's Mansabdars such as Muzaffar-ul-Mulk, Mahomed Ameen Arab, Buddaruddowla, Mahomed Alauddin Khan, Mahomed Hussen Khan march on the right of the Company's troops, move on in the advance agreeable to the advice of Mr. Steuart and Colonel Martin in proper numbers at the distance of 2 coss,  $2\frac{1}{2}$  and at the most 3 coss, and in the rear at the same distances keeping their baggage between them as recommended by Your Lordship, and whenever Your Lordship orders them to seek for grain etc., they do it ; these troops do nothing but obey orders and will execute what they are ordered to do ; agreeable to the conversation to send 3,000 horse with Capt. Dallas I gave the orders to the chiefs and they are already at their stations ; whenever any one shall come from Capt. Dallas they will accompany them.



**No. 315**—Bhao refuses an interview with Tipu's agent, Appaji Ram, who proceeds thereupon to Haripant.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 13th May 1791.*

It was yesterday communicated to me by the Minister that Parsuram Bhao had refused to enter into any discussion with Appajee Ram of the points with which he was charged by Tipu having not authority for that purpose, that Appajee Ram on being desired to depart had declared his resolution of proceeding to Hurry Punt to endeavor to prevail on him to undertake the mediation of his Master's cause and had actually moved towards that quarter, hearing which orders had been dispatched to Hurry Punt to prohibit Appajee's approaching his camp, to decline all intercourse with him and in the event of his having approached before the receipt of the orders to dismiss him immediately after their perusal. While I wish to avoid entering into conjectures disadvantageous to the faith of this branch of the alliance I cannot help observing that Appajee Ram's journies seem mysterious and suspicious, but I trust that the darkest clouds of mystery will soon be dispelled by the decided splendor of your Lordship's achievements.

By Capt. Kennaway's letter of the 2nd May to Your Lordship it appears that all those pretences for delay in Hurry Punt's progress, of which I signified my apprehension to this Court, the instant it mentioned to me the change of route concerted by Hurry Punt with the Nizam, are now brought into play. Had Hurry Punt or his son advanced as they ought to have done in Teydge-Wunt's route, I presume the junction with Your Lordship might have been early effected on your return to Bangalore after your junction with Col. Oldham; that army seems now so much divided between two plans as to have lost the proper time of pursuing either and it is a very bad earnest of Luxaman Raou's future exploits if what Meer Abul Cossim relates be true, of his throwing himself on so weak a support as a small escort of the Nabob's troops to protect his army from the distractions in the country which appear to be uncontrollable by the Nabob's power, even in his ancient possessions.

**No. 316**—Malet gives an account of the movements of Parasuram Bhao's and Haripant's armies and denounces in strong terms the intrigues of the allies.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 14th May 1791.*

On the 14th I received a letter from Capt. Riddell of the 6th advising his arrival at Hubly the 4 inst, and of his intention to proceed on the 7th

to join Capt. Little with Lt. Ross, Gorman Powney and 64 recovered men from the hospital established at that place, and enclosing copy of a letter to him from Capt. Little dated the 30th ulto. 6 coss from Chittuldroog, 140 miles from Dharwar and 70 coss from Seringputtun, mentioning that a strong hill fort 20 coss in advance had surrendered to the Bhaou's force, that a body of the Bhaou's troops would be left in the quarter from whence he wrote, to which Capt. Riddell might advance without fear of opposition.

My last advices from my agent in Hurry Punt's army are of the 29 ulto. from near Gooty mentioning Hurry Punt's having been joined by some more Chieftains with their quotas and that his troops had taken possession of Chillumputty, a small hill fort in the neighbourhood of Gooty. From the Durbar I learn that he had thoughts of recalling his son Luxman Rao and then joining Bhaqu with his whole force. But that to his letters on this subject answers have been sent by the Durbar that the object of his equipment is co-operation with Your Lordship and that it is repeated, he should direct his whole exertions to effect it in the best possible manner.

I have not failed as occasion offered to express my surprise at deviations in Hurry Pant's original plan of operations so totally subversive of those definitively settled with me for which I hold this Court responsible, particularly as by the return of your Lordship to Bangalore another opportunity offered of approaching your army agreeable to the repeated invitation contained in your second letter to Hurry Punt of the 16th April, the substance of which I have communicated to this Court.

With respect to Tippo's having sent a letter to Mahomed Ameen Arab, I have only to observe that every thing may be suspected of the art and intrigue of our allies, notwithstanding the habit of confidential communication in which Musheeral Mulk appeared to be with Capt. Kennaway at the time when, it seems, the foundation of this suspected intrigue was probably laying by Hurry Punt, all whose advances in favor of Tippo, Musheeral Mulk declared, had been rejected by the firmness and sincerity of the Nabob's administration. Indeed the Nabob's Ministry must have been exceedingly ripe for the most exceptionable intrigue and indulgence to Tippo if after the detestation expressed but a little while before of Hurry Punt, it should have so readily coalesced in his political machinations. But, my Lord, I will here once for all make an explicit declaration that I believe these people are as incapable of pursuing their object by direct means as the serpent is of proceeding in a straight line. Their education, their institutions and the state of their society lead them nay force them, into obliquities which nothing but the decided line of Your Lordship's successful rectitude can correct or control.

I have pleasure in acquainting Your Lordship that I yesterday received a bill of exchange from the Durbar for 60,000 payable to Capt. Little on account of his detachment and that I have just received a letter from General Abercromby advising the arrival in very high order of 396 of the bullocks sent hence. The remainder I have learnt from the Resident at Fort Victoria have been dispatched from thence.

**No. 317**—Kennaway recommends to the Madras Board the supply of ammunition for the reduction of Gurramcoondah and Gunjycotah and communicates his sentiments regarding the admission of Tipu's Vakil, Melody Ali.

FROM—CAPT. KENNAWAY,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Pangal, 19th May 1791.*

Having made an offer to the Nizam of the use of two twenty-four Pounders at Innacoonda, in consequence of permission from the Madras Board to that effect His Highness has accepted of it, and Gurramcoondah and Gunjycotah, the places against which the guns will be employed being hill forts I have in compliance with Captain Read's request and a conviction of its propriety recommended to the Board to grant his Highness the use of two or three mortars and desired that four thousands shot with four or five hundred barrels of common powder for the heavy guns, four hundred shells with ten or twelve barrels of fine powder and the other apparatus necessary for the mortars might be sent with them and in the confidence that my request will be complied with, a sufficient number of draft and carriage cattle have been directed to be dispatched from the place where they are at pasture for transporting all the above articles to Gunjycotah. I have desired Captain Read to detach proper people to Innacoonda to receive them and desired that the bullocks may graze on the borders of the Nizam's districts to avoid the detriment they would be of to the Company's cultivation till the person in charge of them shall be informed that the stores, etc., are ready to be put upon them.

I am sorry to acquaint your Lordship that though the treasure intended for Teidge Wunt and the officer with four companies from Captain Read's Detachment for its escort must both have arrived at Gunjycotah I have not been able to send instructions to Lieut. Coupland, the Officer Commanding, to receive and proceed with it owing to the litigious disposition of the Minister who persists in endeavouring by every means in his power to throw the responsibility on the Company which I shall continue to oppose.

On the 17th Meer Abul Cassim waited on me with an arzee and letter which had been received from Tippoo addressed to the Nizam and the Minister. Respecting answers to them I gave the same opinion as before, adding that Mehedi Ali Khan, the Vakeel, Tippoo mentions to have dispatched to his Highness should be prohibited from advancing till his master had bound himself by the written engagement described in the answer Mahomed Ameen Arab had been directed to give to Tippoo's former letter. On the 18th I received a note from Meer Abul Cassim enclosing a copy of a letter from Maleck Esa, an officer of the Nizam stationed near Curramcoonda, to the Minister intimating Mehdy Ali Khan's arrival and requesting instructions concerning his being permitted to advance.

I am informed by this Durbar that by the latest intelligence received here Hurry Punt was twenty coss from Gooty and in his letter to Govindraw Krishen had complained as much of Balajee Pundit's inattention to his wants as Balajee is described by Mr. Malet to complain of his inactivity, particularly in the instance of his having been obliged to liquidate the two lacks and half of rupees he took up here by bills on his family at Poonah and in the superior attention which he alleged to have been paid to the wants and equipment of Purseram Bhow ; Luxmanraw, his son, I understand from the same authority, remains in his former situation about ten coss south of Gunjycotah.

I have the satisfaction to inform your Lordship that the Jemadars party which Captain Read sent with the garrison of Kopul to the place mentioned in the capitulation has returned after having conducted them to it in safety.

*P.S.*—Since writing the above Meer Abul Cassim has been here and while he was sitting with me a letter was sent to him by the Minister which the latter had just received from Teidge Wunt dated the 3rd instant by which I had the satisfaction to learn that your Lordship on that day marched from Bangalore towards Seringapatam and proposed moving again the day following. The Rajah informs me (the Minister) of his having at your Lordship's desire undertaken to carry five thousand shot for the heavy guns, but is extremely diffuse on the distresses of the Nizam's Cavalry on account of the scarcity of grain and forage as well at the time of his writing as for some days past. A letter I had in my possession from a gentleman with the army dated 26th in which the country is described as abounding in forage enabled me to contradict the former part of the assertion and the impossibility of the enemy's being able to destroy it to any extent I used as an argument to invalidate the latter. I also mentioned your Lordship's having agreed to supply the Rajah with as much grain as he could carry while in the vicinity of Amboor and his not having availed himself of your offer I begged Meer Abul Cassim to point out to the Nizam who, by a note which accompanied Teidge Wunt's letter

appeared to have been made very uneasy by what the Rajah had written, how impossible it was for your Lordship in the arduous undertaking you had entered on to listen to such loss and to relieve the numerous applications which would be made to you from all quarters, that the distresses whatever they were, would, I hoped, only last during the march from Bangalore to Seringapatam and that they would be amply recompensed by the acquisition of the object you had in view. Meer Abul Cassim suggested that a friendly letter from your Lordship to his Highness with any expressions indicating your desire of meeting him and the propriety of his advancing in order that it may take place hereafter, would at this time be particularly seasonable, which I promised him I would mention to you.

**No. 318**—Malet analyses the causes of Bhao's subsequent slow progress.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 20th May 1791.*

The substance of Capt. Little's letter was already communicated. Nothing now remains to add but that at the time of Capt. Little's writing, Bhao seemed insistent to attack a small fort called Mycoonda by which he was likely to be detained some days, that his progress since crossing the Tumbudra had not been so rapid as before, that he talked of proceeding at the head of his cavalry to cooperate with your Lordship or General Abercromby and waited to be accompanied by Mr. Uhthoff agreeable to a proposal long since made to this Court and that conformable to my instructions to Major Sartorius while in command of the detachment, Capt. Little meant to permit of Mr. Uhthoff's proceeding with him, and that the captured hill fort mentioned in my last is named Dunnawur.

From a consideration of Bhaou's late rapid movements and subsequent demur it occurs to me that he was at first influenced by an idea of your Lordship's and General Abercromby's immediate advance to the siege of Puttun in the reduction of which place this state may have thought it necessary for its interests and credit to have a share. But on learning from subsequent intelligence that your Lordship's measures had been necessarily delayed by effecting the junction with Teyze-Want and Col. Oldham, it has been thought prudent in the wily policy of this Court to

delay the Bhao in the quarter where he now is, and where he can be employed in safety to the great advantage to his army and the state till your Lordship having surmounted all difficulties shall have approached the enemy's capital, when on the principles above mentioned he will also advance, or in the event of your Lordship's approach to the Capital being frustrated by the advanced state of the season or any other cause, he will continue to employ himself (very beneficially to the interests of his own state and virtually to the alliance by the distress of the enemy) in the reduction of what remains unsubdued of the districts of Chittuldroog and Bednore with an eye to acquisition of those two capitals, thus promoting two objects desirable in its policy, of not forwarding our too rapid success at the same time that it will be extending its own particular conquests and enlarging its field of lucrative collection. The Bhaou's conduct, if not influenced by improper motives above mentioned or by interested views in the ultimate partition, would be unexceptionable, perhaps highly laudable, as pregnant with infinite distress to the enemy. But while Hurry Punt's destination has been and continues to be artfully and studiously evaded and thereby all positive aid to your Lordship's immediate operations withheld, it certainly seems fair to conclude that it is the systematic object of this Court to benefit exclusively as much as possible under the protection of your Lordship's exertions, taking at the same time such measures as in the event of the success of your Lordship's decisive plans may entitle it to the claim of cooperative merit or at least of the merit of intentional cooperation.

Nothing, my Lord, would make me more happy than to see a system, which on conjecture I have here attributed to this Court, invalidated by the speedy junction of Hurry Punt or Pursaram with your Lordship before the vigor of your own measures shall have opened a prospect of success that will deprive their junction of actual or intentional merit.

### No. 319.

(I) *Extract of a Purwanah from Tippu Sultan to the Pattels of Coorg.*

26th May 1791.

It is well known to me that you have for a long time experienced much trouble in your country and under this consideration I forgive everything which has happened—you may now fulfill your several duties as

subjects and observe all the customs of your religion agreeably to ancient practices, and whatever you formerly paid to your own Rajas, the same, I expect, you will now pay to this Circar.

(II) *Translation of the Coorga Rajah's answer to a letter received from Miya Mahomed Sadek, Dewan Kutcherry, Kishen Raou Tosheh Khana and Kauder Khan.*

I have received your letters and comprehend the purport of them. Whenever you write me your real sentiments, I will consider on them and reply to them—you now ask my friendship to which I answer I have pledged my word to the English with whom I am in alliance. They have locked it up in a box which has been sealed and sent to Europe. How can I therefore give my word to you when the English chose to restore it to me again?

**No. 320**—Cornwallis asks Tejwant to march back with his cavalry.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—RAJA TEJWANT.

*27th May 1791.*

As you have already expressed a strong desire to separate the troops belonging to His Highness the Nizam under your command from this army and have been induced to urge this measure from the weak state of the horses and the distresses of the people for want of grain etc., I think the present a very favourable opportunity to carry such a measure into execution, although I cannot but think that those distresses might have been prevented by the exertions which so large a body of cavalry are capable of in an enemy's country abounding with provisions and which I have repeatedly recommended, yet as that cannot now be remedied and I am of opinion that the forces under your command may be very beneficial to His Highness in maintaining and extending his conquests, I desire you to march immediately and to make the first three or four days marches as soon as possible in order that you may lose no time in reaching those districts most likely to afford relief to your troops and where you may be in the power of receiving His Highness's command.

**No. 321**—Malet sends intelligence of the capture of several fortresses by Bhaou and comments on the Nizam's reply to Tipu's letter.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 27th May 1791.*

From Capt. Little I was happy to learn that Bhaou made great progress in the reduction of the country south of the Tumbudra by the capture of Mycoonda, Sunda, Bednoor, Changhery and Woorgunnee. In the latter was found 1,200 barrels of gunpowder and in Changhery which was one of the enemy's founderies, 1,000 rockets and 30,000 shots from 2 to 24 lbs. Capt. Little assured me that he uses every exertion to open a communication by letter with your Lordship and that he addresses you frequently and his letter of the 13th is dated only 40 coss from Puttun, I hope he will find means to succeed. He expected the 9th. Battalion Native Infantry to join between the 15 and 20 as the Bhaou had dispatched a party of horse to facilitate Capt. Riddell's progress, but he seems doubtful of the Bhaou's advancing without previous intelligence of your Lordship's approach to Puttun or Abercromby's to Periaputtan.

On a reperusal of the Nizam's reply to Tippo's letter to Mahomed Ameen Arab it occurs to me that the concluding clause "that the just rights of the three Circars shall be restored to them and they shall be fully indemnified for the losses they have sustained now and before" tends to invalidate the principle of equal partition contained in the 9th art. of the treaty with the qualification thereof relative to the Nabob's and Peshwa's exclusive resumption contained in the 10 art. Under the plea of the restoration of just rights the Peshwa and the Nabob will have unbounded claims, while the Company never having that I recollect had any claim to any part of Tippo's or Hyder's Dominions will be restricted to compensation for the losses as His Highness says now and before, which indeed is a very extensive field of requisitions.

**No. 322**—Cornwallis arrived in the neighbourhood of Seringapatam on the 13th May.

FROM—CAPT. KENNAWAY,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Pangal, 28th May 1791.*

A letter was yesterday received by the Minister from Rajah Teidge Wunt of the 13th instant informing him that your Lordship was to encamp the following day within a coss of Seringapatam. One good arising from this



letter is that it enabled me to afford Captain Little the necessary information which I shall immediately do that you would be before Seringapatam by a certain day, a point on which Pursaram Bhow has declared it necessary that his advancing a body of cavalry to join your Lordship or General Abercromby should turn.

**No. 323**—Kennaway sends to Malet intelligence of the movements of Haripant and Parsuram Bhau.

FROM—CAPT. KENNAWAY,

TO—C. W. MALET.

*Pangal, 30th May 1791.*

I understand from the Hirkaras who brought the letter Hurry Punt was to march the day they left camp to a place only 12 coss distant from Sera and that Parasram Bhaou's army was no more than eighty coss off.

Mr. Stewart draws no additional allowances in his station with Teidge Wunt except 250 Rs. a month established for him as surveyor whenever he may be on the move.

**No. 324**—Malet comments on the successive embassies of Mehdi Ali and Appaji Ram.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 30th May 1791.*

They (the Minister's remarks in reply to Esaw's letter) certainly differ very widely from the letter and spirit of your Lordship's reply of the 21 March to a similar application, and from the reply which I understood was to be adopted by either of the contracting powers in a similar predicament, viz., that no Vackeel would be received till Tippo having made an explicit declaration of his intentions by letter the sentiments of the contracting Powers had been previously collected thereon, and as the observance of this rule is what I have insisted on in all the advances that have been made by Tippo to this Court, I apprehend it will not scruple to complain of the Nabob's following a different mode, unless the whole has been previously concerted between the two Courts which from the circumstances mentioned in Mallick Esau's letter relative to Govinrao Kishun and Hurry Punt does not seem improbable, though if the advances that have been lately made to me here relative to the appointment of a congress are prosecuted, I shall then be inclined to think the whole affair of Mehed Ally Khan may have

been the work of a separate intrigue, fabricated by the Nabob's Ministry in concert with Hurry Punt and Govindrao, without the sanction of this Court, which presumption seems to derive some force from the extraordinary language said to have been held by Hurry Punt to Govindrao and by him communicated to the Nabob's Ministry, whence it seems that dissatisfaction has arisen between the Minister and Hurry Punt and your Lordship may recollect my having mentioned in my letter of 2 inst. the former's disapproval of the latter's conduct, but even this may be art and pretence.

But whatever the object or whatever the springs may be that actuate their manœuvres, it appears pretty clear from the late movements of Appajee Ram and the present one of Mehed Ally Khan that both Courts are busied in intrigues that do not fairly meet the public eye.

No. 325—Cornwallis retreats; communicates to the Nizam his decision to send away the weak horses, under Assud Ali Khan and requests His Highness to send a deputy to the Congress.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—THE NIZAM.

31st May 1791.

I lose no time in embracing the opportunity now offered to communicate with your Highness by the free and unmolested channel which has been so successfully and expeditiously opened by the Maratha armies under the command of Hurry Punt Tatia and Puresram Bhow with whom I had the happiness of an interview on the plains of *Milcotta* on the 29th May.

After having taken possession of Bangalore and having been joined by Your Highness's troops under the command of Rajah Tiedge Wunt I marched towards Seringapatam. The enemy had arrived there before me by hasty marches and had taken possession of the strong grounds near the fort, having the island and the fort of Seringapatam in his rear. On the 15th May I attacked and totally defeated him. The vicinity of Seringapatam and the batteries which he had erected on the north side of the island saved his army from destruction; his loss of men, however, must have been considerable and besides a number of colors, we took four pieces of brass cannon.

After this victory it was my intention to have formed the junction with the army under General Abercromby who had arrived at Periapatam, but the advanced season of the rains and the want of forage which reduced the

cattle of my army to a state incapable of such exertions as my plan would require, induced me to relinquish that design and I accordingly wrote to General Abercromby to fall back to the pass.

At this time I had the happiness to hear of the approach of the Mahratta army and I accordingly effected the junction with Hurry Punt Tautia and Parsuram Bhow whose zeal and activity in marching towards me claims my unlimited praise and proves their earnestness to prosecute the interests of the confederacy and to avail themselves of the favorable opportunity offered to effect the grand object of the alliance. The junction of the Mahratta army and the present position of the joint forces of the allied states has enabled me to comply with the repeated and urgent request which Rajah Tiedge Wunt has made to me in consequence of the weak state of the horses of his army. The inclemency of the weather and the severe exercise his cavalry have had for a length of time in a country which the enemy spared no pains to destroy upon the road of our march, has reduced the horses to a weak and unserviceable state and the Rajah has been for some time past desirous of pursuing the most advisable plan to recruit them and at the same time contribute his assistance towards the general operations. The present being a favorable opportunity I have given my consent to detaching the weak and infirm horses to such country as can supply them with forage, enable them to recover their strength and at the same time assist in covering the supplies that may be on the road towards the army and towards the garrison which I have left in Bangalore. This detachment will be commanded by Assud Ally Khan while the Rajah with such of the cavalry as have not suffered to that degree and are still fit for duty will remain with the army and assist in the execution of the general plan of operations. I flatter myself that this will meet with Your Highness's approbation and that at the expiration of the rains when the horses shall have recovered they will join the grand army and be reinforced by such other of Your Highness's troops as you may think to send with them.

As from the beginning of the present affairs I have uniformly adhered to my engagements and have seriously resolved that the utmost confidence shall be evinced on my part, I have transmitted to Capt. Kennaway copies of the correspondence which has passed between me and the enemy that he may inform Your Highness of its contents. From these letters Your Highness will observe my resolution to consider the interest of the allies in the same manner as those of the Company and my determination to rule my conduct by strict attention to the treaties existing between us. I think it necessary to point out to Your Highness the subject contained in these letters relating to the assembly of deputies from each state for the purpose of examining and discussing the claims and pretensions of all parties concerned according to their respective rights and situation and for consulting on terms for an honorable and advantageous peace. Although Tippo Sultan has inserted the word "confines", I cannot but consider

it as a tacit compliance with the place which I have pointed. On this subject I request Your Highness will let me know your sentiments and I further propose to Your Highness as I have done to the Peshwah that you will as soon as convenient delegate your authority to such person as you may judge proper to superintend the management of your interests at that meeting.

**No. 326**—Steuart communicates to Kennaway the departure of Assud Ali Khan and scarcity of grain in the camp.

FROM—LIEUT. STEUART,

TO—CAPT. KENNAWAY.

*1st June 1791.*

I have the pleasure to send you letters from Lord Cornwallis to the Nizam's minister and Meer Ameen by favor of Assud Ali Khan who left camp to day. We halt tomorrow and will march on the 3rd instant N.W. five miles. We are already living on clover. Raggy sells at 11 seers per rupee in the Mahratta camp today and at 10 in our own.

**No. 326A**—Extract from a private letter, camp 8 miles north of Seringapatam 1st June 1791, describing the situation of the combined allied armies.

“ On the 25th we were agreeably surprised by some Maharattas coming into camp with the intelligence that the Bhao and Hurry Punt were within a few coss of us with 36,000 horse and 20,000 foot which was the first account we had of them since the fall of Dharwar: it was very unfortunate that we knew nothing of their motions sooner as it would have saved all our guns, etc., etc. The Mahratta army are now encamped within 4 miles of us: His Lordship has had two conferences with them and they have supplied us with a considerable quantity of provisions. General Abercromby by orders from Lord Cornwallis has returned down the ghauts but was obliged to leave behind him four 28 pounders not perfectly destroyed and some stores. Rajah Teidge Wunt remains with us with 3 or 4,000 men and Assud Ali Khan with the rest of the Nizam's cavalry leaves us tomorrow. I fancy it is now determined to keep the field till we can be supplied with guns and the season will admit of our laying siege to the capital. We have had no rain lately but the weather keeps very cool. We shall still do very well if we can only manage to get provisions for such a mass of people as the combined armies consist of: they must now amount with their followers to near three lacks of men. Tipoo's resources must fail; his country will be entirely destroyed and the fall of Seringapatam will, I hope, finish the war. I believe there are sufficient

guns in Bangalore for that purpose. We are now about 8 miles to the northward off the fort but must change our ground.

"We have not seen one of the enemy since the Mahrattas joined us. I am convinced Tipu will make some proposals of peace. He sent a present of fruit to His Lordship on the 27th which was immediately returned."

No. 327.

FROM—C. W. MALET.

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 3rd June 1791.*

I have this inst. received letters of the 21 from Pursaram Bhaou's camp by which I understand that he had advanced within 28 coss of Syringputtum and that reports agreed in Your Lordship's being before it.

No. 328—Cornwallis explains to Haripant the strategy to be adopted in the next campaign and describes the distress in his army.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—HARIPANT.

*11th June 1791.*

It is well known to you that since the conclusion of the treaty of alliance between the Peshwah, the Nizam and the English Company I have considered the interests of the three powers as the same and have not only refused to listen to any proposals from the enemy for negotiating a peace in which the names of the allies were not mentioned, but have likewise exerted myself as much for the success of the arms of the allies as for that of our own troops; as one proof of which I shall only mention at present that even when it was highly probable that England would be involved in a war with France and Spain I drew out at great hazard almost the whole garrison of Bombay to assist Parsuram Bhow in the reduction of Dharwar, which I knew to be an object of great importance to the interests of the Maharatta State.

The junction of the two powerful Mahratta armies under chiefs of such eminent reputation as yourself and Perseram Bhow with the army under my command has been highly gratifying to me and the troops of the three confederate powers now assembled form so mighty a force that if it is properly conducted it cannot fail of ensuring the most complete success.

As the Mahratta armies are composed chiefly of cavalry and the English army almost entirely of infantry, their dependance on each other must in a great degree be mutual and it is of the highest importance to either party that the troops of the other should be able to act with efficiency

when the season arrives for undertaking such operations as will in their consequences effect the purposes of the confederacy.

The enemy has hitherto employed his whole force in the field against the English army which has been constantly engaged since the commencement of the war in the most active and difficult service. After great and repeated success, I was obliged by several causes which I need not at present detail to relinquish my design to attack Seringapatam and I was also forced to destroy eleven of my heaviest guns by the great and rapid mortality amongst our cattle which was occasioned by rains uncommonly heavy at that season of the year and by the enemy's having burnt the forage and indeed entirely desolated his country.

It was then my intention to open our communication with the Carnatic and to proceed without loss of time to refit the army and obtain such supplies of clothing, provisions, military stores and especially of cattle as would enable me to renew the operations for reducing the enemy's capital as soon as the season would permit.

On my first day's march from the Caveri, I had the good fortune to meet the Mahratta armies of whose approach I was, by the vigilance of the enemy's scouting parties, kept in total ignorance and in the first conversation which I held with yourself and the other chiefs on the subject of future operations we were unanimous in our sentiments respecting the plan that should be followed, the general outlines of which were as follows, "to distress the enemy by cutting off his resources as much as possible, to secure your communication with Sera and also to establish a free communication with the Carnatic from whence many of our means for carrying on future operations must be drawn". It was likewise determined to relinquish the communication to the westward of Chittledroog in which measure Paruram Bhow, who had marched that road and was acquainted with, the preference to be given to the road by Sera, coincided. This plan having been thus proposed and approved of, I declared my readiness to assist the Mahrattas in keeping possession of as large a tract of the enemy's country as it might be prudent to hold during the monsoon.

In order to enable you to judge how far I consider the future operations of the war to depend upon a steady adherence to the above mentioned plan, I shall briefly state to you the circumstances and wants of this army and the inconveniences of my own situation.

The clothing of our European troops is nearly worn out and the alteration of climate since the late cold winds began, has increased the numbers of our sick to a very considerable degree; the raggy grain disagrees with them and notwithstanding the flattering hopes which I had entertained after the first conversations with you on the subject, I have been scarcely able to find in your bazars a daily supply for the Europeans alone, of rice

Our sepoys are fed wholly and not without difficulty upon raggy which has occasioned great sickness and discontent and desertion already begins to prevail among them.

The money which I have with me cannot last long and the shroffs even at the ruinous exchange at which I should be obliged to draw my bills would be unable to supply a sum sufficient to support this army for a very short period.

Many thousand bullocks must be procured to enable this army to move with a complete battering train, and such a stock of provisions as is necessary for an army constituted like ours, in which regular deliveries of grain are absolutely necessary. These bullocks must be drawn from a country already much exhausted and it will require all my authority and exertions to obtain them with sufficient despatch.

The greatest part of the heavy artillery will be equipped at Bangalore, but it will be necessary to draw large quantities of military stores from the magazines in the Carnatic.

And it is of peculiar importance that an easy junction should be secured for such part of the reinforcements that will arrive this season from Europe, as may be thought proper to bring up the ghauts to strengthen the army.

All these points cannot be effected till my correspondence with Madras and our other settlements can be expeditious and perfectly uninterrupted.

You who are a statesman as well as a soldier, will, I am persuaded, clearly see that the pursuit of small objects should not be allowed to interrupt the preparations I have mentioned, which are so indispensibly requisite for enabling this army to act with vigor, when the proper season returns for recommencing a plan of offensive operations. But even if unfortunately you should entertain different ideas I owe a duty to the country which I serve and the allies with whom I am connected and who have honoured me with so much confidence that would oblige me to withhold my consent to the adoption of measures which from my long experience in military affairs, must in my opinion inevitably produce the most ruinous consequences and turn the fortune of the war in favour of our enemy, who, if we act with wisdom and prudence, is now in our power.

I therefore propose that no time should be lost in quitting the western communication and that unless the enemy should give us an opportunity of attacking him, which is very improbable, the first object of our future movements should be to secure the Sera communication with your country as well as our communications with the Carnatic, and that the frontier-line to be maintained by us should be in the direction of Raydroog, Sera, Shevagunga, Doddo Balapuram, Deonhally, Bangalore and Oussore, all which places except Oussore are already in our possession or open to us and as soon as the situation of this army will admit of it, I shall endeavor to reduce

Oussore, which I understand is not in a condition to make any considerable defence. By the adoption of this plan we shall completely cut off a large tract of the finest part of the enemy's dominions, the forts in the interior parts of which may be either reduced or blockaded, and whilst your cavalry may refresh and recover themselves, after their late fatiguing marches, by the ample supplies which they may receive from the countries behind them you will have it in your power by occasional large detachments of horse to render the country between the line above mentioned entirely useless to the enemy. At the same time if we can obtain possession of Oussore, I think it will become almost impossible for him to draw any material supplies either from the Baramaul or the Salem countries which have both been represented to me as very valuable and productive.

If Tippoo should not agree to the terms which we may think ourselves entitled to demand from him for the re-establishment of peace, we can also during this period of preparation, concert the best plan for employing the Company's army under General Abercromby, which is at present on the coast of Malabar and direct him either to reascend the Coorg Ghaut at the close of the rains, or to attack the Bednore country in conjunction with a body of troops belonging to your state. We shall likewise be able to consult Nizam Ally Khan upon these subjects and to receive reinforcements from him to act with the armies of the other confederates.

I am willing to believe that some temporary difficulties have occurred, which neither yourself nor Parsuram Bhow had foreseen, when both of you made me such positive promises, that you would not only assist me in obtaining a certain number of draught and carriage bullocks, but that you would furnish me with ample supplies of provisions for this army, both for immediate consumption and for forming a stock of not less than four or five thousand bullocks loads in depot, to protect me against the hazard of suffering distress or inconvenience in the course of any movements that might become necessary either for preserving our communications, or for acting against the common enemy.

I think it however incumbent upon me to remind you of these promises and I feel so much confidence in the characters both of yourself and Parsuram Bhow, that I can entertain no doubt of their being soon fully performed.

**No. 329**—Kennaway communicates to the Nizam the G. G.'s decision to return to Bangalore.

FROM—CAPT. KENNAWAY,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Pangal, 12th June 1791.*

Yesterday received a letter from the Madras Board intimating the Commanding Officer of Bangalore having received accounts from your Lordship that the want of forage and provisions and the reduced state of



the cattle of the army had rendered it necessary for you to return immediately to Bangalore.

Apprehensive that intelligence of this resolution and the reasons which led to it would speedily reach the Nizam in exaggerated colors from Rajah Teidge Wunt and desirous that no time might be lost by this Durbar in taking such measures as the situation of affairs required, I communicated the determination your Lordship had come to last night to the Minister in as softened a manner as possible.

Meer Abul Cassim waited on me this morning; he expressed the Minister's concern at what I had communicated, but said he was willing to persuade himself that your Lordship would be able to devise means of avoiding to carry your intentions into effect from the great detriment it would be of to the war; he desired to know what my views were in the communication I had made. I told him in reply that I was afraid to admit a hope that you would be able to relinquish it, that the Minister knew the state of the forage and the distressed situation of the Nizam's army for grain from Teidge Wunt's letters and he knew from me the hope your Lordship had entertained of assistance in those articles from the Nizam's cavalry, that these hopes failing and finding in their stead that it was necessary to afford relief to the army of this Government from the stock you carried with you for the support of the company's troops, were reasons sufficient from the temporary abandonment of your object which you had been reduced to.

My views in communicating the intelligence to the Minister were, first, because it was proper that no circumstances good or bad regarding the common cause in which we were engaged should be withheld by either party from the other; secondly, that the Minister might without delay adopt the necessary measures for completing Teidge Wunt's complement of grain, bullocks to the numbers, he formerly assured me, would either proceed with or join him after he had united with your Lordship, viz., seven thousand of the first and ten thousand of the last as well as that he might exert himself in causing to be laid up in Sidout the stock of grain I recommended on the capture of that place, which Hafiz Fariduddin has hitherto only been allowed to do to the extent of fifteen or twenty thousand rupees; thirdly, to enable him to lay hold of the opportunity I had given him to close his negotiation with the Killadar of Gunjycotah which he had informed me was on the point of surrendering before the news should reach that quarter, and fourthly, in order to add weight to the arguments I had already used to convince him that in so uncertain a thing as war no relaxation ought to be allowed in any undertaking from an expectation that this or that event would render further exertion unnecessary; a language the Minister has for some days held to me to excuse his hesitating about sending off the cattle to transport the guns, mortars, etc., which I have been so anxious to procure being granted by the Madras Board from Innacoondah.

I have the pleasure to acquaint your Lordship that a party reported to consist of between four and five thousand horse from the Rajah of Berar are crossing at Caluchobutra Ghaut on their way to join Hurry Punt and that a hundred and eighty thousand shot and other military stores in proportion have been found in the fort of Kopul.

No. 330—The Mahratta Durbar agrees to pay a donation of 6,000 rupees to the English detachment for assistance in the reduction of Dharwar but adopts an attitude of reserve on the question of the Chief Command being vested in Hari Punt or P. Bhao.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 13th June 1791.*

I have been assured by the Minister at an interview on the 11 Inst. that repeated instructions have been sent to Parsuram Bhao to exert himself to the utmost of his power to promote and facilitate the progress of supplies of provision from north to the allied forces in the neighbourhood of Puttun.

On my enquiring of the Minister whether your Lordship was to look upon Hurry Punt or Pursaram Bhaou as vested with the superior and authoritative character for the regulation of your intercourse with them, he declined giving me an explicit answer by saying he would let me know after he had weighed the matter; but as I have not heard from him since on the subject, it appears to me that he means to leave this delicate point in suspense, thereby avoiding dissatisfaction to either of the parties and preserving the principle of (*Divide et impera*) which is one of the most favorite maxims of the policy of this Court; the consequence however on the present occasion must be embarrassing to your Lordship which I have signified to the Minister.

Behro Punt has communicated to me that the Durbar has assented to increase the former offer of 40,000 Rs. to 60,000 as a donation to the detachment of the Company's forces that assisted in the reduction of Dharwar, which I have made known to Major Sartorius.

I am in most anxious expectation of intelligence of your Lordship's army as 29 days have now elapsed since the action of the 15 ulto. which put your Lordship in possession of the important post of Kurreekutl and as I presume the communication between this and Puttan is pretty secure by establishment of the Mahratta posts in the whole intermediate country.

No. 331—Gunjycotah surrenders and it is decided to send a portion of the army against Gooty and the rest including Read's Detachment against Gurramconda.

FROM—CAPT. KENNAWAY,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Paungal, 15th June 1791.*

I had the pleasure however to understand by private accounts as well as by letters from Teidge Wunt to the minister that your junction with the Maharatta army had taken place and that your difficulties on account of forage and provisions had thereby been considerably relieved.

I desired Meer Abul Cassim to learn the Nizam's pleasure when he would chose to receive your Lordship's letters and requested him to send the one directed to himself to his Highness without delay and procure my being favored with a perusal of it. It was sent to me accordingly the next morning with information that the Nizam would see me in the evening and that Gunjycotah had surrendered the 12th instant. Meer Abul Cassim added that in consequence of Gunjycotah having been delivered up there would now be no occasion to send for the guns, mortars or ammunition from Innacoonda as, for the siege of Curramcoonda they could, with your Lordship's permission, with greater facility be supplied from Bangalore.

At the Nizam's desire I dispatched on the 13th instant instructions to Lieut. Coupland to return with his escort and the treasure to Gunjycotah from whence the Minister informs me it will be dispatched by the direct route leading to Camp.

I waited on the Nizam yesterday evening. He informed me it was his intention to depute Meer Abul Cassim to your Lordship, and that he would be accompanied by a party of four or five thousand horse to replace those which had left you, that he should also send your Lordship some of his artillery, bullocks, to recruit a proportion of your late heavy casualties of cattle, that he intended to detach part of the force at Gunjycotah against Gooty, and the remainder including Captain Read's Detachment against Gurramcoonda. In respect to the latter he desired I would address your Lordship about heavy guns, ammunition, etc., which I said I would do, but that it would be impossible for you to furnish what was necessary, unless his Highness could send the cattle that would be requisite for transporting them. The minister asked me my opinion of the determination to depute Meer Abul Cassim. I told him I thought there would be no harm in his preparing for the journey, but that I could not give an opinion on the subject till I was acquainted with your Lordship's Commands contained in the missing letter. I expressed the sense you would entertain of his Highness's intention to assist you with draft cattle and urged the necessity of grain bullocks

being also sent for the use of his own army which he said should be done. I took no notice of what had been said concerning the four or five thousand horse. But your Lordship may be assured I shall hesitate exceedingly before I encourage any more being sent.

**No. 332**—Substance of conversations between the Governor General and Mahratta Chiefs noted down by the Persian Interpreter.

*20th June 1791.*

Summary of a long controversy that took place between Cornwallis G. G. and the Mahratta Chiefs regarding the disposition of their armies during the rainy season; various plans were discussed at the end of which the plan of separation was rejected and the decision of staying together was arrived at.

The interview between Lord Cornwallis and the Mahratta Chiefs, Hurry Punt and Prusaram happened on the 29th May. In an early conversation with them his Lordship assured them of his determination to carry on the war or to obtain an honourable and advantageous peace for the general confederacy. To this they declared their resolution conformable. His Lordship in discussing the plan to carry into execution this determination mutually made, stated to the chiefs the situation of his army and the mode by which it would be enabled to prepare itself for such effective operations at the close of the rains as the general plan might render necessary. This mode leads to the movements of the army to the eastward—the chiefs represented that by the progress their armies had made towards the junction, their expectations were from a northerly road, viz., that leading to Sera. From this position of opinion relative to the preparations for future operations, there appeared to be a difference so wide as to render some intermediate proposal absolutely necessary. The object in view with the English army was to refit in a manner in which the Mahratta Chiefs could furnish no assistance, that with the Mahratta army was subsistence during the period, that not only the English required for their object, but the season also rendered necessary to be got over, before effective operations could commence. These were the objects suggested by both parties in a conversation which took place between Lord Cornwallis, Hurry Punt and Parsuram Bhow on the 19th June. In this conversation it was declared by the Mahratta Chiefs that their object could not be obtained unless the armies moved to the Sera road and they fixed on a place called Currup; His Lordship declared that this end could not be answered unless the direction taken by the armies be that leading towards Bangalore. The directions of both were widely different, lying one northerly, the other easterly and it was agreed that I should meet an assembly of the Mahratta Chiefs on this day to enter

into the particular merits of both suggestions and inform myself of those on the part of the Mahratta Chiefs for his Lordship's sentiments on the practicability of adhering to either or to devise an intermediate. The result of my deputation was a declaration on the part of the Mahratta Chiefs that their object was the first to be effected and consequently the movement of the armies to corrupt. But as this was indirect opposition to Lord Cornwallis's object it was agreed that a meeting should be held on the next day 21st June 1791. The meeting between Lord Cornwallis, Hurry Punt and Parsuram Bhow took place this day. Lord Cornwallis began by stating in general terms the impossibility, either for the preservation of the English army or for success in future operations of complying with the wish entertained by the Mahratta Chiefs to march to Currup the particulars of which are fully laid down in his letter to Hurry Punt written on the 11th June. On the other hand the Mahratta Chiefs represented that by a compliance with his Lordship's proposal their resources would be destroyed. In short Lord Cornwallis and the Mahratta Chiefs thought it necessary to adhere each to his own plan. But as such an adherence each to his own object which were so wide of each other as to require a separation of their respective armies was impracticable, without separation the mode and the effects of it were the next subjects for discussion. During this conversation a variety of alternative were suggested by both parties. His Lordship remarked that the object wanted by the Mahratta Chiefs might be obtained by a Detachment to the station to which they wished the whole army might go and during the employment of this Detachment the army might take the direction towards Bangalore as originally proposed by him. The Mahratta Chiefs replied in the negative as to the possibility of obtaining their object by a Detachment and persisted in the necessity of the march of the whole army to Currup, there to remain for a certain time and then to follow the line drawn by Lord Cornwallis. They proposed as an alternative that the combined armies should march in an intermediate direction to occupy the period of a month in possessing such places as would enable them to establish a new road of communication from Sera towards Bangalore and to benefit by that from Sera to Seringapatam until the month should expire or their new communication be effected. To this His Lordship objected on the plea of the length of time. Thus on both sides alternatives being rejected, the separation, though declared impolitic in the grand scale of the war and imprudent in the detail of carrying the war on, was left, and only from being without resource was it admitted to discussion. The Mahratta Chiefs requested in case of separation to be furnished with a body of infantry from the English army and proposed that with it they would fall back to Sera and His Lordship would march to Bangalore, employ his time in effecting his desired objects and at the recommencement of the season for operation, the junction of the two armies might be effected in such manner as should be determined

on. The offer was declined by Lord Cornwallis who represented that as the refitment of the English army was absolutely necessary in order for effectual operations against Seringapatam, it was most probable that the enemy would endeavor to prevent such refitment; and as the enemy had since the commencement of the war judged it expedient to watch and harrass the English army without paying any attention to the troops of the allies, there was no reason to suppose that he would now alter that plan to attack the Mahratta armies especially as the object sought for by the English army was the only one that could bring real danger on this capital if effected; that therefore he neither saw the necessity for furnishing the Mahratta army with infantry, nor could he do it, and hope to bring up his convoys or keep the Carnatic free from the enemy's horse; that the infantry requested by the Mahrattas having been in the field with the rest of his army were equally in want of every refitment and on this account also he could not comply with the request made by them. Thus situated nothing remained but the separation of the two armies in the manner in which they had joined and thus to wait the return of the season for recommencing effective hostilities. To this both parties were averse, first from the outward appearance of a separation which would naturally revive the hopes of the enemy or give him room to suspect differences secondly because the Mahratta Chiefs by supposing that Tippoo would attack the weakest (which they considered themselves to be) avowedly declared their fears for their own safety even at Sera and thirdly because Lord Cornwallis, who was convinced that the enemy would endeavour to thwart that power which when refitted would materially threaten his capital, foresaw the difficulties he should have to encounter in bringing up his stores and other preparations but notwithstanding these difficulties and political objections, His Lordship was determined to the separation and refusal of furnishing the infantry required by the Mahratta Chiefs rather than a compliance with their wish of marching to Currup which could not fail of little less than destruction to the English army. The separation seemed to be more feared by the Mahratta Chiefs whatever may have been the cause. They proposed that if, as His Lordship had surmised, the enemy should follow the English army during the separation they would move to its assistance and as a measure necessary for the general success, sacrifice their own object and follow the enemy but still urged their request for infantry. This could not be complied with on the part of Lord Cornwallis consistent with his first refusal and the Mahratta Chiefs, all alternatives having been rejected, declared their willingness to accompany Lord Cornwallis and to pursue his original plan provided his Lordship would grant two points, the first (founded on the sacrifice they should then make of their communication via Sera) was assistance in money for the pay of their troops; the second a few days to withdraw their garrisons stationed in that communication. The amount of the first was fixed at 12 lacks to be lent them within two months to

be repaid by the Poona Government at Bombay, to be advanced them in case they stood in need of it and the second confined to three or four days to be passed in the vicinity to Hebboor, a place intermediate between Currup, their original station, and the road towards Shevagunga, His Lordship's primitive route. To prevent the separation was declared by both as highly necessary, to be accompanied by the Maharatta army was considered by Lord Cornwallis as highly advantageous. The points urged by the Maharatta Chiefs were acceded to, the future movements of the combined armies were resolved in conjunction with which the march of the armies for tomorrow was determined in the direction towards Hebboor.

### No. 333.

FROM—TIPPOO SULTAN,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*24th June 1791 (received 12th July 1791).*

In order to increase the friendship and good understanding with the English Company, the Nawab Asoph Jah and Seremunt Pundit Purdhaun, Mapoje Ram is sent on the part of the Ahmudy Sircar. It is incumbent on our ancient intimacy that the three powers should admit him and act in such manner as shall add strength to the friendship and connection between the Sirkars abovementioned which will tend to the peace and happiness of mankind.

**No. 334.**—On the receipt of the intelligence of Tejwant's being corrupted by Tipu, the Nizam decides to send his son and the minister to the army.

FROM—CAPT. KENNAWAY,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Paungal, 29th June 1791.*

I will not attempt to express my concern at the conduct of Rajah Tiedge Wunt and the cavalry under his command as set forth in the above letter (31st ulto.) I thought however my time might be more usefully employed in bringing the Nizam if possible to adopt such measures as were likely to guard against similar misconduct and be applicable to the present situation of affairs than in making unavailing complaints of what had past; and to this object my attention has been confined in the daily communications I have had on the subject with Meer Allum the minister and the Nizam since your Lordship's letter has been in my possession.

To attain the above and I deemed it necessary along with your Lordship's correspondence with Tippoo to submit to the Nizam and the minister the copies of your letters to Teidge Wunt which accompanied it and to add that although your Lordship was disposed to acquit the principal commanders of having been corrupted by Tippoo and to do every justice to the zeal of his Highness and the goodness of his intention in sending such a body of forces to co-operate with you yet that you found it difficult to account for their conduct on any other principle than secret correspondence with the enemy and that the fact, a remour of which even this place is not free from was generally credited throughout over army, that thus circumstanced it behoved his Highness to take such decisive steps as would wipe of the stain which had been brought on his arms and credit of his Government from this or whatever cause it had originated which I did not think he could effectually do but by deputing an officer of rank and considerations to take the command and that I knew of none but the minister that was adapted for it; that several considerations concurred to establish the policy of the measure and the necessity of his presence with your Lordship at this junction, which it would be necessary to enumerate and that I thought, without permitting the rains to be any obstruction, it should be adopted without delay.

Several objections were urged against the (minister's) proceeding, the most weighty of which referred to the season of the year; promises were added that he would certainly join your Lordship after the rains were over and it was asserted that Meer Allum's being deputed would in the meantime answer every purpose: to which I replied that as the rains would not prevent your Lordship and the Mahratta army from keeping the field and carrying on your operations they certainly ought not to stand in the way of a journey which from the manner it could be prosecuted in, deserved no other appellation than a party of pleasure, that Meer Allum's commission would be confined to negotiation and could neither extend to military command nor compass other necessary objects, that whatever remained to be done relating to the war would in all human probability be effected before or immediately after the breaking up of the monsoon so that if the journey was to be deferred till the season changed, the chief advantages to be expected from it would be lost.

Meer Allum had from the first agreed with me in the necessity of the minister's going and of his being the only proper person that could be sent. On the evening of the 22nd he acquainted me that the minister began to be of the same opinion, that he (the minister) thought it would be necessary that one of the Nizam's sons should accompany him and that I ought also to be of the party. I expressed my satisfaction at the first of his information; to the last I made no reply. The next morning I received a note from him intimating that the Nizam was desirous of seeing me in the evening and that he would call on me previous to my setting out for the Durbar. He came accordingly and acquainted me



it had been determined that the minister should proceed and take with him the Nizam's second son Secunder Jah, provided the following three points could be first adjusted. 1st that the prince should be received with the attention due to his rank, 2ndly that no negotiation between your Lordship and Tippoo should be adjusted till the Minister's arrival and 3rdly that I should also proceed. I satisfied him that there could be no hesitation about the 1st and 2nd but that as your Lordship's dependence for the support of the company's interests here, chiefly rested on the minister himself and me, it would be very unadvisable for us all to be absent and that I could not without a very urgent reason indeed quit my station without your Lordship's permission the justness of which he seemed to be perfectly satisfied of.

In the interview which followed with the Nizam, His Highness dwelt at great length on the firmness and candor with which he had conducted himself from the commencement of the confederacy to the present time and on the great advantage which the zeal he had shown in the cause of the war had been of, that nothing would now induce him to relax; of which his having it in contemplation to send his minister and one of his sons to your Lordship was a convincing proof, that he hoped your Lordship would not allow your ardour to be damped by the necessity you had been reduced to of foregoing your designs against Seringapatam and destroying your heavy guns since these were accidents inseparable from war. Meer Allum he said would set out from hence about the 8th of July. He desired I would inform your Lordship of these particulars and obtain your answer to the three points which had been mentioned to me by Meer Allum as necessary to be adjusted in respect to his sons and the minister's journey; adding that if they should proceed Captain Read's corps would make part of the Detachment that would be formed to accompany them.

In reply to the hopes he expressed of your not allowing your ardour to be damped I thought it sufficient to give him the assurance contained in your Lordship's commands of the 31st ultimo. In respect to the three points allowed to I observed that when your Lordship had never been wanting in attention to any of his Officers you had concern with what room was there to suppose you would be deficient in regard to personages of such superior rank; that he had it under your Lordship's hand that any negotiation in consequence of the late correspondence with Tippoo rested on the arrival of the Deputy you had desired might be sent to attend at the congress which the above correspondence might eventually lead to, that with regard to my proceeding (on which he seemed to lay some stress with what sincerity it would not be easy to determine) I would inform your Lordship of what had passed concerning it when if you approved of his wishes you would devise such means as would enable you to call me to you and at the same time provide against the inconvenience which might result from my station being left vacant, a contingency

which I could not expose it to without very sufficient reason but at your Lordship's express command I have the pleasure to add that my replies appeared to be satisfactorily received.

I am sorry to acquaint your Lordship that notwithstanding the Minister's prohibition to Malek Essan respecting Tippoo's Vakeel Mehed Ali Khan he has been suffered by that Officer on very insufficient reasons to advance and is now only five coss distant from this place. The Minister asked my advice what steps should be taken with him, desiring I would place my Hirkaras over him on his arrival, that I might be satisfied no improper communication would be held with him. I replied I was satisfied none would take place but consistency required that he should be directed to send the letters he mentions being charged with from Tippoo and depart from the place where he now is, without advancing a step farther as it would already be extremely difficult to reconcile his having been allowed to come on so far with the vouchers and assurances which I had been furnished with, in regard to the manner his application to be permitted to attend the Nizam was said to have been answered.

account of your having been obliged to destroy those you had taken with you to Seringapatam I had before taken an opportunity of pointing out to them : on the 27th I received a message from the Minister the drift of which was to establish the insufficiency of the objections I had started and to persuade me into a belief that the appearance of the detachment before the Fort would induce it to surrender ; it was added that it would not at any rate have to remain before the place long and as Gurramcoondah lay on the road from Gunjycotah to Serah where it would be directed to join, no time would be lost by its proceedings against it ; to this message I have not as yet given any answer.

I have the honour to enclose answers from the Nizam, the Minister and Meer Allum to your Lordship's letters in which His Highness' determination to send his son and the Minister to your Lordship and that they will set off about the latter end of next month is pretty decidedly expressed. It may be necessary, however, to inform your Lordship that you may know what degree of reliance to place on it, that the intention in the first draft of the letter was couched in such doubtful terms that I advised them either to be more explicit or omit saying anything on the subject. The Nizam's resolution to send by Meer Allum a thousand of his artillery bullocks was also inserted in the letter at my desire, but even with this pledge I do not conceive much dependance on the number or goodness of what may be sent, although I have received assurances from Meer Allum that the Minister will examine them himself and that it is in contemplation to increase the number to two thousand.

In consequence of the remonstrance Mehdey Ali Khan has been forbidden to advance to Paangul.

Assud Ali Khan who arrived the 26th instant has been coldly received. The Minister, Meer Allum yesterday informed me, upbraided him with the conduct of the Nizam's cavalry and informed him of the reports he had heard of the Leader's having been corrupted by Tippoo : though he declared his own innocence, he acknowledged his and Teidge Wunt's having received letters from Tippoo through a Fakeer who resides as a spy in your Lordship's camp containing offers which he had rejected and that he was ready to produce the letters which had passed, he said he had proposed to Tiedge Wunt to put the messenger to death and make the matter public which Teidge Wunt had declined. Meer Allum added that the Nizam was exceedingly distressed at the reports which prevailed but did not like to punish Teidge Wunt or Assud Ali Khan till proof could be brought home to them : to which I replied that their having corresponded with the enemy without reporting it to your Lordship or the Nizam and their being privy to an emissary of his being in your camp for corrupt purposes without giving your Lordship instant information of it amounted in my mind to a proof of guilt deserving the most exemplary punishment, even though it should appear on further enquiry that they had not actually taken bribes. I expressed my uneasiness

at Tiedge Wunt being allowed to remain in the situation he was in with such appearances against him, and desired he might be directed immediately to discover to your Lordship the emissary that was employed that he might be secured and punished. Meer Allum replied that this mode would not answer as Tiedge Wunt would probably deny his knowing anything of the matter and there was a difficulty in applying the proper remedy—taking from him the command, it appearing that Mahomed Ameen Arab and other Sirdars had been equally concerned in what had past, but that he would immediately concert with the Minister such measures as would be necessary to enable your Lordship to lay hold of him: he said the Nizam was very uneasy lest your Lordship should attach less merit to the zeal he had shown in the course of the war than you otherwise would have done, on account of the untoward causes which had operated to prevent your deriving that assistance from his cavalry which they were sent to afford. I told him, His Highness might be perfectly easy on this head since as I had verbally assured him. Your Lordship gave him every credit for his intentions and ascribed your disappointment chiefly to the want of a proper person to command the troops that had been sent. Meer Allum soon took his leave and has informed me this morning by a note that it was determined one of Assud Ali Khan's followers who knew the emissary above mentioned, should be dispatched to your Lordship on an express camel for the purpose of pointing him out to you, if he was still in Camp.

No. 335.—Malet requests Nana Fadnis to send a Vakil to the proposed Congress and suggests to the Governor General the necessity of the utmost preparation for the reduction of Tipu.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 30th June 1791.*

I had an interview with the Minister in the evening and delivered to him your Lordship's letters from the Peshwa and him, desired that he would lose no time in complying with your Lordship's wish of sending Vackeels to form the Congress at Bangalore. But tho' as your Lordship will have learnt from my two last addresses he had received from Hurry Punt copies of your Lordship's correspondence with Tippoo and of your letters to the Peshwa and himself, so long before hand as to have enabled him to come to a deliberate decision on your proposal, yet on my pressing him for an answer, he desired further time to consider the subject after which he would communicate it to me through Behro Punt from whom however I have not yet received it.

At this meeting the Minister told me that your Lordship had paid Hurry Punt a visit, that Hurry Punt had replied to Tippoo's letter in the manner advised by your Lordship and that Tippoo's having encamped at Matee Talou was not positively ascertained.

I have some reason to think that this Government has written to Nizam Aally Khan to increase his equipments in the idea that whatever professions Tippoo may make, the most vigorous measures on the part of the allies will be necessary to enforce their executions. In like manner permit me to suggest to your Lordship that should you still have designs on the enemy's Capital, the present season admits of the necessary preparations being made at leisure by ordering the requisite stores, should not a sufficient quantity be procurable from Bangalore, from Bombay, which may I believe be landed at Cannanore in August, at which place likewise a sufficient quantity of rice might be ordered from Bengah. While the salt, provisions that have, I understand, been lately received at Madras from Europe in the supposition of a war with Spain might, I presume, be sent to the same place for the supply of the European part of the army and as to bullocks draft and pack, I conceive any number may be provided in the Mahratta army and from the country by the time the stores above mentioned are collected, in conveying which up the ghauts as well as in the previous and subsequent services of the war the utmost exertions of the Raja of Travancore and the other Mallabar Princes might be reasonably insisted on particularly on the part of the Raja of Travancore by increasing the force in Coimbatore and of the Nairs and Coorgs in keeping open the Periaputtun Ghaut and if possible distressing the enemy by the occasional incursions and alarms from that quarter.

No. 336.

FROM—CAPT. KENNAWAY,

TO—C. W. MALET.

*Paungal, 30th June 1791.*

In reply to the question proposed in your letter of the 20th concerning the mode observed by the Durbar in paying Captain Read's Detachment, I have the pleasure to inform you that an order for 3,400 rupees on account of it is regularly granted me about the 15th of every Mahommedan month, the expences of the Detachment increasing in consequence of its late march from Kopul to Gunjycotah. I applied for 16,000 rupees in addition to the regular monthly advance on account of near two months' arrears now due at the rate of Lord Cornwallis's agreement, which after some hesitation was complied with.

## SECTION 7

*Fourth stage of the War: Cornwallis renews campaign and captures many forts on the way (July—December 1791)*

No. 337—Kennaway submits a description of Tipu's spy disguised as a faqir and communicates to G. G. the reluctance of the Nizam's Govt. to take any step against the chiefs of his army.

FROM—CAPT. KENNAWAY,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Paungal, 2nd July 1791.*

Letter I acquainted your Lordship of what has passed relative to an emissary of the enemy's being resident in your camp; in reply to the mode proposed by the minister for securing him as therein stated. I observed that if Assud Ali Khan had been really guilty of any unreasonable practices, the follower he was to send would probably be secretly directed to warn the spy of his danger and that I therefore requested I might be enabled to describe him to your Lordship by letter: in consequence of which the following description agreeably to a written report of Assud Ali Khan was on the morning of the 1st instant sent to me viz., he is an Afghan who calls himself Kyser Khan and resides in the English cavalry lines. He is disguised as a Fakeer with a long beard, wearing a sort of buckdust coloured lung or cloth about his waist and a duputta or cloth of the same die, and some times a handkerchief about his head. The minister has sent, Meer Allum informs me, a man who is acquainted with his person to Tiedge Wunt with directions to secure him and a denunciation of responsibility should he allow him to escape.

• In reply to the opinion I expressed of the delinquency of the Nizam's Sardars, in having had any communication with Tippoo without reporting it to your Lordship or the Nizam, even supposing they had not taken money which I was ready to acquit them of, the minister answered that Assud Ali Khan asserted it had been reported to the Nizam more than once, but that the letters with many others must have miscarried: that he (Assud Ali Khan) asserted his innocence and that of the other chiefs in the most solemn manner of their ever having had a treacherous thought

which the minister added he thought might be true from their conduct in the battle of the 15th May and that at any rate it would not be advisable as the charge extended to so many, to take any steps in it without the utmost circumspection at the present critical juncture.

In my last letter I informed your Lordship of the minister's reply to my representation concerning the propriety of Captain Read's detachment remaining for the present at Gunjycotah, in answer to which I acquainted him that the Detachment would undoubtedly be ready to proceed against Curremcoonda as desired whenever the Nizam chose to give the necessary orders but that my objections to the measure still existed, as they would always do, against this corps being detached against any place, though the season of the year and its situation with respect to cliemat should be unexceptionable, till I saw that the necessary exertions had been made on His Highness's part to furnish it with the apparatus necessary to effect the service it might be sent to me, that on reconsidering the matter it had been determined the Detachment should remain where it was till it was wanted to proceed to your Lordship with the Nizam's son and the minister.

On Mehdey Ali Khan's being forbidden to come on to Paangul, he sent on the letters with which he was charged from Tippoo consisting of an Arzee to the Nizam letters to the minister and Meer Allum and one to the latter and to the minister from Meer Zincul Abdeeri, a brother of Meer Alums in Tippoo's service. I hope to transmit to your Lordship by my next dispatch copies of the answers from the Nizam which I have recommended should be confined to referring Tippoo for any thing he had to propose, to the congress about to assemble at Bangalore.

**No. 338**—Cornwallis discloses the plan of the next campaign against Tipu, and in view of the separation of a portion of the army that goes to Sera, G. G. advises H. Pant and P. Bhao to execute the plan agreed upon with steadiness and not to fritter away their resources in subordinate schemes and desultory enterprises.

*Memorandum of the substance of remarks made by the Governor General to Hurry Punt Taulea and Parsuram Bhow, 2nd July 1791.*

You will, I am persuaded, not think it extraordinary that I was exceedingly surprised at the propositions that were made by you at our last conference. For it would be impossible for the forces of the confederates and particularly the armies now assembled to act with efficacy against the common enemy, if either of us should think ourselves at liberty to engage without any change of circumstances in separate scheme and enterprises which totally counteracted general plans of operations that after full discussion had been deliberately adopted.

I desire that you will examine the line of conduct that I have uniformly observed since the commencement of the war and I am convinced that you will clearly see and be ready to acknowledge that I have in on instance whatever neglected the interests of the allies, but on the contrary that I have never failed in paying an equally strict attention to them as to

those of the state with the care of whose affairs I am entrusted. And I must likewise request that you will advert to the great difference of circumstances under which the three members of the confederacy have hitherto carried on the war. Our armies have gained several brilliant advantages over the enemy and have done him infinite mischief by weakening his power and distroying his resources, but as he has constantly employed his whole force in the field against us, the district that we have acquired have in general been so totally ruined by the two armies from their having been the seat of war, that we have derived but little advantage from them, whilst at the same time we have suffered great loss in our own revenues by the ravage and devastation which Tippoo committed last season in the Carnatic, and by these means the enormous expences of the war have hitherto been almost entirely defrayed by money taken directly from our own treasuries.

On the other hand the armies of the Peshwah and the Nizam having met with no enemy to oppose them in the field have had an opportunity to reduce without much difficulty extensive tracts of the most valuable parts of the enemy's dominions from which they have not only raised large contributions but actually collect at present considerable revenues.

I beg however to be understood that far from grudging those advantages to our allies, I have been highly gratified by their having obtained them at the expense of the common enemy, and that by stating them at present my design is only to show that I shall have strong and just grounds to complain if allies should after having already profited so much from the operations of our army and contrary to the tenor of the treaty now decline to take a full share with this army in the danger, inconvenience and expence that may become necessary to bring the war to an honourable conclusion.

I sent directions a few weeks ago to the Madras Government to provide near thirty thousand draught and carriage bullocks in addition to those at present with the army for the purpose of conveying a sufficient quantity of provisions, artillery and military stores when the season will admit of our proceeding against Seringapatam which I have been assured will be punctually executed, and the Government at home having sent me reinforcements of Europeans and every other kind of support, even beyond my expectations, I shall be able to make such preparations in the course of the next three months, as I imagine would put it out of the power of Tippoo's whole force to prevent the troops under my own immediate command alone from taking his capital. But the execution of the enterprise will be much more easy and the effects of success will be more immediate as well as more extensive and solid, if I should meet with the co-operation and support on which I think I have a right to depend, from the Peshwa's forces.

Upon the supposition that I shall not be disappointed in that expectation my plans is that. as soon as the Cavery is fordable, we should form an



army on each side of that river and of such strength that each of these armies should be an overmatch for the remains of Tippoo's forces which have already been so frequently failed and beaten, that both armies should approach Seringapatam about the same time which would reduce Tippoo to the necessity of coming to one of these following decisions—1st to risk an action with one of our armies—2nd to quit the place and neighbourhood of it with his army leaving only a strong garrison in it, 3rd to throw himself and his whole army into the fort and island and stake his fortune and person upon the issue of our attack. By adopting the first resolution I am persuaded that he would suffer another defeat. By the 2nd that we should take the place without much difficulty and that he would become a vagabond with a small and dispirited army without magazines as revenues to support it and by the third that his power would infallibly be completely and speedily destroyed.

The army which is now acting under my immediate command with part of your cavalry would mutually form one of the armies that I have mentioned and provided you will send the largest portion of the cavalry with the three Bombay Battalions to the other side of the river, I shall take care that General Abercromby shall be ready to join that corps with a force that will constitute such another army as I have abovementioned.

My next earnest attention will also be engaged to open sources of supplies of provisions for all those forces, large quantities may be carried with and your own bunjarries will continue to assist your wants by the means of the communications which you have established in your rear. But I shall likewise give directions that the magazines in the southern provinces and at Tellicherry shall be amply provided and that every means shall be taken to forward grain to us from these places, by the Guzul huthy, Caveriporam and Coorga gauts.

I have already declared in my letter addressed to Hurry Punt and I am still of the same opinion that if Tippoo does not submit to the terms of peace that the confederates think they have a right to enforce upon him, the forces under our command are perfectly sufficient to annihilate his power, soon after the rivers shall subside provided that we concert our plans with prudence and execute them with steadiness. But if we allow ourselves to be drawn off by temporary views and subordinate schemes, if we do not even endanger the ultimate success of our main enterprizes, we shall certainly greatly increase our difficulties in the accomplishment of them.

It was from an apprehension of the evil consequences of departing lightly and without sufficient cause from plans which had been agreed upon and arranged that I expressed as much concern at the proposition that was made at our last meeting and that I desired time to reflect maturely on the proposal that was afterwards made to me through Buchajee Pundit. This latter does not differ much in substance although there is not the

same connection of plan from what I proposed in my letter to Hurry Punt for the convenience of drawing supplies for a few months from our own magazines as well as from the enemy's country, and consequently I shall not now object to it under an assurance that the officers who is to command in the Sera country will not suffer his attention to be so much diverted by light and unimportant designs, from the principal object of the war as not to be in perfect readiness to take his share when called upon in the general plan of cooperation.

A very small body of infantry must be sufficient for the part of the army that goes to Sera because there are in that country no posts occupied by the enemy except a few hill forts that could not be taken by force even by a large corps of infantry without great difficulty and considerable loss and whose garrisons are too small and contemptible to occasion much inconvenience to a large body of cavalry, and because there can be no reason to apprehend that Tippoo would venture to go with infantry and guns against such a Detachment, as the distance is as great that the armies which will be stationed near Oussore would have it in their power to move behind him and cut off his communication or perhaps his retreat to Seringapatam.

From every account that I have received of the countries which I mentioned to you in our former conference as being well calculated to furnish forage and grain for your numerous cavalry I have the greatest reason to believe that they are perfectly capable of supplying you plentifully with both those articles provided you could restrain your troops and followers from wantonly destroying them. It has not been my intention to attempt to make any settlement in those countries on account of the company, but on the contrary to leave them entirely to your discretion, and by occupying certain parts in the passes, with infantry I think I can render it impossible for the enemy to send any Detachment from his army which could give your parties any material disturbance.

I have been particularly attentive to the plan of your procuring dry grain from the Buramaul and Salem districts, as I am well aware that it would not be convenient to your trooper to be obliged for so long a time, to have recourse to the buzar for the supply of every article of provision for themselves and their horses, but in aid of what they may be able to procure from the enemy's country I will engage that the Carnatic shall be open to your Banjarries, and that they may obtain the necessary supplies for your army there at the most reasonable prices.

**No. 339**—Malet expresses his strong sense of disgust and indignation towards the Mahratta Court for not communicating to him any advices from the army, especially for their reserve with regard to G. G.'s proposal of a congress.

FROM—C. W. MALET,  
TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 8th July 1791.*

I have been in anxious expectation of an answer to your Lordship's letters to this Court of the 31st May and of the communication of its

determination on your Lordship's proposal of assembling a Congress of the delegates of the allies and the enemy at Bangalore, but hitherto the Minister has not thought proper to enable me to make any positive communication to your Lordship on the subject, tho' certainly the long interval that has elapsed since his receipt of your Lordship's correspondence with Tippo, and of your last letters to himself and the Peshwa ought to have enabled him to favor me with an answer on points of so great urgency and on which your Lordship will naturally expect the earliest and most unreserved communication, a due sense of which I have endeavored to enforce by recalling to his memory the late extraordinary tardiness of this Court's military operations to which might be wholly imputed the check in the prosperous affairs of the Confederacy, when instead of blockading the enemy in his capital after defeating him in the field, which would certainly have been effected had the Mahratta armies joined your Lordship and General Abercromby, as had been promised, thereby forming two armies equal to keep the field to the North and to the South of the Cauvery, you had by their late arrival 10 days after the enemy's defeat been so totally disappointed of reaping the advantages that had been gained that in the interim you had been forced to destroy your guns and come to the resolution of returning to Bangalore. Yet notwithstanding the infinite detriment thus incurred to the alliance by their failure in engagements, your Lordship so far from making such conduct a subject of complaint or dissatisfaction, had, in your usual goodness and candor, exculpated the Chieftains concerned, and, in the hope that the expression of it to this Court would by so unequivocal an instance of your generosity, insure future exertion and equal ingenuousness from this quarter, had expressed your approbation of the conduct of Hari Pant and Parsharam Bhau in your public letters to the Peshwa and his Minister and in the total unreserve of your personal intercourse with H. P. had endeavored to lead this Court into a similar observance of the most confidential cordiality. What then would be your Lordship's surprise when, added to the delays of which you had already so much reason to complain in military cooperation, you found equal reserve and evasion to a coincidence in your proposals for negotiation, notwithstanding my assurances founded on your Lordship's dispatch of 31 May that nothing should interrupt your vigorous prosecution of the war to an honorable and advantageous issue for the alliance. Surely such conduct, even to a common observer would carry the appearance of an intention rather to protract than to terminate the present war, and were the delay continued much longer, might (after your Lordship's intimation to Tippo that you had invited the delegates of the allies to a Congress) convey ideas to that Prince detrimental to the consistency of the Confederacy.

Notwithstanding the warmth and importunity with which I have urged this language, I have hitherto received nothing satisfactory or

conclusive in reply, tho' Behro P. with a proviso of its being from himself has assured me with desultory hints and suggestions at one time of the Peshwa's moving toward to scene of action in person, at another of his (B. P.'s) proceeding to the Congress, and in either case of the necessity of my moving also, but all in so loose and unauthoritative a style as rather to persuade me of the Durbar's being engaged in the settlement of some previous arrangements or of its being in a state of doubt and hesitation as to accession to your Lordship's proposal of a Congress than to furnish ground for any satisfactory communication to your Lordship.

During this interval of suspense I have some reason to complain of the Minister's reserve in not communicating to me the substance of his advices from the army which are frequent and quick in their progress by which means I am totally in the dark as to every thing that has happened since the 3rd May; nor has the Minister thought proper to favor me with a sight of the correspondence between Tippoo and Hurry Punt mentioned in my last address.

I am just favored with a letter from Capt. Kennaway of the 30th from which I am happy to learn that His Highness the Nabob's acquiescence in your Lordship's proposal of a Congress has been less equivocal than this Court's on whose councils I hope His Highness's conduct will have a good effect, and trust that Capt. K.'s instances relative to the dismissal of Mehedally Khan from the place to which he had advanced, will be attended with the success they deserve and which I conceive to be necessary to that union of councils so indispensably requisite to the preservation of the consistency of the Confederacy, in the prosecution of which important object I hope His Highness the Nabob will have no objection to submit to your Lordship all the illicit correspondence that seems to have passed between the enemy and the Chiefs of his troops, in which there will probably be discovered some connexion with the mission of Mehedally Khan and which is so much in the genius of this people that I humbly presume your Lordship will have occasion for all your power, all your rectitude and all your circumspection to guide you successfully through that labyrinth of intrigue and interested views in which the art of the enemy and the allies will be industriously exerted to involve all futile negotiations.

**No. 340**—Malet makes a masterly survey of the progress of the Governor General, and comparing it with the tardiness and indecision of the Mahratta Chiefs, urges compliance by the Durbar with the G. G.'s requisition for a delegate to be sent to the Congress at Bangalore.

FROM—C. W. MALET.

*9th July 1791.*

Recapitulation of arguments previously urged to the Durbar, communicated to Behro Punt by my (Malet's) Vackeel and taken by Behro Punt in writing for communication to the Durbar.

The equality of exertion prescribed by the terms of the Confederacy is well known notwithstanding which the whole stress of the war since

its commencement has fallen on the Company. After long combating the efforts of the enemy below the Ghauts, the Gov. Genl. agreeable to specific engagements of cooperation with this State penetrated the Balla Ghaut and tho' not joined by Hurry Punt who had marched hence for that purpose, proceeded to the attack of the strong fortress of Bangalore which he conquered singly in the face of the enemy's whole force collected to obstruct his operations. Having after this great event effected a junction with the Nabob's Cavalry tho' with great labor and loss of time, he proceeded to cover the junction of a convey of provisions from Amboor and having effected that also in spite of all the efforts of the enemy, he returned to Bangalore. But notwithstanding the time necessarily employed in these operations with which Hari Pt. was acquainted and tho' there was no enemy to oppose their progress, neither Hari Pt. nor his son detached professedly for that purpose joined the Gov. Genl. who having drawn out his heavy artillery from Bangalore, next proceeded to Seringputtun which H. Pt. was previously advised but tho' the march from the nature of his Lordship's equipment was necessarily slow he was not joined in the course of it by any body of Mahratta horse. Nevertheless, on approaching the enemy's Capital he attacked and totally defeated the enemy's whole army strongly posted to cover it. This victory might have been rendered decisive had the Mahratta cavalry been present.

Long before this General Abercromby had ascended the Periaputtun pass and was in anxious expectation of the advance and junction of Parsuram Bhao agreeable to a plan that had been concerted with me by this Govt. and adopted at the particular desire of Parsuram in preference to his joining H. P. From my confidence in the execution of this Plan I had a great expense provided a great number of cattle and countermanded Capt. Riddel (then on his march to Bombay) to join Genl. Abercromby. But to my great disappointment the Bhao did not perform his engagements, had Genl. Abercromby been joined by Bhao, the combined force including the Bombay Detachment of 3 battalions and a Company of artillery in Bhaou's army would have been equal to Tippoo's whole force and by taking post to the South of the Cauveri between Puttun and Gudurhutti, thereby covering the Carnatic and opening a communication with Coimbatore, while Lord Cornwallis with the Nizam's and Hurry Punt's Cavalry possessed the country to the north, should have formed a complete blockade of Puttun during the rains and in all human probability have reduced the enemy cooped up with his whole army in the small inland of Seringputtun to such extreme distress as would have produced entire submission to the will of the allies and prevented all that necessity for further delay or negotiation which had arisen from the failure of the Mahratta engagements.

For notwithstanding the Gov. Genl.'s successive advantages and decided superiority, the want of (provisions) was one of the consequences

of the late junction of the Mahratta Chieftains and the failure in the engagements of this State, yet on the meeting that ensued between the Governor General and Mahratta Chiefs, His Lordship in the liberality peculiar to him received them with the utmost kindness and cordiality and even wrote a letter to their master the Peshwa calculated to remove any displeasure that he might have felt at their late junction.

After all these events and numberless others which ought to weigh with this Govt. to pay the most decided attention to his Lordship's proposals, is it possible that this State can hesitate to comply with the requisition contained in his late letter of a delegate being sent by the Peshwa to form a Congress at Bangalore? particularly after the assurance from me on the part of his Lordship with which that requisition was accompanied that no relaxation should take place in the measures necessary for a vigorous prosecution of the war? Or will this State after having so palpably delayed the issue of the war by its tardy measures in the field, convince us by a similar spirit in obstructing negotiation, that it proceeds on a fixed principle of protracting hostilities?

No. 341—Cornwallis exposes the delinquency of Raja 'Tejwant, especially his shameful conduct on the 15th, and asks Kennaway to demand his recall from the Nizam.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—CAPT. KENNAWAY.

*Camp near Bangalore, 10th July 1791.*

I read with the greatest surprise the copy of the letter from Rajah Tiedge Wunt to the Minister Azeem ul Omrah, dated the 17th May which was delivered to me by Lieut. Steuart. The gross falsehood of every syllable of this letter is so easily to be proved that no person but so weak a man as the Rajah could have hoped that it would have protected him against the displeasure of his master when the heavy complaints that I had to make against him were fully stated to the Nizam. I must now withdraw the request which I made to you in my letter dated the 31st of May, "that you would convey in the most moderate terms part of my sentiments of dissatisfaction with the cavalry". In refutation of so much misrepresentation and falsehood it is necessary that you should tell the whole truth.

I shall now only think it necessary in addition to what I said in my letter of the 31st of May, to take notice of a few of the most striking points in the Rajah's letter to show that I felt much more concern than he did for securing supplies of provisions for His Highness's troops. I pressed him in the most earnest manner (when we were encamped at Vencatagherry, 24 miles from Amboor) to send all his bunjarees to that

fortress, where I assured him, they would be supplied with as much rice from our magazine as they could carry away on the most reasonable terms, and that the payment of it should not be required until it suited the Rajah's convenience; I likewise explained to him that if he missed that opportunity, it would be impossible for me afterwards to afford him any assistance. When the army halted in any camp I recommended what is, I believe, practised by all cavalry that the Rajah would send detachments of his troops to cover his foragers in procuring forage and grain from the villages in the rear of our position, where no force of the enemy could be apprehended except some parties of his looty horse; and on marching days instead of requiring him to send his cavalry four or five coss for forage after they came to their ground, I requested of him but in vain, that he would order his numerous foragers to forage in the villages on his flank during the march where they would be protected by our line, which always moved between them and the enemy, and where they would find such more forage and grain than in the villages adjoining to the road instead of pursuing their constant practice of pressing forward between the head of our column and our advanced guard and, before our line arrived in camp, stripping the villages that were within its limits, of the only forage that it was possible for us to procure for the support of our numerous cattle and especially of the bullocks that were employed in dragging the battering train and by that means most effectually defeating the great object of the march which was the attack of the enemy's capital. In answer to his ridiculous complaint of marching double the distance that I did, I would submit it to His Highness's decision whether it would have been practicable if I had been captable of wishing it to have given them so unreasonable a degree of fatigue, and in cases where it became necessary to march by different routes whether the cavalry or the four and twenty pounders should have taken the shortest road.

The very circumstance which the Rajah describes so little to his own credit at the head of twenty thousand horse "that the enemy's looties patrolled round our camp" induced me to give order which, after the first few days, were either directly disobeyed or almost totally eluded, for detachments of His Highness's cavalry to extend during our marches a few miles on our flank that was next to the enemy, and the Raja well knows that, on the particular occasion to which I conceive he alludes where knowing that the body of the enemy's army was at a considerable distance, I directed him to send three thousand horse four or five coss into the country in order to assert that superiority which so large a body of cavalry ought to have maintained; the small corps which accompanied them under Captain Dallas was not meant as a proportional force that was to be given by our troops for that service but merely to prevent their being mistaken for the enemy on their return to the army.

The Rajah's rhodomontade respecting his behaviour in the action of the fifteenth is really so absurd that I cannot bring myself to enter

into a serious refutation of it. The truth is that the cavalry shewed on that occasion a better countenance and more good-will than I had expected from them and I was induced to express my satisfaction in the hope that it would operate as an incitement to their acting with more spirit in future than they had previously manifested, but it so happened that the victory was completely decided and gained before his cavalry came up and instead of his contributing to render it more complete he placed his troops directly in front of a body of our infantry that I was exceedingly anxious to push forward on a piece of broken ground in which cavalry could not have acted with advantage and prevented their pressing the enemy in their retreat at a crisis when it would have been most particularly desirable. The Rajah cannot possibly forget that just at that time, I sent Captain Dallas to him to desire that he would make a movement with his cavalry to the left that he might not impede the advance of our infantry.

After having been driven to the necessity of desiring you to lay the above statement of the Rajah's conduct before the Nizam and the minister, you will easily conceive that I cannot by any means approve of his being continued in his present command. Although I have long known him destitute of every military qualification that was requisite for the station in which he was placed, yet being in hopes when I wrote my letter of the 31st of May that he would in future be tractable and probably fall into the hands of better advisers after the departure of Assud Ali Khan, I was unwilling to be the immediate cause of his being publicly disgraced, but having now found him to be capable of acting so falsely and treacherously towards me in his representations to his master, I must desire that you will request His Highness in my name to recall him. I wish that I could accompany this request with a recommendation of a successor, but I freely confess that I do not look upon any of those that have been with us qualified to fill a station of so great importance. I have a very good opinion of Rochund Khan, but his bad health renders him incapable of exertion of any kind. Mahomed Ameen Arab appears to have several good qualities but he is by no means a fit person for the chief command and you are to recollect that if by any accident Assud Ali Khan should be thought of, I put the strongest negative upon his appointment for very substantial reasons which perhaps I shall explain to you more particularly hereafter.

I shall therefore only request in general that the Nizam and the Minister will in the selection of a successor to Rajah Tiedge Wunt endeavour to send me a person in whose zeal for the interest of his master as well as the other confederates I may safely confide, and if the idea should occur to them of placing the minister's son in that situation attended by so able an adviser as Meer Abul Cassim, you may readily assure them that the measure will be most perfectly agreeable to me and that I shall receive him with the most distinguished marks of attention and kindness.



No. 342—Malet submits the answer of the Maratha Govt. to His Lordship's proposal of a Congress at Bangalore and reports the arrival of new emissaries from Tipu.

FROM—C. W. MALET,  
TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 12th July 1791.*

Notwithstanding the earnestness with which I had solicited this Court to accede to your Lordship's proposal of forming a Congress at Bangalore, I was concerned to receive on the 9th the following three articles from the Minister through Behro Punt as the substance of the answer that had been resolved to be given by the Durbar to your Lordship's letters of 31st May.

Tipu in his letter says "Retire to the confines and treat there." What language is this?

Tipu writes "What demands have the allies on him"? What language is this? Had he a dispute singly with this State, he might hold this language; but we (the allies) have now entered on the present war on mature deliberation and with firm obligation to each other.

Letters were received by Hurry Punt and Appa Bulwant from Tipu to which, with the Governor General's advice, the following answer was given. "If you (Tippoo) will agree to treat on terms satisfactory to the three Sircars, permission will be granted for your sending a Vackeel," from which it appears that this point is in its original state.

To these three articles was added the following intelligence of sixteen days date from Hurry Punt.

"That the armies of the allies had marched from Naugmangal to Ooscota and proposed moving as occasion and the convenience of forage and supplies might direct and that provisions still continued very dear."

As the three articles cited contain an unequivocal disinclination to accede to your Lordship's proposal of a Congress and as I have not been furnished with any documents to drop the requisition, not thinking what this Court has alleged in its third article can be received by me as such, I have replied to this communication very much at large and repeated my request that, agreeable to your Lordship's wish, a delegate may be appointed by this State to attend the proposed Congress.

And having on the 9th inst. received from the Madras Board a copy of the resolutions of the House of Commons as transmitted by the Court of Directors under 4 March last, immediately I desired the Minister to fix an early day on which I might in person communicate to him and the Peshwa that important intelligence and at the same time fully discuss the measure of assembling a Congress, to which I received for

answer that being engaged in some religious ceremonies, the purity of which precludes communication with persons of a different religion, he must beg to be excused seeing me for five or six days, so that I shall necessarily be subjected to a further delay in giving your Lordship the ultimate decision of this Court. In the meantime I have some reason to think that Hurry Punt has given the Minister room to hope that your Lordship is not very tenaciously attached to the measure and I think it probable that the delays that I experience may partly rise from expectations of further advices from that quarter for the regulation of the Durbar's definitive answer on this important point.

Observing by the Durbar's intelligence that grain continues scarce and dear in the army, it occurs to me as the enemy's country above the Ghauts will be completely exhausted before the expiration of the rains without a prospect of relief from cultivation and as your Lordship may have occasion for an early supply to relieve you from dependance on the Maharatta Bazar a large quantity of rice from the plentiful granaries of the Bombay Govt. may be conveyed to Cannanore in August and as the fruitful districts of Bangalere (the only ones belonging to the enemy that have not felt the effects of the present war), will probably be looked to by that enemy to supply the consumption that must necessarily be caused by his immense army of the stores of Syringputtun it should follow that (exclusive of the importance of the Conquest to our peculiar interests and to the general ones of the alliance) the enemy's distress would be greatly increased and ours completely relieved, should it be found practicable to take possession of that country during or immediately after the rains.

On the 11 inst. I received good information that people from Tippoo had arrived about 4 days ago at Wyhe the place of residence of the Rasta family and that two days ago the letters they were charged with, arrived here. I have sent proper people to Wyhe to ascertain the credibility of this intelligence which, if true, may be added to the above mentioned cause of the Minister's delaying to receive my visit as he may wish to weigh the contents of the advices from Tippoo before he communicates them (should he mean to do so) to me and before he gives me a definitive answer relative to the meeting of a Congress. At all events these separate and frequent solicitations of the enemy to the different members of the Confederacy bespeak at once an insidious design of creating jealousies and strongly mark the extreme embarrassment of his affairs which I doubt not, our native allies will exert all their art and industry to convert to the acquisition of exclusive personal and governmental advantages.

In consequence of the great disturbances that continue to be created by Malhar Rao Holcar, the son of Tuojee, at the head of about 1,500 adherents toward the banks of the River Godavery, Rang Rao Appa, a Brahmin Chief of this place, is under orders to proceed against and reduce him to obedience.

No. 343—Kennaway makes a strong remonstrance against Mehedy Ali's accompanying Mir Alam on his journey and communicates to the Governor General the supply of two thousand artillery bullocks by the Nizam.

FROM—CAPT. KENNAWAY,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Pangal, 13th July 1791.*

Apprehensions having been expressed by Tippoo's Vakeel concerning the safety of his return on account of the danger he should be exposed to from the troops of the allies and from the Zemindars in the direction of Sera and Gurramcoonda who have thrown off all subjection, I have offered to furnish him in the last resort, with a pass from myself and to procure another from the acting Governor of Fort St. George for his safe conduct through the Company's territories by the route of Nellore, and Amboor. His object seems to be to accompany Meer Allum but against this I have strongly remonstrated, as well from the suspicious appearances it would have which the Vakeel's not being permitted to come to Paungul would hardly counteract, as on account of the intelligence he would be able to give of Meer Allum's route and his progress in it.

On the 9th instant I waited on the Nizam when Meer Allum received his dismissal and is to proceed on his journey in the course of five or six days. The Nizam acquainted me he had determined to send him on although from the tenor of Tippoo's correspondence with your Lordship he thought that there was little reason to expect the proposed congress at Bangalore would be productive of any adjustment from the delay which would occur in preparations for his son's and the Minister's march which he did not think it advisable to hurry, first, because your Lordship in your letter to him of the 31st May proposes the expiration of the rains as the period when any reinforcements should be sent; secondly, because any troops that may be sent before that time would suffer so much as not reach your Lordship in proper order and, thirdly, because he was desirous of hearing of Meer Allum's having arrived with your Lordship before he gave his son and the Minister their dismissal.

By accounts from camp of the 13th having heard it was probable that your Lordship on account of the scarcity of provisions which still prevailed, would be obliged to fall back to Bangalore and postpone your operations against Seringapatam for some time, I did not deem it advisable to oppose the Nizam's intentions as above expressed further than to request that every possible exertion might be made in the preparations that were necessary to enable the Minister to proceed with effect and that Meer Allum might be directed to prosecute his journey as expeditiously as possible.

On the 11th instant his Highness sent me two thousand of his artillery bullocks which he had selected to send to your Lordship by Meer Allum.

I examined them attentively and have the pleasure to acquaint you that they appear in general to be of excellent size and in good condition. I have written to Sir Charles Oakely requesting to know what prospect he has of being able to supply your Lordship's wants in this way from the Nellore and Angole Districts, and the countries to the northward thereof where very fine cattle are to be procured and expressed my readiness to assist in procuring the Nizam's purwannahs for purchasing them in his Highness's districts bordering on the Company's or in buying them myself if he has any doubts of being able to get a sufficient number elsewhere.

His Highness has directed that two companies of sepoy's from Captain Read's corps should be held in readiness to proceed with Meer Allum who takes with him the whole or a principal part of the treasure that was to have been sent by the route of Madras for Tiedge Wunt's cavalry. The Detachment, as I have already informed your Lordship, has been directed to remain at Gunjycotah, but this is not to interfere with Hafiz Feridudeen proceeding against Gurramcoondah. It appeared to me that the best route for Meer Allum to follow would be that by which Tiedge Wunt's junction with your Lordship was effected, but having just received from the Board of Madras a copy of your Lordship's letter to Sir Charles Oakely of the 14th June in which you mention that the necessity of regulating your movement in concert with the Maharattas will keep you so much to the westward as to render it possible for Tippoo to make a rapid march to Oossore, I shall, in consequence, recommend Meer Allum to incline as much as he conveniently can to the route by Sera.

*P.S.*—I have this instant received a message from Meer Allum that he will set out without fail the 16th instant.

**No. 344**—Malet thinks that the Allies especially Sindhia are not heartily pleased with the rapid success of the Confederacy and warns Cornwallis against the intrigues of these Powers.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 15th July 1791.*

When I had last the honor to address you under the 12th instant, I had some hopes that this Court would, by acquiescence in your Lordship's proposal of assembling a congress, have relieved me from the necessity of troubling your Lordship with the particulars of what has passed on that subject.

But as from the communication received from the Minister the 13th inst. without favoring me with an opportunity of previous personal discussion, those hopes are now at an end.

With the official communication of the Durbar's resolution relative to a congress, I was formally told that, "a Vakeel from Tippoo had arrived and taken up his quarters within two coss of Paungul, the residence of Nizam Ally Khan," and queries were addressed by Behro Punt whether his approach was with the knowledge or consent of Capt. Kennaway, accompanied with various strictures on the extraordinariness of the measure, my answer to which was confined simply to its being without Capt. Kennaway's knowledge or approbation.

Reports are circulated here and mentioned also in my last advices from Major Palmer of Sindia's being seriously disposed to return to Ugin. But I think it not improbable that these stories may be circulated to promote some views that he may have of forcing this Court to adopt his cause against Holcar and Ally Bahadur either by an apprehension of his approach, having too great an influence on the councils of this Durbar or by a dread of the evil consequences that would probably ensue to the empire by his abandoning its interests in Hindostan to the management of those Chieftains. On the other hand I think with Major Palmer, that the Patell cannot have any satisfaction in the late rapid and important successes of the Confederacy which yield a prospect of such extension of power to this Court as must be obnoxious to the great Maharatta branches of it, and it may not be improper to notice to your Lordship that Hurry Punt is looked upon as the leader of the party that opposes the interests of Sindia at this Court. The news of your Lordship's victory of the 15th May had reached Sindia before the 21st June.

From the most serious deliberation on the present state of affairs the following are the conclusions that have arisen in my mind ; That the allies are clearly convinced of the superiority that has been gained by your Lordship's operations over the enemy ; that the predominance of the British Power thus manifested is now become an object of their jealousy ; that they will scruple at no means of drawing every possible exclusive advantage from the enemy's extreme humiliation ; that they will at the same time by every art, endeavor to obstruct the increase of the British Power and influence ; that this will be more an object of this Court in essentials than of the Nabob who in the spirit of a Mughal while he can be gratified with ostensible marks and professions of respect may be supposed less hostile to the consolidation of our Power than the Maharattas to whose views of universal conquest or depredation it is an insuperable obstacle and by the parity of reasoning ought to be grateful to him ; that the most complete collection of your Lordship's resources so as to place your measures in a state of independance of the allies will be necessary to enable you to conduct your negotiations or military

operations to an end adequate to the success and the objects of the war, since only by such a state of power and preparation can indulgences be granted with dignity or advantages be claimed with success.

Not having received any dispatches from your Lordship, Mr. Uthhoff or Capt. Little since the junction of the armies, though advices are frequently received by the Durbar in 12 or 13 days, my faith in that channel of conveyance is shaken and to remove as far as possible the risk of miscarriage of any commands from your Lordship at this critical time, when it is so necessary that my language to this Court should be in perfect unison with that of your Lordship to Hari Punt, I have lately dispatched my addresses by express cossids to Mr. Uthhoff and shall continue to do so till a sufficient number is supplied to furnish your Lordship with a succession of returning messengers.

I have been favoured by Capt. Kennaway with copies of Tippoo's letters to the Nizam, his Minister and Meer Allum by Mehed Ally Khan, the former two except in the mention of the accompanying Khelats are exactly the same as the former ones and all of them instead of containing those concessions on which the ambassador's approach was rested, are strongly marked with a design to form a separate interest in His Highness's Council on the powerful plea of a common cause in the support of Mahommedanism.

**No. 345**—Cornwallis informs Kennaway of the surrender of the fortress of Oussore and expresses his assent to the reception of Appaji Ram.

[This letter is mentioned in Ross, Vol. II. 99.]

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—CAPT. KENNAWAY.

*Camp near Oussore, 16th July 1791.*

You will see by my letter to the Nizam that in consequence of Tippoo's compliance with the condition prescribed to him by Hurry Punt of writing separately to each member of the confederacy I have consented to Appajee Ram's coming to camp to make his proposals.

I long resisted this measure more from an apprehension of its creating suspicion and jealousy in the mind of his Highness than from a sense of its being in any other respect either improper or impolitic. But the arguments stated by Hurry Punt in favour of it had great weight. He said that if the negotiation was to begin by the proposal of terms in writing, it was according to all usage the part of the victors and not of the vanquished to make such proposal; that the desirable object in his opinion was to know as soon as possible whether Tippoo was inclined to make such concessions as were likely to form the basis of a treaty in order to prevent our employing our time and thoughts in sending deputies and assembling

a congress when perhaps they ought to be wholly occupied in the most vigorous preparation for war. And that as no answer was to be given to Appajee Ram and as the only use to be made of his communication was to enable the confederates to determine from a knowledge of Tippoo's sentiments, whether it was worth while to assemble a congress he thought there could be no room for jealousy in either of the parties.

The earnest desire which Hurry Punt expressed that I should agree to the reception of Appajee Ram, and the confidence I felt that the Nizam would be persuaded that I would take no step which could in any manner be prejudicial to his interest induced me to acquiesce, and I have now to request that you will state the matter fully to his Highness and assure him that no answer shall be given without his approbation communicated either immediately to myself or by Meer Allum or some other confidential person whom he may think proper to depute.

Oussore was evacuated yesterday. The garrison were preparing to destroy the works but the brigade which I sent to take possession of it advanced so suddenly upon them that they had not time to effect their purpose in any material degree.

I have directed Colonel Duff who commands in Bangalore to prepare some guns in case his Highness should want them for the attack of Gurumconda.

**No. 346**—Cornwallis expresses his satisfaction with Nizam Ali's decision to send his son and minister to his camp and promises to receive the Prince with every mark of kindness and respect.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—CAPT. KENNAWAY.

*Camp Setty Mungalam, 18th July 1791.*

I take the earliest opportunity of requesting that you will acquaint him (the Nizam) that I shall receive the Prince with every mark of kindness and respect which it would be my duty as well as inclination to pay to a person of his high birth and exalted rank, and to the son of a faithful ally to the Company with whom I have had the happiness to form the closest political connection and for whom I personally entertain the greatest esteem, that I will give no decided answer to any proposition from Tippoo, except as far as it may relate to the assembling of a congress, nor enter into a discussion of terms of peace until the arrival of the Minister, unless I should receive special authority from His Highness for that purpose, and lastly that I can by no means consent to your leaving his court at the time when the minister himself will be absent, and when I can have no means but through yourself of making any confidential communication to his Highness.

You will express to the Nizam how much I am gratified by the proof which he has exhibited of his friendship to the English nation, and of his confidence in myself by declaring his intention of sending his son assisted by the experience and great abilities of Azim-ul-Omrah to join the army under my command and that he may be perfectly satisfied that no zeal shall be wanting and no pains spared on my part to bring the war to an honourable and advantageous termination.

You will see by my former letter dated the 16th instant that I am still in a situation to assist his Highness with heavy guns from Bangalore for the attack of Gurrumcoonda.

No. 347—Kennaway expresses his surprise at the despatch of only three lacs of rupees with Mir Alam and refers to intrigues being carried on between the Nizam and Tipu.

FROM—CAPT. KENNAWAY,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Pangal, 17th July 1791.*

Meer Allum took leave of me the 18th instant and immediately set forward on his journey. To my no small surprise and disappointment he intimated to me for the first time that the intention of dispatching the treasure designed for the troops under Rajah Tiedge Wunt had been abandoned, and that three lacks of rupees was all that would be sent, of which sum the cavalry proceeding as his escort about a thousand horse, was to carry one lack and that bills were negotiating with bankers for the remainder.

I sent to the minister in the evening to express my surprise at this deviation from a resolution which, in consequence of his assurances, I had communicated to your Lordship who confiding in it had possibly advanced money to Tiedge Wunt which this scanty supply would hardly enable him to repay. He returned for answer that Tiedge Wunt's corps was so considerably reduced in point of numbers that he was anxious Meer Allum should travel with expedition and, therefore, did not wish to embarrass him with a charge that might occasion any delay, but that means of sending additional supplies would be immediately devised. I had no difficulty in answering these objections, but the fact, I believe, is that Tiedge Wunt has been authorized to ask your Lordship to leave you and repair to Curramcoonda, which I dare say you will readily grant. Before I conclude the subject of money I think it necessary to add that my consent was desired to an application from the Nizam to your Lordship



to supply Meer Allum on account, with twenty thousand rupees which I not only declined assenting to but plainly informed both the minister and Meer Allum that your Lordship could not comply with it if made and that I gave them timely notice to prevent their trusting to it and subjecting themselves and your Lordship to the mortification of a denial.

Captain Read has been directed to proceed and cooperate with Hafiz Ferid-u-deen in the siege of Gurramcoonda which I cheerfully agreed to as well because it will be of great importance to your Lordship's supplies that this place should be reduced as from Tiedge Wunt having written to the minister that you were disposed to assist with guns and mortars for the undertaking from Bangalore provided cattle were sent for them. These Hafizjee has been directed to have in readiness to proceed, if possible, with Meer Allum. I have furnished Captain Read with a copy of the cypher No. 11 and desired him to address your Lordship regularly concerning his motions, the resources of the country where he is in, grain, cattle etc. and on every other necessary point I have desired him to correspond also with Captain Alexandar Read on the same subjects. On the 11th instant I received an application from the latter gentleman dated 14th June, concerning an improper interference of the Nizam's chiefs in the country of the Polygars who have taken the Company's protection and who have been placed under his control, and on the 15th had the pleasure to send him an order to Hafezjee to prevent causes of complaint of this nature in future.

I will not trouble your Lordship with an account of reports of intrigues said to be carrying on by the Nizam with Tippoo with the privity of the Maharattas because they are too vague to be traced to proof and because, I think, we possess a security in the steadiness of our allies from its being their interest to adhere to the treaty which their faith, solemnly as it is pledged, would not afford us: that Tippoo will not neglect to take every advantage of the next three months of inaction to work them to his purpose there can be little doubt, but besides that it will be difficult for him to hold out objects which they will not obtain in a more complete manner by an honourable and upright conduct; I conceive the security they derive from the treaty against the effects of his future ambition and resentment (effects of which without our support they would have serious reason to be apprehensive of) gives us a hold on them which I can hardly imagine we may not with safety trust to. But for these considerations and the experience I have had of the blindness and infatuation of this Durbar I confess I should be inclined to consider the little disposition that has been shewn to enquire into Assud Ali's conduct and the intention to employ him again notwithstanding my earnest remonstrances to the contrary and their being pretty well convinced themselves of his guilt, as a proof of their own corruption.

Mehed Ali Khan, Tippto's Vakeel, has persisted in his objections against returning in the road by which he came, on which account and being extremely anxious to get him off, I have granted him a passport to proceed through the company's districts and sent two of my Hircarahs with him to Nellore where I have informed him he must wait till he hears from Sir Charles Oakely. I have applied to that gentleman for a pass similar to mine and recommended to him to send people with it on whom he can depend to conduct the Vakeel by such a route as shall prevent his acquiring any improper information. I still hope, however, that he will relinquish this route when he finds that his apprehensions of the other are weakly grounded.

**No. 348**—Cornwallis advises Hari Punt to occupy the line previously recommended to him and recommends also the temporary separation of the allied armies on account of scarcity of food-stuffs in such a manner as would enable them to reassemble at a short notice.

20th July 1791.

*Memorandums of the general heads of the message from the Governor General to Hurry Punt and Parsuram Bhow to be delivered by the Persian Translator.*

Lord Cornwallis stated in a letter to Hurry Punt the great and serious distresses of the army under his command and the urgent reasons which rendered an early communication not only with Bangalore but also with the Carnatic absolutely necessary.

It is needless to recapitulate what was written in that letter. He will now, therefore, only observe that since the date of it his soldiers have become much more sickly and his treasure has decreased rapidly.

Lord Cornwallis has been so desirous to fulfil the wishes of the Maharatta Chiefs in every respect, that he has already acquiesced in measures that, he is much afraid, will tend to delay the execution of the great objects of the war, as they may in their consequences considerably reduce the strength of his army, and retard the preparations for undertaking the siege of Seringapatam. He cannot doubt that the Maharatta Chiefs would, if necessary, make some concessions on their part in point of convenience to promote the general interests of the confederacy, but on the present occasion he is confident that their own army would soon experience great advantages from their adopting without loss of time the plan he has already recommended.

Lord Cornwallis has not met with any person who is acquainted with the precise situation of Currup, but he conceives from what passed in the conversation yesterday that it is connected with the western

communication which the Maharatta Chiefs agreed to relinquish in a few days and which it is impossible to preserve against so active an enemy as Tippoo, without employing the greatest part of our force for that purpose and by that means giving up all hopes of a communication with the Carnatic or even with Bangalore itself, which latter, however necessary it may be, yet as far as it concerns the refitment of the army, is a very secondary object.

Lord Cornwallis will not say much upon the scanty manner in which his army has since the junction been supplied with provisions nor upon the exorbitant prices at which they have been obtained, but he wishes the Maharatta Chiefs to advert to the impossibility of supplying such large armies as are now assembled without opening easy communications to various resources and this can in his opinion be only effected by the combined forces immediately occupying the line that he recommended which, during the period of preparation in the rainy season, will give them the command of every article that may be wanted either for their refitment or support from the Peshwa's dominions and a plentiful enemy's country in their rear, and from the well-stored magazines of provisions and military stores that have been long prepared on the frontiers of the Carnatic.

Lord Cornwallis thinks that it is absolutely impossible that these armies can subsist for any time in the same place, if they continue all together in one body, but they may, with the greatest facility and safety be stationed at certain points of the communication in such a manner as to admit of their furnishing material support to each other and of being reassembled at a very short warning, if the movement of the enemy should render it necessary.

Several of the enemy's forts adjoining to that line may be attacked by either of the armies without much inconvenience and Lord Cornwallis wishes to draw to the attention of the Maharatta Chiefs that as Tippoo has now no other considerable magazine but that of Seringapatam he could not advance to so great a distance from that place, either to attack any part of our position, or to disturb our operations in that quarter, without our being almost sure of having timely notice of his approach, and without his being exposed to a total defeat from our army or to the active effects of the whole Maharatta cavalry which, Lord Cornwallis is persuaded, would be able not only to cut off his communications but even to render his retreat to his capital both difficult and dangerous.

Lord Cornwallis considers a temporary separation of the armies for the purposes that he has mentioned to be prudent and safe when the enemy's principal force is shown to be at the distance of six or seven marches, but he would be the last man to recommend such a measure at the distance of two or three marches, as it might be attended with the most fatal consequences.

**No. 349**—Kennaway informs Malet of his never demanding the advance of one month's pay for the Detachment according to the G. G.'s letter of 7th July 1789.

FROM—CAPT. KENNAWAY,

TO—C. W. MALET.

*Pangal, 21st July 1789.*

The stipulation with the Nizam by the Governor General's letter of the 7th July 1789 is that he shall pay one month's established charge in advance for the Detachment, reckoning from the day it enters his dominions in consideration of the expense which has attended its equipment. I have never formally received or demanded the amount of this one month, the orders I regularly get being for advances on account. which I prefer, to the precise month for which the pay is really due, being specified, as it leaves the question whether this Government is to be charged for the Detachment agreeable to the letter or spirit of the agreement, more open to future discussion. But the Nizam in reply to the Governor General's letter of the 7th July having agreed to the terms of it, I have no idea, litigious as the spirit of the Durbar is, that my demand whenever preferred will be received with any greater hesitation than they make on all demands where money is concerned, whether just or not this I shall; probably have occasion to put to the test soon when I will not fail to acquaint you with the result.

**No. 350**—Cornwallis informs the Nizam of his having agreed to receive the envoy from Tipu.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—THE NIZAM.

*22nd July 1791.*

Influenced by my determination to adhere to the engagements subsisting by virtue of the treaty ratified between your Highness, and Peshwah, and the Company, I have considered it incumbent on me to transact that share of the operations of the war depending on the Company, entrusted to my management not only in the manner most likely to answer the end expected from the alliance formed between the three powers but to publish to the world that the interests of the allies have the same weight in my mind as those of the Company.

Upon this principle I have uniformly resolved to decline to receive any person whom Tippoo Sultaun might be desirous of deputing to me lest such a measure might bear the appearance of a deviation from our engagements. Your Highness will have been informed of my sentiments

in this respect by the correspondence which passed between Tippoo Sultaun and me transmitted to Captain Kennaway for that purpose.

Having been joined by the forces of the Peshwah under the command of a person who bears so great a share in the councils of the Maharatta state as Hurry Punt Tautia and whose disposition I have found to be equally sincere with my own to preserve inviolate and in full force the articles of the treaty, it has afforded me a considerable degree of satisfaction that his sentiments have coincided with my own in every respect and in particular on the point of admitting the reception of a Vakeel on the part of Tippoo Sultaun. But as Hurry Punt on the part of the Peshwah had advised that we should learn the extent of the concessions and compensations which Tippoo Sultaun is willing to make to the allied powers, I have been induced to relax in my own resolution and to agree to receive his Vakeel provided I be assured that his desire is to establish a friendship and to negotiate a peace with each of the allied states.

And as Tippoo Sultaun has addressed a letter to each of the confederate powers and has expressed his desire to reestablish a friendship with them by negotiating a peace through the means of a Vakeel fully authorized to treat with the three states, I have granted my consent to receive his Vakeel as well to comply with the advice of Hurry Punt Tautia as from a consideration that it would enable me to judge how far the proposals which the Vakeel is authorized to make to the confederate States on the part of Tippoo Sultaun may render it expedient to proceed in assembling the deputies from the powers concerned in the war.

Hurry Punt has received the letter addressed to the Peshwah and as the person your Highness may have deputed is not yet arrived it has been agreed between Hurry Punt and myself to transmit that addressed to your Highness accompanied by a letter from each of us.

Your Highness may rest assured of my strict adherence to my resolution to consider the interests of your Government with the same attention as those of the English Company, and that I shall postpone making any reply to the proposals which may be made by the enemy until I shall have the pleasure of knowing your sentiments on them or of seeing the person your Highness shall think proper to depute on the part of your Government to superintend the management of your interests.

No. 351.

FROM—MAJOR W. PALMER,

TO—C. W. MALET.

*Agra, 29th July 1791.*

The junction of the Maharatta army with his Lordship though not so critical as could have been wished was still fortunate in the small supply

of provisions which it contributed and thereby enabling us to keep our ground in the vicinity of the enemy's army and Capital.

Our allies will not act with the zeal and good faith evinced by our Government, but it is prudent to connive at these omissions so long as we reap any services from them at all.

Sindia as you will see is advanced into the district of Mewar. He writes to me from thence that he is not yet able to determine whether he shall proceed to Ogein or return to Muttra ; I think the latter and have less suspicion than ever that he will repair to Poona.

No. 352—Understanding the necessity of conciliating the Nizam at the time, Kennaway refrains from submitting to the Nizam the G. G.'s strong representations against Raja Tejwant and communicates the measures adopted by him for the resort of the bunjaras to G. G.'s camp.

FROM—CAPT. KENNAWAY,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Pangal, 30th July 1791.*

On the 26th I had the honor to receive your Lordship's commands of the 10th instant from the particulars of which there appearing to me to be less reason for my being precipitate in communicating to the Nizam than your Lordship supposed, when your letter was written, I have not come to any determination concerning how far I ought literally to conform to your injunctions for the following considerations ; 1st, because the numerous instances of Rajah Tiedge Wunt's misconduct and disobedience to your Lordship's orders as reported to me by Lieut. Steuart were regularly represented to Meer Allum and the minister for his Highness's information ; 2nd, because your Lordship's sentiments concerning Tiedge Wunt and the cavalry under his command as expressed in your letter of the 31st May were also fully stated to them, and your desire of Tiedge Wunt's removal is in a fair way of being accomplished by the resolution lately adopted concerning Meer Allum and the minister's proceeding to the army, and 3rdly, because where the extravagant assertions and misrepresentations contained in Rajah Tiedge Wunt's address to the minister of the 17th of May which your Lordship's letter is intended as a reply to failed of carrying their own refutation along with them ; the want was supplied by me at the time by pointing out in the clearest and most particular manner the absurdities and inconsistencies which that address was replete with.

I must also confess to your Lordship that, independent of the above reasons, I am more particularly disposed to act with caution in respect

to your commands at this juncture from an idea that conciliatory and encouraging language to our allies may be more immediately necessary at this time than any other to guard against the possible effect of the arts which Tippoo will no doubt put in practice to weaken their inclination for continuing the war after the rains break up which their own natural indolence and aversion to expense if left to itself may but too materially assist him in, without allowing them to advert to the advantages that perseverance for a little longer may be attended with. The minister who is considered as the sole promoter and support of the alliance as far as this Durbar is concerned in it, would, I am persuaded, be extremely averse to my communicating to the Nizam the contents of your Lordship's letter for this among less justifiable reasons that it may throw difficulties in his way in prevailing on his Highness to continue to act heartily with us, because though he (the minister) may be capable of estimating the difference between your Lordship's too just intimation of the little use Tiedge Wunt's cavalry has been of to you, and the sense you at the same time express of the merit of the Nizam's intention in sending them, his Highness, I am afraid, is not; he would be apt to confound them together and revert to his former doubts as reported to me by Meer Allum. I have nevertheless prepared a translation of the letter which I shall use as may appear to me to be proper either by submitting the whole or only particular parts of it to the Nizam and the minister, or the minister alone, or even by suppressing it entirely from their knowledge conducting myself on this occasion after mature deliberation in such manner as I may conceive your Lordship would, in your wisdom wish me to do if you were on the spot.

I have the pleasure to inform your Lordship that Mehdey Ali Khan proceeded on the 27th instant from the village he has resided at for this month past on his return to his master, and I am given to understand from what he has said to my hircarabs who are stationed with him that he proposes travelling the direct route instead of passing through any part of our districts as he at first proposed. A few days before his departure he transmitted a letter he had just received from Tippoo to Buckshy Begum. It was accompanied by another addressed to Khan Bahadur the Nizam's sister who died about two years ago which was returned to the Vakeel unopened. The receipt of these letters and the time taken up in preparing an answer prevented him from setting out by a few days so soon as he would otherwise have done.

I have had the satisfaction to learn from Sir Charles Oakely that there is the highest probability that the measures taken by the Presidency of Fort St. George for reequipping the army will be attended with success, and that they expected to have the full number of cattle (viz., 6,000 draught and 20,000 carriage) at Amboor very shortly. My attention has of late been wholly employed in endeavouring to prevail on the minister to

adopt such measures as would effectually promote the voluntary resort of bunjaries to your Lordship's army and having learned on very particular enquiry that this essential object might be accomplished if the Nizam would grant them an exemption from duties I warmly recommended this concession by every argument I could think of to the minister's consideration, but I am sorry to say I have not received any great encouragement to think it will be complied with. The minister, says he, is ready to give up the point to them provided they will agree to sell their grain in camp at a fixed and reasonable rate which, he alleges, should be fifteen seers of rice per rupee, and asserts to me, as he says from experience, that unless this point is previously adjusted though the camp may be supplied yet it will be at as exorbitant a price as any which has prevailed since your Lordship was joined by the Mahratta armies. I returned for answer what I thought there were good grounds to believe would be the case, namely, that if the duties were taken off, the resort of bunjaries would be so great that they would be obliged to sell on moderate terms in their own defence, but that he, as well as I, must be persuaded they would never agree to bind themselves to any certain standard particularly so unreasonable a one as he proposed, seeing the uncertainty of the price they might be obliged to purchase it, after their first stock was disposed of and the danger they might be afterwards exposed to in procuring it at all. He has assured me that a very ample number had engaged to attend him and his whole attention was engaged in adjusting this point so as to afford your Lordship assistance and satisfaction. I reminded him of his failure in his former assurance that ten thousand would follow Tiedge Wunt after his junction with your Lordship; which number, he asserts in reply, were sent, but having taken a wrong route they were obliged to return and I have reason to think that half that number were dispatched as he states.

In the course of what has passed between us on the subject he requested my opinion whether the supplies of grain the Nizam may send or he may take with him in his way were to be thrown into one common stock with your Lordship's from whence the armies of the allies were to receive their subsistence on the same footing with the Company's troops or whether it should be for the exclusive use of the Nizam's and each party provide for itself, to which I replied that your Lordship's army being destitute of bunjaries, you expected a supply of them from the Nizam without yielding any right in return to him on the stock that was carried at a great expense to the Company, and which was served out under very particular restrictions, but that where you had a plentiful magazine I had no doubt of your allowing the Nizam's or the Maharatta bunjaries to supply themselves in case of emergency from it; with this answer he appeared to be satisfied, and has issued orders for obliging the different aumils of the country in our rear to convey grain to the frontier as a deposit; but the hard terms he proposes to them for doing it will, I am afraid, on



this, as on every other occasion where money is concerned, be a great obstacle to his succeeding.

I had the pleasure to receive a note from the minister yesterday informing me that Oussore had been evacuated by its garrison on your Lordship's approach towards it. Having understood from Lieut. Steuart that your Lordship on marching from Bangalore had left orders with the Commanding Officers to deliver four heavy guns to the Nizam's officers for the siege of Gurramcoondah I have communicated the same to the minister, in consequence of which an order is preparing to Hafizjee to send cattle for them. The person who will be sent will carry a letter from me to Colonel Duff to deliver them to him and I think it probable that I shall request the Colonel to obtain your Lordship's permission to grant a couple of mortars also for which spare bullocks must likewise be sent.

No. 353—Haripant narrates the circumstances leading to his meeting with G.G.

FROM—HARI PANT,  
TO—C. W. MALET.

*Received 31st July 1791.*

Formerly I dispatched my son Luxamon Rao from the banks of the Tumbudra near Curnool with a powerful force and ample apparatus to join the Governor General, Lord Cornwallis. He accordingly advanced by long and repeated marches as far as Comar Kalwa where he halted about a week for the purpose of collecting certain intelligence of his Lordship's situation. But by the confusions in the country no intelligence could be procured, which he communicated to me; on which I immediately advanced and ordered my son to join me, and under the auspices of my gracious master, the Killadar of Sera surrendered that fortress to me on my approaching it and having taken possession and established a garrison, I proceeded on my march and at Naugmungal was joined by Pursaram Pundit and we, with our joint forces, proceeded the 2nd day after our meeting and on the 24th of Ramzan encamped near the English army. On the 25th being an auspicious hour, I had the felicity of a meeting with Lord Cornwallis and General Meadows. How can I express His Lordship's goodness and courtesy who in wisdom comprehension, circumspection and bravery is unmatched? Great was my joy on this occasion. Mr. Cherry likewise is a gentleman of experience, sagacity and courage. By the grace of God we shall in future do every thing in concert and by mutual agreement.

Before my arrival, there was a great dearth and scarcity of forage and grain but on my junction some relief took place and in future I shall provide for the arrival of supplies. The enemy, brow-beaten and disgraced, has taken refuge in Seringputtun where with his whole army he means to defend himself but cannot venture to expose himself to a contest in the field.

1791]

WHO COMMANDS NIZAM'S DETACHMENT

475

No. 354—Cornwallis instructs Kennaway to make frequent representations for the early dispatch of the Nizam's son and Minister and expresses his strong objection to the appointment of Asud Ali Khan.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—CAPT. KENNAWAY.

*Camp 7 miles south of Dussur, 2nd August 1791.*

I am very glad to find that the Nizam's troops are advancing to Gurramcondah, the capture of which place would undoubtedly be attended with great advantage; four battering guns are prepared at Bangalore for the attack of that fortress and will be dispatched whenever His Highness shall send an escort and cattle for them.

Meer Allum's arrival which promises to be earlier than I had expected will give me great satisfaction, especially if Tippoo's Vakeel Appappa Ram should make any proposals that may be thought deserving of our attention; but I must acknowledge that I can hardly expect that Tippoo will yet be disposed to make reasonable concessions to the three united powers although he would readily hold out tempting offers to any one of them in hopes of creating discord amongst the allies and by that means of finding an opportunity of recovering on a future day what he may now be obliged to relinquish.

It is of great consequence in every point of view that the Nizam should execute his intention of sending his son and the minister with the reinforcements destined to act against the common enemy; I therefore desire that you will urge him in the strongest terms to give them a ready dismissal as I cannot help apprehending from the procrastinating disposition of the natives of this country and particularly of His Highness's court that unless they are stimulated to action by frequent representations the commencement of our operations which should not be delayed beyond the middle of October may be retarded by waiting for them.

**No. 355**—Kennaway communicates the inconsistency of Nana's conduct in appointing Hari Pant delegate to the Congress but keeping this news concealed from Malet.

FROM—CAPT. KENNAWAY,  
TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Pangal, 7th August 1791.*

I had the honour to receive your letter of the 18th ultimo which arrived very seasonably as the communication I have made of its contents to the Nizam will, I trust, fix and encourage him to persevere in the honourable conduct he appears to have hitherto held towards us and remove the doubts and uneasiness he has expressed at the substance of the enclosed answer from Tippoo to Mahommed Ameen Arab's letter, particularly that part of it which states that Hurry Punt was furnished with absolute powers when peace was concluded between the Maharattas and Tippoo before; so whatever he determined on now would be adopted. On which I have thought it necessary to observe to the minister thus much, if he was furnished with such powers as are alluded to and had been from the beginning, it would not appear extraordinary considering the high rank he held in the Maharatta state, although Balajee Pundit through inadvertence or many other reasons that might be imagined had not formally announced them to the other allies; but that at any rate a vague assertion of the kind in question proceeding from Tippoo should be received with great caution, seeing that it was his interest to endeavour to make the confederates suspicious of each other and that he may think his cause would be benefited by flattering Hurry Punt's vanity in the manner he has done.

It was sent to me the 4th instant with a request to know if your Lordship had written any thing to me on subject of it, that if you had not, I might send a copy of it to you, and suggest the propriety of your communicating it to Hurry Punt and demanding from him on what authority Tippoo spoke of his being so absolute as he supposes him, and to add that if by the exercise of this power whatever or from whoever it was, he (Hurry Punt) could obtain such offers from the enemy as the allies had a right to expect to propose them to you. The Durbar Vakeel added, answers to the Nizam's and Govindrow Kishen's letters to Balajee Pundit concerning assembling deputies at the proposed congress had been but just received, that in the letter to Nizam, Balajee expressed his satisfaction at Meer Allum's deputation, and asks what better person can be appointed on the part of the Peshwah than Hurry Punt; but in the letter to Govind Row which is written by Hurry Punt's son and signed by Balajee in addition to the above it is written that Hurry Punt has accordingly been appointed, though no intimation of it has been given to Sir Charles Warre Malet notwithstanding his frequent solicitations to be informed what resolution had been come to; and that on its being demanded from Govind Row why the knowledge of it was kept from that gentleman, he was silent. The latter part of this information, I do not conceive, is to be implicitly depended on, and if it were it will doubtless occur to Sir Charles Warre

Malet how extremely guarded it will be necessary he should be in the use he may make of it.

I think it but justice to the Nizam to acquaint your Lordship that the reports of intrigues being on foot between Tippoo and his Highness, chiefly referred to a correspondence which was said to be passing with the females of the family and I think are cleared up by Tippoo's letters to Buckshy Begum and Khan Bahadur which had not been communicated to me.

I sometime since gave the necessary information to Captain Andrew Read of the guns which your Lordship was disposed to assist the Nizam with from Bangalore for the siege of Gurramcoonda and desired he would make the necessary application for them or for mortars if he wanted them to Colonel Duff. Hafizjee has been also directed to write to Colonel Duff for such as he may want and send cattle for them and I have requested Captain Andrew Read to consult with Hafizjee and Captain Alexandar Read concerning the party that should be sent to escort them.

**No. 356**—Report of five Europeans who escaped from Chitaldrug.

Extract of a letter from Mr. Surgeon Little.

*\*Hurryhur, 9th August 1791.*

On the 31st last month arrived here five Europeans who made their escape from Chittuldroog. They had been encamped for about 8 days, three or four coss from the fort. It was Dowlat's (the Killedar of Chittuldroog) intention to retake Wallurkerry a small fort six coss from Droog. All of a sudden he ordered his troops to march for Chittuldroog. It was then in the afternoon and before they reached the fort it was dark. At that time the Europeans went to one side to drink water; the other troops seemed to take no notice of them, they let the line pass them. Then they effected their escape. They brought away their arms and accoutrements and were firmly resolved to die, rather than be retaken. Luckily they met with no opposition. You will probably wish to know their names. They are as follows :—(1) William Drake, midshipman of the Hannibal man of war; (2) John Gordon, seaman of the Hannibal man of war; (3) James Curry, seaman of the Hannibal man of war; (4) John Wood, seaman of the Chaucer sloop of war, and (5) Wm. Whiteway, seaman of the Fortitude Indiaman. They are exceedingly anxious to go to Lord Cornwallis. They will go with me to Captain Little should I be ordered to join him when he arrives at Chittuldroog. I have provided them with everything that lies in my power which is very trifling owing to my want of cash. They were sent from Serringaputnam about four years ago, to Chittuldroog where they have remained ever since. They

\*Hurryhur is on the south bank of the Tumbudra where the hospital for the Bombay detachment with the Maratha army has lately been placed.

regret very much the death of a young man Mr. L. Page who was shot about six months ago, when they were sent to quell the inhabitants who had been disturbing the country around. They give a shocking account of their usage since they were taken prisoners. They tell me Lieut. Speedman cut his own throat and Mr. Rutledge was shot; Bunberry is dead. He had taken some fancy for a girl whom he had deluded away from her parents. They complained to the Nabob, Bunberry was sent for, he said that he would change his religion and marry her. Tippu was satisfied, so the matter ended. Tippu sent for Dowlat's wife and child to Seringpatam about seven months ago. If we could get hold of them there, it may probably be the means of his giving up the fort.

No. 357—Cornwallis directs Kennaway to proceed with the reinforcement under the command of Sikandar Jah.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—CAPTAIN KENNAWAY.

*Camp near Oussore, 12th August 1791.*

The earnestness which was expressed by the Nizam and the minister that you should accompany the latter on his intended march to join this army and the communication which Lieutenant Stewart made to me of your opinion that from your having been accustomed to do business with the minister you thought that you being upon the spot might tend to promote the public service, have introduced me to reconsider the propriety of your leaving Paungul to which measure I had before given my negative, and upon mature reflection I am inclined to think that your presence here may be useful.

You will therefore be pleased to acquaint his Highness and Azim-ul-Omrah that from respect to their sentiments, and in compliance with their wishes I have directed you to proceed to the army with the reinforcement under the command of the Prince Secunder Jah and the minister and that I shall immediately send Lieut. Stewart to remain near his Highness's person and to receive his commands during your absence.

No. 358—Kennaway requests the Minister to remit duties on the bunjaras and reports the close connection between the Nizam and Sindia and the latter's determination to visit Poona.

FROM—CAPTAIN KENNAWAY,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Pangal, 14th August 1791.*

I have received notice from the minister that he had received offers from two head bunjaries to supply him one with five hundred and the other with fifteen hundred bullock load of grain a day for the attack of

Seringapatam, from the time the army shall arrive within ten coss of that capital, to the reduction of it, provided posts were established by the allies in the direction of Gurramcoonda and Bangalore, and so onwards or by any route that may be preferred in order to keep the communication open, on which subject he requested I would address your Lordship and request that no time may be lost in your taking the necessary steps to adjust this essential point. He added that he was in expectation of receiving similar offers from other bunjaries ; and that the remission of duties was no longer insisted on, as he had plainly told them he could only agree to their being excused on condition of their binding themselves to sell their grain in camp at a stated rate in which case their request should be complied with, this they will not do, but as I am persuaded in my own mind that plentiful supplies will not be obtained unless their request is complied with, I shall not relax in my endeavors to procure an unconditional indulgence on this point being granted them.

I do not expect I shall be able to prevail on the minister to begin his march till the expiration of the month of Muhurram, or about the beginning of October, and shall be very well satisfied if I succeed in getting him off in earnest so soon ; much will depend in this respect on advices from Meer Allum which I mention that your Lordship may urge him to be pressing in recommending expedition.

On the 12th instant I delivered to the Nizam your Lordship's letter of the 22nd ultimo with the letter from Tippoo alluded to in it. His Highness read the first with great attention and observed to me on the warm terms in which your Lordship expresses your confidence in Hurry Punt and the Maharattas. I told him that allowances must be made for the probability of the letter having been submitted to Hurry Punt's inspection ; besides that his Highness had set the example by the sentiments he had expressed of that chief in the letter to your Lordship wherein he signifies his intention of deputing his son and the minister. He said it was very true and demanded if your Lordship had asked the reason why he had done so, I replied you had not. His Highness put into my hands two letters from Tippoo to himself and the minister which had just been received with another to Salabut Khan, one of the late Chief with Rajah Tiedge Wunt's army, and observed he did not think anything contained in those or any other of Tippoo's letters afforded grounds to suppose he was serious in his intentions at present of making such concessions to the allies as would lead to a peace, desperate as the situation of his affairs appeared to be. I enquired if Salabut Khan had made any communication from him and was answered he had not, he having been referred by Tippoo for what he was to say to Mehdey Ali Khan.

It is understood here that Scindea's resolution to repair to Poona is unalterably fixed and that no concessions Balajee Pundit can, and is even said to be disposed, to make to him in respect to Holcar and Alli

Behader to prevent his coming will induce him to alter his intention. From the Nizam's conversation the 12th instant I understood that the determination had been formed with his counsel and approbation. If it is carried into effect, it may, I think, have a very good effect on Hurry Punt's conduct towards your Lordship from the apprehensions he must be under of Scindea's power and resentment and his knowledge of the good understanding that subsists between him and your Lordship. The connection between this chief and the Nizam which I think may be deemed in its present state rather hostile to Balajee Pundit, appears to have been drawn much closer of late by means of the Minister and has since been further exemplified by the release of some ancient possessions held by the Nizam's ancestors at Delhi and by an increase of nominal rank and power which the phantom of Majesty in Scindea's hands has lately conferred upon him.

P.S.—I have this day forwarded letters from the Nizam to Captain Read and Hafizjee authorizing the detachments being sent on to escort the heavy guns from Bangalore if it should be deemed necessary; in which case I have pointed out to Captain Read the propriety of a body of horse being sent with it.

**No. 359**—Malet analyses the motives of Nana in keeping Hari Pant's appointment as a deputy to the Congress a secret.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 17th August 1791.*

I have been favoured by Sir John Kennaway with copy of his letter to your Lordship of the 7th instant containing an account of Govin Rao, the Peshwa's Vackeel at the Nizam's Court, having communicated the contents of a letter to him from the minister of this, advising Hurry Punt's being vested with the requisite powers to represent this Court at a Congress of the Ministers of the allies, which intelligence corresponds with the mention made of Hurry Punt in Tippo's letter to Mahomed Ameen Arab.

On the other hand it is not authenticated by any communication of Hurry Punt himself to your Lordship, by any from this Court to me nor by the official letters of this Court to your Lordship or the Nizam; whereas the advances that have been made to me relative to the Peshwa's taking the field in person are diametrically contrary to it.

The first conclusion that arises from this appearance of contradiction in the measures of a man generally so close and so consistent as the Minister, is that he has not known how entirely to reject your

Lordship's fair proposal of a Congress already assented to by the Nizam, while on the other hand he has been strongly influenced to evade assension to it by a desire of bringing back the immediate management of the negotiations into his own hands even by adopting the measure hitherto tenaciously avoided of leading the Peshwa into the field.

Two points, however, are worthy of notice relative to the intelligence of Hurry Punt's being vested with the delegatory powers in question. First that Tippo's mention of it may have been without authority to operate as a conciliation on Hurry Punt on the letters reaching him and to stimulate the Nabob by the prospect of such a mediation to a competition for at least a share in it which competition might reasonably be expected to produce more tolerable terms for him.

Second, that Govin Rao's communication to the Nizam's Ministry of the contents of a letter from his superior to him of a nature so very different from the official letters both to the Nizam and your Lordship seems unaccountable, since if such a letter has been written to Govin Rao the circumstances of its being written by Hurry Punt's son of its subject being concealed from me, of its being so different from their Govin's official letters, clearly evince that it must have been highly secret and confidential and probably meant to be used only in the event of finding your Lordship and the Nizam immovably resolved on the establishment of the Congress.



No. 360—Kennaway reports to the Governor General the erection of the Prince's tents preparatory to his departure and the strong denial made by the Minister of his having any secret meetings with Mehedy Ali, Tipu's Vakil.

FROM—CAPTAIN KENNAWAY,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Pangal, 24th August 1791.*

No endeavor shall be wanting on my part to induce the Nizam by frequent solicitation and repeated arguments to give his son and his minister with the reinforcements intended to proceed with them an early dismissal, but after the dear experience your Lordship has had of the lazy and procrastinating spirit of his Highness's councils I should be sorry if you should allow your operations to be delayed in any material degree by waiting for them. I long since acquainted the Minister that if he was desirous of effectually promoting the success of the approaching campaign it was necessary as well for the regulation of your Lordship's as his own arrangements previous to advancing to Seringapatam that he should arrive at Bangalore the beginning of October. The move, however, of our army which I think likely to take place before he can effect this point, ought not to impede his advancing, since as Tippoo's attention will probably be confined to the defence of his capital, he ought not to hesitate at any imaginary risk there may be in following and joining you there.

Another reason has lately arisen which I shall proceed to explain why I think it would not be advisable for your Lordship to allow your measures, to depend materially on the minister's motions. By Sir Charles Warre Malet's letter to your Lordship of the 14th instant an idea seems to be entertained on the part of Balajee Pundit of leading the Peshwah into the field and meeting the Nizam. Now, though I am humbly of opinion that the time when this measure might have been attended with advantage is past, and that if adopted now, it will not only tend to embarrass your Lordship but materially interfere with the support which the different courts ought to afford their armies in the field, yet if the measure is proposed to the Nizam, I am afraid, he will too readily close with it, in which case I do not imagine either that he would be inclined to part with his minister, or that the minister's interests would permit of his absenting himself at the interview with the Peshwah which would follow.

On the 18th instant the Nizam repaired to tents which had been erected at a small distance from the Cantonment to receive the Sanad of the titles and honors lately conferred upon him by Shah Allum. I was pressingly invited to be present, but as to the best of my knowledge it has never been customary for the Company's Residents to attend on such

occasions, and as I had otherwise doubts of its propriety I declined accepting of the invitation in as delicate a manner as I could, offering to wait on His Highness at his house to offer my congratulations at any other time that he would please appoint.

I attended accordingly the 21st instant and your Lordship's letters to him and the minister of the 5th instant having arrived in the interim, I delivered them to him. His Highness expressed himself satisfied with the contents of it in general and in an extraordinary degree with many particular parts of it. To my no small surprise he entered into a detailed explanation or rather defence of his conduct relative to his quitting the alliance he was engaged in with the Company against Hyder Ally in the year 1767 and joining the arms of the latter, which I do not think it material to trouble your Lordship with at present. I barely observed in reply that there had probably been fault on both sides, but that his subsequent conduct had fully obliterated any unfavourable impression that might have been made to his disadvantage by what had occurred at the time alluded to. I took this opportunity to point out to him that the present moon drew fast to its close, that the next was the mourning one of Mohurram, the first thirteen days at least of which, no leading steps could be taken relative to his son's or the minister's proceeding, that I therefore requested the few remaining days of the present month might be taken advantage of for the prince's tents to be brought forth and erected and that orders might be dispatched to the troops in quarters to learn their cantonments at the end of the thirteen days above alluded to and join his son's standard. To both my requests I have the pleasure to inform your Lordship His Highness assented to, and the Prince's tents were accordingly pitched at a short distance from the Cantonment yesterday evening.

Sir Charles Warre Malet having communicated to me under date the 6th instant, that it had been conveyed to him from a secret and confidential quarter that Mehdey Alli Khan, Tippoo's Vakeel, had had several nocturnal meetings with Azim-ul-Umrah while he was in the neighbourhood of this place, I think it proper to state for that gentleman's as well as your Lordship's information all that has come to my knowledge on the subject either before or subsequent to my receipt of the above letter. When I first heard of the Vakeel's approach to and that he was only five coss from Paungul, I remonstrated against his being allowed to advance further; shortly after it was reported to me without any cause assigned that he had come on to Seringaporam, which is only about three coss from hence. Surprised at this procedure I sent to the minister to learn the cause of it which, I was then told, was entirely on account of a scarcity of provisions and forage at the place where he first halted. Though not altogether satisfied with the excuse, and apprehensive that something more was intended by it than the minister chose to acknowledge, I was obliged to put up with his answer: but on the receipt

No. 361—An account of the discussions that took place between Haripant and Lord Cornwallis relating to the reception of Tipu's Vakil, Appaji Ram. Hari Pant's desire to receive him in camp, the Governor General's opposition thereto, the change of Haripant's view and agreement with the Governor General were the main topics of discussion. Towards the end, other topics such as the scarcity of provisions in the Mahratta Camp and the steps taken by the Governor General to relieve it and the movement of Bhao's army cropped up for discussion.

*Concluded 24th August 1791.*

On the 4th August a letter from Col. Duff advised the arrival of Appaji Ram at Bangalore. On the 5th August advice was immediately sent to Hurry Punt. On the 6th August a trooper arrived, who reported that he was sent with the Vakeel from Bangalore, and that in spite of his efforts to the contrary, he persisted in going to the Mahratta camp. The Persian Translator was immediately sent to Hurry Punt to remonstrate against his remaining in the Maharatta camp, and to desire he might be sent to Oussore. It appeared however, that two camel Hircarrahs had brought a letter from Appaji Ram to Hurry Punt from Serjapur, where he was arrived and would remain until further orders.

The letter advised of the arrival of a Mahomedan named Dulel-ud-din Khan, whose rank being greater than Buddur-uz-zeman Khan deputed to Hurry Punt in the last war, it was expected that he would be received with proper honors. This letter the Persian Translator was desired to make known to Lord Cornwallis, whose orders were that he should proceed to Oussore where proper accommodation was prepared for him, and that His Lordship and Hurry Punt would meet to consult on the measures to be pursued.

On the 7th August the armies marched and on the 8th August His Lordship went to see Hurry Punt when he reminded him of what had passed relative to the reception of Appaji Ram on a former occasion and related the plan which, he recommended, should be adopted, which was that a person from each should be sent to Oussore as soon as the Vakeel arrived there, and that according to the issue of this deputation it should be determined to receive a personal visit from the Vakeel. Hurry Punt objected to this plan, by remarking that according to the customs of Poona it would place him (Hurry Punt) in a very awkward situation. He quoted the whole progress of the correspondence which had led to the reception of the Vakeel, and remarked that he had written the letter advising the conditions on which the Vakeel would be received, that those conditions had been complied with, and that it was somewhat singular now that he was come, he should not be received in camp. His Lordship replied that the reception which was agreed to was not explanatory as a personal interview, which he conceived was improper while uncertain of the embassy which he might be charged with. The reception in camp, His Lordship could not agree to, and he stated his reasons for so thinking. His Lordship then desired to know from Hurry Punt whether he possessed full powers from the Peshwa. Hurry Punt was hurt at this question, remarked that His Lordship had consulted and advised with him on the answers to be written to Tippoo relative to his wish to send a Vakeel without ever doubting his powers, that now he seemed to entertain such a doubt, he could proceed no further until His Lordship received a letter from the Peshwa in answer to that which he had written on the subject of a congress. His Lordship explained the reasons which urged him to put this question, and said that by letters from Mr. Malet he had learnt that the minister waived giving any final answer to his Lordship's proposal to assemble a congress of deputies at Bangalore and that it was necessary for him to know whether Hurry Punt possessed full powers from the Peshwa. Hurry Punt persevered in declining to give a direct answer, and continued to declare that he could advise no further relative to the reception of the Vakeel. Lord Cornwallis desired Hurry Punt would reconsider the resolution which he had made to withdraw his interference at a time so critical as the present, as that resolution must tend not only to the injury of the confederacy whose object in the reception of the Vakeel was to learn the subject of his deputation to them

in general, but must denote to the enemy a singular want of unanimity in their counsels, which he must see would serve to revive the hopes of an enemy who was at present so much in their power. His Lordship again urged the question on the necessity of it and Hurry Punt at length, formally declared that he did possess full powers from the Poona Government. Upon this Lord Cornwallis expressed his conviction, and that all doubt was now removed from his mind. Buchajee Pundit now asked how His Lordship, who had entertained a doubt for two months, could be convinced by an hour's conversation. On this remark from Buchajee Pundit, Hurry Punt observed that the point had been fully discussed and that no reply to what had been said by Buchajee Pundit was necessary. At this time the interview had attained to a very late hour, and as the subject of the reception of the Vakeel had not been concluded Hurry Punt agreed to meet Lord Cornwallis at His Lordship's tent the next day.

Pursuant to engagement Hurry Punt came to see Lord Cornwallis on the 9th August accompanied by Buchajee Pundit only. Lord Cornwallis reminded Hurry Punt of the various arguments he had used yesterday against the reception of a Vakeel from Tippoo in camp, and recapitulating his former proposal, remarked on the bad effect of a reception of a Vakeel from an enemy with the honors usual on the introduction of a Vakeel from a friendly power, not only on the minds of the troops but also on the minds of the inhabitants as well as on any negotiations that might be carrying on on any subject, and with respect to the situation in which detachments and other operations of the army might be. Hurry Punt approving of His Lordship's plan, asked how His Lordship intended next to proceed. Hurry Punt [again] repeated the question relative to the steps His Lordship would next pursue to learn from Appaji Ram the particulars of the embassy on which he was sent. His Lordship replied that the commission he should give the deputy selected by himself would be to ascertain the credentials with which Appaji Ram might be entrusted and the outlines of proposals which he might be directed to make to the three powers which he should understand to be either in land or money or in any other article according as the Vakeel might be inclined to declare ; that for his part, he had not satisfied his own mind that Tippoo was seriously inclined for peace and that until he could convince himself on this point it was an additional argument with him for not receiving Appaji Ram in camp or with any kind of honors ; that if Appaji Ram, declared his master's desire for peace by a readiness to surrender country or to pay money, he should conceive that there was some foundation to proceed upon and of course he should be ready to advise with Hurry Punt what was next to be done ; that if he declared in the name of his master a wish for peace and should urge that the confederates declare on what terms they would grant it, that in that case he should consider it advisable to deliberate what measures to pursue, as well how far it would be prudent to make known their terms. Hurry

Punt approved of the remarks and proposed to His Lordship that both should address a letter to Appaji Ram advising him of this joint resolution. To this His Lordship gave his approbation and a letter from Lord Cornwallis was accordingly written to Apajiram.

On the 14th August no reply had been received to Lord Cornwallis' letter from Appaji Ram. His Lordship directed the Persian translator to write from himself to Apageram, a copy of this letter was transmitted to Buchajee Pundit for the information and opinion of Hurry Punt. His approbation was communicated by a note from B. Pundit to Mr. Cherry and the letter to Appaji Ram was dispatched by hircarrahs, who were instructed to wait for an answer.

On the 16th August Meer Abul Cassim deputed by His Highness the Nizam arrived, and had an interview with Lord Cornwallis. During the meeting, the abovementioned hircarrahs returned accompanied by two more from Appaji Ram. They brought an answer to Lord Cornwallis' letter and to that from Mr. Cherry.

Lord Cornwallis wrote a letter from himself to Appaji Ram which before it was signed, was sent to Hurry Punt for perusal and opinion. The Vakeel Buchajee came to Lord Cornwallis in the forenoon of the 17th August and introducing the draft of His Lordship's letter to Appageram mentioned he had not at that time had an opportunity of submitting it to Hurry Punt and asked if it had been sent away. He was answered in the negative. Buchajee Pundit then observed on the general practice which had been followed hitherto of meeting to advise and consult on measures, which had not happened in the present instance. Lord Cornwallis took notice of the expressions in Appaji Ram's letter to Mr. Cherry, insinuating his wish to be introduced through Hurry Punt, and enlarged much upon it, by observing on the repeated attempts which Tippoo had made to create doubts and suspicions in the minds of the confederates towards each other. He laid particular stress on the expressions in the present letter from Appageram which, he said, could not fail of impressing Tippoo with hopes of success in his expectation of creating a want of unanimity in the councils of the confederates. Having heard these sentiments from Lord Cornwallis, Buchajee Pundit took his leave to go to Hurry Punt. He returned some hours after with a message from Hurry Punt expressive of a wish that the dispatch of the letter should be postponed until an interview could be had between Hurry Punt and His Lordship.

Having determined on marching in the morning and the intended encampment being nearer to Surjapur, Lord Cornwallis communicated to the Maharattas his intention of sending a battalion of seapoys to Surjapur, to protect Appaji Ram from the followers of the army, and that the instruction to the officer commanding would be to prevent all intercourse with Appageram, except with such people as should be sent by himself, by Hurry Punt or by Meer Aalum.

The army marched on the 18th August. His Lordship in coming to the ground directed an invitation to be written to the Vakeel—Buchajee Pundit, for an interview with Hurry Punt. Hurry Punt accordingly came to see his Lordship. The subject for the visit having been the reception of Appageram or rather the letter His Lordship had proposed to write to him. Hurry Punt asked whether the copy of the letter had been sent to Meer Aalum and if it had, what had been his answer ; being told that it had, and that Meer Aalum had approved of it, he observed that every thing had hitherto been conducted after consultation with each other, that he considered the draft which His Lordship had sent to him of a letter to Appaji Ram carried with it, at least, the appearance that it had been dictated from suspicions of his (Hurry Punt's) conduct, that he had heard that many tales had been conveyed to His Lordship that private Vakeels had been sent by Hurry Punt to Tippoo, and after having laid particular stress upon the openness of his conduct and the sentiments he had lately imbibed of His Lordship's suspicions, which he deduced arguments in contradiction of, such as the presence of a Vakeel from Tippoo which rendered futile his sending a Vakeel ; the prosperous situation of the alliance and his own repeated professions of perfect coincidence with Lord Cornwallis, pursuant to the instruction from the Minister Nana Phurnaveese. The Vakeel Buchajee Pundit in direct terms put the question to Mr. Cherry personally whether Lord Cornwallis had heard that Hurry Punt had sent a Vakeel to Tippoo. This question with all its leading features having been interpreted to Lord Cornwallis, he remarked on the various reports which were daily spread by different people in two armies, so large as these were, to which he gave no ear, that had he placed any confidence in them he should not hesitate in speaking to Hurry Punt on the subject of them ; that he had not heard any such reports on which he could place reliance. Much more was said by Lord Cornwallis, when Hurry Punt had been assured fully of His Lordship's confidence in him respecting the deputation of a private Vakeel to the enemy and that the letter in question had not been dictated by suspicions, he consented to the measure, but remarked that it was a harsh letter and that it was couched in a style contrary to that used in Indian correspondence, and contrary to the nature of letter-writing among great men, and proposed that while the spirit of the letter was preserved, the diction of it should be altered. To this Lord Cornwallis made no objection, and it was agreed that a new draft should be prepared.

On the 19th August the draft was written and submitted to Hurry Punt. In reply another draft was sent by Hurry Punt. To this Lord Cornwallis answered that although the spirit was not materially altered it was in a slight degree, that as this was a difference contrary to the spirit of the conversation of yesterday, he should consider it as no difference of sentiment on the part of Hurry Punt, and should therefore send away

the letter, as he had prepared it, to Appaji Ram. The letter was accordingly dispatched about 4 p.m. on the 19th August.

On the 20th August Hurry Punt came at an hour later than usual and was attended by Buchajee Pundit. After some conversation in complimentary matters only Lord Cornwallis informed Hurry Punt that at the last meeting he (Hurry Punt) had put a question to him at a time when he was little prepared to answer it, that the question he alluded to was "whether His Lordship had heard that Hurry Punt had sent a Vakeel to Tippoo". He observed that in the situation in which he found himself on that question in presence of other persons he knew not what answer to make to it. His Lordship begged that Hurry Punt would be assured of his confidence in his conduct and not attribute his present remarks to any motive but to his wish for the good of the confederacy. He observed that in two such armies, there must be many people ready to spread reports and to listen to them, but that they made no further impression on his mind than to create a desire for putting a stop to them. That, with this view he should relate what he had heard that Vakeels from Hurry Punt had been in Tippoo's army and were returned, that he had heard it in this camp and from intelligence Hircarrahs, who reported that they fell in with these Vakeels at Chinapatam, and what aggravated the mischief from these reports was that Tippoo's horse who escorted the Vakeels declared on the road that a peace was made with the Maharattas. The injury to be apprehended, His Lordship stated to be only from the effects of public talk, that the enemy might spread these reports merely to render the allies suspicious of each other, that for his part he was determined to counteract this effort as much as possible by not listening to any reports of the kind and by cautioning the other allies not only against paying any attention to them, but in using every means in their power to detect the formers of them. His Lordship repeated his assurance of confidence in Hurry Punt, and promised his exertions to find out those who might employ their time in spreading such reports. Hurry Punt declared he had sent no Vakeels, expostulated on the fact as useless in his situation, and particularly while Appaji Ram a Vakeel from Tippoo was near and earnestly pressed Lord Cornwallis to use every means in his power to bring to light the persons who had spread the reports, and to trace the fact itself home. Few words more than a repetition of the same protestations from Hurry Punt occurred on this subject and the remainder of the interview was engaged with mention on the part of Hurry Punt being made of the distress of his army for want of grain, the critical situation of Purseram Bhow's army, and of a garrison left by the Bhow at Bunabalapore. In a former conversation held with the Vakeel and again with Hurry Punt in the information lately received of the movements made by the enemy to the northward, His Lordship gave his opinion that the Bhow's army was in little danger provided he could find a place of security for his heavy guns, that as to



the garrison of Bunabalapore he would give his sentiments on the most secure measures to be taken in their behalf on the ensuing day; that with respect to the distress of the Maharatta army from want of grain His Lordship observed that he did not believe that, prior to the movement to the eastward, grain had ever been cheaper than it had since, that however it might have been much more so since the armies had moved towards the ghauts, had the advice His Lordship had given them of sending into the Barramahal and into the Carnatic (where all duties on grain coming to the army had been expressly prohibited) been in any respect listened to. Buchajee Pundit began, in a tone by no means consistent with his station, to advance complaints against Captain Reade in the districts of Colar, Ouscotta and Bangalore and against all the Poligars, who had received Cowle from the Company, and declared in a very peremptory manner that Hurry Punt did not please to adopt the measures recommended by Lord Cornwallis. His Lordship said that he should issue positive orders to Captain Reade, as well as to the Poligars whose peculiar situation, he observed, in being but recently in possession of their country, which, for some time part had been over-run by large armies, did not well enable them to furnish supplies.

A letter from Appaji Ram to the Persian Translator was read together with the answer that had been prepared to it. To this Hurry Punt acquiesced, and declared that the name of Appaji Ram had so often interrupted their counsels that he was glad it was done with.

On the 24th August Lord Cornwallis sent for Buchajee Pundit and after having informed him of the reason which had induced him to give Buchjee Pundit the trouble for coming, he observed that Hurry Punt availed himself always of the means of another person when he had any subject of a tendency to discuss which was disagreeable and that in general the person he fixed on was Buchajee Pundit, that many parts of the conversation at the last meeting had been delivered by him, and were of a nature disagreeable to His Lordship, and rendered more so by the choice of Buchajee Pundit to dwell and enlarge upon them; His Lordship remarked on the complaints which Hurry Punt had made repeatedly of his distresses, reminded the Vakeel of all that passed at that time, viz., that Hurry Punt very prudently asked how, in case the Mahratta army accompanied the English army which would lead them far distant from their own supplies, they were to subsist; that the answer was comprehensive of the means for their subsistence, "that Bangalore was not in a state to furnish grain, that the Sera road was uncertain, as was the supply they could be able to obtain from the Poligars situated between Gurrumconda and Chintamanipet, that of course other countries must be resorted to, that the Barramahal and Salem countries belonged to the enemy, and grain in abundance could be procured from them while the enemy could only disturb their parties by such accidental garrisons as he might have in hill forts, that the Maharatta parties could thence procure grain for nothing, that if, however, enough

could not be got there, the whole country belonging to the Company was open for them to purchase grain in, that all duties had been expressly removed from grain merchants, "and that, while at Bangalore His Lordship had appointed an Officer and a guard to escort their bunjarries into the Kittoor district, which abounded in grain of all sorts, and had given directions that should not sufficient be forthcoming in that district, the Company's stores at Vellore should be thrown open for them." This was the answer which His Lordship had made to the question, and he observed that Hurry Punt had frequently represented his distresses and he was sorry to say, had not in any one instance followed the plans His Lordship had recommended to prevent that distress, nor would he now to remove it, that on the contrary, whenever His Lordship renewed his recommendations, the only answer given to his advice was that Hurry Punt did not choose to follow the lines pointed out, without any reason being assigned than that of the impression they had imbibed from a former war that the Barramahal was unwholesome for their horses; that he could therefore only suppose that they were themselves the cause of their own distress. But however to assist as much as was in his power in order to alleviate their wants, he had written in a positive and strong manner to Captain Read in the way requested by Hurry Punt, and as he could not speak in any favourable light of his hopes or expectations of assistance from Bangalore, from whence a letter he had just received, had informed him of the scarcity they labored under at that place, nor was acquainted with any persons who could make any engagements with Hurry Punt to supply his army, he would recommend that Mr. Bushby, the superintendent of the English bazars, should be consulted and declared that he was the only person, who could have the hopes even of pointing out any such people, that still the same modes he had in many former conversations recommended remained at their disposal, and after he had formed all these arrangements, and had removed all particular appropriation of such grain as might come to camp by issuing positive orders that such grain should be exposed to free sale in either bazar according to the wish of the seller in the first instance and in the second the English bazars were open to every purchaser, he was much hurt to hear not only such repetitions of complaints which in fact originated and were maintained by themselves, but a direct accusation that whatever grain could be procured was kept for the use of the English army. His Lordship further remarked that much of the conversation setting forth these matters had been held by Buchajee Pundit, and frequently in a style not becoming his station and that his desire to open his mind to Buchajee Pundit on his conduct which he could not but consider extraordinary weighing his situation and that of his brother at Poona, had been the reasons for sending for him. To these remarks Buchajee begged to say a few words in reply. He observed that he had always received great marks of personal attention from Lord Cornwallis, that

he had attended His Lordship for several months, that he had never spoken but by desire of Hurry Punt, who had frequently discoursed with him on the subject of the situation of the Maharatta army. He entreated His Lordship to be convinced of Hurry Punt's confidence in His Lordship's endeavours and exertions, and concluded by remarking that his own wishes were confined to an earnest desire for the preservation of unanimity and friendship between His Lordship and Hurry Punt. After the reply of Lord Cornwallis Buchajee Pundit reported the advices which had been received of the arrival of a large supply of grain for the use of Hurry Punt's army at Chintamani Pet, and requested that Lord Cornwallis would write to Captain Read on the best mode for them to proceed to camp. With this request His Lordship immediately complied. Some few observations were made by Lord Cornwallis on the situation of Purseram Bhao's army which by every information he could collect was perfectly safe, at the same time he thought it necessary to observe that in order for co-operation between two armies distant from each other, both should be acquainted with the operations and intentions of each other. This he said was not the case with respect to himself, that in order to make the requisite preparations for the ensuing campaign it was absolutely necessary that he should remain in this part of the country, that he could not think of moving to the relief of Purseram Bhow whose situation was perfectly safe provided he prevented any separation of his army and he considered that the marches he had made thus far to the westward would operate to deter the enemy from making any movement or detaching any troops of consequence to endanger the army under Purseram Bhow.

**No. 362**—Kennaway communicates to the Nizam the Governor General's consent to his accompanying Prince Sikandar Jah and reports to the Governor General the siege of Gooty by General Raymond.

FROM—CAPT. KENNAWAY,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Pangal, 28th August 1791.*

Having an appointment on my hand to meet the Nizam at an entertainment given to him by the Minister the following day, I took that opportunity of communicating to His Highness your pleasure concerning my proceeding to the army with the Prince Secunder Jah, which I mentioned to the minister, who professed to receive the intelligence with particular satisfaction, before the Nizam came out. His Highness in reply to my communication expressed the sense he entertained of your Lordship's attention, but observed after a few words had passed aside between him and Azeemul Umrah, that he would defer giving an answer to it and other points connected with it for a few days,

in which time advices are expected to be received from Meer Allum of his having joined your Lordship.

The Nizam's troops under the direction of Monsieur Raymond, a Frenchman of good character in his Highness's service, have invested the fort of Gooty, but the want of battering guns which there is no likelihood of his being furnished with, will, I imagine, prevent the reduction of the place, unless a want of provisions should oblige it to surrender.

**No. 363**—Kennaway reports an instance of the double dealing of Nana Fadnis.

FROM—CAPTAIN KENNAWAY,

TO—C. W. MALET.

*Pangal, 29th August 1791.*

By the letter I forwarded to you from His Lordship the 27th instant that the declaration made by Hurry Punt of his being in possession of full powers agrees with the information contained in Tippoo's letter to Mahommed Ameen Arab and likewise with Govind Row Kishen's to this Durbar, and is in as direct opposition to what the minister had signified to you as stated in the 1st paragraph of your letter to His Lordship of the 20th instant viz., that Hurry Punt was not vested with the powers in question.

**No. 364**—Malet communicates to the Governor General the arrival of Bhau in the vicinity of Chitteldroog and makes another representation to the Poona Court for appointing a delegate with powers to carry on negotiations.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 31st August 1791.*

From your Lordship's letters I had great pleasure in observing that tho' the Marratta Chiefs at first objected to the arrangements proposed by Your Lordship for the mutual preservation of a communication with the frontier of both the States from Bangalore, yet by your Lordship's perseverance in the fair and reasonable plan you had concerted it was at length virtually adopted by them by Pursaram Bhaou's movement to the North.

By advice from the Bhaou's camp of the 13th inst. he was 10 miles north-east of Chittuldroog, his communication was open with the Marratta frontier and both grain and forage were becoming cheap and plenty. I understand that the Bombay Board has dispatched about 600 recruits for the 3 battalions under Capt. Little to Macras.

I have the honor to enclose an account of the late escape of five Europeans from Chittuldroog and have written to Capt. Little to collect from them all the information in his power. The escape of these men is a new and mortifying proof of the incorrigible falsehood of Tipu, if the copy of a letter from Monsr. Macnamarra circulated in our public \* \* \* be authentic containing a positive assurance from that Prince to him that no Englishmen were now forcibly detained in his dominions.

On the 29th inst. I intimated to the Minister through Behro Punt that your Lordship, in bar of the extreme delays that in the event of negotiation would arise from such distant reference as this place, had repeated your instructions to me to prevail on this Court to delegate adequate powers to Hurry Punt or any other person the Minister might think proper to which I have not yet received any answer.

**No. 365**—Cornwallis promises to take effective steps to render the line of communication to Seringapatam safe by posting cavalry at stations, and expects that the bunjaras will be exempted from duties by the Nizam's Government.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—CAPTAIN KENNAWAY.

*Camp near Bangalore, 2nd September 1791.*

We expect the arrival of the bullocks in two or three days from Gurramconda for the guns and shot, but I was sorry to find from Captain Read that Hafez Feriduddeen was so ill provided as not to be able to send gunnies for the latter. I was however so anxious that His Highness should not be disappointed of the means of attacking Gorumconda with effect, as well as to shew the earnest concern that I take in any thing in which he is particularly interested, that I have given directions that those articles should be supplied from our small stock in camp although it is at present very inconvenient to us.

It gives me great satisfaction to hear that proposals to so considerable an amount have been made to the minister by the banjaries for sending supplies of grain to the army when it shall be in the neighbourhood of Seringapatam and I am persuaded that a man of so much good sense as Azeemul Umrah will easily see the weakness and impropriety of attempting to raise a paltry sum by the imposition of duties which are likely to prove so essentially prejudicial to the success of our further operations and that instead of regulating the prices at which it should be sold, he will confine his attention solely to the provision of a sufficient quantity of grain to enable us to accomplish the great object on the event of which the speedy and honorable termination of the present war so much depends.

Nothing shall be wanting on my part to take the most effectual means for securing the communication and I wish you to explain to the minister that as it will only be prudent to carry on to Seringapatam a certain proportion of the best of the cavalry all the remainder both of His Highness's and the Mahratta cavalry may be posted in different stations, under Chiefs on whose attention dependance can be placed in such a manner as to render it impossible for the enemy to give any disturbance to the banjaries or any other person who may follow our route.

I shall only at present add that Meer Allum is now so well acquainted with the manner in which business is transacted in this camp that I believe, I may depend upon him for explaining sufficiently to the Nizam and the Minister that there is no risk of my being biassed by Hurry Punt to adopt a line of conduct with which they would not be perfectly satisfied.

No. 366—Malet communicates to the Governor General the intelligence of a negotiation between Haripant and Tipu and the Peshwa's intended excursion to the Kistna.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Peena, 7th September 1791.*

My last advices from Capt. Little are of the 19th ulto. when the Bhaou's army was about 30 coss n. e. of Chittuldroog, forage plenty and grain becoming more so daily. Appa Saib, Bhaou's son, continued to act with a separate corps to the east of Droog tho' at no great distance from his father; he keeps constantly in motion to distress the enemy and to collect supplies for his own and his father's army.

The scarcity of cash that has lately prevailed in Bhaou's camp, had induced Capt. Little to appropriate to the use of his detachment three bills for 32,000 that I sent from hence 12th July for your Lordship's use before I knew of the separation of the Bhaou's force from your Lordship's army.

Intelligence was received in Bhaou's camp of Appajee Ram's approaching your Lordship's camp and it was said that a person named Sungapa had gone to Tippoo on the part of Hurry Punt. Bhaou's sentiments are thought to be averse to peace and Hurry Punt's favorable to it.

A report prevails of the Peshwa's intending to make a short excursion very soon to the Kishtna probably on principles of expiation and purification for the Brahmin blood that has lately been spilt here.\*

**No. 367**—Cornwallis meets Mir Alam in the vicinity of Oussore and relates the circumstances under which Appaji Ram went back.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.;

TO—THE NIZAM.

*8th September 1791.*

Pursuant to the instructions which Meer Allum received from your Highness he proceeded on his journey with the utmost dispatch and made me happy by an interview in the vicinity of Oussore. He related to me the full particulars of your Highness's confidence in my resolution to pay equal attention to the interests of each member of the confederacy, informed me of the plans and arrangements which your Highness has made for giving efficacy to the united efforts of the alliance, and represented to me the circumstances on which depend the arrival of your Highness's son Secunder Jah and the Nawaub Azeemul Omrah.

Your Highness no doubt will have learnt from the letters of Meer Allum and from the verbal communications of Sir John Kennaway the arrival of Appaji Ram on the part of Tippoo Sultaun. As Appaji Ram would not conform to those preliminary measures which prudence and caution dictated in our part, as well in consideration of the circumspection necessary in all military operations as from motives equally forcible in negotiation, but insisted on coming to reside in our camp and in the first

\* This probably refers to the Ghashiram incident. A number of brahmins were detained by Ghashiram, the Poona Superintendent of Police, in a small room without food or water for over twenty-four hours. As a result twenty-three were found dead on the next day.





overcome till the end of October, but that under certain conditions he was willing to move, if your Lordship advised it, on the Deserrah or 7th of the above month.

The rough draft of this letter was sent to me for my perusal, and I expressed my disapprobation of every part of it, particularly the proviso which made the Minister's moving and that too at so distant a period, depend; at this late season and after assurances of so contrary a nature had been given me, on the uncertainty of a reference to camp, and more especially at the unreasonableness of demanding as a preliminary that your Lordship should enable him to purchase a lack of rupees worth of grain in case he should have occasion for it after his junction, when he had taught me to expect that your Lordship should receive aid in this article. He said your Lordship had granted that amount to Hurry Punt besides advancing him money for the pay of his troops. I called to his recollection in reply the difference between his and Hurry Punt's situation, Hurry Punt at a great distance from his own country and dependent on your Lordship; himself in fact at home with every means in his own power; that, however, I had no doubt but your Lordship would afford him every assistance in your power provided you were satisfied he had not neglected to do every thing he could for himself. I remonstrated in the most earnest manner against such letters being sent as I was persuaded, I told him, it would have no other effect upon your Lordship than convincing you what I myself began to think was really the case that he had never entertained a serious intention of joining you. I reminded him of the information I had given him from Your Lordship's letter to me of the 2nd August in which you signify the latest period beyond which your operations ought not to be delayed. I endeavored to bring him to my purpose of giving up the reference and moving immediately by every argument that I thought had a chance of working on his avarice; his vanity or desire of a close connection being formed between the Nizam's and our Government, but in vain. His answer at the concluding stage of the discussion which had lasted for several days was abrupt and incivil; it imported that he was tired of the subject and wished it should drop as nothing I could say would induce him to alter his resolution. This behaviour he endeavored to palliate by a message the next day the 8th instant apologising for his wrath and signifying that I could not have expedition more at heart or a greater desire to proceed than he had, but that it was utterly impossible for him to proceed earlier than the Dusserrah, that his leaving his proceeding precisely on that day in doubt arose from his apprehension of exposing himself to my reproaches in case of a trivial failure well knowing that it was not customary with them as with us to be punctual within a day or two to their appointment, and that he hoped I would not allow words that slipped from him in the heat of argumentation prevent my advising him with the same freedom in respect to the business in hand as I had hitherto done or deter me from assisting to

improve that connection between the two Governments which it was so much the interest of both to desire and which he wished I would promise him to promote as far as lay in my power with your Lordship.

I returned for answer that my earnestness for his proceeding immediately arose from a persuasion that since he had disregarded my frequent and repeated advice concerning an exemption of duties in favour of the Bunjaries, which would have put his supplies on a secure footing, it was only by such early movement that this point and that of assembling the troops for advancing at the period he proposed in the event of Meer Allum's urging it, as he would most undoubtedly do, could now be effected; that my advice he should still have, in proof of which I recommended that no time might be lost in appointing a rendezvous on the southern side of the two rivers and in immediate orders being given to the troops that were in readiness to repair to it, that he would arrange the prince's and his own establishment so as to retain as few people for the purpose of parade and show as possible and that he would take care to have such number of boats and rafts collected at the fords in time as would enable us to cross when we arrived at them without delay; that with respect to my support with your Lordship in the case alluded to I would make no promises, but that it would afford me a very sensible pleasure if by any extraordinary exertions on his part or by the bravery and conduct of the Nizam's troops in future, I might be enabled to give it without reproach; that however he had formed a wrong judgment of me if he imagined the present occasion when he saw I was intent on carrying a point with him was a proper one for urging it to me.

Though I should have been extremely happy to have effected our moving the middle of this month yet I have never been sanguine in my expectations of it and, as I intimated in my address to your Lordship of the 14th ultimo, shall be well satisfied if it takes place in earnest the beginning of October which I conceived my earnestly urging an earlier period was the likeliest way to effect; one good effect which has attended the late discussion is that an exemption of duties to bunjaries has been allowed in all parts of the country except the town of Hyderabad and this place where it is continued to induce them to carry their grain more readily to camp. A similar indulgence being granted by Balajee Pundit if he has not already done it, to induce them to proceed from the Mahratta frontier, would, I think, put your Lordship and the forces that will be assembled under you on an easy footing in respect to your supplies.

Taking it for granted that we move from hence the 7th October, I do not think it would be advisable that your Lordship should reckon on our arriving at Bangalore in less than a month from that date, nor when I reflect on the evasion to which these people will descend when they wish to procrastinate am I at all confident that it would be safe for your

Lordship to depend on our arrival in that time. The minister in the course of what lately passed intimated to me that Rajah Tiedge Wunt had appealed to him whether it would not be better that the speedy conclusion of the war should draw nearer to certainty before the prince moved on account of the straits and difficulties to which his army would be exposed in like manner as his own and Hurry Punt's had been in the present state of it, but that the Nizam, Meer Allum and himself were but of one opinion as to the folly and impropriety of it, and condemned Hurry Punt for having encouraged Tiedge Wunt to propose it. I hope he is sincere and that the promptitude and decision of his measures for effecting the junction with your Lordship will prove that he is so, though I must acknowledge that the appeal betrays a knowledge of that irresolution in the minister's character which the Rajah has but too often made use of to screen himself from the punishment which his conduct in a variety of instances, since in command, would have drawn upon him, had he had a person of more determination to account to. No vigilance on my part shall be wanting to guard against the possible effects of this weakness in the situation we may soon be in; to facilitate which I would recommend your Lordship's expressing to the Nizam in reply to the enclosed letter the disappointment you feel at the probability there is of your operations being delayed on his account and mentioning in positive terms the latest period that you can wait for him. Were your Lordship to advance from Bangalore without this precaution, I am afraid, the Minister would not neglect to avail himself of it, should he be disinclined to join you, to throw the blame off his own shoulders. It will also, I conceive, be advisable that your Lordship communicate to him directly or through me the route you would recommend him to follow, the neglect of which might be another pretext for delay. He seems intent at present on the business of preparation. The bunjaries are beginning to be in motion and grain is transporting to be deposited in magazines on the frontier. He assures me that 10,000 bullock loads sent by the Nizam lately joined your Lordship's and Hurry Punt's camp, but as the information comes from Tiedge Wunt, I conceive the fact to be very dubious. I am sorry to acquaint your Lordship the periodical rains in this part of the country have generally failed in consequence of which little cultivation but of the drier grains is carrying on.

**No. 369**—Cornwallis asks the Nizam's minister to join him with the utmost expedition.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—CAPTAIN KENNAWAY.

*Camp near Bangalore, 15th September 1791.*

Meer Abul Cassim has this day informed me that he had received letters from the Nizam and the Minister which stated their earnest desire

to comply with the request that I had made that the prince Secunder Jah and the Minister should be at Gurrumcoonda with the reinforcement and the supplies destined to join this army by the middle of next month, but that if the prince began his march at the early period which I recommended he would have it in his power to bring but a small part of the force that was intended for this service, and that the time would be so insufficient for procuring and arranging the supplies of provisions that the prince could only carry with him grain for one month and that he must afterwards depend upon me for the support of his troops.

These letters represented on the contrary that if the prince did not begin his march till after the Dewallee (about the 7th or 8th of November), he should be able to bring to the army a large body of troops and a very considerable supply of provisions.

In answer to this unexpected and very discouraging information I desired Meer Allum to acquaint the Nizam and the Minister that I had no other quarter from whence I could obtain supplies for the army under my command except from the Carnatic with which country we could have no communication after the middle of October and that besides the general ill effects which procrastination and delay must necessarily produce on the affairs of the confederacy, if I should be obliged to remain in this neighbourhood till the latter end of December which would be as early according to the proposed plan as the prince could possibly join me I should by that time have nearly expended all the provisions which I had prepared with great labour and expense for the support of the army in the intended expedition against the enemy's capital and I added that if I moved forward according to the plan from which I could not materially deviate it was probable that the event of the enterprize must be decided before His Highness could join the combined army.

I proposed therefore to Meer Allum that the prince and the Minister should be earnestly pressed to come to Gurrumcoonda about the time that I had mentioned with such a proportion of the troops and the supplies as could be in readiness by that time, and that the Minister should take the most effectual measures to be quite certain that the remainder of both and particularly of the latter should follow him, but on the Meer's assuring me that from the moment that the Minister left the country there would not be the smallest hopes of obtaining another soldier or a bag of grain I requested that he should express my regret at the delay in the strongest terms, and desire the minister to use his utmost exertions to procure a plentiful supply of grain for such a body of troops as were now in readiness to march and that as soon as it could be obtained he would move forward without suffering the intervention

of the Dewallee or any circumstance of that nature to interfere with the very important business in which we are engaged, and in the event of which the cause of humanity and justice and the future honour and prosperity of our respective Government were so deeply interested.

You will second in the warmest manner the representations and requests that I have made through Meer Allum and as a contrast to their dilatoriness you may, in the course of conversation, take an opportunity to call to his recollection my general line of conduct, since I took the field and remind him, notwithstanding the numerous calls upon me from various quarters, of the ready assistance I gave in furnishing and assisting to transport the heavy guns to Gurramconda and you may also inform him that I have a few days ago sent a large detachment to attack the hill fort of Rymahu Guru principally for the purpose of facilitating all their communications.

**No. 370**—Malet sends to the Governor General intelligence of fighting between the Mahrattas and the enemy in Bednore and Chiteldrug district.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 17th September 1791.*

I have this day received an order from the Durbar for Rs. 50,000 on account Captain Little's Detachment which is not adequate to reimburse the sums I have expended in my late supplies to Mr. Uhthoff.

My last advices from that quarter are to the 3rd instant and from Kuncoopy in the neighbourhood of Chittuldroog where Appa Sahib the Bhaou's son had joined with his corps. Balwant Rao Toky had been attacked and totally defeated by a body of the enemy while he was engaged in the siege of Mudgherry and it was reported that Banna Bappo who commands a force toward Bednore had applied to Bhaou for a reinforcement to oppose the troops that were said to be collecting by the enemy in that quarter, but I have not yet received any intimation on either of these points from the Durbar.

From the extreme want of rain which seems to have prevailed throughout the north and the north east part of Tipu's country I presume his hopes of supply must rest almost entirely on the countries to the west of Puttun and north west above and below the Ghauts since the rains seldom fail in the neighbourhood of the mountains.

I have just been favored by Sir John Kennaway with copy of your Lordship's instructions to him of the 8th October 1788 relative to the person assuming the character of Myrza Jungly by which I shall regulate my conduct to him.

The intelligence of the defeat of the Marattas at Mudgheery has been confirmed by Behro Punt.

No. 371.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G

*Poona, 19th September 1791.*

On the 19th the Peshwah made a short movement of about two miles.

No. 372—Cornwallis promises his utmost exertion to procure supplies and requests the Hyderabad Prince to begin his march in the beginning of October with provisions.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—CAPTAIN KENNAWAY.

*Camp near Bangalore, 21st September 1791.*

I do not see that I can add anything to what I have already said to yourself and Meer Allum on the necessity of the Princes's beginning his march as soon as a sufficient supply of provisions can possibly be secured which, I still hope, will be found practicable in time to enable him to move in the beginning of next month.

You may assure the Nizam of the strongest disposition on my part to facilitate the purchase of grain for the use of his troops wherever it can be found within the limits of my authority.

The country above the ghauts to the southward of Gurramconda has been so much exhausted that I do not believe it can furnish any considerable quantity, but you may inform His Highness that the Carnatic shall continue open as it is at present both to his troops and to the Mahrattas to make purchases to any extent they may think proper, without being subject to the smallest duty whatever

and you may at the same time explain to him that Hurry Punt has never obtained or asked an indulgence respecting a supply of grain of any other kind.

In settling the general arrangements for carrying on the war, when Hurry Punt with part of the army agreed to relinquish the communication with his own country and to remain with the army under my command, I was sensible that there was an absolute necessity to give some assistance of money for the payment of the troops and accordingly I consented to furnish a certain sum for bills upon the Peshwa payable at Bombay to which place we have occasion to make large annual remittances. But His Highness can be in want of no such aid, as he has his own treasury at his command and he has a communication open with his army.

I find I have hitherto omitted to answer that part of your letter dated 28th August, in which you express some uneasiness at its appearing from the terms of my letter dated the 12th ultimo that I had agreed to your coming with the prince and Minister in consequence of your own recommendation of the measure. This has arisen from an inadvertence on my part, for upon being reminded by Lieutenant Steuart of the particulars of the conversation which gave rise to my determination upon that point, I recollect very distinctly that he gave the opinion that from your having been long accustomed to do business with the Minister, your being upon the spot might tend to promote the public service, not as yours, but as his own, and it had great weight with me as a candid and judicious suggestion.

**No. 373**—Malet writes to the Governor General about the Peshwa's preparations and the movements of Bhau.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 24th September 1791.*

The Peshwa and Minister are still encamped about 3 miles from the city with about 5,000 men. Orders are dispatched to all the feudatory chiefs that have not yet taken the field to join with all possible expedition and I doubt not but by the time the army reaches the Kishna on or before the 12th October it will amount to ten thousand horse and foot with a train of 10 guns.

After a long series of solicitations here and a total disappointment in the payment of the orders granted to me on the Bhaou for Captain Littles detachment, I have this day received 25,000 Rs. with promises of 50,000 more in equal portion at short intervals. I have on this default of payment on the part of the Durbar been obliged to appropriate sums from the funds provided here for the Bombay Government to the discharge of Mr. Uhthoff's drafts on me and have signified to the Durbar that I shall hold them responsible for the heavy loss of exchange to which, not to mention that of interest and the distress of the detachment, we have been subjected by Bhaou's failure in payment according to the 5th article of treaty, and I have repeated my demand that payment be regularly made in the army agreeable to that article. Should your Lordship think proper, your urging the same to Hurry Punt might be of service to prevent future inconveniences on this subject.

I have pleasure in acquainting your Lordship that to the 15 instant 2,000 bullocks have been purchased for the Bombay Government by people employed on the business and instructed to purchase as many as they can procure in time to be at Fort Victoria by the end of October, shou'd that be the route fixed on for their transportation and I hope the number will be about 4,000.

Tho' Captain Little doubtless keeps your Lordship as regularly informed as possible of occurrences in that quarter, yet the probability of an interrupted communication induces me to mention that by advices from Mr. Uhthoff dated the 11 instant the army was encamped near Cancopy; that forage was plenty; that the Rajas of Harponelly and Zerremulla had waited on Bhaou by whose influence with the Beyders their devastations, it was hoped, would be checked; that the Bhaou had marched the 10th instant with a large unencumbered body of cavalry and on the 11th Captain Little had followed with his detachment and two days provision; also Appa Saib, Bhaou's son, who had been left in charge of the camp which still remained on the same ground. The object or issue of this expedition were not known to Mr. Uhthoff when his letters were dispatched.

On learning that the Bombay Board intended sending the reinforcement for Captain Little's detachment to Madras I suggested its being landed on the Mallabar coast in the idea that your Lordship's instructions for sending it to Madras might have been previous to your knowledge of Bhaou's moving so far to the North-west, but on proposing this route of junction to the Minister so many objections were made that I thought proper to revoke my suggestion to the Bombay Board on the principle that in the course of the co-operative plan concerted by your Lordship with the Maratta chiefs, Bhaou would again proceed so far to the south as to render the junction from Madras easy and in time to assist in the service of the ensuing campaign.



By private letters from Bombay of 21 I learn that General Abercromby was expected to sail from Tellicherry for that Presidency the 27th ulto, so that he may be expected to have arrived ere this. The later rains have been generally deficient on this side of India.

**No. 374**—Lieut. Steuart arrives at Pangal on the 14th. Kennaway thinks that he would be able to move from Pangal on the 7th or 8th of October.

FROM—CAPTAIN KENNAWAY,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Pangal, 25th September 1791.*

I embraced the first opportunity of an interview with the Nizam to communicate to him and Azeemul Umrah your Lordship's sentiments concerning the propriety of only taking on a certain proportion of the best horse of his Highness and the Mahratta army to Seringapatam and disposing of the remainder in such situations as would render it impossible for the enemy to obstruct the intercourse of bunjaries or other persons following the camp. They highly approved of this intended precaution which the Minister said would be of great advantage to him and set his mind at ease in respect to the security of his supplies.

It is determined that we cross the Kistna at a ferry below the junction of that river with the Tungbuddra by which a good deal of delay will be avoided. A considerable number of rafts are in readiness and more with some boats are collecting and from present appearances and the assurances which the minister has given me, I am inclined to think, your Lordship may depend on our moving from hence without fail the 8th or 9th of the month; I have the more pleasure in giving this opinion as the Peshwah's journey has been signified to the Nizam without having had any visible effect on his intentions. Secunder Jah being indisposed it is in contemplation to select one of his brothers for the expedition should he not speedily recover.

Lieutenant Steuart joined me the 14th instant. It is my intention after completing one of the Companies of my escort to leave the other with him under the command of Lieutenant Binny whose presence with the Ellore Detachment will not be so necessary after it joins us, as it has heretofore been. I hope this arrangement will meet your Lordship's approval and I embrace the opportunity it affords me of testifying the sense I entertain of the great use Lieutenant Binny has been of and the zealous manner in which he has exerted himself since he was attached to the above corps which I hope will entitle him hereafter to your Lordship's notice and approbation.

No. 375—Malet warns the Governor General against the designs of the Mahrattas by communicating to him the evasive reply given by Nana regarding the employment of the Mahratta cavalry in the ensuing war and the rumour of Haripant's duplicity.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 30th September 1791.*

The Minister, instead of giving the explicit answer I solicited, gave me to understand that the future motions of the Peshwa must depend on circumstances not yet ascertained and he laid particular stress on the want of forage and grain in the Mysore country, tho' for the relief of the armies acting in those quarters he had abolished the customs on grain in the Southern provinces. From this reserve and from what I can collect relative to Pursaram Bhaou's future motions it appears to me that the march either of the Peshwa or Bhaou will depend on various contingencies the chief of which I think may be pronounced your Lordship's measures, since should they be directed to the reductions of Puttun in such force as to convey to this Court a persuasion of success. I am of opinion that a prospect of so important an event would, as on a former similar occasion, draw the whole attention and all the Power it could assemble to the scene of action for the support of its interests in the subsequent pursuits of conquest or negotiation. In the interim I presume every effort of force and art will be employed to get possession of the important fortress of Chittuldroog to which place I hear the Bhaou had advanced.

I explained to the Minister everything that passed between your Lordship and Appaji Ram. With respect to Hurry Punt's mediation the Minister faintly expressed an idea that as the negotiation had begun through him, it should have been continued, but made no answer to my observation that in the same manner as your Lordship's separate correspondence would have ended in the assembling of a Congress, so of course did Hurry Punt's on Tippo's circular address to the Confederates, and I fully explained that the sole object of your Lordship's fair and candid proposal was the avoidance of jealousy and heart-burnings inseparable from any other mode of negotiation.

Upon the whole the Minister did not appear dissatisfied that the negotiations had been stopped, but I think it not improbable that means may be taken to benefit by it with the enemy through the channel of the Rastas, at whose family seat on the Kistna the Peshwa is to encamp.

But, my Lord, whatever may be the foreign intrigues and whatever the domestic jealousies and factions of this Court, I am of opinion that the most likely mode of your Lordship's continuing to combat them with success is by a pursuit of the conduct you have hitherto so happily

I attended according to appointment and the first part of the conference was employed in the perusal of advices from Hafiz Feridudin which mentioned the guns sent from Bangalore having proved unserviceable and the parched and distressed state of that part of the country on account of the failure of rain which he (Hafizjee) said would render it extremely difficult for an army to subsist in it and His Highness dwelt a good deal on these impediments. In respect to the guns I observed to him that Captain Read having reported the state of them to your Lordship the moment it was discovered I hoped you would be able to devise the means of enabling him to resume his operations and of speedily bringing the siege to a conclusion. I lamented that they had not turned out better, but observed they were probably such as had been taken from the enemy and the best Bangalore afforded and that the large battering train which your Lordship was under the necessity of providing for the grand object of the war may have prevented your sending such as you would have done under different circumstances ; that with regard to the parched and destitute state of the country it would probably be changed by some showers which had lately fallen or at any rate by the mild season which was approaching and that our continuance in it, I hoped, would be but of short duration. That difficulties, however, must unavoidably occur in an undertaking of so much consequence and were only to be overcome by being encountered with patience and resolution.

I then delivered to him your Lordship's letter which the Minister opened and proceeded to read. On his reaching that part of it which takes notice of the various reasons you had assigned to Meer Allum for the arrival of the Prince and the Minister at Gurramcondah at the period fixed upon, I desired him to pause that His Highness might reflect upon when that period was, namely, the middle of the present month. The Minister interrupted me and endeavored to impress on His Highness that it referred to a different period, viz., the beginning of November, but I persisted and desired him to read your Lordship's letter to the conclusion which having done I desired His Highness to acquaint me for your Lordship's information what day he had determined for his son's marching. He said, he would with the Minister receive his dismissal and repair to his tents the 6th instant. I repeated my question as to the period of the march. The Minister said the day was not fixed. I asked if I should acquaint your Lordship with as much. He replied no, "write your opinion of our preparation, write what yourself are and will be witness to ; by the blessing of God the expedition of our march will exceed your expectations." I replied from present appearance I should be exceedingly distressed what to write. The Nizam said that by their religion it would be improper to move before the 14th which I combated by observing that such impropriety only referred to commencing a journey as it regarded the common affairs of life and had no relation to urgent or important business. The Minister said he had no doubt of

arriving at Bangalore in time for your Lordship's operations, since as I would be present I could transmit you daily information of the progress of our journey and you would not, he was sure, hesitate to delay your march four or five days for him. I said you most assuredly would not dispute about four or five days, but addressing myself to the Nizam I begged him to consider what your Lordship had just written him, namely, that the season for the march of the armies towards Seringapatam would commence early in November and compare that period with the date before which he says it will not be proper for his son to commence his march namely the 14th instant, and that I knew not to what further period it might not be protracted, besides which there would be a material delay in crossing the river, and in short that there appeared to me to be no grounds to suppose that we should arrive at Gurramcondah sooner than the time your Lordship would be commencing your march for the enemy's capital; that I could say no more than I had done and should not have been so importunate in my remonstrances but for my conviction of his sincerity in the cause of the war and my regard for his honor and reputation which I conceived to be materially involved in our reaching your Lordship's army before it marched from Bangalore and the siege of the capital was begun.

The Nizam said he was satisfied of the goodness of my motives for urging expedition in respect to him, but that the business of supplies must be arranged and put on a proper footing or the present army with his son and Minister at the head of it would be exposed to the same distresses which through an improvidence in this respect before Tiedge Wunt's had been exposed to. I said I only wished that some day for the commencement of our march was fixed that I might acquaint your Lordship of it. The Minister replied I could not be satisfied in that point immediately but that I might expect information the next day or in the day following it. Here the conversation ended. I did not take leave having represented to the Nizam it was probable I might have occasion to see him again on business before our final departure. Secunder Jah was present and both before the Nizam came out and when the point of his going or not was discussed by the Minister I urged such arguments as I thought likely to effect his accompanying us in preference to Feridun Jah, his Highness's third son, for reasons which I will state to your Lordship at a more convenient opportunity but the question was at that time left undecided.

I heard nothing from the Durbar on the 5th (yesterday) and Lieut. Stuart who was to have visited the Minister in the evening having received a message from him that on account of a religious ceremony he was obliged to seclude himself, I was prevented from sending to him. The same reason operated against his seeing the person I sent to him this morning at four o'clock in the afternoon. He and Secunder Jah

received their dismissal from the Nizam and repaired to their tents which are pitched close to my cantonment. I sent to congratulate them on this occasion and the Minister asked my Moonshy if I was now satisfied. He answered that whatever my satisfaction at this event might be it could not be complete till I was informed when we were finally to proceed. The Minister replied it might be in four or five days or perhaps sooner. The Moonshy demanded if he should report this to me for your Lordship's information. He said he would of course report it to me but that he could go no further. As however he has proposed my appointing an early day for taking leave of the Nizam which I have accordingly fixed for the day after tomorrow I hope he will not disappoint me by any material delay in the expectation which by the above conversation he has held out to me of our speedily moving.

**No. 377**—There is plenty of forage in Chitaldroog for the Mahratta troops.

FROM—J. UTHOFF,

TO—CAPTAIN KENNAWAY.

*Camp 5 miles west of Chiteldrug, 8th October 1791.*

We are now in the midst of the finest forage and shall stay here till after the eclipse on the 12th instant. It is the general opinion that we shall rejoin Lord Cornwallis before Seringapatam, but the period and route are not yet fixed. There is no present appearance of the acquisition of Chittledroog which is extremely extensive, strong, well garrisoned, and well supplied. A body of troops will in all probability remain in this quarter or the neighbourhood of Simoga.

**No. 378**—The Minister and the Prince proceed to the front.

FROM—CAPTAIN KENNAWAY,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Pangal, 10th October 1791.*

I took leave of his Highness the Nizam the evening of the 8th instant. The Prince and the Minister marched to a place about 5 coss distant from hence yesterday where I shall join them this evening. I hope we shall proceed to the Kistna tomorrow as near 50 rafts and 2 pretty large boats are reported to be, by my Hircarrahs who last came in, to be ready at the ferry, our delay in crossing will not be very considerable.



**No. 380**—The Peshwa is expected to go back to Poona.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

9 November 1791.

*Camp on the Kistna near Wye.*

Heavy rains have prevented the Peshwa's marching from hence so that instead of making the circuit he intended, it is supposed he will return to Poona by the shortest route to enter that City on the 19th of the Moon being an auspicious day.

On the 7th inst. I received an order from the Durbar on Poona for Rs. 1,25,000, sixty-five thousand on account of the monthly subsidy of the Bombay detachment and sixty thousand as a donation to the Detachment acting under Col. Frederick in the siege of Darwar.

**No 381**—Cherry announces the capture of Nundydrug.

FROM—G. T. CHERRY,

TO—CAPT. KENNAWAY.

21st October 1791.

I have the honour to transmit letters from the Governor General addressed to his Highness the Nizam and the Nawaub Azeemul Umra notifying thorough possession by the English troops of the hill fortress called Nundy Droog or as Hyder Ally Khan named it, Gurdun Shekoo, the importance of which his Lordship has noticed in the accompanying letters as removing a great obstacle from the free communication with the countries to the northward of Bangalore, from whence considerable supplies of grain can now come unmolested to the army.

Lord Cornwallis has further directed me to request you will in his name inform the minister (and request Lieut. Steuart to communicate it also to his Highness) of the possession of this fortress by assault on the night of the 18th instant and urge the value of it in strong terms as the communication (except Gurramcondah now invested by his Highness's troops for whose assistance four pieces of battering cannon were sent yesterday morning from Nundy Droog) is quite open with the northern countries. His Lordship would have written to you on this subject but in consequence of an alarm in the Barra Mahal the army has marched two days successively and will march again tomorrow towards the eastern gauts, which has prevented him from informing you himself of this circumstance

No. 382—The Minister's party halts at Nandyal and submits various excuses at Kennaway's representation for rapidity of movement.

FROM—CAPT. KENNAWAY,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Camp Sirvel, 14 coss from Gunjycotah, 26th October 1791.*

On the 18th we moved from the banks of the Kistna and arrived at Nundial on the 20th which was one day sooner than was at first proposed. As the minister had previously acquainted me he should be obliged to halt there one or two days and perhaps more, for which there appeared to me no good reason, I sent to him the evening of our arrival to urge dispatch and to caution him against suffering himself to be influenced by the motives which detained Hurry Punt in passing through this (the Kurnoul) district, that of oppressing and exacting money from the Nabob of it. He returned for answer that no inducement of that nature should have weight with him, but that he wanted my opinion as Gurramcondah held out, on the propriety of the prince's halting, and where, till it should fall, and he enlarged on the inconveniences we should be exposed to in respect to our supplies if we advanced without it. I returned a written reply the next morning (the 21st) that I was decidedly of opinion this obstacle, even if it was not removed before our arrival as I hope it would be by the arrangements your Lordship had made, ought not to be suffered to detain us, as in the worst event the siege might be turned into a blockade which would obviate every objection in regard to the intercourse for bunjaries being interrupted by it.

I sent to him again on the 22nd remonstrating against our further halting and as Lieutenant Steuart, who came out with an intention of proceeding no further than the north bank of Kistna, had accompanied us on at the minister's request for the purpose of returning with the Durbar Vakeel, to request he would give that gentleman his dismissal. He returned for answer that he had sent my note of the preceding day to the Nizam and would receive Lieut. Steuart's visit the same evening.

Lieut. Steuart waited on the minister according to appointment when he declared to him that my opinion respecting Gurramcondah as expressed in the note I had written the day before would neither satisfy the Nizam nor himself, that if he proceeded beyond Gunjycotah till Gurramcondah was in the Nizam's possession, it would be impossible for him to subsist his army without expending the grain collected by the bunjaries for future need, as the districts, south of the former place, were desolate, whereas if he halted at it he should be able to subsist the troops on provision from its vicinity without breaking in on his depot, and the troops and bunjaries who had not yet joined would also have time to come up, that by these means he would be able on intelligence of the fall of Gurramcondah or of your Lordship's opinion in respect to it, to push forward



with a plentiful supply of grain and money without any further halt, nor could the arguments which Lieut. Steuart used, induce him to swerve from these sentiments. He dwelt on the delicacy of his situation on account of the Nizam's being surrounded by many persons of influence and power who were equally inimical to the war or rather to him for the part he had taken in inducing the Nizam to engage in it, and that on this account it was impossible for him, particularly while so near his Highness, to take any material step without his orders but he at the same time held out the hope that this might not be the case when we were removed to a greater distance. I am sensible in part that the minister's situation is, on account of the Nizam's character, a very difficult one, but I am at the same time afraid he will make use of this pretext on all occasions when procrastination is his object, as I am afraid from what I have already experienced that it will but too often be.

The 23rd instant I was chiefly employed in drawing up an answer to the Nizam's letter, the draft of which I communicated to the minister the same evening. It was long as I had expressed my sentiments very fully on every point connected with the Nizam's determination to send the present reinforcement, the great exertions of the Company in the present war, and the prospect of delay which his Highness's commands to the minister and myself afforded in place of those which had been held out to me. He sent me word on the 24th that he had fully intended to move the next day, but for an accident which is too trivial to mention ; and returned the draft of my letter on the 25th objecting to many parts of it which he said would be unkindly received by the Nizam and by that means be of prejudice to him, and being extremely desirous on my part to avoid doing or saying anything at this juncture that may give the minister uneasiness, I agreed after much discussion to frame it as it at present stands. He is to forward this letter to your Lordship express, and as so much stress is laid on the opinion you may give respecting our leaving Gurramcondah unreduced in our rear, and as my not receiving it on our arrival on the southern boundaries of the Kurpah district, if I can prevail on him not to remit our march till we get there, if the place continues to hold out, will no doubt be made use of as a pretext for the pernicious halt which is pretended to be necessary, sensible, of which nothing but my conviction of an absolute determination to delay would have induced me to give the smallest countenance to the reference in question, I beg to be honored with your Lordship's answer to this letter as soon as possible. I have in the meantime told the minister he must not expect you would give in to the pretence that is made for it, a pretence, my Lord, so shallow, that if it were removed I should think there is little doubt but some other equally frivolous would be found to supply its place. In addition to what I have already written I have further the mortification to add that the Durbar Vakeel who has just taken his leave acquaints me we are to halt here tomorrow on account of the Dewally.

No. 383.

FROM—LIEUT. STEUART,  
TO—EDWARD KAY.

*Pangal, 28th October 1791.*

By intelligence just received from Sir John Kennaway of the 25th instant from Nundial, I am informed that Secunder Jah's army was to march seven coss to Sirwel, which is 60 coss north of Gurramconda, on the following day (the 26th).

No. 384—The Minister halts again and loses much time in determining the route to be taken; Mehedy Ali, Tipu's envoy, still resides in a village of the Kurnool district.

FROM—CAPT. KENNAWAY,  
TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Camp at Chauglamarry, 31st October 1791.*

We marched from Serwel to Pakunda the 28th instant six coss and about the same to this place, which is four or five coss east of Gunjycottah, yesterday. The minister is to determine here whether he will take the straight road by way of Gulcheroo and send round his guns and wheeled carriage by the Comar Calwah pass to meet him at Rachooty, by which a considerable distance would be saved, or whether he will proceed by Gunjycottah and Jemaul Murroo with his heavy baggage. I have for some days past strenuously recommended the former to him and he seems at present disposed to relax from the objections which he at first stated against it. I am exceedingly apprehensive, however, that much time will be lost in settling this point, collecting the forces which have been ordered to assemble here and finally arranging his supplies, points on which he lays considerable stress while he is profuse in the warmest declarations of his earnestness for dispatch. The blockade of Gooti has been relinquished and the force that was employed against it, of which Monsieur Raymond's corps joined to day, is to form part of the reinforcement that is to proceed with us. I beg leave of offer your Lordship my congratulations on the reduction of Nundydroog and learn that 4 guns would be dispatched from thence to Gurramcoondah at the 21st instant at farthest.

I am concerned to inform your Lordship that Mehdy Ali Khan, Tippoo's Vakeel, is still hanging about this district. The minister was the first that acquainted me of it. It appears that after having dismissed the Nizam's, Govind Row Kishan's and my Hircarrahs on pretence that he had advanced far enough to be out of danger, he returned countenanced by the

Nabob of Kurnoul and took up his residence in one of his villages where he was accidentally discovered, it is said, by a servant of the minister's. Repeated have my remonstrances to him on the subject been and as frequent have been his accusations against the Kurnoul Nabob for his duplicity, the only pretence alleged by the latter for the protection afforded is that the Vakeel having failed in his mission is afraid to appear in his master's presence, which however he promises shall have no weight with him in future.

No. 385—Malet forwards to G. G. an account of his discussions with the Peshwa's court, which had become jealous of the ascendancy of the British power as a result of Cornwallis' victories. Behro Pant therefore proposes the employment of Bhau's force in a direction other than that agreed upon, disfavours Peshwa's proceeding to the scene of war and shows the difficulties of the enterprise against Seringapatam.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Camp on the Kishna near Wye, 31st October 1791.*

I have been prevented addressing your Lordship since my last respects of the 28th inst. by the daily hope of being able to give you some definite intelligence relative to the motions or intentions of this Court, but seeing no end to the uncertainty in which I have been lately held on those points, I shall no longer defer troubling your Lordship with what has since occurred.

On the 23rd inst. I was visited by Behro Punt who acquainted me that the Peshwa and the Minister had resolved to visit the Raja at Sattarra the next day, taking only a retinue of 3 or 4,000 horse and leaving the camp standing, as they meant to return the 24th inst.

At this meeting I entered very fully and very openly on the subjects that had been brought on the tapis at my last conference with the Minister. I enlarged on the appearance of mystery and reserve in this Court's conduct to me and candidly told Behro Punt that comparing this conduct with the frequent and circumstantial reports of cabals and intrigues by which the Durbar was at present agitated, I was at a loss to account satisfactorily for the Minister's conduct on any principles of policy or civility, considering my personal and official claim to candid if not confidential communication for your Lordship's information. I observed that few societies and fewer courts were free from faction and intrigue, but I begged to know if the benefits of our alliance were so neutral as not to afford the Minister and his friends arguments for refuting those of the opposite party, whose factious complaints of the difficulties and loss of horses to which Hurry Punt's army had been subjected would be easily silenced by quoting those of the

last war against the same enemy in alliance with Nizam Ally Khan when, added to the inevitable dangers and difficulties of war, they had the mortifying reflexion of having lost both territory and credit, whereas in the present war an uninterrupted train of success had crowned their armies with glory and enlarged the bounds of the empire with an extensive tract of rich and most desirable territory, the visiting of which, abstracted from every other good consequence of advancing toward the scene of action, should be an object of the policy and curiosity of the Peshwa and the Minister, I laid much stress on the movement of Secunder Jah and instanced the great facility with which every point of future discussion would be settled by a similar one by this court.

Behro Punt in reply begged me not to admit an idea of any diminution of personal or official respect toward me either on the part of the Minister or the Durbar, nor to admit a belief of the prevalence of any factions in prejudice of the Minister's influence, tho' he did not scruple to acknowledge that there were men who cavilled even at the formation of the alliance as derogatory to the dignity of this state by conveying an *implication of debility to seek a partnership in conquest* and that in the present case the connexion had, by leading the armies of the State into circumstances of extreme difficulty, caused greater loss and distress *then would have attended the prosecution of the war in their own way*. In answer to this language without noticing its arrogance and folly, I remained B. P. that the alliance was of their seeking, that it was not an unprecedented violation of the dignity of this state as was evinced by the last war jointly with Nizam Ally Khan against the same enemy from which it only differed in its success that without much presumption might be attributed to the accession of the Company's force.

B. P. observed that the circumstances of the alliance with Nizam Ali Khan differed in the essential point of his being entirely under the influence of this State; but that, he could in confidence assure me, as it was probable the ascendency of the Peshwa would not be so implicitly admitted in the present alliance; his presence instead of proving beneficial might be the source of inextricable difficulties, since in the event of any disputed point it might be found incompatible with his dignity to recede, even tho' the unanimity of the alliance depended on it, in illustration of which he mentioned the late invitation of Appajee Ram through Hurry Punt and his subsequent non-admission to an audience, which could not have been admitted had his embassy been negotiated through the Peshwa in person,

I recalled to B. P.'s recollection the perfect fairness and equality of your Lordship's conduct on every occasion and particularly in the affair of Appajee Ram and observed that you had communicated to H. P. the mode you meant to observe in treating with that Minister on the 19th July, eighteen days before his arrival in the neighbourhood of the allied Camp on the 7th August, so that if it had been thought

exceptionable, Hurry Punt had full time to communicate his sentiments to the Vackeel, tho, it appears that both Hurry Punt and Meer Allum coincided in the reasonableness of your Lordship's ideas and adopted them accordingly. Tho' Behro Punt did not controvert this language, he still inclined to hold fast the position that, had the Vackeel been invited through the Peshwa, he could not have been dismissed as he was.

As to the equipment of the Nabob's son he said that was to be judged of by the issue, adding (though confidentially) that the Minister had received advice of the Nabob's having represented to your Lordship the impracticability of a large equipment to attend his son in a short time, but that on your Lordship's still urging promptitude, he had soon after dispatched his son and Minister ; B. P. said the Prince would proceed expeditiously to Gunjicota and there halt to collect troops which, however, he (B. P.) seemed to doubt equalling H. P.'s army, even after the severe loss of horses sustained during the late season of extreme distress for grain and forage, which the Nabob's troops had escaped by withdrawing into their own territories. At all events he said he hoped your Lordship would not be dissatisfied if the quota of this State acting with your Lordship equalled that of the Nabob and if Hurry Punt's amounted to that number, there could be no objection to Bhaou's acting elsewhere.

Observing the tendency of this language to reduce the Mahratta force, I replied that as your Lordship had concerted plans of operation with Hurry Punt and Bhaou, they certainly ought to be punctually and faithfully executed, for that, if instead of exerting and doing their utmost, each party were to be watchful for a pretence to curtail its force, the consequence was obvious. But if this State wanted an example I begged leave to recommend that which your Lordship had uniformly set in preference to the Nabob's, which by his own account was exceptionable and of which if really so, this Court had a right to urge a correction, but in so doing I begged he would previously remove every ground of recrimination.

Behro Punt acquainted me that the enemy had been long and busily employed in destroying every vestige of vegetation round Puttun and strengthening the place with new works and mentioned these points in such a manner as to convince me. Great credit is given to them here. I accordingly replied that he might recollect the stories of poisoned rivers and desolated countries that were circulated on the commencement of the war, that stories of this kind were always industriously circulated by doubtful friends and professed enemies, that if Tippu dug up the forage round Puttun, it was probable that the loosening of the earth would make it more productive after the first fall of rain. But if not, that the surrounding desert must be more destructive to him than the allies whose communication would soon be open with their own frontiers in every direction, and as to his multiplying his defences, it was rather a proof of the desperation of his situation than of any security to be derived from them against

the superior force of the allies, invigorated by the certainty of a quick and glorious termination of all their labors ; and I strongly repeated the necessity which I had frequently urged before of Bhaou's being positively enjoined to make such depots of grain in his new conquests as might facilitate the accomplishment of this great work and that he should not be suffered by any pretence of want of money to delay his again proceeding to the south conformable to the plans settled with your Lordship.

Tho' Behro Punt could not relinquish the difficulty of the enterprize, he assured me every step had been taken by this Govt. to facilitate its success by exemption from customs on grain proceeding to the army, by orders to Bhaou to collect grain and by the steps that had been taken to supply him with money for the arrears of his army which had been delayed from a mistaken reliance on the resources of the conquered countries.

After the above and a great deal more general conversation on the reciprocal benefits to be derived from a faithful discharge of the engagements of the two states, B. P. left me to go to the Minister, and about 11 a.m. I received a message from him that the Peshwa's journey to Sattarra was put off for the present and that his return to Poona would be delayed; but tho' I have frequently since that time desired an explanation of this change of measures, I have not been favored with any nor any information of what is hereafter intended, tho' reports are confidentially circulated that the Peshwa will reenter Poona about the full Moon.

Various reasons are assigned for the uncertainty and fluctuation that has lately marked the measures of the Durbar. Some impute it to a diminution of the Minister's influence and the consequent prevalence of the caprice and humor of the young Peshwa actuated by persons desirous of counteracting the Minister's councils, who, tho' his mind seems sound and vigorous, holds it on the precarious tenure of a debilitated body ; others account for it in a predilection of the Minister himself still to assemble such a force as may enable this State to give law to the confederates on the conclusion of the alliance, and the circulators of this opinion adduce in proof of its verity that Sindia, Bhosla, and Ally Bahadur have been summoned to join the Peshwa ; but it appears to be that the assembling of the great Feudatories of the State will in the present state of parties at this Durbar be attended at least with an equal prospect of embarrassment as of benefit to the State.

I was exceedingly concerned to learn that the captious temper of Appa Bulwant had caused your Lordship any trouble, the circumstances of which I would have explained to B. P. had I not been restrained by considerations of delicacy and prudence as they are related and as Appa (who is one of those men who gain the character of good nature from a capricious laughableness in common intercourse) is a great favorite of the Peshwa from the circumstances probably of his understanding not entitling him to the usual deference of a more advanced age. Two modes

occur to me of accounting for Appa's conduct, the real captiousness of ignorance that aims to assume by arrogance a consideration which it is conscious of never gaining by any other means, or the common trick of these people who generally in their negotiations introduce a turbulent and a palliating character that they may occasionally reap the benefit of both in pursuit of their objects or in receding from them with decency. But while your Lordship's candor, rectitude, and firmness must control the crude ebullitions of such a spirit on the spot I will endeavor by a proper use of such circumstances as your Lordship may think proper to favor me with, to correct any evil impression from misrepresentation here.

Reports continue as usual to be circulated here of a correspondence with the enemy the truth or falsity of which I esteem of little consequence while your Lordship's force is so adequate to the great object of influencing the issue of the war.

On the 29th I received a visit from a son of Gungadur Rasta who invited me to an entertainment the next day at Anand Rou's, the head of the family, with which I complied and met with a very civil reception. The Peshwa seems well pleased with his residence here and the attentions of his uncles to promote his amusement.

P.S.—It has just been intimated to me by the Minister that the Peshwa will proceed to visit the Raja at Sattarra the 3rd Nov. and direct his route toward Poona the 4th.

**No. 386**—Lieut. Steuart returns to Pangal and submits a written representation to His Highness for ordering the Minister to continue the march.

FROM—LIEUT. STEUART,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Pangal, 4th November 1791.*

Having obtained my dismissal from Azeemul Omrah at Nundial on the 22nd ultimo, I arrived here on the 24th of the same month and on account of the absence of the Durbar Vakeel I had no intercourse with the Nizam till the 20th when receiving intelligence of the capture of Nundydroog I thought it proper to inform his Highness immediately in writing of that fortunate event.

To remove the Nizam's and minister's frivolous pretext for halting at Gurramcoondah in the event of that place holding out after the prince's arrival in its neighbourhood, I was induced on the morning of the 3rd instant, as the only means left me, to draw out a paper for His Highness containing such arguments as occurred to me likely to have that effect, and at noon as I was about to dispatch the above paper to the Durbar,

receiving a message from Mustakeem Jung, the Vakee, abovementioned, informing me of his arrival and intention to pay his respect to His Highness and then to wait on me, I immediately sent my Moonshy with it to him with orders to request him to present it to His Highness in the course of that day if my audience was to be longer delayed.

Mustakeem Jung sent me his approval of my letter to His Highness with a promise to deliver it in the evening and desired my Moonshy to acquaint me that I would have an audience on the following day the 4th instant and would have had one sooner had not the Nizam expressed a desire to show attention to Meer Allum by waiting for his (Mustakeem Jung's) arrival. I received a note to-day (the 4th) from Mustakeem Jung mentioning the delivery of my letter to the Nizam accordingly and that having been promised an answer this morning, he would defer coming to me until he received it. As some delay however may take place before I either see him or His Highness, I beg leave to close this letter.

**No. 387**—The G. G. points out how the holding out of Gurramconda does not constitute a sufficient reason for the Minister's delay and instructs Kennaway to induce the Minister to proceed quickly.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—CAPT. KENNAWAY.

*Camp between Bangalore and Oussore, 4th November 1791.*

My sentiments respecting Gurramcoondah perfectly decided that even if the lower as well as the upper fort should be able to hold out, so far from its constituting a good reason for halting, it would in my opinion be a degradation to the Nizam's son and to the reputation of His Highness's arms to allow that circumstance to retard the march of the armies for a single hour, because the interruption to be apprehended from that place to our supplies can only be in proportion to the number of its garrison, which by all accounts does not exceed 700 men and consequently could with the greatest facility be blockaded and effectually shut up by a small detachment of His Highness's army.

I trust, however, that the troops now before Gurramcoondah, will reduce the lower fort soon after the arrival of the guns and ammunition that I sent to their assistance from Nundy Droog, and from the description that has been given to me of the place. I should in that event look upon it as of every little consequence even if the upper fort should not agree to surrender, and could not be conveniently forced as I understand that by occupying the lower fort with a moderate garrison, the soldiers and inhabitants in



the upper fort would be completely shut up and reduced almost to the situation of prisoners.

You will, therefore, communicate this opinion to the minister and at the same time state to him my expectations that, when he recollects that by the late reduction of Nundy Droog and some other hill forts in that neighbourhood there is not a single soldier belonging to Tippoo between Bangalore and Paungal except the insignificant garrison of Gurramcoondah, a man of his good sense will not suffer an obstacle which is merely ideal to interrupt for an instant the execution of the general plan of operations and that he will accordingly without wasting time continue his march to form a junction with this army.

I shall have occasion in a few days to dispatch a considerable number of the bullocks of the grain department to remove a large quantity of rice from Vencatagherry to Bangalore which it may perhaps require 15 or 16 days to accomplish ; and I have reason to expect that about or even before the time that those bullocks can return, the last of the heavy artillery and stores of every kind that I have ordered from the Carnatic will have reached Bangalore.

Being sufficiently sensible that a failure of regular supplies for the support of the vast multitudes of which our armies will be composed, might render the ultimate success in the object of the campaign exceedingly precarious I have spared no pains to open and secure our communications to the northward and eastward of Bangalore and I have so completely succeeded in my wishes to enable our bunjarries to pass and repass without obstruction that for several months past our bazars have abounded with all kind of grain at reasonable prices.

It is proper that you should know, though I would not choose that it should yet be mentioned to the minister that in order to secure a continuance of that abundance it is my intention to employ part of the time in which our convoys will be upon the road in attacking Severndroog and some smaller hill forts between Bangalore and Seringpatam for the purpose of rendering the communications behind us perfectly safe unless I should find upon a close examination of those places that it would require too much time to reduce them, and on that account that it would be most advisable to blockade them.

I do not, however, wish that this communication of our present situation and of my intentions should induce you to relax in pressing the minister to proceed upon his march as much as you find you can venture, without irritating or disgusting him as from his propensity to procrastination and other circumstances it seems very clear that no means that you can use will hurry him on before the period when his presence would be required to correspond with the other arrangements for the movements of the whole confederate force to invest Seringapatam.

No. 388—Kennaway communicates to the G. G. the Minister's pretext for halting and submits an account of the Minister's march.

FROM—CAPT. KENNAWAY,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Camp Kazipet, 5th November 1791.*

On the 30th I sent to the minister as well to learn his determination with respect to our route as to point out to him my idea of the futility of the arguments he had used for halting till certain points connected with his advancing in a proper manner, which I thought might be settled on the march, were adjusted, and I waited on him the 1st instant for the same purpose. His answer to me on both occasions was, so far as words go, such as I wished, and I fully expected we should have moved the 2nd, but an excuse came from him the evening of the 1st importing that having adjusted an agreement with the Nabob of Kurnoul by which he was to furnish an aid of eleven hundred cavalry to proceed with his two sons who are at present in camp, instead of a few hundred infantry that are with them, besides engaging to provide a lack of rupees worth of grain at a moderate price, he should be under the necessity of halting the next day to give the Nabob's near relation, who had attended him through the district and through whom the agreement had been concluded, his dismissal; that this was the thing that detained him, and that he would march the 3rd.

I sent to him again the evening of the 2nd to remind him of his promise and to entreat he would consider of the valuable time he was wasting; I desired him to reflect that but one day, agreeably to the Mahomedan computation of time, was wanting to complete a month since he received his dismissal from the Nizam and that in that ample time we had not got over above forty coss of our journey. I again insisted on the almost positive certainty of Gurramcondah being reduced before we could get there, and acquainted him that the remainder of the heavy train and such other reinforcements as your Lordship was in expectation of, left Madras the 15th ultimo and had doubtless joined you ere this, after which nothing would be wanting to complete your preparations but his arrival. I desired him to recollect the assurances he had given me that I should meet your Lordship with satisfaction as far as my doing so depended upon his conduct, which he could only accomplish by joining before you left Bangalore; above all I repeated my request that he would not suffer his attention to be drawn aside by inferior objects from the grand one that had called him forth, which he had repeatedly assured me it should not.

The minister sent me word in reply that he would faithfully adhere to every assurance he had given me; that the delays complained of had been

unavoidable and indeed necessary to his advancing in respect to his equipment and supplies in the manner we equally wished, and that every thing now being in a proper train or nearly so, he should move the next morning and hoped to advance by such long and successive marches as would bring him if necessary in the course of six or seven days to Gurramcoondah.

We marched the next morning (the 3rd instant) four coss to the village of Dhoor, and in the evening I again sent to him to remonstrate on the shortness of the distance, and to represent how difficult it would be for your Lordship to wait for him, when from his motions you had so little reason to think he was in earnest to join in time. He returned for reply that his march the next day (the 4th) would be nine coss and half, and six coss and half the day following which would bring him to Kurpa.

We marched again the 4th and the advanced tents were ordered to Cazypait, which is about the distance the minister mentioned; but it beginning to rain before daybreak without any likelihood of intermission, and very little wet weather on this rich and soft soil being sufficient to render the roads extremely heavy, he was obliged to send orders for them to be stopped and pitched at Chintacoontah which is about three coss, where we arrived yesterday, and notwithstanding the wet condition of his tents and rain again this morning I have the pleasure to inform your Lordship that we have come on to Cazypait today, which circumstance has given me better hopes than all the promises I have received and I trust that I shall be further confirmed in them by our proceeding to Kurpa, which is about six coss and half distant, tomorrow. Rain has been much wanted for some time in these districts both for forage and cultivation. What has already fallen, with what may be expected will, I hope, promote both and tend to lower the price of rice which since we crossed the Kistna has been seldom cheaper in the camp bazar than from four to five seers of the middling sort and from five to six of the coarse kind, such as is given to elephants, per rupee; the price of other grains has been in the same proportion and very little cheaper in the villages at a considerable distance from us.

I have the honor to enclose a copy of the Nizam's answer to the letter I wrote him from Nundial, but it is not my intention to contend with his Highness, about whether Hafizjee supplied the number of bullocks Captain Read wanted or not. It is sufficient that your Lordship and the minister know he did not, however desirous the latter may be to conceal it from the Nizam, and that it was with great difficulty the few sent were procured. The minister has lately acquainted me that the Mahratta Vakeels at the Nizam's court were to join him soon; he mentioned their intention of doing so to me before we left Paungul, but as I thought he had construed as such some unmeaning profession they had made him I did not then think the intelligence sufficiently authentic for your Lordship's notice.

No. 388A—Lieut. Steuart requests the Nizam to urge his Minister to proceed.

FROM—LIEUT. STEUART,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Pangal, 7th November 1791.*

I had a visit from Mustukcem Jung on the 4th instant in the course of which he dwelt on the powers of Azeemul-Umrah and the futility of my speaking to the Nizam to hasten his motions.

I highly approved of the powers being lodged with the officer in command and expressed a wish that all pernicious or frivolous causes of delay would thereby be removed, but observed that if any such occurred as in the present instance, I should think it my duty to urge his Highness to enjoin expedition.

On my putting the question to him (Mustukeem-Jung) whether the fall of the lower fort of Gurramcoondah (which I conceive can be taken at pleasure) of which I was told the garrison consisting of Poligars were not admitted into the upper fort that was defended only by 4 or 500 of Tippoo's soldiers, would induce the minister to proceed, as so small a party could easily be hemmed in and would be too trifling to admit of a creditable halt on its account or any danger in having it in the rear, he assured me that Azeemul Umrah having taken the field, his own credit would certainly lead him on, either immediately on the fall of the lower fort or on the receipt of your Lordship's answer to Sir John Kennaway's letter of the 27th ultimo.

In the evening of the above day I had the honor to deliver your Lordship's letter to the Nizam who after expressing much satisfaction at the fall of Nundy Droog and desiring his Moonshy to prepare an answer pointed out to me the very backward state of the Mahratta preparations; in reply I requested his Highness not to be guided by their example but to order the Prince to proceed without delay and to consider a hearty co-operation with your Lordship as the best means of securing a speedy and advantageous conclusion of the war, and being unwilling to run the risk of displeasing his Highness in the smallest degree I desisted from pressing him further. He expressed his regret at the unfortunate choice that had been made of Rajah Tiedge Wunt observing that the officer in charge of an army should always have the power of acting without any reference agreeably to circumstances on the spot, and conluded by showing much anxiety for the speedy fall of Gurramcoondah to enable the Prince to advance and great apprehension that a sufficient supply of stores and apparatus should not be sent with the guns for its reduction.

**No. 389**—Andrew Read narrates the storming of the lower forts of Gurramconda and praises the gallantry of some of the European officers.

FROM—CAPT. A. READ,

TO—CAPT. KENNAWAY.

*Camp before Gurramconda, 9th November 1791 (noon).*

I have the pleasure to acquaint you that the lower forts of Gurramcoondah are now in possession of his Highness the Nizam's troops.

Our breaching battery opened on the 6th instant and with such effect that by next evening a practicable breach was made in the curtain of the outer walls, and the inner as I formerly mentioned to you was so old and shattered that few shots were required to make it in appearance practicable. The defence of the bastions near the breach were also knocked off and the rampart kept clean of the enemy by the guns in the infilading battery and shells from the two 5½ inch mortars. There were shots enough remaining to have levelled the wall to the very bottom, but I thought it better not to give the enemy time to throw new impediments in our way by strengthening or cutting off the breach in the insides, at which they had been indefatigable the night before, although a constant fire of shells round grape and musketry was kept upon them to prevent it. I accordingly ordered a storming party down to the breaching battery in the evening about dusk consisting of the company of artillery (all but a few left with the guns) the grenadiers of the Detachment and 6 battalion companies with 20 guns lascars carrying ladders in case they should be required. The guns from the infilading and breaching batteries kept up a heavy fire of round and grape during the early part of the evening until 9 o'clock which was the hour appointed for the storm when they began to fire blunt cartridges, and the storming party advanced regularly towards the breach, the artillery leading. The fire from our batteries had been so well conducted during the evening that very few of the enemy were near the breach to oppose us, and indeed I do not believe they had the smallest suspicion we should storm so soon. The Europeans got close to the glacis before the party was discovered and immediately jumped down the counterscarp of the ditch at a place at least 6 feet high, the grenadiers following close in their rear some getting down by the help of ladders and others leaping down at once. The garrison not having had time to collect in any numbers near the breach, very little opposition was made and we soon got over it, the enemy flying on all sides to gain the upper fort. The Europeans with part of the grenadiers pushed off to the right along the rampart of the outer fort clearing every thing before them whilst the rest of the grenadiers and the battalion companies immediately advanced exposed to a heavy fire from the upper fort, and stormed the breach in the inner wall, which was found more difficult to get over than was before imagined and required the assistance of the ladders. They soon however

mounted it and pushed forwards directly to gain possession of a Pagoda which commands the road to the upper fort, where a number of prisoners were taken and several of the enemy killed that were making their escape to the first gateway, the ascent to which was found so steep and difficult and so well defended, that it was not thought prudent to pursue the fugitives any further. By this time we had got complete possession of the lower forts, the first party with the Europeans having cleared the ramparts of the outer wall and the Pagoda, the second party had gained, commanding the inner. The gates were soon after thrown open and the Nizam's troops entered who were left in possession of the place and our Detachment withdrawn to camp next morning.

Our loss during the night amounted to 22 killed and wounded, among the latter Lieut. Tueworker Hall of the artillery shot through the leg but not dangerously, 5 private Europeans and 2 Subedars.

As the enemy made but a slight resistance and those who could not escape to the upper fort concealed themselves till the heat of the business was over, not so many were put to the sword as might be expected on such an occasion but a great number of them were made prisoners.

I beg leave to assure you that the resolute and gallant behaviour of the Detachment on the occasion is deserving of the highest praise. Particular thanks are due to Captain Dalrymple who commanded the 6 battalion Companies at the storm, to Lieut. Scott who headed the Company of artillery and to Mr. Conductor Nixon who led the forlorn hope.

Contents of the letter of the 6th I communicated to Unkah Jung, and requested of him to deliver the minister's letter endeavoring at the same time to prevail upon Hafizjee in my name to comply with every thing that was required of him in regard to the disturbances in the Palnaud and Dopaud districts. Two days ago Unkah Jung informed me that he had spoken to Hafizjee on the subject and had seen the Aumil of Dopaud, who was then in camp and was to be dispatched immediately to his district with instructions to do every thing in his power to settle the matter and if he has not sufficient force to apply to Lieutenant Beale for assistance.

I shall pay particular attention to what you desire concerning the laying in a stock of rice for the Detachment and providing carriage for it.

No. 390.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Camp on the Kistna near Wye, 9th November 1791.*

As I have some reason to think, this Court wishes to collect the sentiments of the Nizam's Durbar and frequently of Hurry Punt and

be gained by his proceeding himself with the guns by Comarcalwah, instead of letting an officer in command of them consult his own case with respect to the time of joining us again at Rachooty beyond which he had declared it would not be proper for him to proceed without them, I desisted sending to him on the 10th. On the 11th we marched about 5 coss, and on the 12th, when we arrived at this place, about 7 further. On the afternoon of that day it began to rain and has continued to do so without intermission to this time (noon) with very little appearance of its clearing up. The day we marched from Kurpah I had the honor to receive your Lordship's letter of the 22nd ultimo and also your commands of the 4th instant, such parts of the former as relate to your Lordship's wishes regarding Assud Ali Khan and Tiedge Wunt I communicated to the Minister the evening of the 12th, adding that I wished him to consider the forcible manner in which Your Lordship had expressed yourself, and that I would attend him next morning to explain myself more fully and to receive his answer.

I attended him accordingly yesterday, and after we had retired from the public tent where Assud Ali Khan was, I acquainted him that I had conveyed to your Lordship what had passed between us on this subject with his refusal to part with Assud Ali Khan and assurances that under the strictness of his inspection, he (Asud Ali) should by the gallantry of his conduct, redeem your good opinion; but that your Lordship having had too many proofs of the badness as well of his as of Tiedge Wunt's character, had returned the answer concerning them which I had sent him the preceding evening. I told him that your Lordship was not of a temper or disposition to give way to that degree of resentment you had conceived against the persons in question till after frequent provocations and repeated proofs of their treachery and misconduct; that I thought it behoved, and therefore strongly recommended it to him to pay that regard to your opinion which the justice of it deserved by removing these people from their trusts. He replied that he had maturely considered what your Lordship had written, acknowledged the wisdom and circumspection which had dictated it, and added that he had forwarded the extract itself to the Nizam. Assud Ali, he said, had sworn by the most sacred oath of their sect, an oath which one Shiah would never take to another to sanctify a lie, that he had not taken the smallest bribe from Tippoo. Tiedge Wunt and Mahomed Ameen Arab as well as Assud Ali Khan, he said, he knew, had corresponded with Tippoo, but the letters with the dates of them, which he would lay before your Lordship, were in his possession, and they had been induced to enter into it at a time when their minds were weakened and alarmed by the most absurd fears for their own safety in the particular situation they were in. He entreated I would do him the favor to represent to your Lordship the situation I knew him to be in, from the very few chiefs in the Nizam's service in whom he personally could place any reliance; that Assud

Ali Khan was an exception, and one from whom he expected to derive the greatest aid in the undertaking he was embarked in ; that he had under him at present three thousand of the best horse in this army which would be further augmented in a few days by a thousand more, and thus circumstanced he left your Lordship and me to judge how extremely embarrassed he should feel to be obliged to leave him behind. He desired I would assure your Lordship that you had nothing to apprehend from their being with him, as under his eye they would not dare to conduct themselves but in a proper and becoming manner. He felt, he said, as well from inclination as propriety how incumbent on him it was to take notice of their conduct towards your Lordship, but he hoped you would agree with him that the present juncture was not so fit for it as after the war, when friendly complaints on either side could be attended to and redressed at leisure ; and that he trusted your Lordship would in the meantime indulge him so far as to receive those persons in his company in the same manner as you would do the other chiefs that attended him ; but that any intercourse with them, you would of course be relieved from by his presence. I told him I would report to your Lordship what had passed, but I wished he would take notice of the subject himself in the letter he had just written, and that which is enclosed. He said he could not do it in that as it was finished and sealing, but that it should be done in the next he had occasion to write you.

Fully aware, my Lord, that the Minister would be much embarrassed by my persisting to urge these men's dismissal further than I have done, sensible of the truth of his observation how few chiefs there were in whom he either can, or is disposed, to place that degree of confidence which he reposes in Assud Ali, and believing though he may be disappointed in his expectations of the service which the latter will be of to him that neither he nor Tiedge Wunt will venture to conduct themselves in an improper manner under the Minister's eye, if he is seriously bent on restraining them I thought it proper to desist from further pressing, and to acquiesce in reporting the conversation to your Lordship in the manner stated in the foregoing paragraph. Sensible, however, of the delicacy of suspending my remonstrances with your Lordship's letter of the 22nd ultimo before me on one hand or of persisting in them without any prospect of success and even with some risk of our progress being affected by it on the other hand, I found it extremely difficult to make choice of such a line of conduct as even in my own opinion would not be liable to exception and I shall therefore be very anxious for your Lordship's sentiments on what has passed, as well as for your instructions for my further guidance. I have the pleasure to inform your Lordship that the accounts which the Minister has received for these six weeks past from the army, of the state of forage and provisions in it have been of the most satisfactory nature, and that since my last the price of rice and other grains in this part of the country has considerably fallen.



**No. 393**—Malet returns to Poona and communicates to the G. G. the report of the despatch of five thousand horse to Tipu through the mediation of the Rasta.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 18th November 1791.*

On the 9th I had an audience of the Peshwa in the afternoon to present your letters to him and the Minister announcing the capture of Nundydroog and in return much satisfaction was expressed and a salute fired on the occasion.

On the 10th the hereditary Prattiniddee, who under the Marratta Rajas was the first Officer in rank in the empire, had a meeting with the Peshwa in the neighbourhood of Wye and on the 11th the Peshwa marched to Kinnye, a village belonging to that officer at his invitation.

On the 12th I proceeded on my return to Poona where I arrived the 15th, having on the road been honored with your Lordship's commands of the 22nd ulto. and shall make the best use in my power of the arguments contained in them at my first meeting with the Minister to hasten his preparations.

The Peshwa arrived and entered the City the 16th at night.

During my stay at Wye it was mentioned to me by a person of some credibility that about 5000 horse had been raised and dispatched to Tippoo through the channel of one Ballajee Keyso in the Rasta's service, but tho' I cannot lay the stress of authenticity on this intelligence it tends to corroborate general conviction of that family's constant and zealous attachment to the enemy's welfare and I have not a doubt but that a constant correspondence between him and this Court is carried on through its mediation and from Sir John Kennaway's address it seems equally reasonable to conclude a similar correspondence exists between the enemy and the Nizam, nor may it be improper to mention to your Lordship that when in the last war of this State and the Nizam against Tippoo, the latter's conduct became matter of complaint to this Court the Nabob's correspondence with the enemy was conducted through Meer Allum and his brother Zeinal Abadin who is a confidential servant of Tippoo.

8. It escaped me to mention that at my audience of the Peshwa on the 9 inst. I mentioned in the manner most likely to prevent the effect of misrepresentation Hurry Punt's not marching with your Lordship after the capture of Nundydroog, when the Minister assured me that his detention had been caused by the expectation of a convoy with a considerable sum of money, but that he would soon overtake and join your Lordship, on the expediency of which I expressed my sentiments and I hope the event will have verified his assurances.

No. 394.

FROM—LIEUT. STEUART,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Pangal, 21st November 1791.*

On the 15th instant I took the earliest opportunity of acquainting the Nizam through Mustakeem Jung of the number of Banjarries belonging to your Lordship's army and of the cheap rate at which grass sold in your camp.

2,000 bunjarries loaded with rice proceeded from hence yesterday to join the Minister's camp and that I hear considerable numbers are preparing for the like purpose in the neighbouring districts notwithstanding that coarse rice has been selling here for some time past at 6 and 7 seers the rupee.

No. 395—Malet sends intelligence to the G. G. about the intended release of Buddur-uz-zeman Khan and the dispatch of bullocks for Cannanore.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 21st November 1791.*

On the 20th I had the pleasure to receive intelligence that upward of 2000 of the bullocks and 1000 of the drivers provided by me for General Abercromby had sailed from Fort Victoria about the 16 inst. so that they may be reasonably expected to reach Cannanore before the 26th and vessels were daily expected for the remainder ; I hope they will be with the General by the end of this or early in the next month.

I have received intelligence that Buddural-Zuman Khan, the defender of Darwar, is soon to be liberated and sent back to his master which after the treatment he has received and his long confinement has an odd appearance just at this period. It was this person who settled the last peace between this State and the Nizam on one part and Tippo on the other.

The Essex arrived at Bombay the 17th inst. having left England the 26th May.

No. 396—Kennaway submits an account of the Minister's march and communicates to the G. G. the Nizam's intention to move as far as Gurramcondah.

FROM—CAPT. KENNAWAY,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Camp Rachooty, 23rd November 1791.*

The bad weather mentioned in my address of the 14th lasted without intermission till the forenoon of the 17th when it began to clear up. On the 18th we marched 4 miles to the mouth of the Comarcalwah pass ; we got through it the 19th, but this defile which is about two miles long being formed by the bed of a nallah at that time knee-deep with a very sandy bottom the Minister did not think proper, on account of the labour the cattle had undergone in working through it to proceed further that day ; the 20th we advanced about 7 miles, the 21st and 22nd about 13 miles each which brought us to this place about 11 coss distant from Curramcoondah. The two last marches lay through a confined and woody country which rendered them very harrassing for the cattle many of which are not yet come up, and one of the guns only arrived this morning. This is the reason alleged by the Minister for our halting to day but I hope we shall proceed again tomorrow. I have great pleasure in acquainting your Lordship that we found rice selling here at 8 seers per rupee, and that the country which till very lately was barren of pasture is covered with verdure.

The Nizam talked in general terms before we left Paungul of moving on himself as far as Gunjycottah in the middle of January and the Minister has lately acquainted me in confidence that the 1st of Jimad-ul-Awul (about Christmass) is the lucky day at present fixed on for repairing to his tents ; that his Highness would probably advance by slow marches as far as Gurramcoondah from whence his motions would be regulated by his (the minister's) and your Lordship's joint advice : and that the Nizam had mentioned his intention of moving on generally to Balajee Pundit, which, he hoped, might conduce to the Peshwa's advancing also.

The 20th instant I received a letter from Captain Andrew Read covering copy of his address to your Lordship of the same date. These letters conveyed to me the first intimation I had received of his requiring my interference to procure from Hafizjee the cattle necessary for transporting the two 26 pounders with some shot and stores back to Bangalore ; the letter which he mentions having written to me in his address to your Lordship having miscarried, I have made the proper application to the Minister who has promised me an order to Hafiz this evening ; but as I am apprehensive the Aumil may be rather dilatory in complying with it, being willing to move himself in two or three days to join us. I shall desire Captain Read to use his endeavors to collect as many as he can for the purpose required independent of him.

P.S.—Since writing the above I have received Minister's order to Hafizjee which will be forwarded to Captain Read to supply him with the number of bullocks mentioned to me to be necessary for transporting the two 26 pounders shot, etc., to Bangalore.

No. 397—Malet points out the inexpediency of setting Badar-uz-Zeman Khan at liberty and is assured by the Minister of Bhao's co-operation in spite of his indisposition, which is not regarded as serious.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 25th November 1791.*

I minutely explained to (him) Behro Punt your Lordship's letters to me of the 22nd ulto. and to Parsuram Bhou of the 31st and added such subsidiary arguments as seemed most likely to have weight with this Court, particularly the great derogation that would ensue to the puissance and the foul stain that would rest on the faith of this State, should it, at a period when the objects of the alliance were brought so near a glorious termination, fall short in its engagements and with the labor yield the glory of the achievement to your Lordship's exertions, nor did I omit to give such an account of your Lordship's great preparations as to convey an impression of ample ability to conduct the war to the most honourable termination. But that as the allies were equally bound by their engagements and the respective honor of their States, every degree of facility that could be derived from their co-operation was absolutely necessary and incumbent, from a conviction of which the Nabob had sent his son and Minister to join your Lordship, who, I doubted not, had by this time reached the neighborhood of your Camp, but notwithstanding this movement and the plan concerted at the end of last campaign with Bhou and Hurry Punt and your Lordship's preparations in consequence thereof, I was concerned by letters of 11th inst. from Capt. Little to learn that he had no positive intelligence of Bhou's intending to move to the south on which, by your Lordship's letter to that Chief written with the approval of Hurry Punt, he would perceive so much stress was so reasonably laid.

Behro Punt after hearing all I had to urge on these subjects which I concluded with a particular request that he would explain them so fully to the Minister as to prepare him to favor me with an unequivocal answer on the ensuing day, assured me he would represent them as I desired and use his best endeavor to procure the answer I wished.

I mentioned to Behro Punt my having heard an intention to set Buddural-Zeman at liberty and observed that averse as I was to being instrumental to the continuance of his confinement I could not help thinking that the liberation of a man of his negotiatory as well as warlike

abilities would have a suspicious appearance just at this period. He seemed to agree with me in the opinion and said he would mention it to the Minister.

Agreeable to engagement I waited on the Minister the 23rd and on signifying the motive of my visit found him fully prepared to make it perfectly satisfactory by a full and candid assurance that I might in perfect confidence write your Lordship that measures had been and should continue to be taken to prevent any disappointment to your Lordship by failure in the co-operation of the Bhou whose pecuniary difficulties had been removed and to whose immediate compliance with your Lordship's letter, copies of which he acknowledged having received, no obstacle prevented but indisposition with which he said he had been some time afflicted but not to a degree he hoped to prevent his acting agreeable to the emergency. I expressed my warm satisfaction on this communication which I told him I should immediately make known to your Lordship.

He told me the Bhosla quota with some additional Paughas from him had joined Hurry Punt, and said his latest intelligence of the Nizam's son was of his arrival in the neighborhood of Gunjycota which he understood to be farther from Bangalore than Chittuldroog (Bhou's station) was from Seringputtun. I observed that as the lower fort of Gurrumconda was now taken I imagined the Prince would advance without delay immediately to join your Lordship. In the course of our conversation relative to the plentiful state of your Lordship's bazar, he said he understood none but the people of our own army were permitted to purchase in it on which point your Lordship's letter of the 22nd ulto. enabled me to give him perfect satisfaction and his surprize at being undeceived conveyed to my mind that the fact had been misrepresented to him with circumstances of exaggeration.

I have taken steps to sound Behro Punt relative to the intelligence mentioned in a former letter of the Rasta Family having raised some horse for the enemy and from the opposition of interests between him and that family, he may probably take some pains to investigate its truth, and as a further clue to any enquiries that your Lordship may think worth making it may be proper to acquaint you that Ballajee Keyso is the son of the Dewan of Raja Ramchander of Balkee.

**No. 398**—*The Bhao's indisposition is regarded as serious.*

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 9th December 1791.*

On the 7th I was favored by Capt. Little with copies of his letters to your Lordship of the 20th and 25th ulto. the substance of which I immediately communicated to Behroo Punt who has replied that

from some uncertainty as to the pecuniary arrangements made here for his relief, at the time of Bhou's communication to Capt. Little, he may have been obliged to use some ambiguity in his expressions to that gentleman, yet as very soon after that time he will have received full satisfaction from hence on that point, every obstacle to the concerted co-operation will have been removed except the Bhou's *apropos indisposition which I am sorry to find is here thought serious.*

I have to this day dispatched to Fort Victoria for General Abercromby 4,214 bullocks and 3,100 drivers but from the very rainy and unseasonable weather we have had for some time past here I shall be very happy to hear of their safe arrival at Cannanore.

No. 399.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 19th December 1791.*

I have learnt from the Bombay Board that all the articles *intended as a present* from the Court of Directors to the Peshwa not having been ready in time to proceed by the Elsey the Court has desired that those which are arrived may be detained till the others reach Bombay.

No. 400—Captain Little submits the details of the storming of the fortress of Holihonore and communicates Bhao's movement further westward.

FROM—CAPT. LITTLE,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Camp nearby Coorly at the Junction of the Toom and Buddra,  
22nd December 1791.*

From our encampment near Changhurry where we had been since the 21st November we moved on the 14th instant and on the 17th reached the South-east banks of the Tumbuddra in four marches, about 15 miles west of Changhurry, by a route not direct, the pass through the range of hills to the westward lying northerly of Changhurry. On the 18th the Bhow desired me to reconnoitre Holly Honore about 4 miles to the southward on the Buddra, within a mile of its junction with the Toom, and to report to him my ideas of the most advisable mode of attack. I accordingly reconnoitred it with Captain Thompson the Commanding Officer of our artillery, and with his advice reported to the Bhow that with two 12 pounders and 80 or 100 rounds each I thought a breach might be effected ;

but to render it the more certain and which might at the same time operate the more forcibly on the Killedar to surrender, I suggested four being employed and two breaches attempted in which our Detachment would afford whatever assistance the Bhow might require. The next morning four guns, the two largest 8 pounders were sent with our Detachment; we found the Peynt evacuated, and the Bhow's guns worked by his own people, were employed at my suggestion against a tower at the north-east angle of the fort. About noon two of the guns 8 pounders with some 6 lb shot were put under my orders. In the course of the next day, with the assistance of some other guns, worked by the Bhow's people, a breach was effected and at moon rising on the morning of the 21st the place was stormed and carried by the Detachment. The ditch had been plumbed and found to be 16 feet deep. To provide against a failure at the attack of the breach from the depth of the ditch or any other cause, Captain Thompson was employed with 6 lb. to blow open the gates to enter by that way or along the *fausse-braye* up the breach as might appear most advisable. Both attacks succeeded. On the 19th a Sepoy was killed, a Jemmaddar lost his leg and five Sepoys were wounded, and at the storm two Sepoys wounded. The garrison consisted of about 250 men, many of whom made their escape across the river, and are supposed to have gone to Simoga, no measures having been taken to cut off their retreat, tho' I had suggested it to the Bhow. For my sense of the conduct of the Detachment I beg leave to refer your Lordship to the orders I issued on the occasion. The counterscarp of the ditch not having a revetment was found more easy of access than had been expected. The fort is extensive and has a *fausse-braye* with towers and cavaliers. The walls are partly of stone and partly of mud, and are roofed all round with tiles.

The fort was delivered over to the Bhow's people about 7 o'clock with the Killedar who had been taken alive. Hurryba Appa who had been detached to the south eastward with about 2,000 horse was attacked by a party of the enemy consisting of about 2,000 foot and 500 horse with a few guns and has fallen back to Ramgherry about 7 coss distant, with the loss of a few men, among whom is Ponderah a Marattah Chief of some consideration.

I have requested the Bhow to acquaint me with the cause of his movement to the westward, intimating the great distance to which it leads him from the post that has been appointed for this army between Sera and Shevagunga. I expect an answer from him in the course of the day. On the whole he affects to be satisfied that he shall be in very good time to co-operate with your Lordship, intimating that all the stores have not yet arrived from the Carnatic, that Secunder Jah has not joined and that Sevendroog remains to be taken. The enemy are said to be in force at Simoga and another party to be advancing from Seringapatam, but their numbers I have not been able to ascertain, and from what

I can at present collect, it does not appear that they are likely to make any serious opposition to this army in the field, though they may perhaps be able to cover Simoga, which I understand to be about 3 coss hence on the Toom.

No. 401—The dubious language of Bhau elicits another remonstrance from Malet for compliance with the cooperation plan.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 25th December 1791.*

I have embraced every opportunity that offered of reminding the Minister of the promises made me on the 23rd ulto. relative to Bhau's cooperation with your Lordship and of contrasting those promises with the language held by Bhau to Captain Little as described in the copy of that gentleman's letter of the 10 inst. 16 days after those promises were made me by the Minister.

But notwithstanding the Minister in reply to my instance repeats his assurances that Bhau's conduct will be made perfectly satisfactory to your Lordship and that it will be carefully regulated to promote your objects I am apprehensive that it will rather be calculated to reap the effects than actually to promote the progress of your Lordship's arms, the specific force of which will, however, I hope, be as hitherto as coercive on the allies as irresistible to the enemy.

It has been intimated to me that the Minister is desirous of Sindia's coming here. If so, it can be with no other view than to increase the weight of this Government in the future transactions of the Confederacy, tho' certainly at urgent risk as to the views and disposition of that artful and ambitious Chieftain.

No. 402—The G. G. communicates to General Abercromby the capture of Severndrug and advises him to move to Periatputtun.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—ROBERT ABERCROMBY.

*Camp at Magry near Severndrug, 30th December 1791.*

It gave me great satisfaction to learn that you had ascended the Ghauts and that you were well supplied with draft and carriage bullocks.

I notified to you on the 22nd the reduction of the very strong and important hill fort of Severndroog and I have now the pleasure to add that I have since that time obtained possession without any loss of four other hill forts, three of which might have cost us much time and many men



if they had been well defended: Colonel Floyd with every part of the stores that had remained behind, is now within three days march of Bangalore and I shall be perfectly ready to proceed towards the capital about the 10th of next month, unless the slowness of Pursaram Bhao's movements should occasion a further delay of a few days. As I am neither acquainted with the state of Periapatam nor the nature of the ground immediately adjoining to it, you must necessarily act in a great measure according to your own discretion and your knowledge upon both these points; but as soon as you have got up all the artillery you intend to bring forward, which in my opinion should not exceed ten 18 Pounders and four 12 Pounders and your two mortars, besides your field-pieces, there could, I think, be no risk in your moving with 9 or 10 Battalions to Periapatam as I do not conceive that Tippoo's whole force would venture to attack such a corps when stationary in a tolerable post and he will not be much inclined to attempt a mere cannonade with brass guns against your iron 18 Pounders. It would certainly be very convenient that you should be at Periapatam before we actually arrive at Scringaputtam, as it may be in my power to send a detachment to join you so situated before we reach that place. My wish is that you should lodge a considerable quantity of stores and as much grain as possible on the top of the Ghauts, but I should not by any means recommend that you should bring forward a larger quantity of either to Periapatam than you could carry with you when you are directed to move.

No. 403—Malet reports to the G. G. the capture of Holyhonore by Bhao and communicates the animated debate that took place between him and the minister on the subject of the employment of Bhaou's force. Malet demonstrated the propriety of Bhaou's advance to Magry and in the alternative suggested in junction with General Abercromby the reduction of the north-western portion of Tipu's territories.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Poona, 30th December 1791.*

I... had a meeting with the Minister on the 28th, when I opened the business of my visit by observing that I was sorry to learn from a letter from your Lordship of the 1st instant that you had not then received an answer to your letter to Bhau of the 1st ultimo, though from the assurances of Hari Pant, from the agreements entered into with him and Bhau at the close of the last campaign, and from entire confidence in his (the Minister's) wisdom which could not but feel the necessity of exertion at this critical period to bring the enemy to a due submission to the will of the allies, your Lordship had a firm conviction that no lukewarmness would take place. I observed that all these grounds of dependence on the part of your Lordship would be confirmed by his (the Minister's) assurances

to me of 23rd ultimo, but that on the other hand that well-placed dependence would be greatly staggered by the receipt of Bhau's answer which, to say no more, was indecisive.

I added that as my letter from your Lordship was 27 days old, I should be glad to receive any later intelligence he could give me relative to affairs in that quarter. He said he had advices of 16 days that the attack of Maugry (or as we call it Saven droog) was resolved on, which he (the Minister) seemed to think less expedient than advancing direct to Patan and that only on making one march the bazar rate of provisions had been doubled.

I observed that your Lordship on the spot, aided as you were by your own experience and the advice of Hari Pant, must certainly be allowed the best judge of the conduct of the war,—which he admitted with a show of partiality to his own opinion. From the increase of the price of provisions I drew a new argument in favour of the advance of Bhau, thereby to cover the access of convoys and give security to the Banjaras by controlling the Beyders and other freebooters of the enemy.

But the minister, on the other hand, said that if merely on the Grand Confederate Army advancing one march such had been the rise in the price of grain and that not from any particular molestation of the enemy, of what use would Bhou's advance be but to add to the scarcity, and that the best time for Bhou's advance would be on your Lordship's approaching Puttun. I repeated my suggestion of the security that would be derived to the Bunjaries, adding that while the armies of the allies were engaged in the reduction of Maugry that was in fact Puttun, nay that the exertions of the allies were more necessary there than when the army advanced to Puttun, as then the enemy's efforts would be weakened and confined while during the approach to the Capital they would be most lively and extensive, and I expressed my surprise at the Minister's disapproving the attack of Maugry when its fall must add so much to the facility of procuring grain on the difficulty of which he laid so great stress.

The Minister still with expressions of preferring the blockade of Maugry replied that the dearth did not so much proceed from the difficulty of access as from absolute scarcity of grain and on that principle alone he rested the difficulty of Bhou's approach.

I asked what steps had followed in consequence of the frequent assurances the Minister had given me of measures being taken to send grain from these parts particularly on our return from Wye, when I was told an embargo had been laid on the export of grain to any other quarter he said measures were taking: I said that feeling as he appeared to do the necessity of such a supply your Lordship would have to lament that his intentions for relief signified so long ago as the middle of November were yet unexecuted.

And as to his still entertaining doubts as to the expediency of the attack of Maugry and of Bhou's advancing till after its capture I produced and begged him to read the Marratta draft of Bhou's answer to your Lordship furnished me by Capt. Little and after he had perused it I begged to know if he could still entertain any doubt of the expediency of the attack of a place which Bhou unasked had recommended as absolutely necessary and whether he could still hesitate as to the incumbency of his advancing to support an enterprize of his own proposal and which had probably weighed greatly with your Lordship in the adoption of it, for the Bhou's answer had not reached you the 1st inst. it most likely had previous to the resolution of undertaking the siege.

The perusal of Bhou's letter and the inferences I drew from it evidently disconcerted the Minister both as to the ground he had taken as well as to the preference of a blockade of Maugry and the inexpediency of Bhou's advancing during its siege so that after recurring to the sufficiency of the present force under your Lordship and Hurry Punt (the muster rolls of whose army he produced and said they contained 25,000 horse exclusive of foot and which were soon to be joined by the Nabob's troops under Secunder Jah) he put an end to further discussion by producing letters which he said were just received from Bhou and after the perusal of which he would communicate what might further appear requisite on the subject.

Thinking this a good opportunity to prepare the Minister for a consideration of every practicable mode of employing Bhou's force I, agreeable to what is mentioned in your Lordship's letter on the subject, questioned the Minister as to the advisableness of Bhou's joining General Abercromby. He asked where. I replied at Periaputtun. Behro Punt observed that Periaputtun was only 10 coss from the Capital and that the same difficulties as already enumerated would be equally applicable there. He likewise asked what was to be done after the junction, I replied there could be no want of objects so long as the war lasts. From some circumstances in this part of our conversation I thought the Minister would approve of a junction of the armies of General Abercromby and Bhou to act to the North and should your Lordship's force and arrangements admit of dispensing with General Abercromby's cooperation in your attack of Puttun, it seems reasonable to conclude that the whole of the enemy's North West territories hitherto little molested, would soon fall before such an army as his and Bhou's would constitute, while the enemy's principal force and attention would be employed in the defence of his Capital, and by such a double prosecution of hostilities he would be effectually deprived of resource during the defence of or asylum on the fall of Puttun. In the event of the feasibility of such an idea it might be necessary for General Abercromby to ascend the Ghauts further to the North than the Coorga Pass when in his progress he would probably find little difficulty in reducing the low country and thereby cutting off the enemy's communication with the sea.

At this meeting I mentioned the conduct of the Bassein officers noticed in my last, when the Minister showed such sensations as incline me to think it was entirely without his privity. He assured me, he would enquire into the affair and let me know the result.

On the 29th inst. I received from Stewart copy of Sir John Kennaway's letter to your Lordship of the 9th inst. enclosing copies of a letter from Tippto to the Nizam and his Vackeel Mehde Ally Khan of the 14 Zehige 1205 which from the difference of description cannot I presume be the same as is mentioned in the 4th Paragraph of Sir John's letters to your Lordship of the 14th ulto.

I have not yet heard from the Minister on the subject of Bhou's late letters mentioned above; but last night I had the pleasure to learn from Mr. Ulthoff that Bhou had moved about 25 miles mostly in a western direction from Changerry and taken the fort of Holyhonore by storm on the 21st inst. being the 3rd day from the opening his batteries against it.

I have to this day dispatched to Fort Victoria for General Abercromby 4,463 bullocks, 2,979 pack-saddles, 3,664 pack-bags, 560 yokes and 3,400 drivers. I hope to send off 359 to-morrow with drivers and furniture.



## SECTION 8.

*Last stage of the War : Final attack on Seringapatam and submission of Tipu Sultan (January—February, 1792).*

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No. 404—Cornwallis desires Abercromby to cut off the communication between Bednore and Seringapatam and to supply himself with a full stock of entrenching tools.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—ROBERT ABERCROMBY.

*Camp at Magre, 4th January 1792.*

If you can encourage the people belonging to the Coorga Rajah or any irregulars that you may have with you to endeavour to interrupt the communication between the Bednore Country and Seringapatam so that in the event of Tippoo's drawing any supplies from that quarter it would add very much to his present distress.

Upon an inspection of our entrenching tools, we find that by some mistake or accident we have a very small proportion of felling axes and bill hooks. I wish therefore that you should if possible make an addition to your stock in these material articles. I can enter into no particulars on the plan of reinforcing you from our side of the river until I can communicate with Pursaram Bhaou of whose movement I am sorry to say I have as yet no accounts. Captain Reynold's very satisfactory letter and sketch were received by me.

No. 405—Tipu opens negotiations for peace.

FROM—TIPPOO SULTAN,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

7th January 1792

Received 13th January 1792.

(1) At this time, with a view to strengthen the friendship and to remove the disagreements between the Ahmedy Sirkar, the Company, His Highness the Nawab Asoph Jah and the Peshwa and to cultivate the ties of intimacy between these four sarkars, a confidential and experienced man belonging to this Sirkar will be deputed to your Lordship in order that by negotiation personally with every one the displeasure of the mind may be done away with and a reconciliation with each other, which is for the good and quiet of mankind, may take place. If this meets with Your Lordship's approbation, be pleased to notify it that the abovementioned person may be sent to a place appointed and the ancient friendship may be renewed.

(2) Tippoo Sultan to the Peshwa, Copy received from Buchajee Pundit, 14th January 1792.

The language exactly the same, *mutatis mutandis*, as the letter addressed to the Governor General.

No. 406—Cornwallis suggests to Haripant a plan for the protection of the right flank for the security of communication in the rear, and after a discussion with Buchajee on Bhau's deviation from the agreed plan, the G. G. decides to write to the Peshwa.

Memorandums of the conversation which took place between Lord Cornwallis, Hurry Punt and Meer Aalum, 7th January 1792

Lord Cornwallis met Meer Aalum at Hurry Punt's tent where was also Appa Bulwant Row and Buchajee Pundit; after the first compliments, Hurry Punt informed his Lordship that advices were just received from Purseram Bhau. From the contents of a letter from Capt. Little of 22 Dec. it appeared that Purseram Bhau had marched west about 15 miles and had attacked and carried a fort in the outskirts of the Bednore province called Hooly Hononwur. On learning this movement made by Purseram in a westerly direction, his Lordship asked Hurry Punt whether he had received any letters from Purseram Bhau and if he had, what they might contain relative to his moving in the direction pointed out to him in his Lordship's letter dated 31st October 1791. In reply Hurry Punt said that by the letters which he had received, he learnt that Purseram Bhau had received his Lordship's letters dated 6th December and that an answer to them

would be dispatched in a day or two, Hurry Punt then desired Buchajee Pundit to read over a paper of intelligence from Seringapatam which ending according to the usual custom with the intelligence received by the Mahrattas with a report in the enemy's Camp of an intention to make a night attack on the English and Mahratta armies he asked some desultory questions on the subject of such an event. Lord Cornwallis, apprehensive that the immediate object of his visit might be frustrated by this unconnected theme, observed to Hurry Punt that the first measure now to be pursued was to guard the right flank of the present position of the armies, that the left was very secure from the posts occupied by his infantry, that to the right was also a post of Infantry and of the Mahratta Cavalry, but as the country in that quarter was an open one some means should be contrived to keep the communication with the above party of cavalry stationed at Byrawdroog, distant about 6 miles from Hurry Punt's Camp, and if possible also from Byramdroog towards Peddi Balapore, by which means the enemy's horse would be prevented from getting round the right flank and the convoys on their way from Bangalore could not be molested. His Lordship remarked that from the intelligence first received of Purseram Bhow's situation this precaution is become doubly necessary, as had he moved to the position pointed out to him, he would now be situated as to cover the right flank and keep it protected when the armies advanced towards Seringapatam and no party of the enemy's Cavalry could possibly molest the Bunjarries in the rear. Hurry Punt replied that the post at Byrawdroog was very distant and that the Cavalry there were in want of grain, that even if there was grain, the Mahrattas could not purchase it, as notwithstanding his Lordship's orders relative to the Batta, no one would receive Mahratta rupees: conceiving that his remark might precede the request to recall the Cavalry, his Lordship explained to Hurry Punt that the bazars of the corps of Infantry stationed with the Cavalry were furnished with grain from Camp and that his Cavalry might also be so furnished if Hurry Punt would exert himself, that some exertions of that kind must be made, and the Corps must remain there, otherwise neither army could expect to have any supplies in the course of a few days. Hurry Punt then entreated his Lordship to send some Bunjarries to Byrawdroog, which he was told every endeavour short of force should be used to effect. Lord Cornwallis then entered on the explanation of the measures to be adopted to keep possession of this part of the country when the armies should march, and informed Hurry Punt that all the hill forts would be garrisoned by his infantry, that a battalion of Sepoys to which a small party of horse was attached would also be ordered to move backwards and forwards among these hill forts, and as a further obstacle to the entrance into this situation of the enemy's horse, he proposed to Hurry Punt that a party of 6 or 700 Mahratta Cavalry should be left under the command of an able officer to assist in covering the country, that he did not conceive there would be any danger, as th



Pettahs of the different hill forts would always serve as an asylum in case a larger force of the enemy should appear ; that as he wished to overawe the enemy, which he said would be the case if he knew that a party of Cavalry was also stationed with the Infantry, he had suggested the necessity of this measure to Hurry Punt and would leave the arrangement of it to his consideration. This suggestion was followed by a variety of incoherent questions, such as where was the Party to stay, where would the battalion of Sepoys stay, etc. His Lordship observed that he had only suggested it, and would wish Hurry Punt to consider it, that his desire was to keep open the communication in the rear when the army should move on to Seringapatam. Lord Cornwallis after remarking that he would wish to consider the letters from Purseram Bhow's Camp before he could determine what was to be done, in consequence of the situation in which the Bhow now was, took his leave. During this conversation, his Lordship in a delicate manner hinted at the agreement to bring the shot from Bangalore, which had been made by Hurry Punt some time since, and was told that he might be perfectly easy on that score, as the measure to perform the engagement were adopted, and nothing further passed on the subject.

*8th January 1792.*

In consequence of the conversation that passed yesterday relative to the advices received from Purseram Bhow, Lord Cornwallis thought proper to send for Buchajee Pundit, who waited on his Lordship accordingly. Lord Cornwallis observed to him that yesterday on the perusal of the dispatches from Purseram Bhow, he was much concerned to find that instead of complying with the recommendation repeatedly sent to him from hence, the Bhow had directed his march to the westward, that he did not wish to speak his sentiments on this circumstance yesterday as a part of Captain Little's letter was in cypher and he was desirous also of considering what measures were to be pursued before he communicated fully on the step adopted by the Bhow with Hurry Punt, and having since understood the letter from Captain Little, he had found the circumstance of such importance that he was compelled to trouble him to call. His Lordship then remarked to Buchajee Pundit that he was much surprized at this conduct in Purseram Bhow, as at the time he separated his army from Hurry Punt, it has been agreed that no separate or desultory object should engage the attention of any of the forces of the Confederates, nor should any of the Chiefs be induced to quit the general plan which was directed against Seringapatam by any object of private advantage ; that all the forts which had been taken by the English Army, had been taken from a conviction of the utility in possessing them to cover the communication for supplies to the armies during the siege of the enemy's capital and not with any view to acquire territory or for any separate advantage to the Company ; that the whole Country to the

left of the position of the allied forces was guarded by the English Infantry, and he had recommended the position between Sera and Shevaganga to Purseram Bhow as covering the right, which, however, now he did not perceive how that advantage for which purpose the hill fort of Sawuntidroog and other hill forts lately taken had been attacked could be effected, since the Bhow had marched in a contrary direction ; that independent of this measure, he had recommended to Purseram Bhow to march to the vicinity of this army, that by his approach a more easy communication might be kept up with each other, and the steps to be pursued to effect the junction with general Abercrombie in which his Lordship had relied much on the assistance of the army with the Bhow, could be more easily and expeditiously determined on ; that at present his Lordship had no remedy and should be compelled to trust to chance instead of having a certainty before him to procure supplies for the armies during the ensuing operations, which with that certainty in point of supplies left little room to apprehend any failure in the attack on the enemy's capital ; that he should of course write to Purseram Bhow, and as he had devoted his whole time to the general welfare of the allied troops and his thoughts to the prosperity of the alliance, he should also be obliged to declare his sentiments to the Peshwa in order that any failure after such uninterrupted success should not be attributed to the want of exertion on the part of the Company. Buchajee Pundit observed that Hurry Punt was as much concerned at the step which the Bhow had taken as his Lordship could be, and trusted that Lord Cornwallis would be convinced of Hurry Punt's earnest desire for success to the present connection. He admitted the full force of his Lordship's remarks on this movement of the Bhow's and with respect to Lord Cornwallis's letter to the Peshwa, requested that he would have an interview with Hurry Punt before he dispatched it and promising to represent to Hurry Punt all that his Lordship had said, begged that the letter to the Peshwa might not be sent away. Lord Cornwallis agreed with Buchajee Pundit that Hurry Punt was much hurt at the intelligence from Purseram Bhow, and on that account also he was not inclined to trouble Hurry Punt at the interview yeste day with his sentiments on it ; that he was equally convinced of Hurry Punt's anxiety for the general good of the cause in which they were all engaged, and having that regard for Hurry Punt which the acquaintance he had formed with his character could not fail to instil into his mind, he did not intend to write to the Peshwa until he had seen Hurry Punt; that no letter to the Peshwa nor to Purseram Bhow had ever been dispatched until it had been first submitted to Hurry Punt perusal, nor should any letter be sent away until Hurry Punt had seen it, as he considered the friendship that subsisted between them of a nature that did not admit of a different conduct, and he assured Buchajee Pundit that the letter to Purseram Bhow should be sent to Hurry Punt before it was dispatched, in order that Hurry Punt's sentiments might be known

on its contents, His Lordship then reminded Buchajee Pundit of the heavy expense which the Company had been put to in preparing the equipments for so fine an army as was now above the Ghauts with General Abercrombie, that 9,000 bullocks had been sent from the southern districts of Tennevelly, etc., for the use of that army beside upwards of 4,000 from Bombay; that with such an army so well provided as that on the opposite side of Seringapatam, the armies with himself and Hurry Punt should not and could not remain idle here, and convinced as he was of Hurry Punt's good wishes for the success of the war, as Purseram Bhow had suffered himself to be led away by indirect and useless objects from the general plan, he did not doubt every assistance in Hurry Punt's power towards remedying the bad effects of the Bhow's measures in such mode as he should have to suggest to him for that purpose. Lord Cornwallis then informed Buchajee Pundit that he should prepare and send to them the letter which he intended to write to Purseram Bhow that he might lay it before Hurry Punt for his perusal, desiring at the same time that if it met with his approbation, Hurry Punt would dispatch it. Buchajee Pundit desired that his Lordship would entertain no doubts of Hurry Punt's sincerity and wish for the general welfare and took his leave.

On the 9th January, the letter bearing this day's date was written to Purseram Bhow and sent to Hurry Punt to forward, provided it met with his approbation.

The above letter to Purseram Bhow was immediately sent away by Hurry Punt, and a duplicate was dispatched by Lord Cornwallis's own Hircarrahs.

**No. 497**—Bankapur surrenders to Bhau who inflicts another defeat on Ali Reza, Tipu's general.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—DAVID CARNEGIE.

*Poona, 8th January 1792.*

Since closing my accompanying letter I have received a private letter from the Detachment under Capt. Little of the 20 ultimo advising the surrender of Buncapore to Purseram Bhow on the 23rd. And I have this moment received a \* \* \* \* from the Minister of a battle having been fought

about the 29th ultimo between the armies of Purseram Bhow and the enemy in the neighbourhood of Simoga and that the latter commanded by Ally Ruzza consisting of about 10,000 men had been defeated with considerable loss and the capture of some of their guns by the former. No further particulars have yet reached me. Permit me to hope that you will forward copies of this and the accompanying letter to Gen. Abercrombie.

No. 408—As Bhau does not comply with the plans of action previously agreed upon, Cornwallis has to issue fresh orders to Abercromby.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—ROBERT ABERCROMBY.

*Camp Near Outradrug, 8th January 1792.*

I had yesterday the mortification to learn by a letter from Capt. Little that Purseram Bhow instead of complying with my request that he would approach the right flank of this army and move forward in concert with us to effect the great object of completely investing Seringapatam, on the contrary marched to the Tumbuddra and engaged in operations unconnected with the plan which many months ago had been agreed upon between us and in the execution of which he repeatedly promised to assist; this unexpected conduct on the side of the Bhow has very much altered the situation of our affairs and renders it necessary for me to take further precaution *to prevent the failure of the campaign*. I have no reason to flatter myself that the wretched cavalry and the ignorant and timid chiefs that are rather following than serving with this army can enable me either to keep open the communication in my rear or to bring forward your army in the manner that was proposed. It is therefore incumbent upon me to be prepared to act according to circumstances and if I cannot afford you the means of advancing with a battering train on the southern bank of the Cavalry I should have it in my power to avail myself on this side of the services of as much of your corps as can be spared, leaving a sufficient force for the protection of your guns and stores at the top of the pass; with a view to the possibility of this event I must request that after leaving the guard above mentioned you will advance to Periapatam with the remaining body of your army bringing with you as much provisions as you can but no artillery above six pounds: and if in consequence of my former letter you should have brought forward ~~any~~ heavy guns you will lose no time in sending them back that you may be

prepared in an active state to move on the shortest notice. It will be of consequence from what I have stated that our intercourse should now be very frequent and must desire that you will engage as many intelligent Harkarrahs as you can for the purpose of keeping up our correspondence.

**No. 409**—Cornwallis laments Bhau's failure in his engagements and conveys to Malet an idea of the difficulties that have arisen.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—C. W. MALET.

*Camp Near Outdrug, 8th January 1792.*

I had previously explained to the Bhow that it was my wish that he should march on our right when we moved towards Seringapatam leaving bodies of his Cavalry at different stations to prevent the Beyde horse of the enemy from breaking in upon our communications and cutting off our supplies and that upon our arrival near to the Capital the whole or a part of his force as it might be thought expedient with two or three of our Battalions should cross the Caveri and join General Abercrombie's at Periapatam.

As in consequence of the Bhow's failure in his engagements our supplies must be exposed to the utmost hazard, and it will be very uncertain whether General Abercrombie can move forward, the plan of the campaign the success of which must otherwise have been insured by the capture of Sevendroog and our other late acquisitions, may totally fail. The want of provisions may oblige us once more to return without reducing a place, which I am convinced could not have made a long resistance, if the means which I had prepared at an immense expense to the Company could have been brought to act in full force against it.

I can hardly entertain any hopes that after your receipt of this letter orders from Poonah can reach Purseram Bhow in time to produce any useful effect although I cannot doubt that the Minister will transmit them with all possible expedition, but at all events I thought it right to lose no time in stating my situation to the Peshwa and the Minister and representing what my sensations must be after the extraordinary exertions that have been made by our Government for the general use and advantage of the Confederacy, to find myself deprived at this critical period of the co-operation of so great a part of the Mahratta force on which by the spirit of the treaty and by specific agreements I had every right to depend.

**No. 410**—Malet reports the movement of a body of the enemy's force towards Gurramconda and the capture of Bankapur by Bheau.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—DAVID CARNEGIE.

*Poona, 8th January 1792.*

I have made known to this Court what is signified in your letter of the 4 inst. relative to the conveyance of presents from the Peshwa to his Majesty and the Court of Directors in reply. Sending a part of the articles intended on the Reymond has been declined and I have been desired to give the Durbar timely notice of the next opportunity and of conveyance being practicable for the articles in question on which point I have to request your answers as soon as convenient.

I have the pleasure to acquaint you that the transitory movement of a body of the enemy toward Gurramconda is likely to be attended with no other ill consequence than having taken Hafiz Faridud Deen the Nizam's Commander in that quarter prisoner, for tho' by that means the lower fort fell into their hands I have a reason to conclude from advices just received from Lt. Stewart and Sir John Kennaway's locum tenens at the Nabob's Court that the enemy overawed by the approach of the Nizam's army under his son and minister have retired toward their own quarters by different routes and that luckily they had not fallen in with any of the Bunjarree convoys of the Nizam's army.

I have this morning received intelligence from his Lordship the Governor General of the capture of the strong and important hill-fort of Savendurg by them on the 21st ult., the batteries having been opened the 17th preceding. The agreeableness of this intelligence is increased by the capture having been achieved without loss. I need not add that this conquest promises the greatest advantages by facilitating the access of supplies from Bangalore to Seringputtun and by his Lordship's letters I learn that tho' the Bunjarras had been somewhat delayed by the recent heavy and unseasonable rains, they had with the return of fair weather revisited his camp in great numbers.

**No. 411**—The G. G. complains of breach of promise by Bhao and directs him without a moment's delay to join either him or Abercromby.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—PARSURAM BHAU.

*9th January 1792.*

It has afforded me very great concern to learn by letter from Captain Little that you had marched from your Camp at Changhurry to the Westward. I recommended the position between Sera and S.

to you as being the only means that occurred to me likely to prevent the enemy from getting in the rear of our respective forces, and to secure the constant supplies which my unremitting efforts have brought into train, and which are coming up for the general use of the armies during the siege of Seringapatam. From the situation in which you were when these advices left you, I am the more concerned that you did not, immediately on the receipt of my letter, march to the position it pointed out, as I do not perceive how Hurry Punt and myself are to avail ourselves either of the great advantages we have obtained by the possession of Sawunterdroog and other Hill Forts lately taken, (since that part of the plan which was allotted to you has been neglected and the communication must be exposed from that Quarter) or of the further assistance of your army in effecting the junction with General Abercrombie who agreeably to the orders he has received from me is arrived above the Ghauts, as you have been already informed.

At all times well convinced of your zeal and attachment to the common cause, your march to the westward occasions me very great regret. I must consider any failure in the future operations of the alliance the result of your deviation from the arrangements concerted between us. I shall be compelled to express my undisguised sentiments to the Peshwa in order to remove any apprehensions that he might entertain that (which God forbid) the ill success of the efforts of the allied powers arose from the want of exertion on the part of the Company.

By the blessing of God, success has hitherto attended the counsels of the Confederates, and in this moment of victory I cannot but flatter myself that you, whose zeal and anxiety for the public welfare I have before witnessed, will not neglect the measures which were concerted by Hurry Punt, you, and myself, as well to keep the communication in the rear, and to effect the junction with the army under General Abercrombie and I trust that as the state of affairs will not now admit of further deliberation on measures to be pursued, you will lose no time in resolving either to form the earliest junction with Hurry Punt and myself, or which will be the most preferable step, cross the Cauveri at a suitable distance from Seringapatam at a proper ford, and effect the junction with the Army under General Abercrombie.

**No. 412**—Malet reports the victories won in the northern districts by the spirited exertion of the Bombay detachment and the attack on the stronghold of Simoga.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—DAVID CARNEGIE, BOMBAY.

*Poona, 19th January 1792.*

My desire of conveying to you some idea of the gallant behavior of your detachment under Capt. Little and the brilliant victory lately gained

over the enemy's whole force on his northern districts principally by their spirited exertions in time for the despatch of the Raymond, induces me to send you the [enclosed] imperfect and unfinished account intended by Capt. Little for the Governor General, but which before he could finish he was called by indispensable duty to Simoga, a place of strength and consequence that was attacked immediately after the battle in which I understand the enemy lost 11 guns, several tumbrils and the greatest part of their camp equipage. The action speaks so strongly for itself as to need no encomium.

To this satisfactory intelligence I have the pleasure of adding that a letter just received from Sir John Kennaway advises the retreat of the enemy that had advanced to Gurramcoonda and the unopposed recovery of the lower fort by the Madras detachment acting with the Nizam's army on the 25 ult.

Captain Little's unfinished letter not containing the casualties of his detachment I take the liberty of adding the following from a private letter Lieut. Hugh Ross killed with 6 others, rank not mentioned.

No. 413—Abercromby communicates his intention regarding the operations of his army.

FROM—ROBERT ABERCROMBY,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

10th January 1792.

The impossibility of getting provisions up the Ghaut during the time that the battering guns were on the road has considerably retarded me. The artillery and their stores are now in camp and provision is coming daily.

It is my intention unless I receive letters from your Lordship that may alter my present determination, to march on the 15th or 16th at furthest and I expect to enter Mysore on the 17th or 18th. If there was a tolerable post near Periapatam I would certainly occupy it, but as the country adjoining to it does not furnish one and as Periapatam is dismantled and of no consequence, I propose taking a position about 3 miles to the north of it. In this situation I shall be as ready to meet a detachment coming to join me as it is nearer the fort, and I can cover the road leading to the pass on the eastern confines of the Coorg countrys, which would not be in my power if I advanced further into Mysore.

I should certainly be uneasy and would advance sooner if I imagined there was any danger to your detachment between Periapatam and me, but if they can advance so far they come immediately into a close country and within 5 miles they enter the Coorg Country by a strong Pass. I trust



however I shall be in Mysore in time sufficient to give every assistance in forwarding the junction.

No. 414.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—DAVID CARNEGIE.

*Poona, 12 January 1792.*

I have the honor to enclose extracts of letters from Sir John Kennaway to Lord Cornwallis describing the progress of the Nizam's son to join his Lordships, who by my last letter from him of the 8 inst. was encamped near Outtradroog with his advanced post at Byrow Droog: Col. Duff was to leave Bangalore on the 9th with the last of the battering cannon and expected in camp the 14th inst.

No. 415—Malet offers congratulations to Capt. Little for the victory won over the army commanded by Ali Reza.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CAPT. LITTLE.

*Poona, 14th January 1792.*

On my way to deliver to the Peshwa and Minister an account of the capture of Sawunteedroog, my satisfaction was greatly increased by being enabled by copy of your letter to Lord Cornwallis of 31 ulto. to give the particulars of the brilliant victory of 29 ulto. over the army commanded by Ally Rizza on which occasion I have great pleasure in assuring you that the most cheerful and honorable enconiums were passed on the gallantry and good conduct of yourself and the detachment under your command with expressions of much regret for the loss of Brigadier Major Ross of whom the Bhow in his general honorable mention of the detachment had given a very high character.

I need not attempt to describe my felicity on an occasion so honorable to yourself and your country. You will give me full credit for feelings which I will not attempt to express and if the communication of this Court's sense of your and your Corps gallant exertions to these brave men can add to the satisfaction they must have felt in so nobly asserting the honor of their flag and country I shall have infinite cause to rejoice in being the channel of its conveyance, embracing at the same time so good an opportunity of presenting my hearty and warmest congratulations to yourself and the companions of your good fortune.

After the great services performed under your command so highly and so publickly applauded by the Bhow and this state I trust you will find no longer difficulty in procuring such satisfaction as you may deem requisite in the affair of Ball Pundit which you have already been acquainted has been referred to Bhow.

No. 416—Malet sends intelligence of stores found in Simoga and of the capture of other places.

FROM—C. W. MALET,  
TO—DAVID CARNEGIE.

*Poona, 14th January 1792.*

I learn that in the important fortress of Seemoga surrendered to Pursaram Bhow by capitulation on the 9th Jemadulawal or 4th January, were found many excellent guns and a large magazine of grain. The surrender of that place and Coomsee and Anundpore (forts of considerable strength and local importance) will be of very great service in cutting off the enemy's supplies from the fertile N. W. provinces of Bednore and I also learn that after these important captures (the immediate consequence of the brilliant victory of the 20th) a detachment was sent by the Bhow against Turkoohully, the only place of strength between his army and Bednore, which the Bhow seems to have an intention to attack, should circumstances permit.

No. 417—The Governor General summoned a conference of the representatives of the allied powers to discuss the reply to be given to Tipu's overture for peace and the disposition of forces until the communication of his intention by Tipu. In this conference Cornwallis made additional arrangements for the security of communications, and Earl Port decided in consultation with Mr. Aspin to send a reply to Tipu in conformity with the spirit of the Governor General's letter.

and delivering to Hurry Punt a letter addressed to the Bhow in congratulation of his victory, which he requested that Hurry Punt would forward, his Lordship observed that the letters before mentioned had been received from Tippoo on the 13th January but that he had been so much engaged on the 14th January that he could not have met to consult on the subject of those letters until the 15th January today and had availed himself of today, as he considered the subject of those letters of great importance and therefore was not inclined to lose any unnecessary time in coming to some determination relative to them for which purpose he had requested the interview today, and as he had well considered the letter addressed to himself and those to the Peshwa and to Hurry Punt from the copies with which he had been furnished, he had drawn up the answer which he intended to write to Tippoo Sultaun, and had brought a copy of the draft that he might have the sentiments of Hurry Punt and Meer Aalum on it. A draft in Persian of the letter written to Tippoo Sultaun acknowledging the receipt of his letter on the 13th January was then read over, and Meer Aalum understanding the Persian language was requested by Lord Cornwallis to explain to Hurry Punt what he heard read. After the several clauses of the draft had been read and each of them followed by explanatory remarks, Lord Cornwallis expatiated on the circumstance of the breach of faith which the enemy had been guilty of in regard to the garrison of Coimbatoor and enlarged on the necessity for the stipulation which he had made in the reply being performed before he could give his consent to receive a Vakeel from Tippoo. His Lordship then explained the nature of the capitulation which Cummer-ul-deen Khan had agreed to, and on which Lieut. Chalmers had delivered up the forts of Coimbatoor, and represented that the performance of the stipulation on question, which could be no difficult thing for Tippoo, since the garrison of Coimbatoor could be of no service to him at Seringapatam, nor of any use to this army, as by the terms of the capitulation those troops could not do service during the war; nor had he introduced it in his answer with any desire to procrastination, as he had relinquished what he had a right to claim, viz., the performance of the agreement at Coimbatoor where it was made, merely because that regularity would be a source of delay which was not absolutely necessary. Meer Aalum in the explanation of these arguments addressed himself to Hurry Punt and recapitulating the sense of them, coincided in opinion with Lord Cornwallis on the propriety of the stipulation preliminary to any further measures relative to the admission of a Vakeel from Tippoo, and remarked that it was highly incumbent in a Prince to perform engagements that he had entered into. Hurry Punt and Appa Bulwunt Row both joined in expressions of approbation of the draft proposed by Lord Cornwallis for the reply he should write to the letter addressed to him. During this discussion Hurry Punt observed on the word used in his Lordship's draft relative to the place

to be fixed for meeting the Vakeel in the event that he should be sent, and was of opinion that it had been adopted in consequence of the clause in the letter from Tippoo in addition to the contents of the letters to Lord Cornwallis and to the Peshwa, but on the original letter from Tippoo to Lord Cornwallis being produced and the word in Persian used in it corresponding with the word used in his Lordship's answer, and the indefinite sense of that word in Tippoo's letter being remarked to him, he relinquished his sentiments in this respect. The coincidence of Hurry Punt and Meer Aalum being obtained in the opinion as to the propriety of the draft proposed by Lord Cornwallis, his Lordship mentioned that there were two subjects which he should point out to them, and wish to have their sentiments on them: one was relating to the conduct the allied forces should observe during the period from the dispatch of answers to the letters that had been received until Tippoo's disposition with respect to the stipulation could be known, and the other, the mode of receiving and treating the Vakeel, should it be hereafter agreed upon to admit him, which he said now depended on Tippoo himself. With respect to the first point he was of opinion that delay to this army fully equipped to advance, would be dangerous as tending to consume the means of subsistence on a reliance of the first overture from the enemy, which could not fail to be a material advantage to him, that it was therefore his sentiments that the allies should proceed in the manner that had before been resolved on, and in regard to the second point, he need only call to the recollection of Hurry Punt the debates which had been held respecting Apaji Ram in the month of August to which he still adhered. He observed that he could neither agree in opinion to halt the army nor to admit the Vakeel in Camp, until he should be convinced that a peace was likely to be made, and the allied Powers had some security for the performance of the articles that should be preliminarily agreed. On this Meer Aalum desired to know what would be considered sufficient security and how it could be resolved that a peace was likely to take place. Lord Cornwallis replied that it was first to be learnt if the proposed stipulation would be performed by the enemy, and should it be performed, the deputation of the Vakeel would be agreed to as the next step, and that would be followed by a Delegation from the Confederacy to learn the nature of this mission, from that the probability of the peace would be discernible, and it would then be time sufficient to determine on the nature of the security, which he should think it absolutely necessary to demand. He added that during the negotiation on these points, which it would rest with the enemy to shorten or prolong the period of, he certainly was of opinion the armies should advance, and in the event that the Vakeel should be admitted, he should propose that he should be permitted to approach the armies to the distance of two or three coss, and travel in the same proportion as the armies marched, unless by procuring the above mentioned conditions, a cessation of hostilities should

be agreed upon. No sentiment of contrary tendency was expressed to these arguments either by Hurry Punt or Meer Aalum, nor was there any remark made in the conduct that they meant respectively to follow with regard to the letters that had been addressed by Tippoo to the Peshwa or to the Nizam. Lord Cornwallis observed that he had requested a meeting on the subject of these letters that each might know the other's sentiments and it has afforded him very great pleasure that the remarks which he had made had met with their approbation; that he would leave the draft which he had brought with him that Hurry Punt might consider it maturely and determine on what answer, or whether he should send any answer, should be sent to the letter from Tippoo to the Peshwa and to himself. Hurry Punt thanked his Lordship and said he should weigh the subject in his mind and would inform his Lordship in the course of the next day of his resolution. Lord Cornwallis replied that he did not wish to despatch the messengers until both Hurry Punt and Meer Aalum had formed their resolutions on the subject as it concerned the Peshwa and the Nizam's Government.

His Lordship then reminded Hurry Punt of a proposition which he had made to him at the last meeting on the 7th January relative to the means for protecting the supplies coming to the army when it should advance towards Seringapatam, and recapitulated what had passed in conversation on that subject at that meeting. He observed on the advices which he had received from Col. Cockerell of the conduct which had been observed by the detachment of Maharatta cavalry stationed on the right flank with that officer, which he said had afforded him great pleasure. He had the additional satisfaction to assure Hurry Punt that from the junction of the cavalry under Madajee Pundit Behere with the infantry under Col. Cockerell at Byrawdooog not a single horseman of the enemy had been seen in the rear. He considered it a convincing proof of the utility of the Maharatta cavalry, and independent of the conviction which it must impress in the mind of the enemy of the unanimity of the allies, he was confident that the enemy's horse would never attempt to molest the communication provided cavalry of the allied armies were posted on it. That he intended to station near 3 battalions of infantry with four field pieces and about 100 of his own cavalry under the command of Capt. Read in this part of the country in order to protect the Bunjarries, and he should direct Capt. Read to correspond with the officers of the several garrisons on the hill forts relative to the safety of the Bunjarries and should be happy if Hurry Punt would select an able officer to command about 3 or 400 Maharatta cavalry who should act with Capt. Read; to this Hurry Punt gave his consent.

Since the conversation took place relative to the approach of the Nizam's son and Minister who it was supposed had arrived near Ouscottah His Lordship proposed to change ground and move to the distance of about

2 coss where the interview with the Prince should take place, but on Hurry Punt and Meer Aalum's objecting to the movement as not being consistent with the appearance of perfect unanimity between the allies just as the Prince was on the point of joining the army, His Lordship acquiesced in their wish to halt on the present ground to receive him provided nothing unforeseen should prevent him by compelling him to march.

After Meer Aalum had taken leave Buchajee Pundit waited on Lord Cornwallis on the part of Hurry Punt that he might communicate the drafts of letters which had been prepared on the part of the Peshwa and from himself. They were read and his Lordship expressed himself much pleased that Hurry Punt had thought proper to write answers and still more so from the perfect unanimity, which the enemy would observe, existed between the Allies from the uniformity of the answers which he would receive. Lord Cornwallis desired that Buchajee Pundit would inform Hurry Punt that he approved of the proposed draft and that Tippoo's Hircarrahs would be dispatched as soon as Hurry Punt's letters should be read. Buchajee Pundit informed Lord Cornwallis that he had been directed by Hurry Punt to communicate to him the perfect approbation with which he was impressed on a reperusal of his Lordship's letter and on a reconsideration of its contents.

The letters bearing the seals of the Peshwa and of Hurry Punt were received on the 17th January and the Hircarrahs were despatched early in the morning of the 18th January with three letters, one from Lord Cornwallis, one from the Peshwa and one from Hurry Punt.

No. 418—On receipt of the G. G.'s letter, Abercromby changes his plan.

FROM—ROBERT ABERCROMBY,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Camp Pandacheorem Ghat, 15th January 1792.*

Yesterday I was honored with your letter of the 4th and immediately sent an express to Tellicherry for a further supply of felling axes and bill hooks and hope to have them in time to bring forward with me.

As it appears probable that your Lordship's intention of moving as soon as the [ \* \* ] will be frustrated in consequence of not hearing from the Bhau, I have altered my determination of entering the Mysore on the 18th as I mentioned in my letter of the 10th. I have been induced to this from a wish not to encroach on but rather to add to my magazines, which I could not do if I advanced so far. I shall in consequence encamp few miles in front tomorrow and prepare every thing for advancing at a moment's warning. If I have reason to think that our letters are intercepted I shall soon move to the position near Periapatam I mentioned, but, if possible, I shall wait till I know when you advance and will move in sufficient time to form the junction or execute whatsoever you may direct.

I have paid every attention to your advice about the Madras Cattle and the utmost care has been taken not to overwork them, they are so

reduced by deaths and sickness that I shall not have 3,000 carriage fit for service. This loss has been occasioned principally, I imagine, by their severe marches in Coimbatore and the heavy rains of the season from which they have never perfectly recovered. Fortunately, however, Sir Charles Malet's bullocks are remarkably fine and in good order.

*P.S.*—I expect the Coorga Rajah tomorrow, but I apprehend it will be impracticable to induce him to advance so far from his country; the Nairs will advance or act in the upper Country.

**No. 419**—Cornwallis demands from Tipu the release of the garrison of Coimbatore previous to the reception of his envoys.

• FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—TIPU SULTAN.

*16th January 1792.*

It is well known that after having made every conciliatory proposition in my power to prevent the war, I was forced by the dictates of honor and good faith to have recourse to arms to save one of the Company's allies from destruction, and I have been desirous to make peace as soon as proper compensations can be received for the injuries and losses that have been sustained by the Company and by those allies with whom it is connected in the strictest bonds of confederacy.

But with what confidence can a negotiation be carried on with a man who not only violates treaties of peace but also disregards the faith of capitulations during war.

The garrison of Coimbatore ought by the capitulation to have been set at liberty upon certain conditions immediately after its surrender, and I have just right to demand that the agreement should still be executed on the spot where it was made, but being unwilling at this critical time to occasion any delay that can be avoided in opening a negotiation, I shall not insist on a literal performance of the original stipulations on account of the length of time that the execution would require.

Let therefore the garrison of Coimbatore be sent to this army, to be set at liberty according to the conditions of the capitulations that were settled between Lieut. Chalmers and Cummur-ud-Deen Khan, and I shall then be ready in concert with the allies, to fix upon a place where Nakeels from you may conveniently meet proper persons that will be deputed on the part of the three Confederate powers for the purpose of endeavouring to arrange the terms on which a general peace can be re-established.



No. 420.

FROM—ROBERT ABERCROMBY,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Camp Mughul Ghaut (six miles east  
of Pondercharam), 19th January 1792.*

I have just received your Lordship's letter of the 8th and shall immediately proceed to execute your orders leaving a stronger corps than I originally intended at the head of the Ghaut and by sending back the battering train. When these points are arranged I shall advance and take up a position in front of the Coorg Country and at a little distance from Periapatam.

**No. 421**—Abercromby communicates to the G. G. the detailed plan of his movements so as to suit the latter's operations at Seringapatam.

*Camp Mughul Ghaut (six miles east  
of Pondercharam), 20th January 1792.*

Your letter of the eighth has so materially altered the situation of affairs as far as regards my detachment that I have seriously reflected on the safest and at the same time the most expeditious way of joining your Lordship or any other part of your army you may judge advisable to order to meet me. I am reasoning on the idea that either the one or the other is your present intention and as you have wished me to make myself acquainted with the Cavery, I think I cannot better fulfil your Lordship's expectations than by following the present plan which after mature consideration I have adopted.

Unfortunately it will become necessary to make the movement I propose without waiting your approach of it. I shall not, however, attempt it until I am certain of Your Lordship's intention and that they are for me to join you by your advancing either with the whole or part of your army to one of the fords westward of Seringapatam. As soon as I am acquainted that such is your design and that you are actually in motion I mean instead of advancing to Periapatam to turn off to the left at Sedapore and cross the Cavery there; from thence I shall march and take post at Kooshall Nagar or as it is generally called Moolsoga which is only 13 or 14 miles from thence through a close country and within the Coorg Woods; in this situation by whichever ford you advance you will be between me and Seringapatam and I can again recross and join you either by the Beletpour road or move to the northward as I find most adviseable for your situation. Captain Raynold's plan will better explain my intention and point out how superior a post at Khooshal Nugger will be to one at Periapatam where if I advance I must leave my flank in an open country to any force of the enemy stationed at Cutty Malway.

I must again repeat that I shall not make this movement until I am certain that you mean me to join your army and to act with you north east of the Cavery, that you mean to march to one of the fords westward of Seringapatam either Ramanpour which is the easiest or Kurlapour or Kuggul Kera and that you are in motion for that purpose.

I shall remain encamped at Seddapour on the great road and sixteen or seventeen miles from Periapatam and where the road turns on as I before mentioned to Kooshgall Nagur until I hear from your Lordship on the above subject.

*Camp at Seddapour, 23rd January 1792.*

I arrived here yesterday and now wait to hear from you.

**No. 422**—Cornwallis gives directions to Abercromby regarding the movement of his army and instructs him to make night attacks on Tipu on any favourable occasion.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—ROBERT ABERCROMBY.

*Camp near Outtradug, 20th January 1792.*

I last night received your letter dated the 20th instant. It would only be in the event of my finding it impracticable to bring your Corps down the S. W. side of the Cavary to form the complete investiture of Seringapatam, that I should wish it to join this army on the north bank; the motions of the enemy when I approach Seringapatam can alone enable me to decide finally on these points; the former which is by far the most desirable would be rendered very difficult, and would require a very considerable time to execute from your circuitous movement to Muloga and from your being obliged to cross the river the passage of which even at its easiest fords must, I am convinced, occasion great delay. Encumbered as I am with battering guns, stores etc., I can on no account quit the direct road to Seringapatam nor can I make any detachment until I see what measures Tippoo will take; I am, however, from what I have this day heard from Sir John Kennaway, sanguine in the hopes that the Nizam Ally Khan's Minister, who is truly zealous in our cause, will cross the river to join you with four or five of our battering guns and about ten thousand horse whenever I require it. I am therefore of opinion that it would be most advisable that you should advance in a light state to the position you before intended to take, or to one in the neighbourhood of it, when we will concert our future operations according to circumstances and if it should be found expedient to send a detachment to you, the junction might be rendered easy by your moving in one day to a remote part of the Ghaut where you might take a position with the river in your

rear, and defy anything that Tippoo could do against you whilst you covered the passage of the reinforcement. Tippoo's army is in my opinion in no state to attack nine or ten of our battering guns, and if he ever should encamp or halt within 12 miles of you I should earnestly recommend it to you to attack him in the night and be his force what it may, you are sure to route him completely. The Corps that are to make the attack should have no artillery with them and I must take this opportunity to remark that it appears to me from what I have seen of the wars of this country that the practice which has so long prevailed in our armies of dragging about an heavy train, especially, of the very worst sort of Brass ordnance for the service in the field, has been very erroneous:

No. 423—Tipu says that the Governor General is misinformed regarding the *capitulation of the garrison of Coimbatore.*

FROM—TIPU SULTAN,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Received 24th January 1792.*

Your Lordship's lettera arrived and I have understood the contents. With a view to the quiet of mankind your Lordship writes that in effecting the affairs of peace between the four powers, your Lordship of yourself, is not neglectful, but that the garrison of Coimbatore, who surrendered in capitulation and are in confinement must be released; that after their arrival, the vakeels of the three Sirkars shall assemble at a certain place and such negotiation as may be necessary shall then be commenced. I have understood this. The particulars of the fort of Coimbatore are these. I sent Meer Cummer-ul-Dien to take the fort. He arrived there and surrounded it; when assistance made its appearance from towards Palicautcherry Cummer-ul-Dien marching from Coimbatore, attacked that force, defeated it and then returned to the fort, and took the people that were in it prisoners; if engagements had taken place to release them, how was it possible to act contrary thereto? Some one has reported this falsely to your Lordship. Some time ago, when the troops of the Ahmedy Sirkar besieged Darapooram, the garrison surrendered on capitulation, and were immediately furnished with an escort and sent to your Lordship's army. God forbid, it is not the practice of any state to confine those whose release may have been stipulated by agreement. If with a view to the quiet of mankind, it is your Lordship's pleasure to establish a peace between the four States, the confidential agents shall be sent to you from the Ahmedy Sirkar that the negociation for peace may be entered into with your Lordship, with the Peshwa or with Nizam Ally Khan, that thro' your Lordship's means the peace and quiet of mankind may be effected.

No. 424—Lord Cornwallis rejects Tipu's explanation of the Coimbatore affair and states that he cannot enter into any negotiation unless Tipu redresses the wrong.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

TO—TIPU SULTAN.

*(Written) 21st January 1792.*

I have received your letter in which you say that I have been misinformed and that no capitulation was made at Coimbatore, which surprised me very much.

The manner in which Lieut. Chalmers has been treated has put it out of his power to communicate to me the particulars of the transactions at Coimbatore, but I have, by other means, received information, which I believe to be authentic and correct, that a capitulation was made similar to that which took place at Daraporam, and that the articles were signed by Lieut. Chalmers and Kummer-ul-Dien Khan, by which it was agreed that Lieut. Chalmers and his garrison should march out with their private property unmolested, and be immediately escorted to Palicautcherry to proceed from thence to the Coast, but that they were not to serve against you or your allies during the war and that all the guns, ammunition and stores and public property should be delivered to Kummer-ul-Dien Khan.

I was further informed that when the garrison marched out of the fort, they were, instead of being escorted immediately, according to agreement, to Palicautcherry, detained in the Pettah of Coimbatore, and after much correspondence had passed between you and Kummer-ul-Dien Khan, they were, at the end of thirteen days, sent prisoners to Seringpatam, by your orders.

If any particulars relating to this business have been misrepresented to you or to me, the truth can only be rendered clear and apparent by yourself.

You may, if you think proper, not only communicate again upon the subject with Kummer-ul-Dien Khan, but you may also hear the state of the case from Lieut. Chalmers, who is in your possession, and it is equally in your power to remove the impressions that I have received by sending Lieut. Chalmers and Lieut. Nash or one of them to me to declare the truth, if it be different from what I have heard, by doing of which, your affairs cannot sustain the least injury as I shall engage that the persons who may be sent to me for that purpose shall not serve against you during the present war.

I have ever been ready to endeavor in concert with the Company's allies to terminate this contest by open and fair negotiation, but a meeting of Deputies could answer no useful purpose unless all parties shall be

equally well disposed, and it is impossible that I can have confidence in your sincerity whilst I remain in the belief that you have recently violated a capitulation and that you refuse to give the redress which I have a just right to demand.

**No. 425**—The Governor General refutes Nana's statement regarding the scarcity of grain and tells Malet that his acquiescence in Bhao's movement to Bednore has greatly embarrassed him.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—C. W. MALET.

*Camp near Outdrug, 26th January 1792.*

You will before this time have heard of the further operations of the Bhow's army, of his or rather Captain Little's victory near Simoga, of the capture of that place, and of the Bhow's determination to proceed to Bednore instead of assisting as he had promised in the operations against Seringapatam.

In the conversation with Nana which you mention in your letter of the 30th ult. you appear to me to have had no recollection of the plan for the campaign which was settled with Hurry Punt and Pursaram Bhow previous to the separation of the latter from this army and nothing has occurred since the Maratha Chiefs acceded to that plan which has rendered it less necessary to invest Seringapatam on both sides of the river, a measure that must have rendered our success infallible.

The Bhow's conduct, however, has greatly disconcerted all my arrangements on the point of execution, for as I am apprehensive that I shall not obtain sufficient detachments from Hurry Punt and Azeem-ul-Omrah I see little prospect of having it in my power to send to General Abercromby the aid I proposed, and it may become impracticable without such aid to employ his Corps and the heavy artillery in the manner I had intended.

I think you were a little off your guard when you in some measure acquiesced in the Minister's ideas about Bednore, for even admitting that an expedition into that country was more likely to distress Seringputtun than the complete investiture of that place, it was then much too late to change the plan as it was certain that General Abercromby must be at the head of the Pondicherrum Pass with his stores and heavy artillery before such alteration could possibly be imparted to him.

When the Minister knew not only that the whole Carnatic but that our large magazines of grain at Amboor, Vellore and Arnee were open to the Bunjarries of the three armies at the most reasonable rates, I do not understand what he could mean by saying that no grain could be procured. I think I have already explained that the advance in the price of grain,

which took place in the beginning of December, was not occasioned by the situation of the army but by the extraordinary falls of rain and violence of the monsoon which prevented the Bunjarries from returning from the Carnatic.

Grain as well as every other article will certainly grow dearer in proportion to the distance of its transport, but if our allies will give us any assistance there can be no danger of an actual want, even for the troops on the north bank of the Cauvery. But Behroo Punt shewed his total ignorance of the state of the country and of the situation of the army when he said that Perseram Bhow would be reduced to equal distress at Periapatam, for the country south of the river has been all cultivated, and the combined forces would not only have received great supplies from General Abercromby's large magazine at Iliacore twelve miles below the Ghaut, but as they advanced towards Seringaputtun they would have had the Guzzle hatty Pass open to them to obtain provisions in the greatest abundance from the fruitful district of Coimbatore and the southern countries where Major Cuppage has now assembled a respectable force and where I have directed the Collectors to take measures for the speedy transportation of grain to the head of the pass whenever it may be required for the use of the army.

The Nizam's son and Minister joined our Camp yesterday near Outradroog, and were met by me and by the Maratta Chiefs at a few miles distance, and this morning our Army advanced to the neighbourhood of Ouloordroog where there were three or four guns and a garrison of about eighty peons who after firing a few shot surrendered to the advanced-guard.

**No. 426**—Cornwallis explains to Abercromby the difficulties of sending a detachment to carry out his junction with the main army and asks him to remain in readiness.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—ROBERT ABERCROMBY.

*Camp near Outradrug, 27th January 1792.*

The Bhao has decidedly taken the route of Bednore so that all expectation of assistance from him in our operations against Seringaputtun naturally cease. I advanced yesterday from my camp near Outradroog to the neighbourhood of the fort of Ouloordroog which surrendered after firing a few shot, to our advanced guard and this morning the whole of our army encamped close to the fort, the Marattas and the Nizam's son and Minister which latter joined us on the 25th, are about three miles in our rear.

I can scarcely flatter myself that a detachment will be made from either of the Corps of our allies that are now with this army, that would venture

to cross the Caverry unless I sent so considerable a force with them as would entirely cripple my own army and render it incapable of performing the extensive duties that the present situation of our affairs require. You will therefore keep yourself quite light and be ready to move at the shortest notice with your six pounders and as much provisions as you can conveniently carry. Your men will no doubt be ready after the example of this army to take eight or ten days stock; I would not, however, advise you to load them beyond their powers. It would be very desirable that you should bring you some felling axes and bill hooks as I have been disappointed in an attempt I made to get some up in time from the Carnatic, and that you should select some strong cattle for this essential service. I have sent several of the most intelligent people that I could procure to examine the fords, part of whom are still employed in that duty, but I have hitherto received no satisfactory report on that subject. Should circumstances therefore render it necessary to call your Corps to this side of the river and should I name a ford to you that may not be so practicable as I have imagined. I must leave it to your discretion to make use of some other that will enable you to comply with the spirit of my instructions. I think it probable at present that I shall reach Seringapattun about the 6th or 7th of next month. In the meantime I shall be glad to hear frequently from you, as the Hircarrahs that were dispatched from your army are, from their knowledge of the Country, best calculated to carry on our correspondence.

“ I wish to know as soon as possible the precise number of Regiments and quantity of grain that you can bring with you.

**No. 427**—Malet denounces the Bhau's pretexts for not proceeding to join Cornwallis.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CAPTAIN LITTLE.

*Poona, 29th January 1792.*

I received a letter last night from Lord Cornwallis of the 8 inst., containing the strongest expressions of disappointments and dissatisfaction on the failure in \* \* \* \* as signified in your letter to his Lordship of the 22nd ultimo. What then must his Lordship's just feelings have been to learn from your subsequent one of the 11th that notwithstanding that Bhau told you (as mentioned in your letter to his Lordship of the 6th) “ that there now remains no further obstruction to his proceeding to the south as soon as he hears of the capture of Magrey ” and he had, on that plea being removed, taken refuge under the insurmountable one of a want of money which, I am sorry to say, appears to me the most palpable and most mortifying pretence that has hitherto been assigned and I must

beg leave particularly to point out to your notice and occasional application that this ground of impediment as it was disclaimed by Bhau in the above quotation of your letter to Lord Cornwallis, it is not mentioned in the detail of his objection to advance signified to this Durbar and communicated to me by the Minister the 15 instant and from these two very strong circumstances there is but too much ground to conclude that the pretence has been assumed to serve the occasion and that the innuendoes as to a supply of cash from the Compy. (when considering the difference of expense and exertion in the war we have so much better ground to expect it from this Court) are only a refinement on the art of the pretence of which you seem to have so just an idea. I shall conclude with a repetition of my hopes that the last orders from hence will have removed (tho' I fear too late) all the real and pretended obstacles to your advance.

**No. 428**—Abercromby reports the strength of his army and the quantity of provisions he was carrying and promises his readiness to act at a moment's notice.

FROM—ROBERT ABERCROMBY,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Camp at Siddipur, 1st February 1792.*

My letter of the 20th not having been received I must wait your Lordship's ideas on the movement I proposed before I leave my present camp, but whether you approve of the road by Mool Sogu or wish me to advance by Periapatam, I shall be ready to obey your orders. I have no reason to doubt my intelligence respecting the passes to the westward, which, provided you do not cross the Cavery, appear the only practicable road for me to join you.

If a corps is advanced to Sulgrum or even to Harkyabant, a measure I conceive very necessary, I might on the fourth day or the fifth at furthest from hence cross the Cavery at Kuggul Kera. I have such dependance on my troops that I am not apprehensive of their safety whatever force may come against them and it is unnecessary to observe that with a large supply of provisions and a long train of followers I cannot be answerable for the safety of my baggage in an open country without cavalry. Before I reach Beletpore the country opens and continues a plain to Kuggul Kera. This I think it is my duty to submit to your Lordship's notice.

My force consists of 4 European and seven native battalions. A strong Post by detachment and from the battalions below is formed on the Ghaut. It is well fortified and I am under no apprehension for the safety of my battering train should the communication be shut up. My European regiments are about 1872 rank and file and my native battalions 3420 rank and file, artillery 150.



In constant expectation of being suddenly called on since the 10th of last month, I have not had it in my power to send my bullocks below the Ghaut for provisions and have hitherto subsisted on my magazine and what I could procure in the country. As all the public followers are provisioned from the Company's stores, our consumption is great. I have, however, remaining a month's stock, I now supply myself daily from the country and expect a further quantity to take with me. We always march with ten days rice.

No. 429—Abercromby agrees to take up a position in the neighbourhood of Periaputtun and says that he can as well cross the Cavery to form a junction.

FROM—R. ABERCROMBY,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Siddapur, 3rd February 1792.*

I had great pleasure in receiving your Lordship's letter of 28th ultimo as I find that the plan of employing my Corps west of the Cavery to complete the investment of Seringaputtun is not entirely abandoned. My satisfaction at this important measure is considerably heightened by my letters from Sir Charles Malet of 18th January as I find the Bhao has received the most positive orders to return and co-operate in the seige. I shall in three or four days take the position you desire. The intermediate time must be employed in collecting a large supply of rice which the Coorg Rajah has, by great exertions procured me, and I cannot avoid informing you how much I feel indebted to him for the assistance I have received in his country. He is the only native I have yet seen who possesses a strong spirit of independence, a high sense of honour and a strict regard to veracity.

Your Lordship's advice about a night attack I shall pay the utmost attention to; your sentiments on that head so perfectly coincide with mine, that the evening I retreated from Periapatam last campaign, previous to a receipt of your orders I meditated an attack on Seid Saib's Corps.

There cannot be the smallest difficulty in my opinion in forming the junction, provided I do not move with all my baggage. If I am afterwards to return for my battering train, I could wish to leave it in a secure place when I advance to the fords. In this, however, I shall be guided by your Lordship's orders. It was my apprehensions about it that let me propose the measure of crossing the Cavery which must be attended with some delay, though not very considerable as the is tolerably good and at Moolsoga is excellent.

No. 430—Malet shows his prudence by asking Kennaway not to lay much stress on the merit of the Nizam.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—LIEUT. STEUART.

*Poona, 3rd February 1792.*

I observe you lay some stress on His Highness' comparative merits though in my humble opinion none should be assumed on that ground in the discharge of an equal alliance particularly after His Highness' own late acknowledgment of the deficiency of his present equipment in comparison with his usual and necessary war establishment in which the Nabob rather has awkwardly sacrificed the discovery of what he is to the vanity of conveying an idea of what he can, or rather what he ought to be.

No. 431—Cornwallis directs Abercromby to take up a convenient post with his army which, when joined by a detachment of cavalry sent from the main army, was to begin the siege of Seringapatam on the south side of the river.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—ROBERT ABERCROMBY.

*Camp six miles north of Seringapatam, 5th February 1792.*

I have just received your letter dated the 1st instant, and hope that very soon after it was despatched you will have received my letter dated the 28th desiring you to move to the neighbourhood of Periapatam.

The account you give of your force is very satisfactory and I request that you will march on the morning after your receipt of this letter to the ford which is marked in the sketch transmitted to me by Capt. Reynolds as adjoining to Tippoo and Eertoora, and which is described to me as one of the best and smoothest upon the river.

You will there take post, and I have no doubt of your being able to do it with perfect safety to your own corps in the manner that will best cover the ford giving me notice both of your march and your arrival by as many Hircarrahs as you can procure and I shall, according to the information I receive from you, detach a large body of cavalry and some battalions to join you by crossing the river at that ford. The object for the whole corps after the junction will be to invest Seringapatam on the south side of the river. Tippoo is now encamped on the north side bank of the Cavery opposite to the island and you may be assured that I shall use my utmost endeavours to give him full occupation. I have mentioned the ford near Tippoo as being the best from information on which I thought I could depend. But should you see any particular objection to it or

know of any better ford at no great distance from it, I would have you march thither giving me notice of your determination that I may take my measures accordingly.

**No. 432**—Abercromby thanks the Government of Bombay for the supply of bullocks from Surat but requests them to stop further purchases.

FROM—ROBERT ABERCROMBY,

TO—THE BOMBAY BOARD.

*Camp Siddapur, 7th February 1792.*

I am very sensible of the attention of the Hon'ble Board in procuring me a second supply of draft bullocks from Surat. These late importations were totally unexpected on my part as it had been determined, previous to my departure from Bombay, to stop all purchases except thro' Sir Charles Malet, from the idea that the Surat cattle tho' remarkably fine would prove a very heavy expense to the Company. I have now the pleasure to assure the Board that I am well supplied with bullocks, that I have written to Sir Charles Malet to stop all further purchases, and have to request if any more are ordered from Surat they may be countermanded.

**No. 433**—In compliance with the wishes of Cornwallis, Tipu sends Lieut. Chalmers with his people and property.

FROM—TIPU SULTAN,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Received 8th February 1792.*

I have received your Lordship's letter in which you write that if I will send Lieut. Chalmers who was taken prisoner in Coimbatore to your Lordship, you will then send for the confidential emissaries of the Ahmedy Sirkar to strengthen the friendship and will re-establish the old intimacy. As I am also inclined for a sincere friendship and approve of ancient intercourse I therefore send Lieut. Chalmers with his people and property, and five others belonging to him, to your Lordship. From the agreement in Lieut. Chalmers' possession, your Lordship will learn all the particulars of engagements. In this situation, solely with a view to please your Lordship and to preserve friendship I send them to you. If agreeable to your Lordship's letter you will notify it to me, I will send confidential people to treat for peace.



**No. 435**—Malet reports Bhau's operations against Fatch Pet and requests Dick to supply him with early information for the conveyance of animals from the Peshwa to His Majesty the King of England.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—GEORGE DICK.

*Poona, 10th February 1792.*

By late letters from the Assistant Resident with Nizam Ally Khan, I learn that his army under his son and Minister reached Bangalore on the 18th ultimo, and that the junction was expected to be formed with Lord Cornwallis on the 26th.

Private letters of 28th ultimo, from Pursaram Bhow's army mention its advance to within three miles of Futty Peyit which place is only four miles from Bednore, a large detachment of Mahrattas with the 11th Battalion of Capt. Little's Corps were sent in advance to Futty Peynt the day my letters left camp. It was said Ally Ruzza (the same that was defeated near Seemoga) commands between 7 and 10,000 men at Bednore. Toorkunhully had been evacuated.

The notice with which you furnished me having been judged too short by the Durbar for the despatch of the animals, etc., intended as presents from the Peshwa to His Majesty and the Hon'ble Company to proceed by the Essex, a desire has been signified to me of sending them to Bombay to be in readiness for the next opportunity to which I have objected on the idea that it would be inconvenient to you. Permit me however to hope you will cause me to be furnished with as early a notice as possible of any further conveyance.

To this day I have despatched 6,812 bullocks, 4,400 drivers, 4,482 pack saddles, 4,460 bags to Fort Victoria for General Abercromby.

**No. 436**—On the release of Lieut. Chalmers Cornwallis agrees to receive Tipu's envoy at an appointed place, but refers to another document bearing the seal of Comeruddin and signed by Chalmers being taken away forcibly from Chalmers.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—TIPU SULTAN.

*11th February 1792.*

I have received your letter by the hands of Mahomed Ally to whose verbal communication you refer for other particulars and Lieut. Chalmers and four other persons who formed part of the late garrison of Coimbatore are arrived with me.

I have perfectly understood the contents of the paper bearing the seal of Cummer-ul-Dien which was brought by Lieut. Chalmers and which contains a reference for your approbation of its purport. But I was sorry to learn from that officer who does not understand the Persian language that another paper written in Hindustani and in English signed by himself and likewise under the seal of Commur-ul-Dien, by which it was agreed that the garrison of Coimbatore should be permitted to march unmolested with their private property to Palacautcherry without waiting for any reference to you, was taken from him by force a few days before he was released.

And it gives me concern to add that I have heard thro' various channels that the remainder of that garrison which ought to have been set at liberty when they surrendered the fort, are not only at this time in confinement but that many of them are actually in irons.

Notwithstanding these circumstances, however, as the release of Lieut. Chalmers etc., is considered by myself and by the other members of the Confederacy as an indication on your part of a disposition to make atonement for the breach of the capitulation of Coimbatore, it has, on account of the present critical situation of affairs, been resolved by the allied powers not to insist upon the complete execution of that capitulation previous to any negotiation and we shall therefore be ready to receive a confidential person or persons deputed by you to communicate to Deputies that will be appointed on our part, the concessions and compensations that you are willing to make to the confederates.

I request that whoever you may choose to send may come by the Deria Dowlut Baug ford and when you name the day and hour at which they are to come, I shall order the officer commanding at the Redoubt opposite to it to send a party of soliders to receive them and to conduct them in security to the neighbourhood of the Edgah Redoubt where the Deputies from the allies will meet them to hear your propositions.

**No. 437—The captive garrison of Coimbatore is sent back under escort.**

**FROM—TIPU SULTAN,**

**TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.**

*12th February 1792.*

Your pleasing letter relative to sending the Deputies of the Ahmedy Sircar to negotiate an accommodation and containing other matters has arrived and given me pleasure. Twenty days ago the whole garrison of Coimbatore were sent below the Ghaut under a proper escort whence they will reach you.

Tomorrow the 19 Jemad al Sane 1206 being Monday the vackeels of the Sircar will reach you by the pass of Derriadoulat-Baug that by treating with you in person and reestablishing the ancient friendship amity may be daily increased.

**No. 438**—Bhau advances towards Cornwallis and Capt. Riddell towards Abercromby.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CAPTAIN LITTLE.

*Poona, 13th February 1792.*

Sir,

I enclose extract of a letter from me to the Governor-General on the subject of the Bhau's movement at last toward the combined armies.

You have been furnished with my sentiments relative to the Bhau's pretended want of money and I hope the referential mode in which you have got rid of his application to you for assistance will be attended with no inconvenience to Lord Cornwallis of whose probable pecuniary wants you will have been informed by a late application from Col. Rose to Mr. Uthhoff.

I was much concerned to observe by your letter to General Abercromby of 3rd inst. that there was then a probability of the division of your corps which your objections will, I trust, have prevented, at least as far as relates to your detachment, for you must recollect that Capt. Riddell's destination is to join General Abercromby.

**No. 439.**

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—GEORGE DICK.

*Poona, 14th February 1792.*

I have the pleasure to acquaint you that my last advices from Capt. Little's Detachment of 3rd February mention that in consequence of peremptory orders from hence and very strong requisitions from Lord Cornwallis and Hurry Punt Furkia, Pursaram Bhow had quitted his designs against Bednore after approaching within seven miles of it and on the 30 ult. directed his route toward the grand combined army.

I have further satisfaction in acquainting you that letters received from Lord Cornwallis' camp advise the junction of Nizam Ally Khan's army under his son and Minister on the 25th with whom his Lordship had a meeting that day and on the 26 made a march toward Seringputtun when the enemy's fort of Holydroog surrendered,

No. 440—Malet submits to the Chairman of the Court of Directors a brief account of the advantageous position of the allied Powers in the war with Tipu.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—J. S. BURGESS, CHAIRMAN OF THE SECRET COMMITTEE OF THE COURT OF DIRECTORS.

*Poona, 14th February 1792.*

A short but true sketch of the state of the belligerent Powers in this part of the world may not be unacceptable to you from an authentic quarter and having the sanction of the Governor General's permission to address you trust to that and my subject for your excuses.

The principal forts of the enemy between Bangalore and Seringaputtun having been rapidly captured by Lord Cornwallis, his Lordship's reinforcements having joined, his other necessary preparations being completed, his armies attended by that of the Mahrattas under Hurrpunt being well advanced toward the enemy, General Abercromby having ascended the Coorg Pass at the head of the Bombay Army and taken post completely equipped between the Ghaut and Periaputtun, the northern Mahratta Army commanded by Pursaram Bhao, in which the Bombay detachment under Captain Little serves, having totally defeated and taken all the guns of an army of the enemy of ten thousand or twelve thousand horse and foot charged with the important service of covering the enemy's supplies from the rich and fertile provinces toward Bednore, and having also reduced several strong and important places in that quarter, letters were received by his Lordship and allies on the 13th ultimo, from the enemy requesting permission to send Vackeels, to which a joint and unanimous answer from his Lordship and the plenipotentiaries of the allies was sent on the 18th demanding, previous to further intercourse, the liberation of the garrison of Coimbatore agreeable to the capitulation settled by Lt. Chalmers with Kumra-al-Deen Khan.

In this state of affairs the army of Nizam Ally Khan commanded by his son Secunder Jah assisted by his Minister and accompanied by the Company's Resident Sir John Kennaway joined the confederate army on the 25th; on the 26th moved toward the enemy's capital; on the 30th Mahratta army under Pursuram Bhao quitting its views on Bednore after arriving within 7 miles of that place, also proceeded agreeable to the requisition of Lord Cornwallis and the orders of this Court to join and co-operate with His Lordship against the common enemy who was said to be waiting the event of all these formidable preparations in the neighbourhood of Seringaputtun and of whose situation a tolerable idea may be formed by the above description of the position of the grand confederate army, General Abercromby's and Pursuram Bhao's.

Under these circumstances it cannot be thought presumptuous to express a firm persuasion that the necessary and just war in which we



have been so long engaged must be shortly brought to an honourable conclusion.

I cannot conclude this letter without acquainting you that the conduct of this Court in word and deed continues to breathe friendship toward the company's Government, the person of His Majesty and toward our nation in general which the Peshwa has been lately desirous of notifying by sending some tokens thereof to His Majesty and Honble. Court of Directors, but has been prevented by the want of timely notice for sending the intended articles to Bombay.

**No. 441**—Bhau is accompanied by the entire detachment under Capt. Little.

**FROM—C. W. MALET,**

**TO—CAPT. LITTLE.**

*Poona, 22nd February 1792.*

I was very glad to learn that the Bhau was advancing, that your entire detachment was accompanying him and that the army was so well provided with bunjarries as to give hopes of assisting rather than of being an encumbrance to the grand confederate force in the important article of grain, the probable demand for which you are so fully apprized of.

From the circumstances you mention I conceive your enlisting recruits must be absolutely necessary for keeping up the strength of your battalions.

**No. 442**—The war is brought to a close with the signing and exchange of the preliminary articles of peace.

**FROM—G. F. CHERRY,**

**TO—C. W. MALET.**

*Camp north of Seringapatam, 24th February 1792.*

I have the honor to obey the commands of Earl Cornwallis Governor General in informing you that this day the preliminary articles having been agreed upon and exchanged between the confederate powers and Tippoo Sultaun, a cessation of hostilities took place on both sides.

His Lordship being much employed at present and anxious that you should receive as early intimation of this event as possible has directed me to notify it to you and to transmit a copy of the articles for your information.

Copy of the preliminary articles agreed upon and exchanged between the Confederate Powers and Tippoo Sultaun.

*Dated 22nd February 1792.*

Article 1. One-half of the dominions which were in the possession of Tippoo Sultaun at the commencement of the, present war, shall be ceded to the Allies, adjacent to their respective boundaries and agreeably to their selection.

2. Three crores and thirty lacs of Sicca rupees shall be paid to the Allies agreeably to the following particulars viz :—

1. One crore and sixty-five lacs shall be paid immediately in Pagodas or Gold Mohours or rupees of full weight and standard or in Gold or silver bullion.

2. The remainder one crore and sixty-five lacs at three instalments not exceeding four months each in the three coins before mentioned.

Article 3. All subjects of the four several Powers who may have been prisoners from the time of the late Hyder Ally Khan to the present period shall be fairly and unequivocally released.

4. Until the due performance of the three articles above mentioned two of the three eldest sons of Tippoo Sultaun shall be given as hostages ; on the arrival of whom, a cessation of hostilities shall take place.

5. When an agreement containing the articles above written shall arrive bearing the seal and signature of Tippoo Sultaun counter agreements shall be sent from the three powers ; and after the cessation of hostilities such a definitive treaty of perpetual friendship as shall be settled by the several parties shall be adjusted and entered into.

No. 443—On account of Bhao's arrival within the vicinity of Seringapatam Malet expects direct communication between Puttun and Poona.

FROM—C. W. MALET,  
TO—CAPT. LITTLE.

*Poona, 4th March 1792.*

I was happy to learn from your despatch of the 21st ultimo, that you were then within 3 days march of the grand confederate army, and I apprehend the vigor and decision of his Lordship's measures and the rapid success with which they have been crowned will have obviated in a great degree the inconveniences that might otherwise have arisen from the delay in his advance.

It seems fair to conclude that the many places of considerable strength that have been reduced in your progress will add greatly to the enemy's distress at the critical period and insure a safe communication direct from Puttun to this place by which means advices may be expected here in future by that route in 12 days.



## SECTION 9

*After the War: Disputes and Settlement—Partition of Conquests—  
Cornwallis's generous release of hostage Princes (1792–93)*

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No. 444—General Medows shoot's himself.

FROM—C. W. MALET,  
TO—GEORGE DICK.

*Poona, 17th March 1792.*

You will be shocked and grieved to hear of the lamentable circumstance of General Medows having shot himself. He was not dead on the 28th ultimo, but it was not thought he could survive. I need not add that numberless causes and conjectures will be started on event so melancholy and extraordinary while the true one will probably die with the unfortunate man, who has evidently fallen a victim to a sense of honor too refined and too high strained to submit to the common errors and disappointment incidental to our nature. I regret his loss as of a man, and lament it as a friend and admirer of his many virtues and amiable qualities.

No. 445—On the victorious termination of the war Malet waxes eloquent on the many qualities of head and heart for which Cornwallis was distinguished.

FROM—C. W. MALET,  
TO—J. S. BURGESS, CHAIRMAN, ETC.

*Poona, 18th March 1792.*

In my address of the 14th ultimo, via Suez, I had the honor to anticipate the glorious event that has since happened and the progress of which is fully detailed in the enclosed accounts of the signal victory gained by Lord Cornwallis over the enemy on the night of the 6th ultimo, the subsequent junction of General Abercromby and the consequent progress of the seige of Puttun which ended in the submission of Tippoo Sultan to the enclosed terms prescribed by the allies the 22nd ultimo, which glorious event has been sanctioned by the highest applause and entire approval of this Court and the Nabob Nizam Ally Khan.

Accept, Sir, my most hearty congratulations on events so glorious to our country and so truly honorable to the Company's Govt. under the great and good man by whom it is administered, who having conquered the enemy by the superiority of his genius and the force of his arms has gained the affections and respect of our allies by his wisdom, moderation and equity, who by stopping short in the intoxicating career of victory, has sacrificed every passion to the dictates of true patriotism and of the most inflexible integrity, and conveyed to the world a sublime example of conquering to correct and not to destroy.

It is scarce less matter of exultation that his Lordship's wisdom should have commanded the most unequivocal confidence and respect of the allies than that the matchless vigor of his arms should have enabled him to convince the enemy of his generosity.

Both the Peshwa and the Nabob Nizam Ally Khan have been induced by his Lordship's high character to express their wish of a personal acquaintance. But I know not at present whether circumstances will admit of their meeting. In the event of its being found convenient it might tend to cement the cordiality of the different states.

I have received orders from his Lordship to hold myself in readiness to proceed to assist at the Congress for settling the definitive treaty in the event of such delay in the conclusion of it as would admit of my arrival.

No. 446.

FROM—C. W. MALET,  
TO—GEORGE DICK.

*Poona, 21st March 1792.*

I have great pleasure in acquainting you that the hopes of General Meadows's recovery gained ground from the tranquillity of his mind and freedom from pain the 29th ultimo—on which day the first payment was to be made by Tippoo.

No. 447—Malet speaks in the highest terms of the services rendered by Capt. Little and his detachment in the war.

FROM—C. W. MALET,  
TO—CAPT. LITTLE.

*Poona, 26th March 1792.*

I have been duly honored with your letter of the 24th ultimo. From subsequent private advices I have learnt your arrival with Bhou in the neighbourhood of Puttun and I have now the happiness to congratulate you on the honorable and advantageous manner in which his Lordship the Governor General has terminated the long and arduous war in which we have been engaged. I beg leave at the same time to assure you of my high sense of and to present you my warmest felicitations on the uniform gallantry and good conduct with which our national reputation has been

so brilliantly supported by yourself and the detachment under your command throughout a long course of active military service involved in circumstances of peculiar political delicacy.

No. 448—The Govt. of Bombay brings to the notice of Abercromby the immense importance of the tract of country from Goa to Cochin with a view to its acquisition.

Extract of a letter from the Government of Bombay to Major-General Abercromby.

We have received the agreeable intelligence that preliminary articles of peace have been settled between the confederate powers and Tippoo Sultaun, and altho' we entertain no doubt of his Lordship the Governor General's attention to the political and commercial interests of this Presidency yet we think it particularly fortunate, that from your being in his camp, the Governor General will have an opportunity of consulting you on so important a subject, which, we flatter ourselves, will be the means of securing to our Honble Masters considerable advantages on this coast. As your absence puts it out of your power to refer to the records of this Presidency, we think it will be acceptable to you to have copies of every material paper relative to the former views and negociations of this Government with Hyder Ally and Tippoo Sultaun. As neither of the former wars were completely successful, no important political advantages could be derived from them and even the few commercial privileges granted us were extremely precarious; the glorious conclusion of the present war opens a fair and extensive prospect of acquisition, peculiarly advantageous to this Presidency. The territory from Goa to Cochin, from the sea coast to the Ghauts, includes a country valuable in every respect of situation, produce, revenue, and commerce; by fortifying the passes in the mountains it may be defended with a small body of troops and by our having possession of the ports, Tippoo will be cut off from all communication with the French and other European Powers who have hitherto supplied him with military stores, and he will thereby be effectually excluded from a very essential resource for carrying on future wars.

No. 449—Cornwallis sends intelligence of the conclusion of the definitive treaty and the return of Bhau towards Poona.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—C. W. MALET.

*Camp at Ouralore, 28th March 1792.*

I transmit a copy of the definitive treaty by which you will see that the country selected by us for our share cannot occasion the smallest degree of jealousy to our friends.

Purseram Bhow, who is very ill, has separated from us, and is to return by the shortest route. I cannot help apprehending that he will commit many irregularities upon his march, for his corps has hitherto paid very little respect to the treaty. But as our detachment has joined General Abercromby (a point which I carried with some difficulty) he will not venture to loiter upon the road, and may perhaps be more cautious in his general line of conduct.

Hurry Punt will make seven or eight more marches with me, and he professes and I believe with truth, to look forward to our separation with very great concern. We have never had any serious difference and for many months past his behaviour has uniformly been most obliging and accommodating.

The peace will probably prevent altogether Scindias's visit to Poonah, but if it should still take place, it will be less embarrassing to us as well as to the Minister, whose hands must by now be greatly strengthened.

If I had suspected in time that it would be the wish of Nana that Major Palmer should not accompany Scindia to the capital I would have devised some means to prevent it, but in the present state of things it does not appear to me to be a matter of much moment; should you however be of a different opinion, and Major Palmer be still at some distance from Poonah, you may transmit to him a copy of this letter, and recommend to him not to come forward if he thinks he can find pretexts for delay that will not give serious offence to Scindia.

**No. 450**—G. F. Cherry communicates the sentiments of Cornwallis in reply to Tipu's complaint against the detention of Haridas pant by the Mahrattas and the conduct of the Nizam's and the Peshwa's troops in their return journey and expresses His Lordship's solicitude for the promotion of friendly intercourse and the increase of trade between the two States.

FROM—G. F. CHERRY,

TO—GOLAM ALI KHAN AND ALI REZA.

*Written 24th April 1792.*

I have communicated the subjects which passed in conversation between us this morning pursuant to the letter which you had received from Tippoo Sultaun to Lord Cornwallis.

In regard to Hurrydoss Punt his Lordship remarked that he had already expressed his sentiments fully to you in presence of Govind Row Kishen while the army was at Seringapatam, that as Hurry Doss Punt after the surrender of Darwar entered voluntarily into the service of the Mahratta State and deserted from Tippoo Sultaun, he could not be considered a prisoner of war, and of course did not come within the letter of the definitive treaty, and no doubt you will recollect, that Govind Row Kishen declared at that time that if Hurry Doss Punt in presence of Lord Cornwallis expressed a wish to return to Tippoo's service, the Mahratta State would

not detain him. You must be sensible that any other line of conduct would be a breach of faith and of the universal practice among nations.

In reply to the representations made by Tippoo Sultaun of the conduct of the armies of the Peshwa and the Nizam his Lordship observed, that he had not yet received any communication that may have passed between Hurry Punt or Azeem ul Omrah, but reports had reached him stating that the Bayde horse belonging to Tippoo Sultaun had plundered several horses, etc., from those armies, which he paid no attention to from considerations of the irregular and depredatory system in which the Bayde Horse of Tippoo's state and the pindary horse of the Mahratta armies were employed without any check or control, that from the nature of those horse the march of armies thro' a country was always attended with circumstances of this description, that he is confident from the assurances of Hurry Punt and Azeem ul Omrah that every exertion has been made to put a stop to them, and he trusts, that these matters will be considered as temporary inconveniences, which will exist no longer.

His Lordship will be very happy to see the intercourse between the inhabitants of Tippoo's country and those of the Company's increase by the mutual advantages of trade, and will immediately write to the Government of Madras to issue the necessary orders for that purpose. He further desires that you will assure Tippoo Sultaun, that he shall at all times be inclined to meet the measures of Tippoo Sultaun in any respect tending to establish an intimate and easy intercourse between the inhabitants of both countries for the purpose of carrying on a trade which is replete with great advantages to each State and cannot fail under their wise regulations and encouragement to be very beneficial to the inhabitants themselves.

Sepoys will be furnished to accompany Meer Abdulla to Eleavanoour whenever you will be pleased to send him there to take charge of the countries entrusted to him, where, since the treaty of peace restoring them to Tippoo Sultaun has been concluded, no authority on the part of the Company has been exercised and the orders you require shall be sent to Bangalore to prevent the destruction of the houses in the Pettah.

No. 451—Certain points of dispute arose in the execution of the treaty. In this letter Cornwallis requests Tipu to agree to an exchange of certain territories and to release prisoners.

FROM—G. F. CHERRY,

TO—GOLAM ALI KHAN AND ALI REZA.

*13th May 1792.*

Lord Cornwallis is informed by a letter from General Abercromby who commands the Bombay army and has now returned below the Ghauts



by the route of Periapatam, that in the schedule containing the names of the ceded districts and accompanying the treaty, there are three districts which belong to the Rajah of Travancore named,

Alungaar	..	4,000
Paroor	..	4,000
Koonutnayr	..	4,000
Pagodas	..	<u>12,000</u>

Notwithstanding that while the negotiation was pending no trouble was spared in undertaking the enquiry into minute points, yet mistakes are frequently and unavoidably committed; and as it is well known that Tippoo Sultan is ever ready to correct a mistake on discovery, Lord Cornwallis directs me to write to you that you may represent this matter to Tippoo Sultan and procure an order for the delivery of country amounting to 12,000 pages. per annum in the vicinity of Nelisuram, which is contiguous to the Company's boundaries, in exchange for the districts above mentioned. It appears also from General Abercrombie's letter to Lord Cornwallis that several people belonging to the Rajah of Travancore are still in confinement and his Lordship further desires me to remind you of your information that the moodeliars were released by Tippoo's orders. It is, however, surprising that they are not yet arrived. You will mention this to Tippoo, and at the same time inform him that positive injunctions will be sent to the Rajah of Travancore to release such people as may be in confinement belonging to Tippoo's Government.

No. 452—Tipu complains of disturbances caused by the Coorg Rajah and Cornwallis writes to Abercromby to prevent them.

FROM—G. F. CHERRY,

TO—GOLAM ALI KHAN AND ALI REZA.

22nd May 1792.

I have received your note mentioning that you had been honoured by a letter from Tippoo Sultana enclosing copies of the arzijs from certain aumils, stating the disturbances committed by the people belonging to the Coorga Rajah. The contents have been communicated to Lord Cornwallis who is surprised and much concerned at such intelligence, and observed 'that altho' it was probable that this conduct had been shown from not knowing that peace was established and was a continuation

of the measures during war yet that it did not by any means meet with his approbation, and that he should immediately write to General Abercrombie to desire that he would take effectual measures to put a stop to such behaviour.

(I)—Complaint to Tipu of disturbances caused by the Coorg people.

FROM—AUMIL OF PERIAPATAM,

TO—TIPU SULTAN.

*22nd May 1792.*

Arzee from the aumil of Periaputtam to Tippoo Sultaun :—

Having taken leave of the presence I repaired to the Talookas, encouraged the ryots to return to their habitations, and was desirous to engage them in tilling and cultivating the lands ; about 3,000 Coorgas assembled and set fire to and plundered ten or twelve villages, carrying away with them many women and children. In consequence those ryots who had returned fled ; I have no orders to resist or oppose ; The improper conduct of these people knows no bounds. I have no resource. But how can the country be cultivated ? I have represented it to the Presence, and shall obey the orders I recieve.

Arzee of similar purport from the aumeels of Terreekana Beyloor.

Munsurabad otherwise called Bul.

No. 453.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—ROBERT ABERCROMBY.

*Poona, 3rd June 1792.*

Three of the bullock drivers sent from hence to serve in the army under your command having returned without their noses and right hands which were cut off by Tippoo's orders, permit me to submit to your consideration the expediency of your authorizing me to direct their being supplyd with a maintenance by the Deputy Paymaster of this station.

No. 454—Cornwallis communicates to the Coorg Raja the complaints made against him.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—THE COORG RAJA.

5th June 1792.

It has been represented to me by Tippoo's Vakeels residing with me that the subjects of your country commit depredations and make incursions into the districts being on the borders and belonging to Tippoo.

Altho' I am well convinced that such conduct cannot have occurred with your knowledge, yet it is incumbent on me to communicate to you the information which I have received, and accordingly I send you a copy of the letters which Tippoo received from his Aumils, and which he transmitted to me.

As peace has been happily established between Tippoo Sultaun and the Company, it is highly necessary that all acts should be prevented which can in any respect lead to renew disagreements or be in the least contrary to the rules and customs established between nations and particularly those of the hostile nature complained of, which Tippoo will with propriety resent. I therefore desire that you will immediately issue orders throughout your country to proclaim the peace concluded between the Company and Tippoo and to prevent the inroads and incursions of the inhabitants of your districts into the territory appertaining to Tippoo.

No. 455—The district of Vencatgiri is demanded in exchange for the villages of Caveripoor to adjust the difference in jumma.

FROM—G. F. CHERRY,

TO—GOLAM ALI KHAN ANDALI REZA.

10th June 1792.

When the division of territory was settled and the portions allotted to each of the Allied Powers, it was agreed that the villages of the different Talukas should be relinquished and retained on an investigation on the spot. Lord Cornwallis has been informed of the particulars of the districts of Caveripoor etc., districts mentioned in the fourth article of the definitive treaty. As the situation of the villages of Caveripoor with regard to the river Cauvery, whether on this or the other side of the river was not ascertained, the districts of Vencatighury, Ruttonghurry, and Denkanicottah, belonging to the Barramhal, were left to Tippoo,

notwithstanding that in an early part of the negotiation of the definitive treaty they were made over in the Company's share, until it appeared that the whole Jumma exceeded the Company's portion of the general division. I have now the pleasure to enclose, by order of Lord Cornwallis, the statement which he has received of the district of Cauveripoor. Tippoo Sultan is to make good the surplus in the statement, and Lord Cornwallis is extremely desirous to adjust every point in an amicable manner and to the convenience of both parties. His Lordship therefore demands the district of Vencatigury in exchange for the above villages, the Jumma of which stands rated at 6,000 Pagodas, and the remainder will be taken whenever and wherever an enquiry shall render it advisable and convenient. I request you will write to Tippoo Sultan on this subject and will procure an order addressed to the Aumil and Killahdar of Vencatighurry to make over that district to the English Company.

Enclosure in the above.

Particulars of the villages of Cauveripoor, which according to the treaty are to be relinquished and retained on an investigation on the spot. Names of villages belonging to Cauveripoor, which being situated to the southward of the Cauveri river are, pursuant to the 4th article of the definitive treaty, to be restored to Tippoo Sultaun, and an equivalent to be ceded to the English Company elsewhere.

Pallamalla bettum ..	..	..	..	88	5	0
Shamhully Agrars ...	..	..	..	900	0	0
Cheeka devieraipeti	..	..	..	998	4	12
Areegooranagoonta	..	..	..	203	0	0
Para wul calwa ..	..	..	..	189	9	0
Novaputty ...	..	..	..	550	0	0
Mullacara ..	..	..	..	222	0	0
Caveripoor Cusba ..	..	..	..	5,306	4	15
Burgoor Hill ..	..	..	..			
Nulloor ..	..	..	..			
Chunampany ..	..	..	..			
Shingerry Nully and the customs	..	..	..			

Canterai Pagodas .. 8,448 5 10

Names of Talooks belonging to the district of Caroor, which being situated to the northward of the river Cauveri are, pursuant to the 4th article of the definitive treaty, to be retained by the English Company, and an equivalent to be made to Tippoo Sultaun elsewhere.

Cuddapatoor ..... 1,500 Canterai Pags.

Agreeable to the above account made by enquiry on the spot it appears that pursuant to the treaty, the English Company and Tippoo Sultaun are both to relinquish territory, and that Tippoo Sultaun is to make good to the English Company the difference, being 6,948-5-10 Pagodas from other parts.

No. 456—Cornwallis wants to justify his claim to Vencatagiri.

FROM—G. F. CHERRY,

TO—GOLAM ALI KHAN AND ALI REZA.

*11th June 1792.*

On my return from you I related to Lord Cornwallis what had passed in conversation between us relative to the cession of Vencatigherry in exchange for the villages belonging to Cauveripoor, situated on the other side of the Cauveri. His Lordship was much surprised at learning your sentiments on this subject, and remarked that he had made the choice of Vencatigherry for the following reasons; first, that the Jumma of Vencatigherry was nearly adequate to the Jumma of the villages of Cauveripoor; secondly, because Vencatigherry is contiguous to the Company's boundaries. He observed also that in this choice he had strictly adhered to the preliminary treaty; that, exclusive of these arguments he conceives that he has consulted the pleasure of Tippoo Sultaun who had freely agreed at an early stage of the negotiation to relinquish Vencatigherry with the other districts of the Barramahal. At present he selects the district of Vencatigherry which Tippoo has before agreed to give up in exchange for the villages on the other side of the river Cauveri belonging to Cauveripoor, which are relinquished by the Company solely in conformity to the definitive treaty; but he is much surprised that there can be any delay on the part of Tippoo Sultaun in the promised delivery of Vencatigherry, and is confident that Tippoo, on learning these particulars, will immediately transmit the orders addressed to the Aumil and Killahdar.

No. 456A—Cherry communicates to Tipu's envoys the Governor General's exasperation at receiving no reply to the disputed points communicated to them and calls upon Tipu to cede Vencatigiri, to make good the stores left in the forts made over to Tipu, and to restore to liberty all prisoners of war.

FROM—G. F. CHERRY,

TO—GOLAM ALI KHAN AND ALI REZA.

*15th June 1792.*

Notwithstanding that every subject which has occurred relating in any sense to the late treaty of peace, since the march of the Confederate

armies from Seringapatam, has been uniformly communicated to you by order of Lord Cornwallis, and doubtless you will have by you the notes which I have written to you, yet many causes combine to render it necessary that many of the subjects mentioned in my notes should be recapitulated to you, and I obey his Lordship's orders in addressing you.

The most important of those causes is that no reply whatever has been received to any one of the subjects communicated to you, who from your station and the important trust reposed in you by Tippoo Sultaun from the day that the negociation for a cessation of hostilities commenced have been and still continue to be the only channel of communication between Lord Cornwallis and Tippoo Sultaun.

The uniform conduct which Lord Cornwallis has observed since the conclusion of the peace, and even during the negotiation that brought it to a conclusion, has been in proof of his disposition to strengthen the friendly intercourse set on foot by it between the allied powers and Tippoo Sultaun; and fortunately you have been yourselves witnesses of his conduct, and any recapitulation of it is therefore unnecessary.

But while he is conscious of the sincerity of his conduct and of your earnest desire to promote the good understanding recently commenced, he cannot omit remarking that neither the frequency nor the importance of his communications to you, thro' me, have met with that attention from Tippoo Sultaun which they are entitled to, and which, from his own deportment, he conceives that he has a right to expect.

On this account he requested you would call on him that he might verbally inform you of his sentiments, and in consideration of your good will towards a future intimacy and friendship between Tippoo Sultaun and the Company, point out to you in few words the subjects that he conceives have not been yet sufficiently adhered to by Tippoo Sultaun, and forming a part of the late treaty.

After mentioning them, and hearing your answers to them, his Lordship has directed me to commit them to paper for your better recollection, and that you may represent them to Tippoo Sultaun without deviation.

It cannot be unknown to you that Lord Cornwallis, urged by the importance of the charge entrusted to him, is, after so long an absence, desirous of returning to his Government in Bengal; and confident of the sincerity of Tippoo's professions he does not hesitate to prepare for his departure from hence. But at the same time he is anxious that several articles of the treaty, which from their nature could not be adjusted at Seringapatam, should be settled before his departure, for which purpose there has, he conceives, been time sufficient.

These articles I shall repeat to you by his orders, notwithstanding the letters which I have written to you make mention of them.

The first of these points is the insertion of three Talooks belonging to the Rajah of Travancore in the share made over by Tippoo to the Company ; on this I wrote to you, and proposed the exchange Lord Cornwallis demands for them. You have my letter, and will send it to Tippoo.

The second was in virtue of the 4th article of the treaty relating to the divisions of the district of Caveripoor lying on the opposite side of the Caveri, which river had been agreed on as the boundary in that quarter between the Government of Tippoo and of the Company, and proposing the Talook of Vencatigheery in exchange. My letter to you on this subject informs you of his reasons for making this choice, and he expects that Tippoo will see the attention which he has paid to former conversations relative to this district belonging to the Barra Mahal and the connection which the choice has to the first article of the preliminary treaty dated 22nd February 1792 or 28th Jemmadual Saany 1206 Hejeree. He trusts that orders for its delivery will be sent by Tippoo prior to his departure from hence.

The third subject of his conversation with you was relative to the stores in the different garrisons. I have already sent you a list of those left by the Company in the garrisons which they restored to Tippoo. This list you will send to Tippoo and on receiving a similar list from him of those left in the forts ceded to the Company by Tippoo the difference will be seen. Lord Cornwallis is convinced that such difference will be due to the Company, and trusts that Tippoo will make it good. You have my letter on this subject also. The 6th article of the treaty which relates to this subject was, as you well know, inserted for mutual convenience, not for trouble to each party.

But the most important of all the communications from Lord Cornwallis to you was on the subject of the prisoners belonging to the Company and to the Rajah of Travancore. You are well aware of the words inserted in the 5th article of the treaty and his Lordship has the more reason to complain of the neglect evident on the part of Tippoo to this articles from the experience of Tippoo's conduct in this respect at the close of the former war, proved by circumstances which have occurred during the last war, and which he mentioned to you. Many prisoners who were detained have since made their escape, and many were released by the English troops from Shehr Ganjam. Lord Cornwallis therefore expects a faithful account of such as may have been prisoners, according to the third article of the preliminary treaty ; and as his information, which cannot be complete, has hitherto led him to believe many to be in confinement, particularly two officers taken at Caweripatan, he relies on Tippoo's good will and sincerity to his engagements to give a faithful account of every individual, European and Native, and to release immediately those who are in existence.

These were the subjects of his conversation with you and while you have been witness of Lord Cornwallis's sincere desire to execute every article of the treaty, you must be equally aware that he expects a similar conduct on the part of Tippoo and as the measures in his hands to enforce it are known to you, he relies on your representations to Tippoo of his determination to ensure a faithful performance of every article. His Lordship used many arguments to you to prove his own sincerity and his confidence in Tippoo's ; but he also mentioned to you how much he regretted Tippoo's dilatory conduct.

He reminded you also that the period for the payment of the first kist of the remaining sum to be paid to the allied Powers was advancing ; but as he is not inclined to entertain doubts before the period shall have expired, he is not desirous of more than he conceived his duty to the Allies, which he considers to be to make mention of the circumstance.

Lord Cornwallis has directed me to commit these remarks to paper that you may immediately transmit a copy of my letter to Tippoo and procure a speedy answer.

**No. 457**—The Governor General writes to the Peshwa to release Buddur-ul-zeman Khan.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—THE PESHWA.

*Madras, 19th June 1792.*

[After communicating the arrival of Lord Cornwallis at Madras on the 29th May and his intention to return to Bengal after he had concluded certain affairs there.]

Having brought these important undertakings to a successful and honorable issue, I have every reason to hope that the engagements entered into by Tippoo Sultaun will be rigidly adhered to by him and by the Confederate States and I trust that the conduct which I have uniformly pursued will serve to convince each party concerned of my future intentions. Such I am confident will be the measures pursued by you and by his Highness the Nizam, and such they should be to ensure a steady adherence on the part of Tippoo Sultaun to the treaty lately concluded.

The Vakeels on his part attendant on his sons have informed me that Budder-ul-Zaman Khan who surrendered the fort of Dharwar to Purseram Bhow is still in confinement notwithstanding the articles of capitulation on the strength of which he surrendered that fortress and contrary to the late treaty which stipulated for the release of prisoners on all sides.



No. 462.

FROM—ROBERT TAYLOR,

TO—G. F. CHERRY.

*Tellicherry, 27th July 1792.*

The Coorg Rajah having written to me on the subject of the complaint made by Tippoo Sultaun and desired I would send a copy of his letter for the information of Earl Cornwallis, I have accordingly enclosed a translate thereof. Should it be necessary I shall propose to the parties concerned to adjust their differences in the mode pointed out by the treaty of peace.

The Coorg Raja brings counter charges of molestation and forcible seizure of two districts by Tipu's men.

FROM—COORG RAJA,

TO—CHIEF OF TELLICHERRY.

*17th July 1792.*

I have received your two letters with that which you sent me from his Excellency the Governor General. Formerly, when General Abercromby's army was here, Tippoo and his principal officers wrote to me that they knew I was in friendship with the English which could prove of no advantage to me, because they were people who belonged to Europe; and that Tippoo's territories were adjoining to mine; that in giving the preference to his friendship Tippoo would consider himself as bound to be strictly my friend, and to give me every assistance in his power, for which reason I ought to commit some treason against the English army to make them go away. Immediately on receipt of these letters I sent them with their messengers to the general, and wrote to Tippoo that, having but one tongue, I had pledged my word to the English and never would prove false to them, having so pledged myself. As I would not side with Tippoo the English Army passed through my country and arrived at Seringapatam, in anger at which, he has written to the Governor General that I had committed outrages in his territories, and other bad things against me. The letter which you sent me from the Governor General of Bengal mentions that having made peace with Tippoo his country ought not to be molested.



show them that attention during my absence, which they have uniformly experienced from me. I trust you will be at perfect case in this respect.

I cannot, however, avoid to express my surprize that no answer has been received to the repeated messages which I have sent to you, thro' Golaum Ally Khan and Ally Reza, upon subjects which relate to business of the greatest importance, among others relative to the surplus stores left by the Company in the forts restored to your Government, which, according to the treaty are to be made good, and I had flattered myself that you would have furnished me with an order to your Aumil of Vencatighery to deliver that district over to the Company in exchange for that part of Caveripoor, situated on the southern side of the Cauveri, as well as that the exchange for three districts belonging to the Rajah of Travancore but inserted by your Mutsuddies in the division of country ceded to the Company, would have been finally settled. Upon these subjects I have fully communicated to your Vakeels and it is with regret that I am about to depart for Calcutta without having heard from you about them. They relate in every respect to the treaty of Seringapatam which has been hitherto strictly adhered to on my part, and while I cannot doubt your sincere intentions to execute it, I can only attribute the delay that has arisen in receiving answer to references made to you relative to it, to the neglect and inattention of your officers. I flatter myself, however, that in a few days I shall have the pleasure to hear from you. In the meantime you may rest assured that I shall give the most positive instructions to the Governments of Madras and Bombay to pay rigid attention to the articles of the treaty which appertain to their Governments and to be equally attentive that those articles are fulfilled on both sides.

No. 464—Cherry will communicate the Raja of Travancore's claim to the possession of Alungar, Paroor and Koontnayr for a long time past.

FROM—GOLAM ALI KHAN AND ALI REZA,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Received 14th August 1792.*

Since your Lordship's departure for Bengal, not a moment has passed that we have not had your kindness in recollection, nor is there a tongue that does not sound your praise. The young Princes are for ever talking of and recollecting your Lordship's great goodness towards them. We hope that your Lordship will show more kindness to us now absent than was even your constant practice while present, and that we may be honored with letters mentioning your health. Mr. Cherry will represent to your

Lordship further particulars on business which we have written in a separate letter to him. We trust that your Lordship will attend to them.

FROM—GOLAM ALI KHAN AND ALI REZA,

TO—G. F. CHERRY.

*Received 14th August 1792.*

We addressed an arzie to Tippoo Suldaun containing the particulars of Lord Cornwallis' commands at the Gardens, and have received an answer to our address, copy of which we enclose to you. We request that you will understand its contents, and represent every particular to his Lordship. From the general tendency of the answer the right is on our side, and we beg of you to state these matters to his Lordship from us in a manner that hereafter his Lordship may decline to give us such injunctions on such trifling matters, notwithstanding that we are right. We are in every respect obedient to his Lordship.

No. 465—Tipu refuses to surrender Vencatagiri by taking objection to the assessment submitted by the Governor General, promises to examine into the accounts of military stores, and points out the absurdity and injustice of the claim to the three districts, Alungar, etc., by the Raja of Travancore.

*(Enclosure.)*

FROM—TIPU SULTAN,

TO—GOLAM ALI KHAN AND ALI REZA.

I have perfectly comprehended the contents of your arzie. You write that Lord Cornwallis, conformably to the treaty, demands villages on the other side of the Cauverie in exchange for villages on this side of the river, belonging to Cauveripoor. I understand the question. In answer, the district of Cauveripoor is rated at a Jumma bundy of 8,000 Caunterai Pagodas; of this sum, villages of Cauveripore which, on the other side of the Cauverie, are in the possession of the English Company, in number 14, and the hamlets belonging to them 94, making in all 108, are estimated at 6,062 Pagodas 9 fanams; the remaining sum of the Jumma of Cauveripore, for villages on this side of the river, amounts to 1,937 Pagodas one fanam, and for this sum my Sircar is to give an equivalent, according to the treaty, to the Company. I therefore make over the village Cautpore with 8 hamlets appertaining to it, belonging to the district of Caroor, estimated at a Jumma bundy of 3,873 Pagodas 7 fanams 10 annas, property of the Hyderi Sircar and situated on the other side of the Cauveri. It therefore appears that, after allowing for the equivalent which I am to make of 1,937 Pagodas 1 fanam, the Company is to return me an equivalent for the balance, being 1,876 Pagodas 6 fanams 10 annas. This equivalent, wherever they please to select it, contiguous to the boundary, you will accept, and report to me. It appears from the paper which you received

from Lord Cornwallis and enclosed in your arzie that the Jummabundy of the villages of Cauveripoor, situated on this side of the river, is 8,448 Pagodas 9 fanams. Probably you have forgot the Jummabundy of Cauveripore, since, on the receipt of his Lordship's memorandum, you did not give an answer to it at the time but wrote to me about it. I desire that you will pay particular attention to what I write now, and you will find that the whole district of Cauveripoor stands estimated in the treaty at 8,000 Pagodas (this you will observe from the copy of the treaty which I send you) of the villages,  $\frac{3}{4}$  at a Jumma of 6,062 Pagodas 9 fanams, which are on that side of the Cauveri, belonging to the English Company, and  $\frac{1}{4}$ , situated on this side of the Cauveri, are estimated at a Jumma of 1,937 Pagodas 1 fanam; notwithstanding this, villages at a Jumma of 8,448 Pagodas 5 fanams belonging to the district of Cauveripoor, which sum is more than the original Jumma, are found on this side of the Cauveri. This is surprizing on this ground, for what equivalent, or on what plea, am I to relinquish Vencatigherry? You will state all this fully to Lord Cornwallis, and explain the accounts on this side and on that side the Cauveri and accept an equivalent of 1,876 Pagodas 6 fanams 10 annas, which will be the surplus of the district of Caroor in the Company's possession on account of Cautpoor, and represent the particulars to me. I will examine into the accounts of military stores left in the forts and made over to the English Company and those left in the forts and made over to my Sircar, and they shall be written out and sent to you shortly. You write that my Mutsuddies have unintentionally annexed 3 talooks belonging to the Rajah of Travancore to the district of Calicut, at a Jumma of 12,000 Pagodas, and they are ceded in the Company's portion. Alungaar, Paroor and Koonutnayr never belonged to the Rajah of Travancore, he took them by force from the Rajah of Cochin. Prior to the late war, I went towards that country and at a meeting and conference with the Rajah of Cochin and people there, I made particular enquiries into these districts and attached them. These districts did not formerly belong to the Travancore Rajah, nor at the commencement of the war, but he had possessed them for some time by force. In the 3rd article of the treaty how is it written and concluded on? That I am to relinquish to the three states half of the country of which I was possessed when the war broke out. As this was agreed upon, my Mutsuddies gave in an estimate of my country at 70 lakhs of Pagodas, and the division for the three States was, at a rough calculation, 35 lakhs of Pagodas when the negociation was pending and under an investigation into particulars, the officers of the three powers canvassed the increase and decrease. At that time in order to please Lord Cornwallis, whom as my well-wisher and friend do not wish by any means to offend, I consented to relinquish country to an amount of  $4\frac{1}{2}$  lakhs of Pagodas more than was agreed upon. It is also written in the treaty to relinquish country contiguous to the boundaries of each when they took the country. What country did they take? Where were the

boundaries preserved? Further, when half my country was estimated 35 lacks of Pagodas, if this 12,000 Pagodas is to be deducted, a deduction should be made in the 35 lakhs also, consider this. If notwithstanding I have agreed to relinquish half my country I have ceded a further portion of  $4\frac{1}{2}$  lakhs of Pagodas, why should there be an altercation for trifles, on this account my Muttsuddies wrote it. You further write that two Europeans and several others are still confined by me, and that my Buckschy carried away from Kishengerry Abul Cauder Havildar and Shick Mahomed Jemahdar, and you desire that they may be released. I am astonished that with your knowledge that not one of the prisoners is detained, you should write in this manner; reflect seriously in your own minds that for such persons the name of God and his Prophet are written in the treaty, and an engagement has been concluded with a Chief of such rank to release all prisoners, shall I act contrary to this engagement, and shall I not release them? shall I displease Lord Cornwallis for so trifling an object, who is my friend and well-wisher? never, I never desire to do this. I am anxious from my heart to perform my engagements and to secure his Lordship's pleasure in every matter, nay it is even my intention thro' the means of Lord Cornwallis who is a Chief of high rank and a well-wisher to the States, to establish a friendly intercourse by correspondence and to lay a foundation for friendship and intimacy with the King of England and with the Company. Independant of this, I desire that you will state to his Lordship the particulars of friendship that exist in a full and conciliatory manner, and report to me his Lordship's pleasure and satisfaction. Terbeyet Ally Khan, Meer Kureem-ul-Dien, Zeman Bag, Mahomed Hyder, Mahomed Ameer, Abdul Mahomed, etc., who are men of rank in my Government were taken prisoners by the Raja of Travancore until the peace was made; he kept them all in confinement and on the conclusion of peace he released a Bramin, named Zewun Row, who was a prisoner. Jewun Row reported that the Rajah put to death some of those above-mentioned, and that he kept others in confinement. You will report this to Lord Cornwallis, and endeavor to release those that may remain. You will take care in instructing my sons to speak slow and properly to Lord Cornwallis. Several people belonging to the Rajah of Travancore were made prisoners. I gave each of them a rupee and [a cloth?] and released them before the peace was concluded. This was done while you were here, it is not necessary to write it. The visit of my sons to the Nawab of Arcot agreeable to the opinion of Lord Cornwallis, the Nawaub's visit to them, the presents of jewels, Khillaats and elephants, were all extremely proper; the visit of my sons to the Governor of Madras and to Lady Oakeley whose behavior to them was very friendly is all very proper. You will take care to do everything that Lord Cornwallis recommends and inform me of it. The account of Talooks on this side of the river and on that side of the river is sent to you; from it you will learn all particulars.

(i) Since copying the above, we have received another letter from Tippoo Sultaun dated 4 Zelhejah, 23rd July 1792 to the following purpose.

**No: 465A**—Tipu intends to send money for the first instalment and instructs his deputies to press for the return of Soonda and the release of B. Zeman Khan.

The money for one instalment to the three States will be dispatched in a day or two. You must procure an order to be written to the officer at Kishengeery to receive the amount and on its safe arrival, you will obtain a receipt and send it to me; the money for the other States will be sent to Darwar and to Kurpa. The Peshwa has not yet relinquished Soonda and its environs, nor is Buddur-ul-Zeman Khan released. Pay proper attention to your negotiations, and state all these matters to Lord Cornwallis, that they may be so arranged that no further obstacle may exist to the restoration of the country nor to the release of Budder-ul-Zeman Khan. Every one knows how the allies destroyed the country and carried away the ryots and cattle after the conclusion of Peace, but exclusive of this, their garrisons are in Soonda and Budder ul Zeman is not released. I have related the particulars of the faith to treaties on the part of the allies. The Hyderi Sirkar is to act according to the treaty, but probably it is not necessary that they should do so; consider well this.

**No. 466**—Doveton communicates the news of the delivery of Bellary.

FROM—CAPTAIN DOVETON,

TO—G. F. CHERRY.

*Fort St. George, received 14th August 1792.*

In reading over last night the extracts of the correspondence from Seringapatam, which the Vakeels have transmitted to you I observed that they had not inserted an article respecting Bellary, which I had read in the original letter last received. It was, I think to this effect that, upon the receipt of their (the Vakeel's) Arzdasht, orders had been sent to deliver up Bellary, and that, it would accordingly be delivered up in a day or two. I mentioned to Ali Reza, that the knowledge of this circumstance would, I thought, be pleasing to his Lordship. He said the insertion of it was of no consequence, as his Lordship will have been informed of it by Sir John Kennaway before this letter could reach Calcutta.

1792

TIPU'S EVASION AND DECEIT

315

No. 457—After offering his best wishes to the Princess Cornwallis complaining that  
 Tipu's letter is full of denials and evasions.

FROM—CORNWALLIS G.G.

TO—COLLINS KEAN AND ALI REZA.

23rd August 1792

It affords me very great happiness to learn by your letters and by the information I receive by other means that my friends the young Princess enjoy good health since the departure of General Meadows. I have no doubt that Sir C. Oakeley pays them equal attention, and that under the care of Sir Charles Oakeley and your unremitting attentions and assidues, they will continue well and hearty. Yet by no means less anxious for their happiness than before my departure I shall expect that you will not fail to write me frequently the pleasing news of their health, and such other subjects as can in any respect contribute to their ease and happiness.

I have comprehended the particulars of the business you entrusted to the communication of Mr. Cherry since the conclusion of peace at Seringapatam. The conduct which I have observed has been guided by a faithful adherence to my engagements, and I have uniformly trusted that my conduct would have secured a similar behavior from Tippu Sultan. Consider, therefore, with what disappointment I have observed that the purport of the answer from him to the several points transmitted to him by you is replete with denials and evasions from the spirit of the treaty that ought to have established a mutual confidence in negotiation and laid the foundation for an amicable adjustment of those points in which rested on future investigation. I have given full instructions to Mr. Cherry to communicate my sentiments to you in reply and beg leave to refer you to this letter for all particulars.



Conformably to your request I translated and submitted to his Lordship's perusal your letter to my address and its enclosure from Tippoo Sultan of their contents. Lord Cornwallis remarked, that he is extremely concerned to find this reply to the several subjects still unadjusted which he verbally discussed with you at the Gardens replete with denials and evasions from the true spirit of the treaty, and tending to destroy the confidence mutually reposed by the late engagements. But nevertheless influenced by his sentiments of Tippoo's inclination to arrange these points amicably, and by his own wishes for conciliatory measures in support of his uniform conduct, he has directed me to communicate his opinion on the several subjects, and to request that you will lose no time in writing to Seringapatam, that the steps necessary to settle every matter may be immediately taken.

In regard to the portion of the district of Cauveripore, situated to the westward and southward of the river Cauveri and of the Caroor district situated to the eastward and northward of that river, the statement contained in Tippoo's letter to you is directly opposite to the information received by Lord Cornwallis. It is well known to you that the allies were compelled at the negotiation for peace to receive such accounts of the Jumma of the respective districts of Tippoo's dominions as he thought proper to give them, and to admit those accounts at their own risk. As far however as those accounts relate to the district of Cauveripoor, they can have but little weight in the adjustment of an equivalent for that portion of this district which is to be retained by Tippoo. It should be regulated by the actual valuation of this portion of Cauveripore on the spot; and for this purpose Lord Cornwallis recommends that if, on further consideration, Tippoo should not be inclined to acknowledge the justness of the statement of these villages formerly transmitted to you, Ameens selected by both parties, of character and abilities, be directed to meet and after minute enquiry from among the respectable inhabitants to report on the value of this portion of the Cauveripoor district situated on the south west side of the river or on the Coimbatore side, and of that part of Caroor situated on the north east side of the river or opposite side from Caroor, and according to their report both parties will agree to the equivalent which may appear to be due from either. Lord Cornwallis is convinced that the result of this investigation will show that the statement which he formerly transmitted was just; and he will, therefore, expect that the district of Vencatigherry shall be ceded as the equivalent due to the Company.

Whenever Tippoo shall furnish the accounts promised of miliatry stores, his Lordship will be ready to settle them, pursuant to the conditions of the treaty.

By virtue of the definitive treaty lately concluded all acts of former times are buried in oblivion and harmony and friendship are established

nor does it provide for any enquiry into ancient possessions of any one, whether of either of the contracting parties or of the tributaries of either of them, but points out a limit to former situation fully and clearly by the words, "One half of the country which was in the possession of Tippoo Sultaun at the commencement of the war, in the first article of the preliminary treaty, on which the definitive engagement was founded; with respect therefore to the Talooks of Alungaar Paroor, and Koonutnayr, the justice of the cession of them to the Company must be decided by the period of the commencement of the war, when if they were in the possession of the Rajah of Travancore by whatever means, and more especially if it shall appear that the Rajah of Travancore had acquired those districts from the Rajah of Cochin before the Rajah of Cochin became tributary to the Hyderly Sirkar, it would be an act of great injustice on the part of the Company to deprive him of them. Lord Cornwallis recommends as the most amicable mode to determine this point, that Aumeens be nominated to examine into and to report upon the grounds on which the Rajah of Travancore states his claim to those districts. During the negociation at Seringapatam too much cause existed for doubting the statement delivered by Tippoo of the value of his dominions, of the countries to be ceded to the allies, and of those retained by himself; and time sufficient has elapsed to prove that those doubts were well founded. You cannot have forgotten that it was represented to you, when Tippoo delivered his statement valuing his country at 70 lacs of Pag. of which at rough calculation one half was rated at 35 lacs, that the division ceded to the allies was overvalued and the remaining portion estimated much under its real worth. This statement was afterwards increased by mutual agreement and tho' the disproportion of the two divisions still remained, his Lordship having once agreed to the valuation inserted in the treaty, has hitherto declined to remonstrate against the gross exaggerations which he has discovered in the Jumma of the districts ceded on the Malabar Coast; should therefore the three districts in question be adjudged to the Rajah of Travancore, his Lordship cannot submit to the Company being subjected to a still further loss, by giving weight to the arguments urged by Tippoo on the ground of the valuation of his country delivered by himself or relinquish an equivalent for them in addition to the present overrated value of the districts on that coast, but, must demand it in the neighbourhood of Nelisuram.

It is with great concern that Lord Cornwallis finds himself obliged by the repeated disavowals on the part of Tippoo Sultaun of prisoners still detained, to state that the same assertions were made at the close of a former war which have been refuted by the escape of several from Chitteldroog and other places, and by the release of many from Shehr Ganjam, and he regrets that he should be compelled to remark also that several prisoners belonging to the Rajah of Travancore were at the close of the present war

declared to have been released, but of whom no account has ever been received. He is equally surprized that Tippoo should demand men from the Rajah of Travancore when he shows so little inclination to release those belonging to the Rajah. Lord Cornwallis therefore demands an account of the prisoners taken with General Mathews in Bednore, with Colonel Baillie, and particularly of the 52 young men who were sent from Bangalore and compelled to embrace the Mahomedan faith, and a number of mechanics who were selected and detained when the other prisoners were released, as well as of the rest of the prisoners delivered over to Hyder Ally Khan by Mons. Suffrien, and of the two officers of Cavalry taken at Caveripatam and a Surgeon taken by the Byde horse in the vicinity of Bangalore. He trusts that on motives of humanity to the families of those unfortunate men as well as on the grounds of good faith Tippoo will transmit this account specifying the time and place of the death of those who are dead, and that he will immediately release those who may be alive in any part of his dominions.

By the information which Lord Cornwallis has received he has every reason to expect that Budder-ul-Zemaun Khan has been released and sent to Tippoo and his Lordship is concerned that any cause should have existed to render the representation which Tippoo has made of the detention of any district that ought to have been restored necessary. He does not doubt that the Peshwa will on that head immediately remove all ground of complaint. But at the same time Lord Cornwallis is surprised to observe Tippoo's remarks relative to the conduct of the allies; while the advices from Hyderabad report that the fort of Belhary, ceded to His Highness, has not been delivered up. He flatters himself, however, that long ere this it is in his Highness's possession.

After you have maturely considered the various subjects mentioned herein, you will communicate Lord Cornwallis's sentiments to Tippoo, and assure him at the same time that his Lordship is much pleased with the many expressions of friendship and personal regard contained in his letter, and hopes that the earnest wish of both to cement and strengthen the present intimacy may daily be carried in effect.

**No. 469**—Tipu's envoys express their readiness to surrender Bellary to the Nizam and request the Governor-General to write to the Peshwa to release a few prisoners and to surrender several forts.

FROM—GOLAM ALI KHAN AND ALI REZA,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Received 15th September 1792.*

On your Lordship's departure for Calcutta you were pleased to entrust to our care a letter addressed to Tippoo Sultaun, we immediately forwarded

it, and on the 19th of August we were honored with an answer, which we now forward to your Lordship. On perusing it every particular will be known and your Lordship will have learnt the contents of our letter addressed to Mr. Cherry which enclosed a copy of Tippoo Sultaun's letter to us. There is no prevarication nor delay has there been in the surrender of Belhary. The whole fault rests with Meer Maany Khaun who was deputed by the Nizam to take charge of the fort and the Killadar of the Hyderly Sirkar was not to blame. This will appear evident to your Lordship on enquiry. At any rate the fort of Belhary will have been delivered over to his Highness. Our hopes are, that your Lordship, a chief of Power a well wisher to mankind, and the Powers concerned having been the means of establishing peace, not one of the articles be ever broken; that whatever will increase the friendship established between the Powers and add to the ease and quiet of the universe may ever come to pass. One kist on account of the Company has been dispatched for Kishengheery and in like manner the amount for the Allied Powers will have been dispatched to them. The Peshwa has not yet given up several small forts and districts such as Suddaseo Ghur, Soonda district, and several others, nor has released Meer Welly Feaz, Mehey-ul-Dien Chingir etc., prisoners; a letter from your Lordship to deliver up the country and to release the prisoners is necessary. By the blessing of God the two young Princes are very well and are for ever discoursing on the subject of your Lordship's goodness and friendship, but particularly Sultaun Moiz-ul-Dien, who continually says that Lord Cornwallis has brought me away from Tippoo Sultaun and has left me here, going himself away for Bengal; this was by no means proper. If his Lordship will return in a week or ten days very well, otherwise you must carry me to him. Further compliments.

No. 470—Tipu explains more fully the reply submitted to Cornwallis and pays the first instalment of the indemnity.

FROM—TIPU SULTAN,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*15th September 1792.*

I have received your Lordship's letter in which you mention your intention to embark for Bengal. I have perfectly comprehended [these] points and understand, and am well pleased with your Lordship's friendly conduct, I have repeatedly written answers to these points to Golaum Ally Khaun and Ally Reza, my Vakeels. Considering that they would have stated my replies to your Lordship, I did not trouble you with a separate letter on the subjects, I now beg leave to explain them fully.

I have comprehended the answers which your letter contains to the points mentioned in my former address, and having received from your Vakeels a copy of your letter to them on these subjects, which I have directed to be replied to, stating my sentiments on the matters mentioned, I have only now to refer you to the letter written by Mr. Cherry pursuant to my instructions to Golaum Ally Khan and Ally Reza.

I am much pleased with your assurances that the treaty shall be strictly adhered to on all sides, and, fully determined to abide by it myself, I entertain firm hopes that such parts of its conditions as are yet to be performed will be executed by all parties concerned, especially the exchange and adjustment of countries and the release of such prisoners as still may be confined by any of the contracting Powers and their dependents. On this subject, though I entertain no doubt that the Talooks mentioned in your letter will have been relinquished by his Highness the Nizam and the two persons you represent to be still detained by the Peshwa will have been released, I shall direct the Residents at those two Courts to inform the Nizam and the Peshwa of your communications in these respects. I shall also write to the Rajah of Travancore on the subjects of the persons said to be still confined by him; at the same time I must point out to you that the Rajah of Travancore has requested my application to you for many persons belonging to him said to be still confined, of whom he has received no intelligence. This is a subject worthy of your attention.

The friendly expressions contained in your letter towards the English Company and towards me personally are extremely satisfactory, and I beg that you will be assured, that the Company, whose earnest desire is to cultivate friendship on the strong principles of sincerity and good faith with all the Powers in Hindustan and the Deccan, will be equally ready and zealous to strengthen the treaty of friendship that is now established with you, and you will ever find me disposed to discuss and adjust all the subjects that are still unsettled in the most amicable manner.

**No. 474**—Captain Lindsay reports the negotiation begun by Tipu for the employment in his service of a body of Europeans who have recently arrived in Pondicherry.

FROM—CAPTAIN J. LINDSAY,

TO—SIR C. OAKELEY, GOVERNOR OF MADRAS.

*Permacoil, 28th September 1792.*

I take the earliest opportunity to inform you that I have received intelligence of two Harcarrahs of Tippoo Sultans, that have been four days in Pondicherry, and who were accompanied by a moor man who brought a letter to Monsieur De Fresne, the Governor,

Of whatever purport the nature of this letter may be, I consider it the more incumbent on me to transmit to you this information, as a report prevails that Tippoo has been negotiating there for a body of Europeans that have lately arrived amounting to nearly 500, who are extremely turbulent in their conduct, especially to the troops they found there, and as no money whatever has been sent to pay them, they only add to the distress of the place, which was great before, and it is conjectured that any reasonable offer of Tippoo Sultan's to employ them in his service, would be privately accepted by the Pondicherry Government and also by the men, who would be well content to change their present situation for the expectation of a better. In addition to the numbers that have already arrived this season, three hundred men, mostly raised for the artillery, are also expected daily.

**No. 475**—Tipu writes to his envoys to get the treaty sealed and signed by the Nizam and the Peshwa.

FROM—TIPU SULTAN,

TO—GOLAM ALI KHAN AND ALI REZA.

*2nd October 1792.*

You have a copy of the treaty by you. You must also look therein and in the 8th article thereof it is expressed that the treaty of peace is to be delivered with the seal and signature of the Nabob Asuff Jah Bahadur and the Nabob Mashir-ul-Mulk Bahadre, and with the seal and signature of Row Pundit Purdhaun Bahadre and Row Hurry Pundit Bahadre.

The Sirkar has received it with the seal and signature of Mashir-ul-Mulk Bahadre and with the seal and signature of Row Hurry Pundit Bahadre. But as yet it has not been delivered with the seal and signature of the Nabob Asuff Jah Bahadre nor of Row Pundit Purdhan.

It is necessary that you get letters written and sent to them and having procured the treaties from both transmit them to the Presence.

**No. 476**—Cornwallis intends to establish factories at places on the coast and desires that deputies sent for that purpose be well received by Tipu.

FROM—G. F. CHERRY,

TO—GOLAM ALI KHAN AND ALI REZA.

*10th October 1792.*

After complimentary reply to their letter received 8th October 1792 containing expressions of compliment and mentioning the health of the Princes.

You are already well acquainted with Lord Cornwallis's disposition and inclination to promote the benefit of both Governments by giving every encouragement in his power to that intercourse between the respective subjects of each, which enables them to carry on trade and commercial concerns so beneficial to the State as well as to the individual. As a proof of this I beg leave to recall to your recollection the Proclamation issued by his orders from the Government of Madras, copy of which I gave you.

Considering that the Treaty at Seringapatam was concluded not only to establish peace between the parties but also to promote friendship and good neighbourhood with each other and thereby secure the immediate object of peace, which, he is confident, is the prosperity of each respective State, his Lordship has desired me to mention to you, that as nothing can contribute to this end more than a free and uninterrupted trade in the produce of the countries appertaining to each other, he intends to give directions to the Government of Bombay to take the proper measures for executing the first article of the Treaty at Seringapatam by deputing responsible men to establish the factories on the part of the Company at the places on the coast granted for that purpose in the former treaties referred to in and confirmed by the present treaty.

His Lordship therefore requests that you will communicate these subjects to Tippoo Sultan, and he does not doubt but that Tippoo Sultan influenced by the same disposition as himself to execute the stipulations of the treaty, and to contribute towards the prosperity of each State by encouraging a free intercourse between each other's subjects will issue the necessary orders for the persons deputed from Bombay to be well received and treated with civility in the progress of their commission. This will add much to the mutual friendship and confidence in each other.

No. 477.

FROM—SIR CHARLES OAKLEY, GOVERNOR OF MADRAS,  
TO—C. W. MALET.

*Madras, 16th October 1792.*

Nothing particular has lately occurred in this quarter. Tippoo's first payment of the 2nd Kist was made here last month, and the Vakeel's say that he means to perform every part of the Treaty with great fidelity. The little hostages are well and happy.

No. 478--By pointing out the difference in the account of revenues of the Malabar Coast according to the treaty and that according to the settlement made under the orders of the English by an officer of Tipu, Cornwallis requests Tipu to adjust the disputed points satisfactorily

FROM--G. F. CHERRY,

TO--GOLAM ALI KHAN AND ALI REZA.

*22nd October 1792.*

I have the pleasure to forward a letter from the Governor General to Tippoo Sultan with a copy of it for your information. His Lordship trusts that you will transmit it to Tippoo Sultan without delay and procure a satisfactory and explicit answer to it. Lord Cornwallis has received the accounts of the districts ceded to the Company on the Coast of Malabar, and his suspicions relative to the value at which those districts were rated by Tippoo Sultan, have been realised. I enclose for your information, and by his Lordship's orders, a copy of an account of the revenues of those districts according to the settlements made by an officer of Tippoo Sultan's Government, named Arshud Beg Khan, stating also the value of the districts according to the treaty, that you may observe the difference. About the year 1787, or about 1201 Hejeree, it also appears that another settlement was made through Singum Pillay; but all accounts agree that neither of these settlements were ever realised. The English Commissioners who have been deputed from Bombay to settle those countries have found the districts in consequence of the war and the unsettled state in which they had been for some years prior to it, very much impoverished, and have been obliged to satisfy themselves with a settlement, including Palicautcherry, amounting to Rupees 6,48,640-3-0, allowing for the support of the Rajahs and charges of collection, and including land and sea duties only. You will observe the great difference between the value of the countries by either of the settlements and the valuation put on them by Tippoo Sultan in the treaty; while the value of the country was under discussion at Seringapatam, Lord Cornwallis entertained suspicions on this head, which are now realised. These suspicions you were acquainted with. However, His Lordship, ever earnestly desirous of adhering to his engagements and considering the late treaty solemn one, not to be broken on any account, is not desirous of proposing any examination into the accounts delivered by the Muttasuddies at Seringapatam; but, receiving the countries at the valuation in the Treaty, trusts that what has now become known from the local information obtained, will induce Tippoo Sultan to engage and settle in a satisfactory and expeditious manner all points relative to countries and boundaries, viz. the equivalents for the division of the Cauveripore district, for the three districts claimed by the Rajah of Travancore should they on enquiry prove to be his property, and for the district



of Coriagutta, in the event that Tippoo Sultan should admit the justness of the claim made to it by the French. His Lordship is confident of Tippoo Sultan's intentions to execute with steadfastness the treaty between the powers, but he trusts also that the material deficiency which now appears in the value of these countries, as given in by his own people, will be a powerful incitement to Tippoo to expedite all matters unadjusted, on motives of justice as well as friendship. Complimentary message from Lord Cornwallis to the young Princes.

Comparative statement of the revenues of the ceded countries on the Coast of Malabar, as valued by treaty at Seringapatam and by the settlement made by Arshud Beg Cawn, an Officer of Tippoo's Government.

Names of Talooks	Value by Treaty in Conterai Pags	Value by Treaty in Rs. 2½ Rupees per Conterai Pags	Value by settlement Arshud Beg Cawn in Rupees
	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
Calicut 3 Talooks .. ..	54,470	1,36,175	76,725
Coormenad 7 Talooks .. ..	94,919	2,37,297½	2,07,224
Betutnaad 10 Talooks .. ..	1,11,965	2,79,912½	2,46,866
Emaddo 4 Talooks .. ..	41,370	1,03,425	1,05,000
Chowgaat 11 Talooks .. ..	1,16,020	2,90,050	2,55,002
Iruynadoo 2 Talooks .. ..	15,900	39,750	25,000
Cherical 5 Talooks .. ..	80,472	2,01,180	1,00,000
Cotiate 3 Talooks .. ..	40,001	1,00,002½	40,000
Kartinaad 3 Talooks .. ..	50,108	1,25,270	60,000
Cananore 1 Talook .. ..	30,000	75,000	15,000
Cochy 14 Talooks .. ..	1,00,000	2,50,000	1,20,000
	7,35,225	18,38,062½	12,50,817
Difference ..		5,87,245½	

Under Chowgaat, the value by Arshud Beg Cawn is deficient, as he has taken no notice of Cranganore in his Settlement; it is valued by Tippoo at Conterai Pags 7117 or Rs. 17,792½.

**No. 479**—Cornwallis communicates to Tipu the claim made by the French on Cariagatta and requests Tipu either to surrender an equivalent elsewhere or to explain to the French the possession of that district by him.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—TIPU SULTAN.

*22nd October 1792.*

Having in consequence of the Treaty concluded at Seringapatam between the confederate Powers and you, I directed the Company's Government at Bombay to take possession of and to settle the districts ceded to the Company according to the schedule accompanying the said treaty and included therein under the head Talooks appertaining to Calicut, 63 Talooks, valued at Pagodas 8,48,765-5-4 $\frac{1}{4}$ . The gentlemen composing that government proceeded accordingly to execute the orders which they had received. I have now been informed by them that the Governor of the French Settlement at Mahie has claimed, in the name of his nation, the district of Cariagatta which is one of the Talooks appertaining to those included under Calicut as above.

In consequence of this information, I have directed enquiries to be made to ascertain the boundaries of the territories that were possessed in the neighbourhood of Mahie by your Government and by the French respectively at the breaking out of the war; and I request in the event that you should admit the justice of the claim made by the French to the district in question that you will grant an equivalent to the English in another quarter or should you not admit their claim thereto to be just, that you will explain to them that the district of Coriagatta was in your possession at the commencement of hostilities, and on that ground was transferred to the English.

Confident of your desire to accommodate every matter in an amicable manner for all parties according to the spirit of the treaty, I flatter myself that your answer to this letter will be explicit and satisfactory, as well with respect to the equivalent to the English, in the event that you admit the justice of the claim made by the French to the district in question, as to the explanation to that nation, should you deny it.

**No. 480**—Cherry requests the envoys to send the enclosed intelligence to Tipu without delay and to induce him to release the prisoners.

FROM—G. F. CHERRY,

TO—GOLAM ALI KHAN AND ALI REZA.

*26th November 1792.*

Altho' time sufficient has not elapsed to receive an answer to the letter which I had the pleasure of writing to you on the 23rd August last on a

variety of subjects and Lord Cornwallis is confident that in due time an answer of satisfactory tendency to every point particularly relative to prisoners, will be received, yet in order to give every information towards the release of those unfortunate men and to prevent, what his Lordship apprehends is the case, the delay which the evil disposition of the subordinate officers under Tippoo Sultaun's Government may occasion, contrary to Tippoo Sultaun's own wishes, by concealing prisoners whom he has ordered to be released, he has been pleased to direct that the intelligence obtained within these last two months from a man, who escaped from Hurrial Sumrany on the 12th September 1792 be sent to you, and to request that you will forward it to Seringapatam without delay, accompanied by such arguments from yourselves in your arzee to Tippoo Sultaun as shall make known to him the apparent disobedience of his orders on the part of the killadars etc. and shall induce him to use every necessary measure to procure the release of all the prisoners pointed out to you in my letter abovementioned, among whom are those named in the accompanying paper. I need not urge to you how futile must all the arguments prove in the eyes of the world that were formerly and have hitherto been uniformly urged by Tippoo Sultaun, that it could answer no purpose to detain these men, when the information every day obtained by the escape of several even after the conclusion of peace will convince you that those arguments are ill founded. The intelligence now sent to you cannot be doubted as the man, who furnished it, is alive, and as it is strongly corroborated in regard to names and the places of confinement of several more which were communicated by prisoners who made their escape from Chitteldroog and appeared before Lord Cornwallis at Seringapatam.

I trust that more is not necessary to induce you to use your utmost influence to procure the release of all the prisoners, Europeans, Parsees, and natives of all discriptions, and thereby convince the world and the friends to Tippoo Sultaun that he is studiously inclined to fulfill every item of the Treaty.

Complimentary message from Lord Cornwallis to the Young Princes

Extract from the narrative of William Lee, enclosed in a letter from the Resident at Poona under date 13th October 1792.

William Lee named by Tippoo Sultaun Dellawar Beg, formerly in a cushoon commanded by Zeenulabad Dien, was, after the war with the Mahrattahs and Nizam at Adone, sent with 28 other Europeans to Bednore where on his arrival he was put into the cushoon commanded by Daud Khan. He continued at Bednore 3 years, and was there, when the late war broke out. He reports to have been at Bednore with him George Hooper and William Skinner who were starved there. William Lee was one of the number delivered over by the French to Hyder Ally,



Nothing remarkable has happened here since I wrote you last. I spoke to Tippoo's vakeel here about the Kist due to the Marattas and he seemed much surprized that it had not been received, but said he would write immediately to his master on the subject.

No. 483—Tipu replies that the district of Cariagatta belonged to him but three other villages were presented to the French. He further complains of the retention of several taluks by the Peshwa and the Nizam in contravention of the treaty.

FROM—TIPU SULTAN,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*11th December 1792.*

*Received 7th January 1793.*

I have the happiness to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's letter and am much pleased with its contents. Your Lordship writes that you have given instructions to the Government of Bombay to take charge of the talooks ceded to the Company, Calicut 63 Talooks at the Jumma of 848,765 Counterai Pagodas 5-4 $\frac{1}{4}$ , according to the schedule annexed to the treaty bearing our seals and signatures. What you had now learnt by letters from that Government, that the Chief of the French Settlement at Mahi had demanded the district of Cariaghatta, which is among the districts of Calicut, as his own. I have understood this, my friend. Sixty-three talooks appertaining to Calicut, which were mentioned in the treaty and in the schedule in detail, were in the possession of the Ahmedy Sirkar and the talooks belonging to the said country were allotted and written over to the Company. Had any of these talooks belonged to others, how could they have been so inserted? Thus all the talooks written in the treaty and in the schedule belonged to the Ahmedy Sirkar, and were made over in the share to the Company, but three villages (Keera) one named Puller, the second Challuk, the third Pundecuttora were presented long ago by the Ahmedy Sirkar to the officers at Mahe belonging to the French, and the Jumma of these villages is separated from the Jumma inserted in the schedule. I am convinced that where there is a Chief so famed as your Lordship, and so renowned for adjusting all matters and a well wisher for both Governments no deviation will take place in the engagements. On the part of the Peshwa Shera, Jambotee and Soopa, three talooka, notwithstanding the treaty and a long lapse of time, are not restored to the Ahmedy Sirkar; and in like manner on the part of the Nizam, the talooks Nuradoodee which is near Sungun Nullah is not returned to the authority of my officers, and in Suddaseo Ghur there is yet the garrison of the people of Goa. I am well aware that when the dispute arose, the Goa people placed their garrison

there without your Lordship's knowledge, otherwise I am convinced that in like manner as those talooks in the Company's possession which were to be restored, were given up, this fort would have also been returned. I therefore trouble your Lordship to write me the particulars of placing a garrison on the part of the Goa people in that fort, and why it is not restored, and I request that you will be pleased to write to the Ministers of the Nizam and the Peshwa to release the districts abovementioned ; at the time of concluding the treaty mention was made of the Peshcush from the Kurnoul Country which has time immemorial been paid to the Ahmedy Sirlar. Sir John Kennaway replied that I had the option and should take whatever was the established Peshcush. Doubtless your Lordship will recollect this. In consequence, some time ago I deputed a confidential person to make the demand for this Peshcush, and I under-

throw an imputation on the Peshwa as the instigator of the refractory conduct which is observed by the zemindar belonging to the Ahmudy Sirkar. His Lordship desires that you will reflect on the probability of such a circumstance after the arrangements which took place by the treaty on settling the boundaries between the territories of His Highness the Nizam, the Peshwa, and Tippoo Sultaun. But, independent of the improbability of the facts in regard to the Peshwa, his Lordship is not less astonished at the present representation, when he recollects that in several instances charges of the same nature on account of the zemindar of Anagoondy have been preferred against the Nizam's officers and more particularly is this subject stated in your letter to the Nawab Azeem ul Omrah which mentions that this zemindar has combined with the Talookadars on his Highness's confines. All these circumstances unite to impress his Lordship with the idea that the representations of Tippoo's Aumils in that neighbourhood are without foundation, since it cannot be supposed that the Nizam and the Peshwa would mutually agree to infringe the treaty recently concluded, solely with the view of clandestinely assisting one of Tippoo's zemindars in plundering and ravaging the country. You will weigh these remarks in your own mind, and consider on the truth of the representation of Mahomed Hoosein in the present instance, and on those of the Killadar of Bydroog on a former occasion.

With regard to the reference from Mahomed Fucker ul Dien, his Lordship is inclined to suppose that it is the same as that which at your request was some time since communicated to the Coorga Rajah by Lord Cornwallis, the answer to which I had the pleasure to send you on 21st September 1792, from which it appears that the people of the Ahmudy Sirkar were the aggressors in attacking Amara and Sull. I need not quote further of his answer, as you will have understood it fully from the copy which I sent to you. The Coorga Rajah after the express commands which he has received from Lord Cornwallis will not raise any disturbances, but he will not relinquish his just claims to districts which have been in his family upwards of two hundred years. Lord Cornwallis, however, with a view to prevent the interference of the lower class of people, who, if any have, must have been guilty of the conduct stated by Fucker ul Dien, and thereby occasion disunion among the rulers of countries, has transmitted the representation to the Government of Bombay, that it may be forwarded to the Coorga Rajah, and his answer, when it arrives shall be made known to you.

To conclude his Lordship recommends as an effectual measure to prevent similar complaints, which he is confident can have no foundation in the minds of the different Powers themselves, that Tippoo Sultaun will enjoin his subordinate officers to refrain from all unnecessary altercation on the frontiers and to cultivate harmony and good neighbourhood among themselves in like manner as friendship and peace are desired and sought after by their constituents,

I have the pleasure to send you the answer which has been received to the complaint transmitted by you from the Kellahdar of Rydroog.

No. 485.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—C. OAKLEY.

*Poona, 30th January 1793.*

I have the honor to acquaint you of this Court's having advised me that the amount of the first Kist due from Tippo Sultan has been paid by that Prince to this Government's officers at Darwar.

No. 486—Tipu writes a complimentary letter and expresses his satisfaction at the exchange of visits between his sons and those of Nawab Walajah.

FROM—TIPU SULTAN,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Received 11th February 1793.*

I have the pleasure to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's letter written in reply to mine, the perusal of which, from its assurances of my resolution to perform the Treaty had given your Lordship great satisfaction. Not having perfectly comprehended from their writings the subjects of your Lordship's conversation with Gollaum Alli Khaun and Alli Reza Khaun, which were replete with every expression tending to increase the friendship between the two Governments and which took place when your Lordship was about to set out for Calcutta, I sent for Alli Reza; and from his verbal communication I have understood every point. There can be no doubt that the peace and friendship which have taken place between the States were effected by your Lordship's means, for you are my warm friend and I hope and trust to the kindness of Heaven and to the good will of your Lordship that the foundation of the friendship existing between the several states, which has been raised by the means of a person of high rank and a friend to mankind like your Lordship, will last for ever without any alteration but a daily increase to its stability and permanency. I trust that your Lordship will consider me in every respect a well wisher and friend to the Company and to yourself, and that you will not permit any sentiments with regard to my conduct, except that of my earnest desire to increase our friendship, to gain root in your mind. It is my wish that in like manner as your Lordship enjoys complete authority over the Company's affairs, you should preside with full powers



over the affairs of the Ahmedy Sirkar, and I agree to whatever your Lordship shall suggest as leading towards an increase to our friendly system. I am confident your Lordship will not think that there will ever be a difference between us.

I have learnt from Alli Reza Khaun that from the excess of your friendship your Lordship kindly took my sons to see the Nawaub Wallah Jah of Arcot, and in return brought the Nawaub to see my sons. This I consider entirely arising from your Lordship's friendship. The Nawaub, when he paid the visit to my sons honored them with presents of elephants, horses, khillaats, etc. the particulars of which your Lordship is acquainted with. In consequence conceiving it necessary to return the compliment, I have sent the necessary return from hence. I do not think it necessary to be continually troubling your Lordship with the particulars of misconduct and disputes which happen on all sides of my country, and I have accordingly desired Gollaum Ally Khaun and Ally Reza Khaun to communicate them to you.

**No. 487**—Tipu's envoys continue correspondence on the disputed points, the exchange of Cauveripur and the release of prisoners.

FROM—GOLAUM ALLY KHAN AND ALLY REZA KHAN,

TO—G. F. CHERRY.

*Received 11th February 1793.*

Having several matters which required a personal communication, some time ago Ally Reza Khan set out for Seringapatam, and on his arrival there he related every particular of his Lordship's friendship, his desire to increase the intimacy between each other and his affectionate and kind conduct towards the young gentlemen; and on the 23 Jummadie ul Owul 1207 he returned and paid his respects to them. We write to you without any restraint or hesitation, that from this communication of his Lordship's virtues, his sincere regard and partiality for the Ahmedy Sirkar, Tippoo Sultaun was extremely pleased, and was more desirous of seeing his Lordship than we have the power of expressing. May it please Providence that one interview take place between his Lordship and Tippoo Sultaun, and that you and we, who are the channels of intercourse, may obtain credit thereby. In short Tippoo Sultaun, on hearing his Lordship's good qualities, is more desirous of a meeting than can be described. As this, however, rests with Heaven to effect and time to bring about, we transmit a letter from Tippoo Sultaun to his Lordship's address, from the contents of which his Lordship will observe Tippoo's attachment and friendship and the excess of his happiness. You attend his Lordship and suggest whatever can tend to the prosperity of both States, and we are confident that you will exert yourself in such manner as that nothing but

additional strength to the existing intimacy shall occur ; when Tippoo Sultaun heard of your good qualities, he replied that wherever there was such a person employed, possessed of comprehension and very commendable qualification, friendship and harmony must subsist between States. The rewards which are infinite for such a person will soon come to light.

You are pleased to write that several people are still confined. If among the supposed prisoners there is one of any rank or station whatever, it would be surprizing that he should have been detained, and that you should have applied for him. If any one should have been overlooked either by neglect or from his low rank, and should have some time after made his escape from hence, and influenced by hatred and bitterness, which belong to prisoners should report stories without foundation to the English gentlemen, their reports are not deserving of any attention or credit ; and during a firm and sincere friendship, and while treaties are in existence, which are the rules by which Princes are guided, it is astonishing that the sayings of such people should be admitted, and should be heard, and it is equally contrary to the rules of friendship.

The particulars of the factories are as follows. Formerly the Calicut country belonged to the Ahmedy Sirkar. It now belongs to the Company. Then what is to be said about factories ? In regard to Onore you will doubtless have heard all the particulars relative to it from other quarters, or you will learn them ; after which be pleased to inform us of your sentiments. With respect to the intercourse of merchants, a similar order has been issued by Tippoo Sultaun with that issued by the Company in this respect. No one ever has or will prevent their intercourse. You have written also on the subject of an exchange for several villages in the neighbourhood of Cauveripoor. It is very easy to adjust matters of a few villages where affairs of crores of rupees have been settled. In settling affairs of crores of rupees it appears unnecessary to write so often on the subject of one or two trifling villages, for which even an exchange may be made in the talook of Caroor. When Ally Reza Khan took leave of Tippoo Sultaun, he was charged with a few articles for his Lordship and for you ; you will observe what they are by the accompanying list. Be pleased to inform us how they are to be sent.

List accompanying—

For Lord Cornwallis—

A Khellaat Mehtaaby Kaarchooby

A serpeach and Kulgee

Two horses

For Mr. Cherry—

Khellaat Mehtaaby a Jigah and Serpech and a Chestnut horse.

No. 488—The Nizam's officer on the frontier brings counter charges of depredation caused by the Darogah of Gooty and others.

FROM—G. F. CHERRY,

TO—GOLAM ALI KHAN AND ALI REZA.

Enclosure from the Resident at Hyderabad.

*Received 10th December 1792.*

*Copy of an arzie from Mullick Esau Khan to the Nawaub Azeemul Omrah received at Hyderabad 23rd November 1792.*

I have been highly honored with your letter giving cover to a copy of the letter from the Killadar of Rydroog to Tippoo Sultaun, of the letter from Tippoo Sultaun to the Government of Madras, a copy of a note from Sir John Kennaway to Meer Aalum, and a list of talooks of Bulhary which were delivered to me by Sheo Persaud. As I am particularly careful to execute the orders which you were pleased to give me when I took my leave, what power have I to act without your orders to deviate from your pleasure? I am obedient to your orders and am not deficient in obeying the commands of my patron, I am raised from the earth and am honored by you, notwithstanding that I am thus involved in distress, I will never be guilty of such perfidy. The writing of the Killadar of Rydroog is entirely false and calumnious. It is an unjust complaint against me. Let the person who charges me with such conduct, bring proof of it, and I shall be guilty. I can produce ten times the arguments which the Mutta-suddies of the Sirkar can advance in the subject. It is a hard case that what any person pleases to advance against me shall not be enquired. It is a source of injury to affairs and deprives me of the confidence of my superiors. It is necessary that it should be investigated when I have the honor of attending you. The Talookdar of Bundanuntpoor and the Darogah of Gooty, influenced by an evil disposition, took possession of 5 or 6 villages belonging to talook Secundergur, and 4 or 5 belonging to talook Tarpetry, killed as many cattle, and carried off as much grain and other property as they could find. I have already represented these particulars to you. On my arrival at the talooks I took some villages belonging to Tippoo's talookdars and was preparing to recover the cattle, property etc., but from attention to your orders, I desisted and did nothing; I will hereafter transmit you the particulars of the plunder made by the people of Bundanuntpoor and Gooty from the reports of the Putwarries etc.

The Zemindar of Secundergur has fled, and the dispute is at an end and plenty of rain has fallen. There is no disturbance on the part of the Zemindar of Secundergur, either in his Highness's talook or in those of Tippoo Sultaun; but the people of Bundanuntpoor and Rydroog come into the talooks appertaining to the Nizam and commit robberies. I have seized the thieves, and have sent them to Tippoo Sultaun's Talookdars.

Several zemindars of talooks belonging to Tippoo Sultaun in the neighbourhood of His Highness's districts have been dispossessed of their talooks, and commit depredations in them. I have punished those zemindars, and in every respect I cultivate good will with and assist the Talookdars of the other side. The Darogah of Gooty is informed of this. Even the letters which I have written on the subject of the ryots etc. to the Talookdars of Bundanuntpoor and Gooty have been sent to their constituency by them. They will explain everything.

Pursuant to your orders I have sent Sheopersaud to make enquiries towards Rydroog; but until the arrival of the people from Tippoo Sultaun and Sir John Kennaway in order to carry on the investigation, the truth will not appear. I hope therefore that they will be sent.

**No. 489**—Cornwallis requests Tipu to appoint officers for investigating the claims to certain disputed taluks and asks Tipu to release the prisoners still confined in his dominions and to take steps against the Amildar of Aveacourchy.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—TIPU SULTAN.

*10th February 1793.*

I have received your letter explaining the subject of the French claims in the vicinity of Mahi, on which I wrote to you. I have accordingly notified to the Chief of that nation at Mahi the reply which you have made to my application, and have desired the Government of Bombay not to molest the three villages which you have named in your letter.

On the subject of the talooks which you represent to be still retained by the Peshwa and by the Nizam, I am compelled to observe that the accounts which I receive from those Powers on the situation of talooks, many of which they state to be still in the possession of your officers, notwithstanding that they are particularly expressed in the schedule to the treaty of Seringapatam as ceded to them, differ so widely from the representations which I receive from you that I cannot pretend to form any decision on the subject. It is my earnest wish, as I am confident it is the desire of the Peshwa, the Nizam and yourself, that these boundary arrangements should be settled in an amicable manner, and as it can answer no useful purpose to continue a correspondence replete with unpleasant altercations on subjects which in many instances owe their rise to the litigious disposition of aumils and subordinate officers on both sides, and which, until the boundaries are finally settled, must occur, I recommend, as the most likely mode by which these unascertained talooks can be decided on, that in your correspondence with either of those Powers on such subjects, you adopt the measure which I have suggested in my former letters to you relative to the boundaries at Cauveripoor, of deputing intelligent and

experienced aumeens to the spot who will make the necessary investigation, and will conform to the article of the treaty of Seringapatam expressly inserted to answer the end of deciding the claims of the respective Powers to the talooks on the boundaries.

I am surprized at the request contained in your letter relative to the garrison stationed in the fort of Suddaseoghur on the part of the People of Goa. You are doubtless well informed that the English Government have no authority over the Government of Goa, which is a settlement belonging to the Portuguese, and the fort of Suddaseoghur was not taken by either of the Powers in alliance. It is therefore a subject in which I cannot interfere, and I can only observe that your application for the particulars of this transaction should be made to the Government of Goa, on whose part you state that the garrison is placed in that fort.

With respect to the subject contained in your letter relative to the Peshcush from Kurnoul, I have already communicated my sentiments to Sir John Kennaway for the Nizam's information; and I have no doubt that this matter will be adjusted in a manner that shall be consistent with the justice due to all parties, and conformably to the friendly system existing between each other.

I trust that Golaum Ally Khan and Ally Reza have transmitted to you the copy of a letter which I directed should be written to them, stating the intelligence which I have received of prisoners still detained within your dominions contrary to the treaty, which stipulates that they shall be released. I have not yet received any reply to it; but I should consider myself deficient on my part, if I did not inform you of such account as I have received of prisoners still detained, and of some that are even at Seringapatam; a person named Beecher was taken prisoner on the sea coast and was sent to Bednore near three years ago, and from thence to Seringapatam, from whence he made his escape in November last, and arrived at Tellicherry, where he informed General Abercromby that there are still several Englishmen and some women, as well as native tradesmen, who were taken prisoners with General Mathews. I will not trouble you with the enumeration of the names of those people who have made their escape after the repeated assurances which were made to me on your part that there were no persons detained within your dominions; but their escape tends to confirm the apprehension in my mind that this article of the treaty of Seringapatam has not been executed. I request that you will give immediate orders on this subject that the doubts which from these circumstances must arise in the mind of the Peshwa, the Nizam and in my own, of your intentions to execute the treaty in this respect, may be removed.

The conduct of the aumildar of Aveacourchy, who has, as he represents by your orders, taken possession of villages belonging for 50 years and upwards to the Poligar of Verepatchu, a subject of the Company, has been

communicated to me, and has been made known to your Vakeels at Madras. It is not possible that his conduct in this respect can have been in consequence of your orders, for while friendship subsists between us, how can such hostile measures be adopted in pursuance to the orders of either Government? I have that confidence in your friendly disposition as to hope that you will apply the necessary remedy to this evil, so that the property in the villages in dispute may be ascertained by amicable intercourse, while I am confident that the declaration of the aumil of Aveacourchy is void of truth. I think it will appear to you, as it does to me, that this is an instance where the disinclined temper of the aumil to adjust matters in an amicable manner as they occur, is so evident as to strengthen my recommendation that aumeens be deputed to enquire into the respective claims of each party in disputed places; and I must regret that my letters on this subject, which is for the mutual good of both parties, have not yet been answered.

**No. 490**—Communicating the Governor General's strong desire to send back the princes before his departure, Cherry reports Cornwallis's dissatisfaction at Tipu's reply on the disputed points, e.g., the exchange of Cauveripur, release of prisoners, etc.

FROM—G. F. CHERRY,

TO—GOLAM ALI KHAN AND ALI REZA.

*11th March 1793.*

I have now the pleasure to enclose a letter from Marquis Cornwallis addressed to Tippoo Sultaun and a copy of it for your perusal. You will observe from it that his Lordship in consideration of the friendship happily subsisting between him and Tippoo Sultaun, and conceiving that it may be considerably increased by acts of mutual confidence and by a frequent intercourse, has communicated to him the intelligence which he has received from Europe that his request for a successor to be nominated to take charge of the Government of the Company's affairs on his Lordship's departure has been complied with. Independant, however, of this confidential communication which his Lordship is induced to make to Tippoo Sultaun merely on the conviction that the unanimity and cordiality subsisting between them will be considerably strengthened by a disclosure of this information, which in other respects relates only to the affairs of his own Government, his Lordship has notified to Tippoo Sultaun that he does not intend to quit the Government for some months; and states that among other reasons which have led him to form this resolution his Lordship is anxious to have the unspeakable pleasure of returning the

young Princes to the Presence of Tippoo Sultaun before his departure for England, and of being able on his arrival there to add to the universal pleasure which the English nation have received on hearing that friendship was established between the Governments in India, by representing that this system increases daily in strength by the due adherence on the part of Tippoo Sultaun to the engagements which laid the foundation for it and in the performance of acts of confidence and mutual advantage.

Notwithstanding that these expressions in his Lordship's letters speak pointedly to his disposition that the unanimity and good will now prevailing between the two Governments may last for ever, yet I must notice to you that independant of this inclination towards Tippoo Sultaun in particular, and his steady adherence to his engagements subsisting between the Company and the other Powers in India in general, his Lordship is influenced by the private feelings and personal regard which, you are witness, have always actuated him towards the young Princes, and he cannot without great uneasiness submit for a moment to the idea of leaving them to the care of his successor. You are well informed of the charge entrusted to his Lordship by Tippoo Sultaun when he received the young Princes at Seringapatam, and you have seen his uniform friendly and kind conduct to them since and although he is well convinced that his successor will pursue the same friendly conduct towards Tippoo Sultaun as has hitherto been observed by himself, and in conformity to the desires of the English nation he will do his utmost that the harmony subsisting may prosper, yet as that successor has not the pleasure of so intimate a personal acquaintance with them nor has been in the habits of intimacy or of unreserved correspondence either with Tippoo Sultaun or with the young Princes or with you, his Lordship would feel great reluctance in being compelled to leave them in a situation in which they might feel doubtful of being treated with the same attention and kindness which they have hitherto experienced. He is at the same time aware that Tippoo Sultaun will be actuated by similar sentiments, and that he will enjoy a particular satisfaction in receiving back his sons from the hands of the person to whom he himself entrusted them.

Thus situated in regard to the Princes, and desirous on his part to promote the mutual good understanding with Tippoo Sultaun which it has been his satisfaction to see established during his administration, he has directed me to express his sentiments on both points to you.

My former letters to you have contained everything that has occurred on the subject of the Treaty of Seringapatam, several parts of which, a mutual confidence in the parties to it, and that friendly will which they bear to each other induced them to leave to time and local circumstances to execute. I beg leave therefore to refer you to those letters in which you will find that the principal points yet unsettled are, first, the full discharge

of the sum agreed to be paid to the allies ; secondly, the release of all the prisoners that may be detained by either party, and thirdly, the exchange of country that may be necessary for a full performance of the article of the treaty relative to the cession of country where on local experience and enquiry it shall be due to the justice of either side.

On the subject of the first of these points his Lordship directed me to call to your recollection the article of the treaty by which you will observe that the period for the discharge of the whole sum to the three states in alliance is arrived. That hitherto Tippoo Sultaun has paid very little attention to this stipulation, which relates to each of the three powers equally as to one, and that while his Lordship receives every assurance of a steady adherence to the treaty from Tippoo Sultaun, he is under the necessity of remarking that these assurances are not fulfilled in this respect. After the repeated instances of sincerity and candor which his Lordship has displayed towards Tippoo Sultaun and towards the allies, which you are equally well informed have been productive of a steady friendship between them, he is not inclined to suppose that Tippoo Sultaun can entertain a different opinion of their respective dispositions than that which he has hitherto had on sufficient proof of its existence.

On behalf of the prisoners, after the repeated letters which have been written to you and the positive facts with the most circumstantial evidence of time, place and situation of several Europeans still confined and of the persons from whom this evidence was obtained, all of which has been written to you by his Lordship's commands, it is some what extraordinary that you should reply to these observations by the argument contained in your letter to me (*vide* letter received 11th February 1793) that the information of prisoner's arising from revenge was not to be credited, nor is it the act of a friend to pay attention to it. Had the intelligence in this respect been from one person only, his Lordship would have paid little attent on to it, but the facts are so circumstantially related by several persons who have made their escape, and as I mentioned in a former letter are so corroborated by events prior to the late war, that there remains no room to doubt that several persons both European and native are still confined and his Lordship repeats the purport of his wish, as contained in my letter to you under date 23rd August and 26th November 1792, extracts from which I enclose herein and I am further directed to inform you that until he shall receive a satisfactory answer on this subject, his Lordship will consider the second article of the treaty not executed on the part of Tippoo Sultaun and will act accordingly.

I have likewise by his Lordship's commands written to you frequently on the subject of the exchange for part of the district of Gauveripoor situated within the boundary of Tippoo Sultaun's dominions, and have at length been favoured with an answer, *vide* letter received 11th February



1793, wherein instead of noticing the mode by which his Lordship proposes to settle this matter by a convention of aumeens from the parties on the spot, you consider a few villages too trifling for consideration where matters for crores of rupees have been settled. Orders have been issued for aumeens to be deputed by the English to settle the Cauveripoor exchange, whether by the share of Caroor which you have suggested, or by Vencatigherry which his Lordship proposed to you some months ago, and also to meet any person who may be deputed by Tippoo Sultaun to ascertain the nature of the claim made by the Rajah of Travancore to the districts of Paroor, Alunguar and Kurrutnayr, and I request you will inform me whether Tippoo Sultaun will appoint aumeens to meet those on the part of the Company to settle these matters.

Having myself been witness to the happy effects of a friendship between Tippoo Sultaun and the allied powers I cannot but be interested in its increasing strength and permanency. On this account I have troubled you with these sentiments and I doubt not that you will consider the propriety of my observations on the present and on the future state of affairs, and that you will in consequence exert yourselves for a full performance of engagements subsisting between all the powers, and that you will be convinced that the allied powers will perform their share in their own engagements and of those subsisting with Tippoo Sultaun.

**No. 491**—Referring to the earnest desire of the Allies to execute the treaty, Cornwallis requests Tipu to fulfil the friendly system by a similar conduct. He submits a list of prisoners in Tipu's dominions for immediate release.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—TIPU SULTAN.

*19th March 1793.*

I have the pleasure to acknowledge the receipt of your letter (11th February 1793). The contents of this letter have afforded me great satisfaction, as they are worded in the language of friendship which it is my earnest wish may ever subsist between us. Considering it unnecessary to be continually representing the particulars of misconduct and disputes which happen on all sides of your country, you have desired Golaum Ally Khan and Ally Reza Khan to communicate them to me.

Golaum Ally Khan and Ally Reza Khan have accordingly written to Mr. Cherry and have delivered a paper to Sir Charles Oakley at Madras containing several matters which you had instructed them to represent.

My friend, I have perused all these matters with attention and must observe that as they were communicated to me several of them in your own letters, and all of them in letters from Golaum Ally Khan and Ally Reza Khan every attention consistent with a sincere friendship has been paid to them, which doubtless you will have seen by my letters to you and by letters which I have directed to be written to them. I am therefore at a loss to assign a cause for the repetition of them. But at the same time it affords me satisfaction to notice that not one of these circumstances denote any deviation from the treaty of Seringapatam on the part of the Allies; although every item has been replied to and the necessary measures adopted to put a stop to the irregularities and misconduct which may occur on the boundaries, and although in consequence of the undetermined property in several places on the boundaries I have repeatedly recommended that aumçens may be deputed on both sides to adjust this point, which you have in no instance approved of, yet willing to give due weight to your applications, as far as they concern the English Company, I have directed every circumstance in the paper received from your Vakeels to be replied to, and beg leave to refer you to it. Hitherto the Company have not infringed the treaty; but on the contrary they have applied a remedy to such evils as have occurred from the events of the war and I have the happiness to learn that the same earnest desire to maintain friendship has been shown on the part of the Nizam and the Peshwa. It therefore rests with you to fulfill the friendly system by a similar conduct.

It is a matter of great surprize to me that your Vakeels should have repeatedly informed me before I left Madras, and since, that there are no prisoners detained within your dominion, and that notwithstanding the repeated information which I have received and have communicated to you with particulars that leave no room for doubt, not a single person has been released in consequence, but on the contrary this information is attributed to the motive of revenge in those who have made their escape. Several persons both European and native have effected their liberty, which of itself must appear extraordinary after the repeated assurances which I have received on your part, and they have delivered a statement particularizing the names, European and Mahommedan, of several others still detained. This information I have uniformly sent to you through Golaum Ally Khan and Ally Reza Khan, and I now enclose further accounts which I have received and request that you will order that they be released immediately. This request is consistent with good faith, and is conformable to the treaty existing between us.

Enclosure.

Some time ago; the information which had been received from a person named Beecher was communicated to Tippoo Sultaun by Marquis Cornwallis; since that period, further particulars have been received from the

same person as follows. That the following persons were still prisoners, and that he had seen them.

Arthur Ross Hossien Beg—Cheelah at Bednore.

Joseph Mackenzie, Muchan Beg or Kadar Beg—Cheelah at Bednore.

Francis Ormsby, Ismail Beg—Cheelah at Bednore.

John William, Mahommed Beg—Cheelah at Bednore.

James Edwards—Not in the Cheelas, Bednore.

Thomas Bull—Bullun Beg, Cheelah Seringapatam employed in the Paper Mill.

Bolton not in the Chilas—Mons. Vizzy.

A Serjeant, a smith by Trade taken at Bidnore, employed in the Karkannah at Seringapatam and his wife a European.

An English woman taken at Periapatam in Vizzy's Camp.

Natives taken with General Mathews

Dinnajee Carpenter

Nussurwangee Carpenter

Pestongee Carpenter

Muncher Pestongee Carpenter

A servant of General Mathews

A servant of Captain Lampurd

} Bednore.

about thirty others, names unknown, carpenters, smiths and servants, all from Bombay.

Four or five Englishmen confined in a small place near the karkannah, names unknown, Seringapatam.

Since the arrival of Beecher, another person by name James Duncan who was taken with colonel Baillie in 1780 has made his escape and arriving at Tellicherry has given the following information.

That he was taken with seven men of his regiment, and was sent with them to Seringapatam where they were confined for six months; from thence in company with 18 men he was sent to Chitteldroog where they staid 15 months, from thence to Rydroog where they staid 15 months from thence to Gurrum Condah, where they staid two years, from thence

to Gungycottah, 3 years, from thence to Bangalore, 18 month, from thence to Seringapatam, where he remained until he effected his escape, accompanied by Mootoo, a Seapoy who was sentry over him. He left Seringapatam in September last, and reports that there were fifty English prisoners, chained two and two employed to carry loads of earth etc. Among other English prisoners confined at Seringapatam he recollects the following names :—

John Jackson	taken at Periapatam.
William Stone	Do.
William Berry	Do.
Alexr. Macneal	Do.
John Mac Glasson	Do.
John Johnson	Do.
Peter White	Do.
John Macpherson	Do.
James Gordon	Do.
George Wilson	Do.
John Docherty	Do.
John Windale	Do.
William Shaw	Do.
John Hendrick	taken with Col. Baillie
Peter Wallace	Do.
John Mac Cay	Do.
George Mac Cay	Do.
William Shaw	Do.
John Baillie	Do.
George Baillie	Do.
William Charter	Do.
James Stacey	Do.
John Stracey	Do.
John Evans	Do.
Alexr. Montgomery	Do.
George Short	Do.
Davy Hughes	Do.
John Lyons	Do.
Thomas Wilson	Do.
Thomas Jones	Do.

An English woman, name unknown, taken at Periapatam. Muttoo Seapoy confirms the report of James Duncan, as far as concerns his accompanying Duncan when he was stationed as a sentry over him, and declares that he recollects there were about forty English prisoners confined at Seringapatam, and that they were made to carry earth.

The information of Jaygur armourer who was taken prisoner with General Mathews, and effected his escape from Bednore about five months ago in August 1792.

He and two brothers were taken with General Mathews and confined in the fort of Bednore ; from whence during the Mohurram they effected their escape to Coondupore, and from thence to Mangalore ; from whence they went to Tellicherry, where they arrived about  $2\frac{1}{2}$  months ago. At Bednore they left the following people in confinement. They were all taken with General Mathews and are armourers and carpenters, Sicculghurs and fifteen Carnatic People whose names he does not know except the name of Ram Sing, Sowbahdar.

Hurry, an armourer in the Commissary's Department.

Pursooram,	Do.	do.
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Binson,	Do.	do.
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Kumur,	Do.	do.
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Kagoo, an armourer in the 5 or late Captain James's Battn. N. I.

Wissun,	Do.	do.
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Narran, an armourer in the 8 or late Jameson's Battn. N. I.

Baycheer,	Do.	do.
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Juram,	Do.	do.
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Narran, an armourer in the 15 or late Capt. M. Culloughs Battn. N. I.

Mooteel,	Do.	do.
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Cursen,	Do.	do.
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Juram,	Do.	do.
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Nasserwan, a Carpenter in the Commissary's Department.

Rustum,	Do.	do.
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Munchaw,	Do.	do.
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Aspundesh,	Do.	do.
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Pesteems,	Do.	do.
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Narran,	Do.	do.
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Sunker,	Do.	do.
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Bychund, a Sicculghur in the Company's Department.

Sunkar, a Sicculghur in the Commissary's Department.

No. 492—Azim-ul-Umara complains of the plunder of the Nizam's territories by Tipu's cavalry and requests the G. G. to select a proper person for defining the boundaries and watching the transactions there.

FROM—AZIM-UL-UMARA,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Received 21st March 1793.*

watch every transaction and ascertain the encroachments of the Talookdars belonging to Tippoo Sultaun and the fair and consistent conduct of those belonging to his Highness, so that these matters may not be misrepresented. As this in the eyes of wise men is of the first consequence, and is even a foundation for future good management and order in other affairs, I trust that your Lordship will lose no time in selecting a person who shall be fit and who shall be versed in the transaction and ascertainment of business. As Sir John Kennaway's presence is highly necessary with his Highness for many causes, it is more fit that some other person should be selected for these affairs who shall always remain on the frontiers and shall watch the transactions there.

**No. 493**—Tipu asks his vakils to communicate to the G. G. the depredation caused by the Mahrattas who were joined by two thousand horse belonging to Parsuram Pundit and the punishment inflicted on them.

FROM—TIPU SULTAN,

TO—GOLAM ALI KHAN AND ALI REZA.

*4th April 1793.*

Some time ago it was written to Hurry Pant Pundit Ferkia Bahadre, that from the day of the conclusion of the war until the present time about ten months the zamindar of Anagoondy under the auspices of the Talookdars of Seremunt Bahadre has been destroying and laying waste the whole country in that quarter. In the treaty of peace it is written that no protection is to be given to plunderers and robbers.

Hurry Pant Pundit in answer to the above said, that no protection was given by him to plunderers, and that the Ahamady Sirkar should send a force and punish the offenders. In consequence of this, a small force was detached in order to chastise them, which having arrived at the place above named, punished in the most exemplary manner the whole of these plunderers. Among them were nearly two thousand horse belonging to Purseram Pundit who were engaged with the plunderers, and who likewise met with the most exemplary punishment.

In the treaty of peace it is agreed, that protection shall not be given to plunderers and robbers. Therefore wherever the talookdars of Seremunt Bahadre join with such in order to destroy the country of the Ahamady Sirkar themselves they receive chastisement.

It is necessary that you consider this business well, what appearance it bears, and what has happened. It is proper that you explain it particularly to the Governor Bahadre, and give His Lordship information thereof.

No. 494—Tipu communicates to his envoys the origin of the Kurnool dispute and the Nizam's attempt to establish his protege as the Nawab of Kurnool and explains the necessity for sending the kists of the three Sarkars to Krishnagiri.

FROM—TIPU SULTAN,

TO—GOLAM ALI KHAN AND ALI REZA.

You write that four elephants belonging to the English Company were going from the Sirhud of the Hydere Sirkar to Palacautcherry, but that the people of the Sirkar prevented, and would not allow them to proceed. I understand this. Before the receipt of your Arozdasht, upon hearing the above circumstance, the strictest injunctions were dispatched to the Talookdars of Coimbatore to furnish an escort for the said elephants and to forward them to the place of their destination, and in future also by no means to prevent or interrupt the passage of people belonging to the Sirkar of the English Company through their districts. By the blessing of God, one authority is over the two Sirkars, and in such matters no interruption shall take place on the part of the servants of the Hydere Sirkar. Acquaint the Governor Bahadre that the Talookdars having acted in this affair thro' ignorance, he should not think more of it.

I understand what you write, "that the talook of Mocha has not yet been surrendered to the Sirkar of Asuff Jah Bahadre". Let it be enquired from other quarters how many months have elapsed since the garrison of the Sirkar has been removed from Mocha. If the people of the Sirkar of Asuff Jah do not come and remain there, whose fault is it?

At the time of the division of the shares of half the country to the three Sirkars, it was my desire that the sum of two lacks of rupees yearly, being the Peishcush from Kurnoul, should be included in the share of the Sirkar of Asuff Jah, upon which Delawer Jung Bahadre (Sir J. Kennaway, Bart.) and the other vackeels of the three Sirkars observed, "Our business relates to the share of Country, and we have no business with the Peishcush of Kurnoul, You and the Zamindar of Kurnoul know about that, Keep it herefore in your own share."

After the settlement of affairs, a person of consequence was sent from the Ahamedy Sirkar to the late Runmust Khan Bahadre, in order to collect the Peshcush. The said Khan detained the deputed person with him, and engaged that he would discharge the balance of Peeshcush, part of the same having been formerly received by the Sirkar and that in future no delay should happen on his part. Suddenly Runmust Khan Bahadre died. During his own life, however, and in the presence of many people of consequence, of the inhabitants, of his servants, the said Khan appointed his son Alif Khan in his place, and declared to him his will that he should pay the balance of Peeshcush due to the Ahamedy Sirkar, and in future be careful in the discharge of the Peeshcush and of his obedience to



the Sirkar. You will learn the particulars of this from the copy of the Mahsir which is sent enclosed.

The said Alif Khan having succeeded his father, kept with him the person deputed by the Ahamedy Sirkar, and was adjusting the business of the Peeshcush when, from the Sirkar of Asuff Jah Bahadre, an army being appointed for Ayem Khan, son of the deceased Runmust Khan, moved towards Kurnoul with purpose to contend with Alif Khan. In consequence of these transactions Alif Khan Bahadre says, "In the event of troubles and disturbances without cause, how can the payment of the money to the Sirkar (Ahamedy) be accomplished? By all means it is necessary to dissipate these troubles. I am ready in the discharge of the Peeschcush and in my obedience to the Sirkar conformably to the last will and injunctions of my father."

It is incumbent that you who know the business of Kurnoul from the beginning and through whose means and knowledge everything was transacted at the settlement of the peace, represent this affair to the Governor Bahadre, and write to Lord Cornwallis Bahadre whatever is proper to be written on the occasion, so that the contentions respecting Kurnoul may cease, and that the servants of the Sirkar of Asuff Jah may not grant assistance, contrary to engagement, lest differences should arise between us.

Previous to this you have been repeatedly informed of the Kists having been sent to both parties, of the delays and excuses of the servants on the borders respecting the receiving the same, and the giving receipts with the seals and signature of the Nawab Asuff Jah, and Seremunt Bahadre. The cause of these excuses and delays I do not comprehend. You know, when all the Persons empowered by their own Sirkars ever assembled in one spot, that, after paying the half of the money at Seringapatam, notwithstanding that Lord Cornwallis was himself present, in what manner delays, excuses, and contentions were then brought forward respecting the delivery of receipts, in so much that, after receiving the receipt of the Sirkar of the English Company, the receipts from the other Sirkars were not obtained until a considerable time had elapsed, and after many conversations on the subject, although Dilawar Jung Bahadre (Sir. J. Kennaway, Bart.) interested himself in procuring them from the Allied Sirkars; consider then, that Lord Cornwallis is at present in Bengal, and each in his respective place, what excuses they have made and will make. The Kist for the Sirkar of Seremunt Bahadre was forwarded to Darwar, according to engagement, in the month of Rubbe ul Avul, and until this time which is about five or six months, no receipt has been obtained. In like manner it is some months since the 1st Kist for the Sirkar of Asuff Jah Bahadre was sent to the Sirhud, that business also is not yet settled.

Conceiving it improper that delays should so often be made respecting the granting receipts, altho' the money should be paid, and thus become

the cause of uneasiness and having fixed my attention upon the due performance of engagement, which by all means will afford me ease and leisure. I am desirous that the Kists for the three Sirkars, and also the 1st Kist for the Sirkar of Asuff Jah being remanded, the whole be sent at once to Kistnagherry, so that, in the same manner that Peace between the Sirkars was established through the means of Lord Cornwallis, the money of the Kists also, without pain and uneasiness, may, by means of the servants of the Sirkar of the English Company, be delivered to the Allied Sirkars, and their receipts obtained.

With this view the second Kists for the three Sirkars have been forwarded to Bangalore. It is necessary that you represent this matter to the Governor Bahadre, and write without delay, so that the money may be sent from Bangalore to Kistnagherry. The second Kist being thus settled, in like manner the third Kist also shall be forwarded to Kistnagherry.

No 495—Cornwallis censures the conduct of the Nizam's officer Malik Esau and requests the Minister to place honest and loyal officials on the frontier to prevent similar disputes.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—AZIM-UL-UMARA.

*18th April 1793.*

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter on the subject of the disputes on the confines of the dominions of His Highness the Nizam and those of Tippo Sultan, and suggesting to me the necessity that exists to appoint a confidential person on the part of the Company, who will by constantly residing on the frontiers be able to ascertain all the circumstances that relate to the disputes there, and prevent the ill effects of a misrepresentation of them on either side and Mr. Cherry has also communicated to me the substance of your letter to him on this subject.

It has been a source of no small concern to me, who am a real wisher of His Highness's Government, to observe that when by the assistance of Providence the arms of the alliance have been crowned with success, and the frontiers of the territory acquired by the late treaty of peace were at the negotiations at Seringapatam selected more with a view to future peace and security than to any revenue acquisition, nevertheless the harmony and friendship so happily established by our mutual exertions are still subject to the caprice and to the rapacious dispositions of aumils and Talookdars, who while uncontrolled by the superior power, commit depredations on the districts of the neighbouring states, with the view of plunder and private advantage, and without being sensible of the bad consequences of their conduct. I have perused with attention and regret

all the representations which Sir John Kennaway received from you and transmitted to me on the subject of the irregularities committed by the people belonging to Tippo Sultan, and have not failed to transmit to Sir John Kennaway the frequent complaints which I have received from Tippo Sultan of a similar conduct on the part of His Highness's subjects. I am sensible that it is neither the wish of His Highness's Government nor of Tippo Sultan that these people should behave in a manner so inconsistent with the unanimity subsisting between their superiors; but after perusing the copy of your letter to Tippo Sultan on this subject, which His Highness did me the honour to enclose in his letter relative to Kurnoul, I cannot avoid pointing out the reprehensible conduct of Mallic Esau, who doubtless exceeded the commands which he received from His Highness when he entered the territories of Tippo Sultan in pursuit of fugitives. Such a conduct can never have met with your approbation. It is, however, incumbent on me to point out this circumstance to you; for to acts of this nature is to be ascribed all the irregularities which happen on the confines, and this is the conduct which ought to be checked and severely punished. In order to effect a reform in this point, the first measure and the most deserving your attention, is to select trustworthy and respectable men as aumils to the Government of the districts on the frontier, instead of persons whose fidelity and attachment to His Highness's interests are very suspicious and whose misconduct has undoubtedly been the cause of the disputes and quarrels which prevail in these parts. With respect to the request contained in your letter that I will select a confidential person to reside on the frontiers on the part of the Company, I am sensible that when you reflect for a moment on the spirit of the treaty of Seringapatam, and on the nature of the connection formed between the Company, His Highness and the Peshwa, you will observe that such an appointment on the part of the Company would be extremely incompatible to the unanimity prevailing between all the Powers; for by the treaty of Seringapatam in particular, it is stipulated that in the event of disputes occurring on the boundaries they shall be adjusted by the contracting powers. Thus, how can the Company, in justice, appoint an Aumeen as you request?

In consideration, therefore, of these arguments, I recommend to you, as the most effectual means to put a stop to the irregularities complained of, that you make a proper choice of Aumils for the frontier districts in particular, whose zeal and integrity and attachment to His Highness's Government can be depended upon, and whose abilities and disposition will enable them to suppress the litigious conduct of the inhabitants of newly acquired territory, and furnish you with true and faithful information on all that passes in the districts subject to their jurisdiction.

I beg leave to refer you to the treaty of alliance between the three states, from which you will observe that it cannot be the effect of deliberation and design on the part of Tippo Sultan that the circumstances represented

by the Nawab Dara Jah have occurred and I doubt not that on your representation of it to him, he will take the proper measures to prevent a similar conduct in future.

For the rest of the arguments which are deducible from the subjects above mentioned, I beg leave to refer you to Sir John Kennaway, of whose zealous desire to promote the prosperity of His Highness's Government and to cement the intimacy between both States you have witnessed repeated proofs. He has regularly transmitted to me such papers as you gave him in charge relating to the disputes on the boundaries, and will have communicated to you what occurs to him as advisable to put a stop to them.

No 496—Jackson communicates to Malet the reply he gave to Tipu's proposal of sending the second kist of the three Sarkars to Krishnagiri.

FROM—W. C. JACKSON.

TO—C. W. MALET.

*Fort St. George, 3rd May 1793.*

I am directed by the Honourable the President in Council to inform you that the Vackeels of Tippoo some time ago represented to the Board that their Master proposed sending the second Kists for the three powers immediately to Kistnagherry and that an answer was returned to the proposition, signifying that this Government had no authority to receive any payment but for the Company, and that the Kists for the three powers must be paid in exact conformity with the articles of the treaty.

In consequence of this intention the second Kist for the Company only has been sent to Kistnagherry.

No. 497—Tipu gives an account of the various pieces of coins sent on camelback.

FROM—TIPU SULTAN,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*7th May 1793.*

The money for the whole of the second instalment amounting to eighteen lacks, thirty-three thousand three hundred and thirty three rupees six annas (18,33,333) consisting of various pieces of coin, agreeably to the following particulars, viz., ten thousand gold mohors at 16 Rs. each making one lack and sixty thousand rupees (16,000), ten thousand Shaunanry Kauss at five rupees each, making fifty thousand rupees (50,000), ten thousand rupees in silver (10,000), three lacks ninety-one thousand one hundred and eleven Hyderce pagodas, at four rupees two annas each, making sixteen lacks, thirteen thousand, three hundred and thirty-two rupees

fourteen annas (16,13,332-14-0) and one Aubadu equal to half a rupee (8 as.) making altogether eighteen lacks, thirty-three thousand, three hundred and thirty-three rupces six annas (18,33,333-6-0) is now sent upon the camels of the Ahmedee Sirkar to Kishnagurry, and will arrive. Be pleased to notify its arrival; and considering me always desirous of your Lordship's welfare gratify me by letters denoting it. Dated the 27th of Shaboun 1207 Hedjerree.

No. 498—Tipu makes a solemn affirmation of his having released all prisoners, promises to send Amins to the frontiers wherever directed and communicates to the G. G. the payment of the 2nd kist to the Nizam and the Peshwa.

FROM—TIPU SULTAN,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*16th April 1793 (4 Ramzan 1207).*

*[Received 20th May 1793.]*

Your Lordship is pleased to write that several talooks, which, pursuant to the schedule annexed to the treaty, belong to the Peshwa and the Nizam are still detained by my officers; and your Lordship guided by pure motives of friendship recommends to me to adopt those measures towards those powers which you suggested in a former letter relative to the adjustment of the boundary disputes in the neighbourhood of Cauverypore and on the subject of the talooks claimed by the Rajah of Travancore, that is to appoint respectable and capable aumeens and to send them to the spot, where they may investigate and make themselves masters of all particulars, and act in conformity to the treaty. Your Lordship is wise, and moreover a well-wisher of Princes in general, but in particular my friend and I consider you my warm friend and sincere adviser of my affairs. As your Lordship laid the foundation of the friendship subsisting between the Company and my State, I cannot entertain a doubt of the propriety and justness of whatever may occur to your Lordship as expedient and adviseable for the prosperity of us both. I have delivered over to the Nizam and to the Peshwa all the talooks specified in the treaty, and their respective officers have possessions of them. However, conformable to your Lordship's recommendation, two persons of experience and prudence are ready to be sent to whatever parts of the boundaries of the Nizam and the Peshwa's territories they may be directed to go, in order that all frivolous altercations may be adjusted, and letters are accordingly written to the Peshwa and to Azim-ul-umara which I transmit to your Lordship to forward to them. In like manner, an experienced man is ready to enquire into the particulars on both sides of the Cauveripoor, and to ascertain those relative to talook Catputoor which was made over to the Company in exchange for villages on this side the Cauveripoor, and likewise the particulars of the villages belonging to the

Zemindar of talook Aveacourchy. This person shall be sent whenever your Lordship pleases to direct him to go to the borders. The particulars of the talooks claimed by the Rajah of Travancore are as follows. Those villages have time immemorial appertained to the Rajah of Cochin, who was a dependant on my Government, as is known to all the world, at the commencement of the war; these talooks were attached by my Government and it is written in the third article of the Treaty that the three States should receive a share of the Country which belonged to me at the commencement of the war. Thus the claim of the Rajah of Travancore is ill founded.

I have paid the full amount of two kists to the three States, but I have not obtained the receipts from the Nizam nor the Peshwa. It is of no consequence where your Lordship is concerned. There is no want of receipts from those States. If I receive them I will inform your Lordship accordingly. The remaining Kist to the allied States will be sent in the month Tucky, corresponding with Zekaida, 1207 Hejeree, or June 1793. It is incumbent on your Lordship's kindness and friendship that you take the trouble of going in person to Madras, and in your own presence send my sons to me. This will afford me great pleasure, as well as be satisfactory to the inhabitants of their country, and will tend no less to your Lordship's good name. I am confident that your Lordship will at all times be desirous that a system of harmony and friendship be existing and increasing daily between the Company and me and that you will lay yourself the foundation of a personal regard between us. There are certain interested persons, how well disposed towards me (or us) your Lordship is well aware; should such persons bring forward any selfish points, your Lordship will conceive it a duty appertaining to friendship to communicate them to me, that I may represent all the facts to you. Your Lordship is wise, to write more is superfluous.

Your Lordship writes that you have communicated your sentiments to Sir John Kennaway on the subject of the Peshcush from Kurnool, that he may inform the Nizam of them and that you doubt not that this matter will be settled according to the principles of justice and conformable to the friendship existing between us. As the Kurnool business was settled in your Lordship's presence at the time of the negotiation for peace, I am confident that nothing will happen wrong from any party. It is very well known that the Nawaub of Kurnool was a friend and a tributary of this State from the beginning. The deceased Nawaub Runmust Khan disinherited his eldest son on account of domestic broils and in his place substituted a younger son of the age of ten or twelve years and a day or two before his death he assembled his relations and followers of the same sect and declared his last will in favor of his younger son, Alif Khan, after his death, and Alif Khan obtained a declaration to this effect, attested by the seal of the Cauzy and his brothers and fellow followers and Runmust Khan prior to his death wrote me a letter, that sensible of his approaching

dissolution he had nominated his younger son Alif Khan as his successor, and that he would carry on the pecuniary negotiations with my Government in the usual and customary manner, and hoping that I would observe the customs of kindness towards him. I trust that your Lordship will consider this maturely and will write to prevent the troops of the Nizam, who are plundering the districts of Kurnool, from persevering in this conduct, that the pecuniary transactions with my Government may be fulfilled according to usage, and that the money may be paid to me.

Your Lordship further writes that you had written a letter to Golaum Ally Khan and Ally Reza Khan on the subject of the release of those prisoners who are still in confinement in my country, but that hitherto no answer had been received to it. There is not a single Person confined, nor shall there be one confined. When the name of the Creator is inserted in the treaty, what being can have the power to act contrary to this momentous matter? Thus let not your Lordship give credit to the reports of interested men. Keep your mind free from the impressions. Knowing me always desirous to hear of your welfare, I hope your Lordship will favor me frequently with letters of a friendly tendency.

P. S. Talookdar belonging to the Nizam, influenced by litigious motives keeps possession of Nudumdoodry, a principal village belonging to Gooty. But I did not think it worth while to trouble your Lordship with a subject so trifling. As however Azeem ul Omrah has written on this subject, I am compelled to write to your Lordship that several robbers and notorious vagabonds have fled from my country and taken up their abode in another person's talook, and have circulated litigious and quarrelsome stories of this kind. It is not fit that I should be continually writing to your Lordship on such subjects, and I have accordingly written fully to Golaum Ally Khan and Ally Reza Khan who will communicate them to your Lordship. Notwithstanding that, with a view to prevent future altercation, particulars and names at full length have been committed to paper, still however contention and altercation is improperly and idly kept up.

**No. 499**—In reply to Tipu's letter Cornwallis requests him to send Amins without delay for investigation into the disputed taluks in the Cauveripur district and to renew his positive order for a minute report of the dead prisoners and for the release of those who may be living.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—TIPU SULTAN.

29th May 1793.

I have the happiness to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, *vide* letter received from Tippoo Sultaun on the 20th May 1793.

In former letters to you, and by my directions from Mr. Cherry to your Vakeels, I have entered largely on the several points which tho' provided for by the late treaty could not at the time be finally adjusted. There is no necessity therefore now to repeat them.

I was influenced by the desires of mutual harmony and reciprocal prosperity when I suggested to you the nomination of Aumeens to investigate into the disputed talooks on the boundaries at Cauveripore, and as my sentiments in this respect have met with your concurrence, I have written to the Government of Madras to depute a person of abilities and local knowledge to meet those whom you may think proper to nominate, and I request that you will be pleased to send them without delay to the spot, and signify their departure from your presence to your vakeels at Madras, that no time may be lost in entering on the investigation. I have hitherto instructed that Government to enjoin the person whom they may depute on this business to pay due attention to the friendship subsisting between us ; and in the event of a difference of opinion occurring between them on the information which may be obtained on the spot, to transmit their respective reports to you and to me that we may finally decide the point which I have no doubt will take place in a manner consistent with the good will that now so happily prevails.

I have transmitted the letters which you enclosed to me addressed to the Peishwa and to Azcemul Omrah and altho' I have no doubt that all places which by the treaty are ceded to the Peishwa and to the Nizam have been delivered over to their respective officers, yet I have recommended to those Powers to accede to the measure of deputing Aumeens wherever there may be any place the boundaries of which are still unadjusted.

In regard to the three talooks claimed by the Rajah of Travancore, altho' the district of Paroor from its situation within the lines of Travancore could not have been in your possession until you had attacked and carried those lines, yet desirous in this respect, as in all others, to act in strict conformity to the rules of justice, and to the letter of the treaty I shall suspend any farther determination on this subject until I can have an opportunity of receiving more particular information from the enquiries which I have directed the gentlemen to make who were deputed to investigate the situation of affairs on the coast of Malabar, and who will soon return to Calcutta. I trust that you will be assured of my earnest desire to accommodate this point in an amicable manner ; and that, however, under the impression of the doubt which existed during the negotiation at Seringapatam of the statement which was received of the value of your dominions, I may be particularly desirous that the circumstances of these three talooks be minutely ascertained, yet I shall never lose sight of the rules of justice and friendship.

I have fully comprehended what you have written relative to Kurnoul in a former letter. I did myself the pleasure to inform you that I had



communicated my sentiments on this point to the Nizam. I have not yet been favoured with an answer. As I have no doubt that this matter will ultimately be decided in a manner becoming the friendly disposition of the parties concerned, I do not entertain any apprehension that during the period that it is in suspense it will make any variation in the harmony existing.

Sometime ago I communicated to you my intentions of returning to Europe at the expiration of a few months and I represented the chief motive for deferring my departure, which, in consideration of the assurances that I made to you at Seringapatam on receiving charge from you of the young Princes, is almost wholly confined to the expectation that before the time which I have fixed for my departure shall arrive I shall be enabled to return them to you. After the repeated declarations which I have received from you that there are no prisoners confined within your dominions, and after the solemn attestation of Heaven to all acts, and in particular to this of releasing all that shall be alive, which was purposely inserted in the treaty relative to the prisoners, I can not but be surprized at the frequent information which I have received, under many corroborating circumstances, of several Europeans being still detained within your territories, and which I have regularly transmitted to you. It cannot now be necessary for me to assure you that my earnest desire to live in harmony and to cultivate a sincere friendship with your State will never permit me to attend to the designing conduct of interested persons who may be desirous to disturb the tranquillity and good will that prevails, nor am I ready to pay attention to the reports which men who may have made their escape may make to me under the impulse of revenge for the sufferings which they may have undergone, unless I may be induced to give them credit from the circumstantial detail of corroborating facts and it has been with the view of defeating the pernicious tendency of too easy a belief that I have informed you of every point which has come to my knowledge, that you might direct the release of those who on enquiry you might have found to be in confinement, and that you might, by means of the same enquiry have obtained a knowledge of the fate of those who, once your prisoners, may be no more, particularly of the fate of two officers of Cavalry who were taken at Cauveripatam, and of a Surgeon who was taken by the Beyder horse in the vicinity of Bangalore ; I can therefore only repeat my earnest requests on this point and my reliance on your friendship and on the personal regard subsisting between us that you will renew your positive orders for a minute report on the fate of all who may be dead, and for the release of those who may be still alive.

Impressed by the earnestness which you display in your letter to accommodate all matters still unadjusted, it will afford me an inexpressible happiness to meet your wishes and those which the Princes have notified in their letters to me, that I will call at Madras on my way to Europe and see them set out in a manner consistent with our cordial intimacy to return

to you. But independent of this motive, the personal regard which I have imbibed for them on discovering their good manners and disposition during the period that I had the happiness of being in their company will always make me anxious to see them, and to be personally present at the happy time, when in pursuance to the engagement subsisting with the allied Powers they shall commence their journey to you. As this, however, will in a great measure depend on the season when I shall embark from Bengal, for I can scarcely suppose that their return will be delayed by anything that rests with you, I can only for the present assure you that such an opportunity will afford me very great happiness.

I will not now occupy you with any further remarks than that I trust you will ever find me and my successor, Sir John Shore, desirous of meeting your wishes, that henceforward a cordiality and permanent friendship should subsist on the firm basis of sincerity and good faith between the two Governments.

**No. 500**—Tipu sends a complimentary letter expressing friendship for the G. G. and the Company.

FROM—TIPU SULTAN,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Received 6th June 1793.*

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Lordship's letter (letter dated 11th March 1793). Your Lordship is pleased to write that some time ago you had made application that a person might be nominated to take charge of the affairs belonging to the Company on your departure for Europe; that you had now learnt by dispatches from England that your request had been complied with, and a Person had been nominated to succeed your Lordship, and was expected to arrive shortly in Calcutta, that notwithstanding that this point was settled, yet you did not intend, for certain causes, to quit the Government for the space of some months, that I may be confident that you will continue to observe the same principles of good faith and friendship which you have hitherto done towards all the Princes in India, and in particular that you will cultivate the good understanding subsisting between us; that when your Lordship shall arrive in England nothing will afford you more pleasure than to represent in person the particulars of the friendship and harmony existing between the Company and my Government.

Altho' I cannot but be greatly concerned at your Lordship's departure for Europe, I do not consider that the distance between us can have any effect on our intimacy and friendship; but confident from your Lordship's virtues, from your great character, and from your good will towards all

the Powers in India in general, and in particular from your well wishing towards my Government, I have no doubt that after your arrival in England so far from neglecting any of the ties of friendship or omitting the arrangement of the affairs of your friends, the union between the Company and me will experience a considerable addition of strength by your Lordship's attendance in the presence of his Majesty the King of England. It is incumbent on your Lordship to consider yourself the regulator of the affairs of my Government, and by virtue thereof to exert yourself in England towards the prosperity and success of it. [*A verse expressive of wishes for the safety and expedition of the voyage.*] I trust that your Lordship will pay due attention to absent friends, which is one of the duties attached to friendship ; and not wishing to keep your friends more uneasy than they will naturally be, that you will frequently comfort my mind by letters mentioning your health.

The distinguishing mark of his Majesty's gracious favour conferred on your Lordship in the title of Marquis has given me more pleasure than I can express. May providence bestow higher honors on your Lordship, the well wisher of Princes, and in return for your good qualities raise you to higher offices and dignities ; for the result will be beneficial to mankind. [Follows the recapitulation of the contents of the letter of the 16th April 1793.]

**No. 501**—Tipu's envoys complain of the Nizam's not delivering the treaty conformably to the letter of the treaty and of their not receiving receipts for the kists paid to the Nizam and the Marathas.

FROM—GOLAM ALI KHAN AND ALI REZA,

TO—G. F. CHERRY.

*Received 6th June 1793.*

God is witness that Tippu Sultan is desirous in every sense of his Lordship's satisfaction, and thro' him to commence an intercourse by correspondence with his Majesty the King of Great Britain. This also will be speedily effected by his Lordship's means. From you we hope that the adjustment of affairs between both the states will always be an object of your earnest pursuits, and that this system of friendship which is replete with benefits to mankind will be extended to England. More than a year has elapsed, but we have not received the treaty from the Nizam under his seal pursuant to stipulations. His Highness has beside this sent the treaty to Sir C. Oakley that the deed bearing the seal and signature of Azeem ul Omrah may be first obtained from us, and then that the other treaty may be delivered up. We have replied that the tenor of the treaty cannot have escaped the memory of great men ; be pleased in

order for our satisfaction to look at the treaty and then demand the deed bearing the seal and signature of Azcem ul Omrah. If it therein be expressed that the deed bearing the seal and signature of Azcem ul Omrah is to be returned and the deed bearing the seal and signature of the Nizam is to be taken, we agree ; otherwise where is the propriety of this detail and negotiation for a sheet of paper, when it is clearly written in the treaty that a treaty bearing the seal and signature of the Nawaub Asoph Jah and a treaty under the seal and signature of Azcem ul Omrah shall be given to the Ahmedy Sirkar on the part of the Nizam ; let every one act conformably to engagements ; six months have elapsed since the first kist was sent to Darwar, and two months have elapsed since the second kist was sent there and in like manner the first kist has been sent to Kurpa these two or three months, and the second kist has also been sent, but no receipts have yet been obtained from either Power. What can be the motive for delaying in giving these receipts and the treaty ? We request you will represent these matters to Marquis Cornwallis that he may be pleased to write to both parties to send the receipts and the treaty to us.

We hope that you will interest yourself in settling matters.

Complimentary message from the Princes and the Vakeels to the Governor General.

**No. 502**—Cherry communicates the sentiments of Cornwallis on the delivery of the treaty and renews orders to Malet and Kennaway for the delivery of receipts for the kists.

FROM—G. F. CHERRY,

TO—GOLAM ALI KHAN AND ALI REZA.

*10th June 1793.*

I have the pleasure to acknowledge the receipt of your letter (*vide* letter received 6th June) and have translated the letter which accompanied it addressed to the Governor General from Tippo Sultan.

In regard to the receipts from those powers for the kists when paid by Tippo Sultan, his Lordship directs me to inform you that he is very much concerned at the repetition of these remonstrances, when you have been already informed that he has frequently desired his sentiments and wishes to be made known by the English Residents to their respective Courts of Hyderabad and Poona. He is willing to attribute it to the want of information at Seringapatam when these advices were dispatched from thence that any steps had been taken to expedite the delivery of these receipts, and trusts that the replies which have been made to these remonstrances by the Courts of Poona and Hyderabad will have afforded perfect satisfaction on this point, although it cannot be unknown to you that

the receipt from the Nizam for the first kist had been made out and had been sent to the place appointed a considerable time prior to the payment of the money, yet anxious to expedite the final adjustment of all points in reference, his Lordship has repeated his injunctions to Sir C. W. Malet at Poona and to Sir J. Kennaway at Hyderabad to urge the delivery of the receipts whenever Tippu Sultan shall pay the kists conformably to the treaty.

However this point of the receipts has been unpleasant to his Lordship, he is much more concerned at the procrastination which has taken place relative to the counterpart of the treaty to be received from the Nizam. The treaty stipulates that a counterpart bearing the seal and signature of the Nawaub Asoph Jah and of Azeem ul Omrah Behauder shall be delivered to Tippu Sultan, and his Lordship is informed by Sir John Kennaway that the treaty forwarded by him to Sir C. Oakley does bear the seal and signature of the Nizam and is authenticated by the seal of Azum ul Omrah which is considered in general of equal force with the seal and signature. In this case his Lordship is surprized that you should hesitate a moment in returning the copy delivered for the time by Azeem ul Omrah, notwithstanding that the words of the treaty do not expressly demand it. On the other hand his Lordship is no less surprized that His Highness the Nizam should make so serious a point of procuring the copy delivered by Azeem ul Omrah, which by the execution and delivery of the treaty under the seal and signature of the Nizam and of Azum ul Omrah becomes to all intents and purposes null and invalid. Under these impressions his Lordship trusts that you will not delay the complete execution of all matters unadjusted by any farther altercation on a subject that is of no importance in itself. His Lordship has directed these sentiments to be communicated to the Nizam, and has recommended to His Highness not to permit the delay in the return of the former copy to operate in any shape as an obstacle to the speedy and final adjustment of every matter.

Concluding with a complimentary message from the Governor General to the Princes.

**No. 503**—Azim-ul-Umara writes a very strong letter against the conduct of Tipu's Taluqdars and the G. G.'s intention of returning to Europe, leaving things in confusion.

FROM—MIR ABDUL LATIF,

TO—G. F. CHERRY.

Received 21st June 1793.

*Copy of letter from Azim ul Umara to Mir Abdul Latif.*

Impressed by motives of friendship I have written some points of importance in a separate paper. You must take an opportunity of representing them through Mr. Cherry in private to Marquis Cornwallis,

and inform me of his Lordship's reply. The fairness of his Lordship's dealings has r'veted his friend's to him. I do not hesitate to communicate every thing which I learn, whether good or bad.

Enclosure.

At the close of affairs at Seringapatam, which ended in peace being established, as from the conduct of Tippo Sultan before the war, during it, and at its conclusion, the allied powers were convinced that no dependance can be placed on his engagements, nor was there any probability that he would in future abide by them; I repeatedly stated these points to Lord Cornwallis through Meer Aalum, Mr. Cherry and Sir John Kennaway, which Mr. Cherry will doubtless recollect. At this time Tippo Sultan does acts which breathe the reverse of sincerity and friendship towards the three states, and from this conduct his *versatility* of temper in respect to treaties and engagements with these powers, whenever a favourable opportunity shall offer, must strike every one who has any knowledge of affairs. However, from motives of policy the three powers have thought proper to attribute this conduct in Tippo Sultan to his Talookdars, and exonerate him from any blame, and even knowledge of these acts, yet in fact it is not so. How can it be supposed that Tippoo Sultan's Talookdars have even the power to drink without his permission, much less can they dare act in a manner that shall injure the affairs of his Government? In consideration of this idea, I do not understand how Lord Cornwallis, who is famed for his prudence and good sense, can merely from a desire of returning to his own country entertain the intention of going to Europe, while not confident with respect to Tippoo Sultan, and with such strong presumptive proof of deviation from his treaties. If I shou'd point out to his Lordship the scrutinizing and investigating disposition of the administration in England, it would be wonderful indeed, for who is better acquaint'ed with the customs and regulations of his own Government than his Lordship. But as I have imbibed a sincere friendship for Lord Cornwallis, his return to England is a source of uneasiness to me, lest the Parliament should ask, why he made peace contrary to the sentiments of General Medows; and why he shuts his eyes on matters and returns to Europe, notwithstanding the commission of acts contrary to treaty and engagements. This is self-evident that his Lordship's going to Europe at this time is like a man smelling fire in his own house and anxious for his own safety, quits his house, and leaves the other inhabitants of it to extinguish the flames. As I have written these particulars purely upon ground of friendship and prudence, I desire that you will represent every word to Lord Cornwallis and obtain an explicit answer, that my mind may be made easy; for a summary reply in matters which create uneasiness to friends can never allay the pain.

**No. 504** Cornwallis announces to Tipu his determination to sail for his country as soon as possible and promises to visit the young princes on his way.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—TIPU SULTAN.

*26th June 1793.*

I have already communicated to you the intelligence which had reached me of the commencement of hostilities between England and France, and I informed you also of the measures which I have pursued in Bengal, that such an occurrence in Europe may not disturb the tranquility prevalent throughout India.

I did myself the pleasure also to inform you of my intentions to return to Europe, and I availed myself of the friendship which is established between us to assure of my anxious wish to see your sons at Madras prior to my final departure for Europe, as you request. I need not repeat my declarations that, as well with a view to your satisfaction in this respect as for a personal gratification which I shall derive from another interview with them, I shall eagerly embrace the opportunity that now offers. Circumstances having occurred which require my presence at Madras, I lose no time to inform you of my intention to embark as soon as a vessel can be ready to receive me on board, and that I shall go to Madras on my way to Europe, where I trust I shall meet with the Young Princes in perfect health, and where I hope to have the pleasure of hearing frequently from you and of bringing all points to a conclusion thro' the means of your vakeels.

**No. 505**—Cherry communicates to the Nizam's minister the G. G.'s sentiment that the readiness to perform the stipulations of the treaty which has been amply shown by Tipu should be the criterion of judging his disposition and not the refractory acts of the aumils.

FROM—G. F. CHERRY,

TO—MIR ABDUL LATIF.

*27th June 1793.*

I have translated and delivered to Lord Cornwallis the letter from Azeem ul Omrah to you with the separate paper accompanying it, and am directed by his Lordship to furnish you with the enclosed answer to it, which you will be pleased to transmit for the information of Azeem ul Omrah.

Enclosure in the above.

Whatever circumstances have occurred on the boundaries of the territories of the allied powers and those of Tippoo Sultaun, Lord Cornwallis is of opinion, as he has always been, that they are the effect of litigious and turbulent dispositions in the aumils etc. and as the treaty was formed on

mature deliberation of all the parties concerned, and was intended to establish perfect harmony between them, the disposition of each should be ascertained by the readiness which each may display in the performance of its own stipulations, and not by the refractory acts of aumils etc. which, while the Principals are steadfast to their engagements, cannot with justice nor consistent with sincerity and good will be attributed to them. A perusal of the correspondence with Tippoo Sultaun relative to the disputes on the boundaries and to the adjustment of them by means of intelligent and trustworthy aumeens will convince Azcem ul Omrah of the truth of this opinion.

Lord Cornwallis is sensible of Azcem ul Omrah's friendship, and pays due attention to his advice relative to his Lordship's return to Europe. But he has not been inattentive to the events which have occurred since the Peace, nor to the united interests of the alliance. He has considered them maturely in his intention of returning to Europe, a measure the propriety of which he can best determine, nor will his Lordship, as long as he remains, nor his successor after he is gone, neglect, or in any respect swerve from, the treaties in which the English Company is engaged.

**No. 506**—The third kist was not accepted by the English as no official notice was received of the payment of the second kist to the Nizam and the Mahrattas.

FROM—W. C. JACKSON,

TO—C. W. MALET.

*Fort St. George, 13th July 1793.*

I am directed by the Honourable the President in Council to acquaint you that having received advice from the officer commanding at Kistnagherry that on the 10th instant a party belonging to Tippoo arrived at that place in charge of treasure. The Vackeels residing here were informed that the money which their master had sent could not be received by Government until official notices were sent by you and Sir John Kennaway that the second instalment had been paid to the Marattas and to the Nizam.

**No. 507**—Cornwallis expresses his intention of sending back the Princes before his departure provided Tipu paid the third kist and was acquitted of all demands.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—C. W. MALET.

*Fort William, 11th August 1793.*

From the great exertions that have been made to render the attack of Pondicherry powerful and efficacious, there is every reason to hope that the place will be in our possession ; and that I shall be at liberty to embark



for England by the beginning of October and as Tippoo has of late manifested an earnest desire punctually to fulfill the articles of the late treaty of Peace, I think that it may materially tend to promote the future good understanding between that Prince and our Government and I must confess that it would be highly gratifying to my personal feelings, if I could have it in my power to release the young hostages, and send them back to their father previous to my departure from this country.

I request, therefore, if the third Kist should arrive soon according to Tippoo's assurances, that you will do every thing in your power to expedite the receipt of it, and that you will endeavour to forward to me at Madras by the time I have mentioned an acquittal of all demands upon Tippoo in consequence of the stipulations concluded by the treaty of Seringapatam.

**No. 508**—Tipu Sultan sends intelligence of the seizure of his territories and the plunder of the frontier district by the Peshwa's and Nizam's talukdars and by banditti and reaffirms his declaration of the release of all prisoners.

FROM—TIPU SULTAN,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Received 10th September 1793.*

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of three letters from your Lordship. You are pleased to write that you have given instructions to the Government of Madras to depute a person of experience and abilities as an aumeen to settle the altercations relative to the villages of Cauveripoor. Upwards of two months have elapsed since Syed Mahomed, a person of confidence and experience, has been deputed to settle these disputed villages and of this notice has been given to Gholam Ally Khan and Ally Reza Khan. Doubtless the English Aumeen will have arrived on the boundaries, that the two Aumeens will have met and will have proceeded on the business of adjusting these disputes in a manner that shall have no room for future litigation. All the districts allotted to the respective shares of the Nizam and the Peshwa, have been delivered over to their officers, nay their officers have taken possession of a district or two more than belong to their share and which appertain to me. I have repeatedly written to them on the subject and now address myself to your Lordship and inform you that his Highness the Nizam's Officers have possessed themselves of Nundumdoorg belonging to Gooty and Hunjunhall belonging to Gunjycota and the officers of the Peshwa's Government have taken possession of Puttunttully appertaining to the districts of Derwajee (?) The villages of *Eidathaawur* are annexed to the district of Beyloor which has for these centuries past been a part of the country

belonging to Seringapatam. The inhabitants of the Coorga Country have laid these villages waste and desolate, for they are situated contiguous to the Coorga forests. I request your Lordship to write to both the powers above mentioned, to restrict themselves to the districts actually belonging to their respective shares and to relinquish those which they have possessed themselves of belonging to me and that you will also write to the English Resident in the Calicut Country to put a stop to irregularities in districts which have belonged to Seringapatam for upwards of five hundred years so that the country may be cultivated and the friendship between the two Governments increase. A person heretofore in the service of the Peshwa named Donjee has raised the standard of rebellion and robs and plunders my country and in like manner the Talookdars of the Nizam's Country protect the Poligars of Anagoondy, Kunnekghury, Hurponhully and Soorapoor, who have plundered and laid waste my country to the value of twenty lacks of rupees; when my troops are deputed to punish them, these rebels fly for protection to the confines of the above powers. Having enjoined most positively to my people not to enter the districts of others, my troops cannot follow these people, consequently they meet with no punishment and when the troops return, they renew their depredations and plunder of the ryots and other inhabitants. In the same manner the Nairs of Chukul, etc., districts in the vicinity of Tellicherry, make inroads into my country and have possessed themselves of the whole district of Nelisuram. Many are the subjects of this trifling nature with which I do not wish to trouble a person of your Lordship's rank but should have confined my mention of them to Golaum Ally Khan and Ally Reza Khan; seeing however your Lordship's attention to these points I have written them to you; Tumpo Gaura, and other banditti residing under the protection of Paulgautcherry and Trichinopoly rob and plunder the confines of my country and have taken possession of some of my districts. I have in consequence detached troops to punish them and have particularly instructed the Commanding Officer not to cross the borders, tho' these banditti should seek shelter in the districts belonging to the English but to notify to the English Resident or Officer Commanding the troops in that quarter that such and such people have fled and have taken protection under his authority, and request him to seize and send them in agreeable to the treaty, and the Officer of my troops has accordingly informed the English Resident at Paulgautcherry, of the thieves and banditti who have run away to the English territory. The third kist for the English has been sent away under charge of Meer Hirasut Ally who arrived with it at Kishungerry upwards of a month ago, but the English Agent has not yet received the money. The representation of Meer Hirasut Ally has been transmitted to Golaum Ally Khan and Ally Reza Khan who will communicate every particular to your Lordship. Three months have elapsed since the second kist was sent to the Nizam, it has not

been received, the third kist has been also sent to the Nizam. Thus are the second and third kists to Nizam on the frontiers; no one will take the money, nor will any one grant a receipt for it. I have written frequently on this subject to the Nawaub Azcem ul Omrah but hitherto have received no answer. The third kist for the Peshwa has also been sent to Darwar. This I mention for your Lordship's information. Your Lordship will hear all the particulars of the Kurnool business from Golaum Ally Khan and Ally Reza Khan.

Your Lordship writes that two persons of some rank were taken in the action between our Cavalry at Cauveripatam, and a physician was made a prisoner in the neighbourhood of Bangalore by the Beyde horse and your Lordship requests that I will send these gentlemen to you. The Beyde never brought any person of the Faculty a prisoner, but in the action at Cauveripatam there was a person taken, whose rank not being known, he was confined in Bangalore where he died. As God of Heaven and earth is witness, I have sent men of confidence to all my forts and over my country to enquire for prisoners and it does not appear that there is one single man a prisoner. As friendship and intimacy are perfectly well established between the English and me, I trust that your Lordship will be convinced that there is not a single person prisoner, and I hope your Lordship will not give ear to the representations of the interested. It is incumbent on your Lordship to go in person to Madras and see my sons who will be sent back while your Lordship is present that the happiness of friends may be increased.

I have understood what your Lordship has been kind enough to write to me relative to affairs in Europe and the disturbance made by the French. When that nation pursues the faith of infidelity towards their sovereign and have committed disturbances which are replete with the destruction of mankind, there can be no doubt that they will meet with the punishment which they deserve. I trust that your Lordship will write me frequent letters mentioning your health.

**Nc. 509**—Cornwallis makes a sincere and friendly gesture for the release of Tipu's sons. He expresses his satisfaction at the meeting between Capt. Macleod and Tipu's amin Syed Muhamad and promises to give up all claims to an equivalent of territory yielding a revenue of 9363 pagodas provided Tipu gives up his claim on the villages appertaining to Solagury and restores those of Verapatchy.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—TIPU SULTAN.

*5th October 1793.*

Soon after my arrival here I had the happiness to receive your letter (recapitulate the letter received—10th September 1793).

I have perfectly understood the contents of your letter, and have likewise learnt from Golaum Ally Khan, and Ally Reza Khan, the sincere and earnest desire which you entertain, that the connection so happily formed between us may increase daily by mutual exertions. Having availed myself of the interview which I have had with them to discuss fully all matters in agitation, I have, without any disguise, made known my sentiments to them, and I beg leave to refer you to their representations of our conversations for the particulars of my sincerity and friendship.

Being within a few days of my departure I have explained my sentiments fully to your vakeels on every point, which has occurred since the treaty of Seringapatam, and have not omitted to assure them that Sir John Shore, my successor, will follow the same steps of good faith and amicable disposition which have guided my conduct. I have particularly noticed to them the natural disposition of the Zemindars etc. on the confines of our respective territories to foment feuds and animosities, which, I am confident, owe neither their rise to the intentions of either Government; nor will they be of any duration; for I have no doubt that every possible measure will be adopted on both sides to put a stop to them. I have represented to the vakeels that it will afford me particular satisfaction if any plan could be suggested by which more speedy remedies can be applied to these evils than such as can result from the tedious application by letter, which in consequence of the distance, frequently is so much delayed, as to preclude all alternative until the evil has arisen to its highest pitch. In short I have not neglected to express my sentiments on the happiness which I shall derive from the most cordial and friendly intercourse and arrangement of every occurrence, that can in any shape tend to strengthen our connection; I have duly considered on the disputes existing between your Government and the Coorga Rajah as represented in your letter: the English Resident at Tellicherry has been written to on this subject; and I recommend that deputies be sent on both sides to the spot, in order that this point may be also amicably settled. Having also so fully discussed the contents of your letter, I do not wish to trouble you with any farther mention of the subjects which it contains; I cannot however decline expressing the satisfaction which it has afforded me to observe that you had deputed the person selected to meet the Aumeen nominated by the English Government to adjust the disputed villages of the Cauveripoor district; and, since my arrival here, I have heard that the aumeens had met and had proceeded on the investigation entrusted to them. By the advice from Captain Macleod it appears that the revenue of Cotpatoor, which, on account of its situation (being north of the river Cauveri), was ceded to the Company, has been after minute enquiry, deducted from the revenue of the portion of the Cauveripoor district south of the river Cauveri, ceded to you on account of its situation, and pursuant to the treaty, and that there remains an annual balance due to the Company of Pagodas 4104-7-3. It farther appears that Syed Mahomed claimed in

your name four villages viz. Luckumpetty, Goondampetty, Shingapoor, and Dhatapany appertaining to your talook Andoor, but being situated on the north east side of the Cauvery, are now in the Company's possession, and are annexed to Pinagra, the revenue is valued at Pagodas 135 and that this being deducted from the above balance of 4104-7-3, leaves a net balance due to the Company of Pagodas 3969-7-3. Having already discussed in my correspondence with you . . . I trust that there is no necessity to make any reply to the argument urged by Syed Mahomed to Captain Macleod in his discussions of the grounds of the Company's right to an equivalent for that portion of the district which is to be restored to you in consequence of its situation. The Company's right rests on the treaty, by which the whole district of Cauveripoor was ceded to them ; but it was on both sides agreed that the Cauvery river should form the boundary and that the Company should receive an equivalent for such part of the district of Cauveripoor as is situated in the south side of that river. I trust that you will see the force of this remark, and that it will meet with your concurrence.

Independent of the right which the Company have to the annual revenue of Pagodas 3969-7-3 as above stated, there still remains a point to be determined, which is the situation from whence the equivalent shall be selected. Justice points out that the equivalent should be in situation as well as in money. In a former letter on this subject I suggested the district of Vencatigheery and assigned my reasons for making choice of this district in preference to any other. I beg leave to refer you to that letter ; prior however to the final adjustment of this point, I must observe to you that there are claims on both sides yet unadjusted. The Company have a claim on villages belonging to Verapatchy taken from them by force, and certain villages belonging to Solagury but annexed to Ryacotta are claimed by you.

It cannot have escaped your notice that in all matters relating to the Company I have been actuated by the principles of strict justice, but I have not nevertheless, been unmindful of the earnest desire which is mutually entertained to establish and strengthen a firm friendship with each other ; and, in order to prove the sincerity of my professions in this respect, I have exerted myself in all instances to expedite the final adjustment of every article of the treaty, that in conformity to your wishes and to my own inclination, which is not less earnest, I might have the happiness of returning your sons to you prior to my departure for Europe.

The same desire still prevails with me to strengthen our connection ; and confident, by your repeated assurances, that the same inclination prevails in your breast, it is not my intention, notwithstanding the undoubted right which the Company possess to the equivalent for an annual revenue of Pagodas 3969-7-3 to make this claim a source of delay on the part of the Company to the return of your sons, nor do I wish to retain

them in order for any further enquiry into the contested villages of Verapatchy and Solagury and I am ready, should my proposal meet with your acquiescence to give up my claim to the equivalent above stated of 3969-7-3 should you consent to relinquish your claim on the villages belonging to Solagury, and to restore the villages belonging to Verapatchy which after being in the Company's possession, were (doubtless unknown to you) wrested from them by force, contrary to all friendly intercourse, and in total opposition to existing engagements. I am informed that the value of these villages is but trifling, and where matters of great importance have been amicably adjusted, I am confident that these trifling villages will not impede the ultimate arrangement of all points; and therefore, in order that my earnest desire to comply with your wishes may not be frustrated by the delay that will arise before an answer can be received to this letter I shall not hesitate to direct that your sons be returned immediately on receiving the declaration from the Courts of Hyderabad and Poona that the kists have been paid, and that the Nizam and the Peshwa have no further claim on your Government by virtue of the treaty of Seringapatam.

**No. 510**—Cherry requests Malet to explain to the Poona Court the deputation of Capt. Doveton to accompany the hostages on their return journey to Seringapatam.

FROM—G. F. CHERRY,

TO—C. W. MALET.

*Amurbag-chouttry Plain, 9th October 1793.*

I am directed by the Governor General to inform you that when the hostages return to Seringapatam, his Lordship, conceiving it a mark of distinction and a compliment due to Tippoo Sultaun, has directed Captain G. Doveton to accompany them, and as on his arrival at Seringapatam Tippoo Sultaun may express an inclination to converse on matters relating to the boundary dispute and to the friendship subsisting between the Company and him his Lordship has given to Captain Doveton a letter to Tippoo's address that it may serve as credentials should they be necessary. The Secretary to the Government of Fort St. George has been directed to transmit to you copies of the letters lately written by his Lordship to Tippoo Sultaun two of which relate to Captain Doveton's attending the hostages to Seringapatam, and will, with the third dated the 5th October, inform you of all the correspondence that has passed since the Governor General's arrival at Madras relative to the treaty of peace. His Lordship desires that you will communicate the contents of these letters to the Durbar, in such manner as may fully impress the Peshwa with the strict attention paid by the Governor General to the stipulations of the treaty,

and his desire to strengthen the present unanimity by expediting an accommodation of all matters though at the expense of an annual revenue to the Company, and he farther requests that you will explain the deputation of Captain Doveton to accompany the hostages on their return, in order that no misconstruction may be put on a measure calculated to conciliate and to give permanency to harmony and good will.

**No. 511**—Cornwallis expresses his regret at not being able to send Tipu's sons before his departure.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—TIPU SULTAN.

*9th October 1793.*

Notwithstanding my anxious inclination and your repeated wishes that your sons should commence their return to you prior to my departure the season of the year will not admit of my continuing here any longer, and I am compelled to take my leave of them. During their residence here, I have not been unmindful of the trust which was committed to my charge, nor have I overlooked the object, much desired on both sides, of strengthening the friendly system so happily established between the English and you. I have derived great satisfaction from the pleasing manners and dispositions of your sons, and have, in strict conformity to your wishes, considered them in every respect as my own. In consequence of my great regard for them, and of my sincere inclination to give permanency to our connection I should have been happy not only in returning them to you before my departure but even to have had it in my power to accompany them part of the way. The approaching monsoon however deprives me of this gratification but that I may enjoy some share of the pleasure which their return to you must afford, I have earnestly requested Sir Charles Oakley to lose no time in their departure immediately on receiving the declarations mentioned in my last letter from the Courts of Hyderabad and Poona; and that the intimacy established between us may be fully known to the world, as well as that your sons may have every attention paid to them which is incumbent on sincere friendship, I have directed Captain Doveton to accompany them to Seringapatam and have particularly enjoined him to represent to you, how much I regret that it is not in my power to send them back before my departure. As Captain Doveton has attended them since they were delivered into my charge, and is perfectly acquainted with the esteem which I entertain personally for them and being well known to them, I trust that I have complied with your wishes as well as my own, in making choice of him to see them safe to you, and bring back the satisfactory news of their arrival, which I shall always be impatient to hear.

I shall quit this country fully impressed with your favourable disposition which the English Government in India will always be desirous to increase by a steady adherence to good faith ; and on my arrival in England, I shall use my endeavours to add to the mutual good will by every means in my power.

I beg leave to refer you to Golaum Ally Khan and Ally Reza Khan, whose desire to strengthen our friendship has afforded me great satisfaction, for further particulars. Captain Doveton has charge of a few articles, the manufactures of Bengal and of England, which I hope you will accept in token of friendship.

### No. 512.

FROM—W. C. JACKSON OF THE MADRAS GOVT.,

TO—C. W. MALET.

*Fort St. George, 6th November 1793.*

I am directed by the Honourable the President in Council to acquaint you that the third payment has been made by Tippoo Sultaun to the Company, and the Governor's receipt passed for the amount.

**No. 513**—Tipu complies with the G. G.'s requests and gives up his claim on Solagury and promises to restore Verapatchy.

FROM—TIPU SULTAN,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*13th December 1793.*

The receipt of your Lordship's friendly letter (*vide* that written 5th October) in reply to mine, containing sentiments of attachment and unanimity convinced me of the earnest desire your Lordship had to send back my sons yourself from the impulse of that friendship and integrity which by the favour of God are interwoven in your nature. Your Lordship writes that "the English Resident at Tellichery had been written to, and that you recommend the affair of the disputes with the Coorga Rajah to be duly adjusted by deputies sent to the spot". This I have understood. The case of those people is this, the Coorg territory is bounded by woods and that of the Ahmedy Sirkar by open country and the ill disposed inhabitants of the former make incursions into the latter at night and plunder and harrass the ryots. Hence there is no necessity for deputies to be sent on both sides.



[Recapitulation of the portion of the G. G.'s letter relating to Cauveripur disputes].

As a daily increasing union and friendship subsists between the Ahmedy's and the Company's Sirkar, as it is my cordial wish to conform to your Lordship's well directed opinion and the revenue of the villages in question is but trifling, from a regard to your Lordship's satisfaction and the sincere friendship that subsists between us, injunctions have been sent to Syed Mahomed Assof, agreeably to your Lordship's desire to deliver up the villages belonging to the taalook of Solagury and Verapatchy to the Company's people. Conformably to the treaty the three kists have been completely paid to all the Sirkars. I write this by way of information. Deeming me always solicitous to hear of your Lordship's welfare and prosperity. I hope you will continue to gratify me with letters.

**No. 514**—Shore agrees to depute Lt. Stuart to assist the Nizam's and Tipu's amins in the adjustment of the disputes and directs Kennaway to submit to the Nizam the impropriety of withholding his acquiescence in the return of the Princes on account of the Nizam's claim to a few villages.

FROM—SIR J. SHORE, G. G.,

TO—CAPT. KENNAWAY.

*Fort William, 24th December 1793.*

I cannot observe without the greatest concern the probability of a delay in the restoration of the young Princes to their father from the territorial claims of the Nizam in virtue of the treaty of Seringapatam which yet remain unadjusted. But whilst I consider the faith of the Company as depositaries of the Guarantee for the due performance of that treaty more particularly pledged that the stipulations of it shall be duly fulfilled, it is a satisfaction to me to reflect that if Tippoo Suldaun had not been remiss in deputing an Aumeen to inquire into the claims of the Nizam, agreeably to his declarations, all discussions between the Courts of Seringapatam on the grounds of the treaty, would probably have been brought to a conclusion before this period.

That such discussions should exist at the moment when Tippoo expected the return of his sons is peculiarly unfortunate and the impression made by the disappointment will not easily be removed by these considerations, altho' he must be sensible of the disposition of this Government to facilitate the return of the hostage Princes which has been so frequently and substantially evinced. The conclusion of Lord Cornwallis's letter to him of the 5th October informs him that his sons would be returned immediately on receiving the declaration from the Courts of Hyderabad

and Poonah that the Kists had been paid and that the Nizam and Peishwah had no further claim on his Government by virtue of the treaty of Seringapatam. This declaration as far as regards the Court of Poonah, the payment of the third kist excepted, is complete, and it rested with Tippoo Sultaun himself to take care that no obstacles occurred to a similar declaration from the Nizam. We cannot consent to the sacrifice of our faith and justice to any considerations of convenience or gratification of Tippoo Sultaun whilst he himself furnishes ground for withholding the declaration.

The preceding reflections suggest the information which you will communicate to his Highness the Nizam as the determination of this Government and I recommend the following remarks to your attention with a wish that they should be mentioned to the Nizam as your own reflections.

All the stipulations of the treaty of Seringapatam, as far as they regard this Government and that of Poona, the payment of the third kist to the Peishwah excepted, have now been fulfilled and the restoration of the hostage Princes depends upon the performance of them as they relate to the Nizam. The disposition of the Company to facilitate this event has been evinced in various instances and in none more strongly than in the liberal propositions of Marquis Cornwallis for the final termination of all territorial discussions detailed in his Lordship's letter of the 5th October. Under these circumstances it is submitted to the consideration of the Nizam and his Minister whether the villages claimed by his Highness in virtue of the treaty of Seringapatam are of such importance either as to value or situation as to induce him to withhold his acquiescence to the return of the hostage Princes until an adjustment can be made of his claims to them. His Highness, in this case, ought to be well satisfied that his claims to these villages can be substantiated on the most solid grounds, as a perseverance on them can only be vindicated by the justice of his title to the lands in question.

In support of these arguments his Highness will naturally weigh the impression which Tippoo Sultaun must unavoidably feel from a disappointment in the return of his sons at the moment of anxious expectation as well as the effect of that impression on the future good understanding between the two courts.

On the other hand, he will consider the advantages which may result from his acquiescence in the return of the hostage Princes without relinquishing his claim to the villages in question, previous to a final determination of the discussion regarding them. If their detention as ascribed to the Nizam may be considered by Tippoo as a source of dissatisfaction the restoration of them ought to have an equal tendency to promote harmony and good understanding between the two courts.

There are obvious reasons against the communication of these arguments as suggested by me ; I therefore particularly direct that they be introduced

by you as the result of your own private reflection on this subject ; and that they be considered as unconnected both with the previous communication which I had directed, and with what follows.

With the view to remove, as speedily as possible, the obstacles which now intervene to the restoration of the hostage Princes I agree to your proposition for deputing Lieutenant Steuart to assist the Aumeens in their investigations of the villages claimed by the Nizam, provided Tippoo Sultaun should consent to depute an Aumeen to meet one on the part of the Nizam, and intimate a wish for the assistance of a person in the Company's service. Of this you will be advised by the Government of Madras to whom information has been given of our determination with a request that they would notify to you Tippoo's answers without delay.

The object of this deputation is to facilitate the investigation of the Aumeens, and particularly to acquire that authentic information on the rights of the party claiming the villages in question as may enable us on any future reference to form a decided opinion respecting it. In your instructions to Lieutenant William Steuart you will be careful to point to him the necessity of avoiding any decision between the Aumeens deputed by Tippoo Sultaun and the Nizam respectively that may implicate this Government in support of it. His presence will be most serviceable in stimulating their activity, and in obviating the trifling delays and impediments which continually arise between native Aumeens when left to their own guidance and discretion. I entirely concur with you in opinion that he is peculiarly well qualified by his temper, prudence, and abilities for this deputation, and have a perfect confidence that it will be well conducted by him.

I observe with great satisfaction the temperate tone of Azeem-ul-Omrah's address to Tippoo Sultaun and have only to recommend a continuance of the same moderation in any future discussions.

**No. 515**—After a review of the situation Shore points out that no impediment now remains in the way of the return of the Princes except the adjustment of the dispute with the Nizam and requests Tipu to communicate his opinion regarding the attendance of an Englishman to assist the Nizam's and Tipu's amins.

FROM—SIR J. SHORE, G. G.,

TO—TIPU SULTAN.

*Fort William, 24th December 1793.*

I have received from His Highness the Nabob Nizam Ally Khan a copy of the address of his Minister Azeem-ul-Omrah to you under date the 23rd of Rubbee us-sannee, and I feel the greatest concern in observing that

the claims of his Highness to certain villages in virtue of the treaty of Seringapatam should still be unadjusted and that an Aumeen agreeably to the notification which you transmitted to the Nizam, through the Marquis Cornwallis, has not yet been deputed by you to meet one on the part of His Highness for the purpose of investigating your mutual claims to those villages.

It is impossible for me to express the vexation and uneasiness which I have suffered from these circumstances, lest they should occasion any delay in the return of the Princes. The Marquis Cornwallis considered it a subject of the greatest regret that he could not have the pleasure of restoring them to you previous to his departure from Madras, and the letter, which he had the honor of addressing you upon that occasion, expresses his concern at the disappointment; but in the expectation that all impediments to this desirable event would soon be removed he informed you that he had left directions for the return of your sons immediately on receiving the declaration from the Courts of Hyderabad and Poonah that the Kists had been paid and that the Nizam and Peshwah had no farther claim on your Government by virtue of the treaty of Seringapatam. This declaration as far as regards the territories ceded to the Peshwah by the treaty of Seringapatam is complete and satisfactory, and all that remains to be settled with the Mahrattas is the payment of the 3rd Kist which, I doubt not, before this time has been discharged, although from the distance the intelligence of it is not arrived. His Highness the Nizam has acknowledged the receipt of the last Kist, and he has no claims beyond those for the villages specified in Azeem-ul-Omrah's address to you of the 23rd Rubbee Ussannee. With respect to the Company, your acquiescence to the propositions in Marquis Cornwallis's address of the 5th October leaves nothing unsettled; it only remains to carry those propositions into execution and the restoration of the sons will not be retarded a moment on this account.

I have been thus particular in stating the situation of the concerns of the allied powers as arising out of the treaty of Seringapatam, that no doubt or uncertainty may exist as to the stipulations which have been fulfilled or may be unperformed, and that you may perceive at once what remains to be done. I assure you with all sincerity, that nothing can exceed my desire for the return of the Princes to you, and the expectation that this happy event would take place amongst the first occurrences after my accession to the Government of Bengal, afforded me the greatest pleasure and satisfaction, not only from a consideration of the gratification which you would derive from the society of your sons, but as an event, which by proving the good faith of the Company, would tend to a confirmation of that harmony which has been established between you and them by the treaty of peace, and which by the blessing of God will be daily strengthened and improved.

The conduct of Marquis Cornwallis, from the conclusion of that treaty to the hour of his departure from Madras, affords innumerable proofs of the sincerity of his wishes, which it is equally my desire to substantiate. I beg you to consider the exertions which he made to remove every obstacle to the accomplishment of the treaty ; that no impediments were raised on the part of the Company, and that the last propositions which he made on the 5th October, and which I observe with pleasure have had your concurrence, were directed to the same object, which embraced the return of the Princes to Seringapatam.

In these considerations you will perceive an adherence to that principle which the Company profess, a strict observance of the treaties and engagements that their friends, their allies, and all the world may be convinced of their sincerity and good faith.

The Nizam's minister Azeem-ul-Omrah with a view to the speedy determination of all discussions relating to the villages claimed by His Highness as appertaining to him by virtue of the treaty of Peace, has again proposed the deputations of Aumeens to the places in question and you may therefore now think proper to order an Aumeen on your part in conformity to the intention you formerly expressed, the execution of which has probably been overlooked amidst the various and important occupations of your Government. Under these circumstances, if you and the Nizam should be of opinion, that the adjustment of the claims would be facilitated by the attendance of an English gentleman with the Aumeens, upon the receipt of an intimation of your respective wishes, either to the Government of Madras or myself, I shall have no hesitation in appointing one on whose judgment, prudence, and good sense I can place reliance. You will consider this suggestion, as dictated by a desire to promote as far as possible the completion of all the stipulations of the treaty of Seringapatam, that after the receipt of the declaration of the allies mentioned in Lord Cornwallis's address to you above, I may have the satisfaction and happiness of seeing your sons restored to you.

**No. 516**—Expressing friendship for Shore, Tipu sends him the news of the despatch of amins both on the Nizam's and the Peshwa's frontiers and the Nizam's further encroachments on his territory.

FROM—TIPU SULTAN,

TO—SIR J. SHORE, G. G.

(Received) 30th January 1794.

I was extremely gratified by the receipt of two letters from you notifying your succession to the office of Governor General and the sincerity of your attachment towards me and your resolution to follow the steps of

Marquis Cornwallis, etc. (*Vide* letters written 28th October and 18th November 93.) You write that you were anxious to receive the declarations from the Courts of Hyderabad and Poona that my sons may commence their journey pursuant to his Lordship's wish, and that you wait with impatience the reply which I may write to his Lordship's letter; I have the fullest confidence that you will consider me as belonging to yourself and, agreeably to the wishes expressed by his Lordship, send back my sons. The money due to the three Governments has been completely paid and I trust the receipt from Pundit Pardhaun will soon arrive. Altho' ostensibly I am at a distance from you, yet mentally, by the remembrance of your kindness, I hope you will believe me near to you and constantly call me to remembrance by gratifying me with letters, which are half a meeting, notifying the good news of your health, and that I am a cordial well wisher and an unalterable friend, and always zealously intent on adhering to our mutual engagements (as it is expressed in the Koraun, fulfill your engagements,) and that you will without ceremony gratify me with Letters. Dated 25 of Daukree of the year Sauhir 1221 Mohuamudie.

*P.S.*—The same day that Syed Mahummud Assuf set out for the purpose of adjusting the boundary affairs on the English frontier, Meeran Hussien Assuf was also deputed to adjust those with the Nizam and Pundit Purdhaun, and is waiting near the frontier, but hitherto no one has come on the part of the two latter to meet him. The Nizam has taken possession of another taalook Hinchunhaur dependent on Kunchungur, not included in the treaty; not thinking it proper to write to Sirdars (Chiefs of rank) upon such matters I have hitherto waited until he should of himself observe what is contained in the treaty, and give up the taalook. Having however no alternative, (since it is necessary to have the treaty in view) I now write these circumstances. There are various matters of this sort unadjusted; to represent them is superfluous.

**No. 517**—Previous to the final adjustment of the dispute with the Nizam, the Princes are sent back by Shore, who requests Tipu to show an accommodating spirit in adjusting the boundary disputes with the Nizam.

FROM—SIR JOHN SHORE, G. G.,

TO—TIPU SULTAN.

*Written 10th February 1794.*

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 30th January 1794 (recapitulate the contents) and assure you with great satisfaction that the information of your welfare and the friendly sentiments expressed in it afforded me very sincere pleasure.

It was equally the wish of my predecessor Marquis Cornwallis and myself that your sons the Princes should be speedily and happily restored

to you, and every hour's delay in the accomplishment of this desirable event was a source of uneasiness to me ; but by the blessing of God which ever attends those who proceed in the paths of rectitude, all the material stipulations on which the return of the Princes depended, have been fulfilled on all sides, and what remains to be done is little in comparison of what has been effected and with mutual efforts will be easily and expeditiously adjusted ; in the mean time the return of the Princes will at once furnish proof of the sincerity of the allied powers and of their friendly and conciliatory disposition towards you. To complete my satisfaction on this occasion it only remains for me to learn that the Princes reached Seringapatam in perfect health and that you enjoy the same blessing, and I anticipate with great delight the arrival of this intelligence.

In the various and important transactions arising out of the treaty of peace concluded at Seringapatam, the Company with that regard to good faith which they ever profess, have acted in concert with their allies and all matters have been conducted with their knowledge and participation, and altho' I considered the residence of the hostage Princes at Madras under the care and protection of the Government there a fortunate circumstance in this respect, that it afforded the English an opportunity of showing their regard and attention to them, I was at the same time sensible of the additional obligation which this trust imposed upon us of seeing all the provisions in the treaty in favour of our allies duly fulfilled previous to their restoration. Under these circumstances you will conceive how great my uneasiness must have been when I perceived that his Highness the Nizam had preferred claims to several villages as his right in virtue of the treaty of Seringapatam which had not been delivered into his possession. From an apprehension that the return of the Princes would be delayed on this account, and in truth if the Nizam had persisted in requiring that his claims should be adjusted previous to their return, the obligations of good faith would have denied me that gratification which I now feel from their restoration. Nothing, therefore, could have afforded me more pleasure than the declaration of his Highness the Nizam, that he would not oppose his claims as an obstacle to the return of the Princes provided we were satisfied that they would be settled after their restoration, and as I entertained the most undoubted conviction that the return of the Princes would rather facilitate than retard the adjustment, I did not hesitate a moment to comply with the anxious wishes of my heart in authorizing Sir Charles Oakley to permit their departure.

I am now happy to find that you have thought proper to depute Meeran Hussein Assof to enquire into the boundaries on the frontier of His Highness the Nizam, but you mention that he is waiting near the frontier and that no one has arrived on the part of the Nizam to meet him. His Highness's minister Azim ul Omrah on the contrary informs me, that Mahomed Ameen Arab was deputed by the Nizam to the frontiers, where,

after waiting a considerable time and not finding any person on your part he returned. What can I say upon representations so different? It was doubtless your intention and that of His Highness the Nizam that the Aumeens should meet and make the prescribed investigations, and there must have been some mistake or inattention on their part. I shall therefore take the liberty of earnestly recommending to the Nizam, as I do to you, that the most positive injunctions may be given to the Aumeens to be attentive to their duty and to pursue their enquiries with candour, caution and acuracy so that the rights of all parties in conformity to the treaty of Seringapatam may be duly ascertained and settled, and that each may possess what he is entitled to.

You also write to me that the talook Hinchunhaur dependant on Kunchungur not included in the treaty has been taken possession of by His Highness the Nizam, who, on the contrary, informs me that many places are yet in your possession to which he has a right, and which have not been delivered over to him in pursuance of the treaty.

I am very sorry to observe these representations on which I beg leave to offer the following remarks. In the concerns of mankind in general the performance of the contracts and engagements which they enter into is deemed an inviolable obligation; it is the principle which strengthens the bond of society and is the cement of human happiness; but when princes contract treaties with each other the obligations of observing them with the strictest adherence to good faith is much stronger, not only because it is incumbent upon them to give in their own conduct an example to mankind, but because a deviation on their parts from justice and equity involves the world in disorder and misery. By these maxims the conduct of the several parties to the treaty of Seringapatam has hitherto been regulated and by the blessing of God they will be observed in future. With respect, therefore, to the representations which I have received from yourself and His Highness the Nizam it is first to be well considered and weighed to whom the territories claimed by His Highness and Hinchunhaur, which you state to be your right, belong by the terms of the treaty; and as all parties are bound to observe it, nothing further is necessary than to attend to the prescriptions in it agreeably to the dictates of justice, good faith and equity. If any doubt should occur let these doubts be ascertained by the same rules by the appointment of prudent and intelligent officers to investigate the claims of rightful possession on the spot.

It cannot have escaped the observation of a Prince of your wisdom and penetration that the inhabitants upon the frontiers of a state are ever disposed to excite disturbances; that those who are most prone to begin them are the first to complain to their own sovereign of violations committed by the subjects of another, and the irregularities of these people often become sources of enmity amongst princes. Where the boundaries



of two adjacent kingdoms are indefinite, and the line of separation is not precisely laid down, every day furnishes new opportunities for incursions and plunder, and the representations upon this subject become endless. Let me earnestly request, therefore, that no time may be lost in defining with a precision that excludes doubt or dispute the respective limits of your dominions and those of His Highness the Nizam agreeably to the treaty of Peace. With a sincere disposition on both sides the adjustment cannot be long protracted and if you and His Highness the Nizam should be of opinion that the investigations of the Aumeens would be facilitated by the presence of an English gentleman, as has already been the case in settling the limits of your country and those of the Company, and if it should be by your mutual desire, I shall, with great satisfaction, depute a gentleman on whose prudence, good sense and integrity I can firmly depend for this purpose.

By the blessing of God peace is now everywhere established throughout India, and I trust it will be perpetual. It is the wish of the Company and of all who have the happiness of mankind in view. The Almighty who has placed mankind under the dominion of Princes entrusts them to their care as a sacred deposit and has imposed upon their rulers the indispensable duty of consulting and promoting their happiness. I beg you will consider me as participating your joy on the restoration of your sons and as sincerely anxious for your welfare and happiness; I beg also you will increase mine by frequent intelligence of your welfare and that of the Princes for whom I entertain the greatest affection.

## SECTION 10.

### *Letters of General Francois Raymond.\**

No. 518.

FROM—RAYMOND,

TO—COUNT DE CONWAY.

*Hyderabad, 1st December 1787.*

My General,

Without having the honour of being known to you, I venture to take the liberty of writing to you, being persuaded that it is the duty of all Frenchmen who are today under your command and especially of all who enjoy your protection. I think that all are equally to be felicitated on their being under the orders of a General whose great reputation has been so legitimately established. If I still had the hope that my letter would reach you before the departure of Mons. de Cossigny, his kindness would have emboldened me to persuade him to inform you of my services and tell you who I am. I have had the honour of serving under his orders in the last war and I was engaged in different actions under his eyes. I had been for a long time attached to the party of Mons. Colonel De Lalee,† which I commanded, when very good reasons,—about which I have

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\* This correspondence of Raymond, the Nizam's French General, was secured by Sir Jadunath Sarkar and first translated and published by him in *Islamic Culture*, Hyderabad, 1933.

† Another emigrant Savoyard, Henri Francois Pierre-Charles de Motz de la Sale, better known under the name of General de Lallec.... Born at Rumilly (Savoie) in 1732, he served successively Hyder Ali and Tipu Sahib, and died in 1799 (1790) (*General De Boigne*, par Victor de Saint Genis, p. 254, note).

"M. Lally died of the wounds which he received in the action of 14th September, 1790, at Dariporam (Satyamangalam). The loss of the officer must be severely felt by Tipu, as he is supposed to have the merit of bringing his artillery to the perfection in which it now is," (*Calcutta Gazette* of 18 Nov. 1790, quoted in *Bengal Past and Present* No. 17.)

informed M. De Cossigny,—forced me to leave the corps which has no stability now. It is now eighteen months since he sent me here, with very strong letters of recommendation to the Subedar (i.e. the Nizam), who made much of them and received me well. By his orders I have formed one battalion of Sepoys, which is now (well) trained and disciplined, of which I am the sole owner. It is composed of seven hundred Sepoys, with one European with the title of second commandant, and sub-officers, also European, and its conduct has appeared to me praiseworthy upto this day. It is drilled and formed according to the prescribed French (military) regulations.

After the information which the colony of Pondicherry is in a position to furnish you regarding my conduct, I hope, my General, that you will not disdain a work which M. de Cossigny commenced and that you will give me in it your assistance and your good wishes. I am ready to sacrifice all, if I am so fortunate that circumstances may ever put it in my power to prove the zeal for my country which animates me and the profound respect with which I am, my general etc.

No. 519.

FROM—RAYMOND,

TO—COUNT DE CONWAY.

*3rd January 1792.*

The departure of M. Piron having been delayed by some days, I am able to give you by his (hands) information about the change which has taken place, in the position of the armies.

At the commencement of this month (December 1791) the English army made a move and took the fort of Mag\* while the son of Tipu (Fath Haidar) with 10,000 horsemen reached the Mughal camp (i.e. the Nizam's) at Garamkonda, consisting of 8,000 soldiers, on the 21st of the month. He defeated it entirely, revictualled the place, and has returned to his father.

The army of Sikandar Jah has returned and is encamped now at Garamkonda; that of the English is ten leagues from Patan and waits for junction with it in order to advance. It appears that the English army will have to wait very long indeed.

The loss in the camp at Garamkonda is estimated at a hundred lakhs of Rupees. The Chief has been made prisoner and so also some other special officers, such as M. Riviere and others.

My General, M. Piron can give you all the details which you desire.

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\* Probably Migry, midway between Savendroog and Outradoorg. For these operations see Wilks, 2nd ed., ii 233-235. Savendroog fell on 21st December.

No. 520.

FROM—RAYMOND,

TO—GENERAL (COUNT DE CONWAY).

*Hyderabad, 13th July 1792.*

My General,

By two harkarahs (messengers),—of whom I have had no news since,—I had the honour to reply to the two letters which you had had the goodness to write to me on the 17th and the 22nd of last month. My letter was dated from Chenganga, where the English separated themselves from the Mughals (i.e. the Nizam's forces) and the Marathas. The last-named also departed some days after. The news which was received then about the illness of Nizam Ali put his army in such disorder that it has now been rallied with difficulty; our chiefs left the troops behind; these went with the greatest haste close upon the heels of their masters, and each thereafter in his own way and by a different route.

I believe, my General, that you cannot be ignorant of the smallest detail about the treaty of peace relating to what Tipu has lost, and to the partition (of the spoil) which has been made among the allies. What people say, as also my letters, will have given you the most exact idea about it.

Our prince (Nizam Ali) is in perfect health, and the officers have again taken to their ordinary courses. It was no other reason than that of illness and above all the difficulties that M. Piron experienced on his way to Guntur, which deprived me of the honour of writing to you earlier. Neither did I write, while sending you the kitchen garden seeds, which you would have duly received (by now) by the hands of M. Piron. Whilst he was still at Morapalli, on the rumour that had circulated about the death of the prince (Nizam Ali), he was detained a prisoner in that place for one month. An English officer with 50 sepoys formed his guard. He has not yet returned, but I understand that he is now encamped eight leagues from this city.

The distress here offers a frightful spectacle. I can say that every day 200 persons die of starvation. The streets of Hyderabad are paved with dead bodies; and although the Government has set itself to remedy this lack of food, one can foresee that no change (for the better) is possible before the next crop is harvested. The people are in a riot; it was carried to the limits of Golconda on the 15th of the last month. Besides the plundering they have made in all the bazars, they almost besieged the prince in his house. The gate having been closed, they burnt it, and did not retire before they were forced by arms. One seer in this country weighs 30 ounces; and they sell two measures (i.e. such seers) of rice for one Rupee.

I am unaware of the effect which the arrival of (Mahadji) Sindhia in the Deccan will produce. He has come with the design of dethroning Sawai Madhav Rao, king (i.e. Peshwa) of the Marathas, or of replacing him by a son of Ragoba. He wishes that Nizam Ali should cede to one of the sons of the Emperor, whom he has brought with him from Delhi, the province of Payinghat and Berar; and he has also come on account of a grand marriage. Undoubtedly all the different interests (i.e. Powers) would come to an agreement from a distance as to how the war might be conducted. The party of Sindhia will dominate Poona, and Nizam Ali has not now ten thousand men to put in the field. The intelligence of his minister alone will not make head against a hundred thousand good horsemen; from which we can conclude either that it (the war) will be terminated by money, or that Sindhia will be given what he demands. Nevertheless, preparations are being made for the war.

It is in view of these things that the prince (Nizam Ali) urges me to raise troops. I have already 3,000 men under arms, and I have privately sent to M. Le Mercier Rs. 20,000 for buying arms and clothing for a thousand others. You had the goodness, my General, to favour my first ventures which encourages me to a new one. It is with this intention that I have undertaken to produce two pieces of cannon, 1,000 muskets and 1,000 uniforms of Sepoys. My General, you have not raised any difficulty as regards the muskets. As for the cannon I equally implore your aid. In case there is any obstacle, I pray M. Mercier to do all that he possibly can to procure them for me, either at Negapatam or at Madras. My English passport authorises that if the articles are purchased at Madras, they are to be equally allowed to embark. Be so kind, my General, as not to disapprove of the importunity of my demands. I have not yet forgotten the services which you have already rendered to me by the help which you have given to M. Piron, and if my hopes are not deceived, the use to which I shall put it may in your eyes take the place of my thanks to you.

My troops are the only ones in the capital; and in view of the troubles that reign there, I shall in vain ask the Prince for permission to go to you. He has for you, my General, all the admiration and esteem which you deserve. The reputation which you have acquired in this Revolution of the French is perfectly known to him. By the wisdom of your government during a commotion like that, he judges with reason about what you can accomplish, given peace and an army. I hope, I may send you, without fear, on his behalf this testimonial. As for myself I pray that my fellow citizens may agree and place at your disposal in India enough means for acting on the first necessity. Then, my General, the feeble strength of the machine which I have put together under your auspices may display itself.

*Hyderabad, 13th July 1792.*

M. Piron not being able to reach the province of Guntur, I have the honour, my General, to send to you to-day those that were entrusted with the kitchen garden seeds.

No. 521.

FROM—RAYMOND,

TO—CHEVALIER DE FRESNE, COLONEL, ISLE OF FRANCE.

*Hyderabad, 1st October 1792.*

My General,

It was nearly two months ago that I had the honour of sending you a letter through M. Chemitte, who is employed in my first Battalion as adjutant ; and though I have had no news from him since, I remain calm in the confidence I have in your goodness. Having entered into new engagements with the prince (the Nizam) for raising, in addition to what I already have, a corps of 5,000 sepoys, I have to-day sent Rs. 50,000 to M. Le Mercier. If that operation had appeared easier to me, I should have sent one Lakh of Rupees more. The three principal and most necessary articles are,—10 pieces of cast iron cannon, 5,000 muskets of French or English make and 5,000 uniforms for sepoys.

You will see, my General, from the letter of the prince which I have the honour to send you, that he urges you to favour him in realising an object which he has at heart and into which he will enter in greater detail in his next letter. It is no other than to enter into a regular correspondence with you. I have at first pressed the Minister to take a more open step. But he has replied to me that it is necessary that the prince should first receive from you, my General, a satisfactory letter on the friendship and the good understanding which he said always existed between him and the French. He has promised me very positively not to oppose my departure for Pondicherry, as soon as Sindhia will take with his army the road to Hindustan, which will take place in the course of this month. I think, my General, that if the aims of the prince and those of myself do not displease you, you can without difficulty part with your muskets, which may be seen at your requisition replaced from the Isle of France.

I pray M. Le Mercier not to dispose of the funds which I have sent him, without having received your orders. As for me, my General, I shall always follow as my first duty whatever (orders) you wish to give me. I have enough passports for the carriage by land, up to Kammam, of the articles which it will be possible to procure.

Peace appears to be entirely re-established,—at all events for the great Powers, because, as regards the interior of the dominions of the prince (the Nizam), there is always something wrong about some corner, and M. Piron finds himself cut off with 1,500 men in a tract of the country fifteen koss from here. The abundance of the rains promises a rich harvest and an approaching amendment of the scarcity of food-stuffs.

I desire, my General, that you will let me know what this country produces that is agreeable to you: my eagerness in supplying your orders would always be in proportion to the respectful attachment and gratitude with which I am etc.

No. 522.

FROM—RAYMOND,

TO—CHEVALIER DE FRESNE, COLONEL, GOVERNOR.

*Hyderabad, 4th October 1792.*

My General,

On the 1st of this month I had the honour of writing to you when I sent you a letter of the King or Nabab (the Nizam). In that letter I did not dwell at length on the aims of the prince, nor on my intentions. According to the news which I received from M. Chemitte, I have only ordered the persons whom I have entrusted with my bills of exchange on Madras to keep them till you have given your last instructions in respect of me to M. Le Mercier. Had I ever expected to find myself under the suspicion of being guilty of an act as vile as it is dishonourable, I would not have addressed you, my General, with so much confidence; nor could I have done so if I had ever wished to deceive you. Are there not at least a hundred persons in Pondicherry, even among the civil population, who can prove my sincerity by the refusals that they have met with from M. Piron?

I blush, my General, to be forced to justify myself before you. It is not the public that I care for most on this occasion. Your opinion alone suffices for my satisfaction. If in the colony that you govern, my General, with so much justice, there is found one being who can prove that either by my letters or by my men I have sought to injure the interests of the nation or the discipline of the soldiery, I give you my word of honour, my General, to present myself under your orders at Pondicherry to account for my conduct.

I do not venture, my General, to continue my letter; I trust nevertheless in your goodness still. I do not ask that you should favour my projects if they should injure (the nation's interests). I have

always asked for your orders on that point .....  
 But, my General, my reputation is very dear to me.

Tranquil in my own conscience, in the fullest confidence about your intentions, I have taken steps in the service of the prince which I believed to be advantageous to my country, and I have sent you one of his letters on that point. It would, my General, be very unfortunate if not only should I be deprived of your esteem, but also, by an accusation so false, prejudice should be created against me in the mind of the prince whom I serve.

I beg you, my General, to give M. Le Mercier the orders which concern me, in order that he may communicate them to my man who will conform to them and who will bring me back the funds which the prince has confided to me,—an object sacred to my mind.

Some evil-minded persons have deceived you with regard to me and the injury which they have done me by depriving me of the muskets which I had been assured of getting by the letters I have had the honour to receive from you, is nothing if I am not deprived of your good wishes.

No. 523.

FROM—RAYMOND,

TO—THE GOVERNOR (DE FRESNE).

*Hyderabad, 17th October 1792.*

My General,

I have received through M. Chemitte the letter with which you have been pleased to honour me, and I have sent on to M. de Morampont that which was addressed to him.

The circumstances which have placed obstacles before the desire you had to oblige me, do not permit me to complain of the ill success of the mission of M. Chemitte; it has been no more fortunate at Madras than at Pondy. This is not surprising to those who know the policy of the English. And I shall make up my mind to abandon my enterprises until a more favourable time arrives. The two letters which should have been delivered to you by M. Le Mercier with that of the Nabab, have informed you, my General, about his intentions and mine. I shall not add anything specially.

The impossibility which you have felt in supplying me with the things I had asked for having been made clear by you yourself in the last letter which I have had the honour to receive, I shall not permit myself to have in this matter the smallest semblance of the fear of growing importunate.

In my letter of 13th July I have had the pleasure, my General, of explaining to you the designs of Sindhia upon the Deccan and the Court of



Poona ; and this latter was at first alarmed and has made preparations of War. Nizam Ali and Nana Farnis, wishing to act with more certainty, have raised against Sindhia a great part of Hindustan. Holkar, the powerful Maratha Chief, joined by Ali Bahadur, has attacked all the possessions of Sindhia during his absence (at Poona) and has compelled him to abandon the project in order that he may go to the succour of his own country. He was to have departed from Poona the day after the feast of Dasahara, which took place a few days ago. But it is doubtful whether the Marathas will let him make his retreat in peace. According to the last letter that I have received about the army of Sindhia, his forces consist of 4,000 horsemen, eight battalions which can form 5,000 bad sepoy, and 52 pieces of artillery. He has, besides, in Hindustan, 50,000 horsemen under different chiefs, 18 battalions under the orders of M. De Boigne, an Officer, Savoyard by nationality, who also commands his great park of artillery and who possesses the confidence of Sindhia. He has, moreover, the detachment of the late M. Sombre, but that is a very small matter. Here, my General, are the news that I can give you with certainty.

The arrival of Sindhia has not caused anything extraordinary in the Deccan. It is, on the contrary, a journey that he has made without doubt to his great disadvantage, especially if they have put obstacles in the way of his departure ; and it is about this that I shall be able to inform you shortly.

It is not necessary, my General, that I should have to be in a fix, when you send for the things that may interest you. Your wish will be always an order to me. It will be enough if I know it, which I shall not lack opportunity to obey.

I wish very sincerely that France may be usefully served by her great armies and her great resources of all kinds. Not only the Powers of the North, but also all those that may turn enemies to her liberty, would succumb if every Frenchman, my General, had your quality (and were like you) a good citizen and tranquil-minded over the fate of his motherland. As for me, I live in a state of mingled fear and hope.

Be pleased, my General, to receive my thanks for the services which you have been so willing to render me. That which has happened not permitting me to hope for anything else, I shall be blessed if I obtain your esteem.

No. 524.

FROM—MORAMPONT,

TO—DE FRESNE.

*Hyderabad, 19th January 1793.*

To Monsieur Cheva'ier De Fresne, Chevalier of the Royal and military order of St. Louis, Special Governor of Pondicherry.

My General,

I have the honour to inform you that the Prince Nizam Ali, Subahdar of the Deccan, has just ordered the raising of a battalion of Sepoys on the same condition as M. Raymond. From my preceding letters you must have seen how my unhappy condition demands a prompt change. It is with alacrity that I have the honour to apprise you of it, not doubting at all that you will be responsive, when you understand that it is under the French flag that I shall be able one day to prove my zeal and my attachment to my nation. Alas ! if ever I can be still useful to France, I am ready to pour my blood once more for her. I labour only to discharge this duty and gain your good opinion.

In the letter which you did me the honour to write to me on the 18th September last, in reply to mine of the 12th June, you tell me that you are waiting for the coming from Europe of the Civil Commissioners to regulate and to make laws with regard to all matters, and that you will place my complaints before them and support them to the best of your ability. There is no doubt whatever, my General, that your support before these gentlemen, seconded by the justice of my demand, cannot but command all the success that you should look forward to with regard to it and that you will obtain the repayment of my salaries along with the things I have advanced.

I count firmly upon this (money) for supplying myself with a part of the articles of which I am in need for the formation of the battalion I have been ordered to raise. It is equally the king's duty to give me either the articles or the money. There are arms ..... and clothing in the stores, things essential, (but) having no use for me.

Be, my General, favourable to the officers who beseech your integrity and your justice. You have at all times been the father of the officer as well as of the soldier. You have listened to the cry for justice and extended a generous hand to the unhappy, for which reason should I not have recourse to your generosity, having just right ? Deign, my General, to second my wishes by falling in with them and giving me the three articles of which I have need. I shall be in eternal gratitude to you for it.

M. de Lagrenoir, to whom I have written, will supply my needs, ..... and will speak to you verbally what my feeble pen cannot express. (Then follow New Year's greetings.)

No. 525.

FROM—RAYMOND,

TO—GENERAL (DE FRESNE).

*1st June 1793.*

My General,

Sultan Nizam Ali Khan has done me the favour of returning to me the letter with which you honoured me on the 26th of March last, and I have

received since then your letter of 12th April, which has been found among the personal effects of the deceased M. Duclanseau. He died in a village 12 leagues from Hyderabad from an illness of 7 to 8 days. I mourn the loss of that officer very sincerely, but I hope to be informed that it is not he in whom you take interest (and whom you mention) in your first letter. I wait for your orders as to the disposal which I should make of the effects which belonged to the deceased M. Duclanseau. You will find herewith an inventory of them, which is a proof of that unhappy event.

I cannot, my General, receive any news more flattering than that of your nomination to the Government of the French in India. Circumstances have deprived me of the pleasure of being known to you ; but (your) renown has informed me that no better choice could have been made in the interests of the nation in general and to the satisfaction of the citizens in particular. I am very sincerely one of the latter.

You need not doubt the favourable reception which the Sultan (Nizam) will accord to your relative. The ignorance in which I am about his name, troubles me besides.

In the letter which you have written to the Sultan, I have not seen the particular which concerns the young officer. Doubtless through the forgetfulness of your Persian interpreter, there is no mention made of it, nor also of your favourable disposition regarding the object of his seeking. I have taken it upon myself to assure him of the success of that negotiation, after what you had the goodness to inform me. I have represented to him that usage does not permit one to enter into great detail in a first letter, and that this (first letter) you have written to him simply in order to let him know of your promotion to the Governorship.

As soon as you will be pleased to inform me of the price which may be put on the things to which I have laid a claim, I shall expedite the payment of it by the bankers of Madras, to the order of the persons you may be pleased to indicate to me.

I explained long ago the advantages which may be derived from my operations. I shall place them under your eyes over again, if you order it, in assuring you that my position will become more favourable to the interests of the nation by reason of the independence which it can acquire. I have the honour of serving a good prince whose attachment to the French is not doubtful and he will prove useful to them in need, if however they desire him, in preparing at a distance the reinforcements which ought to be effective.

I have the pleasure of sending you his reply by my couriers (harkaras), and in this matter I venture, my General, to represent to you that the usage of this country prescribes an order of corresponding more (formal) between the Powers of India and those of Europe. The abatement of (lacuna in MS) ..... in his manner of treating with the different courts of Asia. It is only from the perfect knowledge I have of your

character, that I put myself forth to communicate this detail to you. For the rest, my intention is not to swell the expenses of the Government (of Pondicherry). I shall not ask for anything for following the orders which I may receive. I desire solely that the French may enjoy in India the greatest consideration, and if I have the happiness to contribute to it, the Republic has no more flattering recompense to offer to me than that which I shall find in my heart.

I desire to conform to the decrees of the Republic, if I know the changes which it has made in its first constitution. I received a long time ago the design of the flag of the nation, which is the one I use.\* I understand that it has again been changed, along with many other things. Do me the favour of informing me as to what has been established (in France) in this matter, and I shall conform to it. The troops that I have the honour of commanding have not yet been designated under the name of the Swiss Company. If I receive your approval on this point, I shall follow the usage which I have established by calling them the Detachment of French Corps of Raymond. There has not been in India yet a corps of 15,000 men.

No. 526.

FROM—RAYMOND,

TO—W. KIRKPATRICK, Resident at Hyderabad.

*Hyderabad, 21st April 1796.*

[*Note.*—The following letter, though not relevant to the present volume, is included here in order to collect all the letters of Raymond in one place. Its language is so characteristic of the typical French soldier that it is given in the original. The circumstance that led to its being written was his :—

Raymond was in the habit of seducing sepoys and even British soldiers of the English Company to desert and join his corps. They used to come to Hyderabad from the Madras territory very easily via Marpilly or Cumbum. When in 1796 his lieutenant Tailhade paid a visit to Guntur on the way to Madras, he was suspected of having come to seduce British troops and was immediately thrown into prison. He was released only after the Nizam had certified that Tailhade was his servant. J. SARKAR.]

Monsieur,

J'avis innocent alors que vous m'avis privé de vos volontés, comme je le suis encore, de l'interpretation desavantageuse qu'on a fait, du voyage de Monsr. Tailhade a Madrast ; aucun autre motif que les interets du Prince ne l'ont conduit la ; M. de la Haye n'ayant que tres imparfaitement consommé la mission d'ont il fut chargé avec votre agrément, M. Tailhade a été choisi pour aller la terminer, on l'a arreté et accuse de trahison ; j'ay appris le matin par la vaye du Nababe Mir-alem. Voicy,

\* Scene etrange ! les fantassins de Raymond portaient le bonnet rouge et combattaient sous le drapeau tricolore ; les soldats de M. de Boigne marchaient sous l'enseigne bleue et la croix blanche. (St. Genis, 234.)

Monsieur, le fait en deux mots. Bien que vous le connaissiez déjà, j'ai reçu dans le temps, 160 mille Roupies pour l'achat de canons, fusils, drapes etc ; que le Gouvernement a accordé au Prince ; une partie de l'argent a été dissipée (c'est un malheur). Mais enfin les canons, n'ont pu être livrés faute d'argent, et le Sirkar me forcent de rendre compte. J'ai été forcé d'y supplier ; en conséquence j'ai écrit à M. Tailhade de se rendre à Madrast, pour solder les effets retenus et vérifier la conduite de Monsr. agent.

Helas, Monsieur ! je commande une corps dont MMs. les officiers ont pour toute fortune *L'honneur* ; ils ne sont jaloux que de ce bien. Leur camarade prisonnier à Gontour, sous des inculpations deshonorantes, les met dans un Etat de sensibilité que ils n'avaient pu encore éprouver. Veuillez, Monsieur, me donner quelque motif de consolation ; rendez-moi un off<sup>er</sup> dont le courage, et la probité, ont été utiles au Prince votre allié ; et ordonnez, s'il le faut, que tout ce que j'ai d'effets, à Narpely, Madrast, et Pond<sup>y</sup> soit retenu confisqué,—perdu même, je payerai l'argent que le Sirkar m'a confié, avec résignation. Cette désagréable nouvelle m'est parvenue le matin, ensemble, avec l'ordre de mettre en campagne p[our] le service du Prince ; j'espère, Monsieur, que vous voudrez favoriser le retour de M. Tailhade à son Corps, en m'envoyant une lettre que j'expédierai sur le champ à Gontour ; j'attends cette grâce de vous, avec la plus vive impatience.

Je suis, Monsieur, dans une position difficile à vous prendre, aussi j'arrête à vous assurer de l'attachement très respectueux avec lequel je suis,

Le 13<sup>e</sup> de la lune de  
Chawal, 1210.

Monsieur,

Votre très humble

Et très obéissant serviteur

Raymond.

*Note.*—For other French records relating to Raymond, see E. Gaudart, *Catalogue des Manuscrits. Pondichéry*, tome ii :—No. 1563 (Letter from Raymond to De Fresne, recd. 29 Dec. 1791, position of allies in the war), No. 1657 (5 March 1792, De Fresne introduces Raymond to French Minister of Marine, anti-English plans in the Deccan), No. 1775 (16 June 1792, De Fresne to De Cossigny the Governor General, reporting frequent desertions from the garrison of Pondicherry due to Raymond's raising a large force for Nizam Ali), No. 1896 (5 Nov. 1792, Nizam Ali endorses Raymond's request to De Fresne to sell him 5,000 fusils and six cannon), and No. 2200 (Raymond's strength in Oct. 1794).—J. SARKAR.

## Index to Volume 3.

### *The Allies' War with Tipu Sultan*

[The figures denote the numbers of letters.]

A

A—*contd.*

**Abercromby, Robert**—Governor of Bombay—61, 71; 76; 90; instructions to Colonel Frederick of the Bombay detachment 177; captures Cannanore 193; ascends the Coorg Ghat 261; retreats on Governor General's failure at Seringapatam 325, 326A; asked to move to Periapatam 402; 403-404; 408; advances up the Ghat: advises Governor General of his movements 413, 418, 420-21, 426, 428, prepares to take up position for the investment of Seringapatam 429, 431; 432.

**Ali Reza**—Tipu's envoy—attempts to negotiate through Rasta 201, 204; his proposal discussed by the Hyderabad Court 209, 209A and by the Poona Court 212; adjusts the various articles of the treaty with the Governor General 450-52, 455-56A, 460, 465, 467-69, 471-72, 475-76, 478, 480, 484, 486-490, 493-94, 501-2, 508.

**Appa Balwant Mehendale**—229; 385; 417.

**Appaji Ram**—Tipu's envoy—arrives in Bhau's Camp 293; his arrival disapproved 302-304; refused interview by Bhau 315; Governor General agrees to receive him in camp 345; important discussion about negotiating with him 361; his embassy fails 367; 375.

**Appa Saheb Patwardhan**—366; 370; 373.

**Asad Ali Khan**—Nizam's Chief—194; 207; 210; 222; 228; 251B; 252; 253; 298;

MO-I Bk Ca 46-45

325; 326A; returns to Seringapatam 334; his secret correspondence with Tipu 337; 341; objection to his appointment as a commander 354; 392.

**Azim-ul Omra**—93; objects to Haripant's command of the Maratha army 189; averse to act in co-operation with the Marathas 194, 201; defends his connection with the English: his objection to assume the command in person 211; recommends the appointment of Raja Tejawant 213; proposes abandoning the siege of Kopal 220; demurs to the junction of Tejawant's cavalry with the Governor General 232; directs Tejawant to join the Governor General with expedition 240, 43; dilatory tactics 264A; 270; 287; 296; objects to the dictatorial tone of the Resident 298; his duplicity 316; his concern at the setback received by the English army 329; resolves to proceed to the front 334; denies secret meetings with Tipu's agents 360; his advance to the main army urged 368-69; 376; commences his march 378; slow progress 382, 384, 386-88A; 391-92, 396, joins the Governor General 425, 440; complains against the high-handed conduct of Tipu's officers 492; 495; 501; 503; objects to Governor General's departure 503.

B

**Bachaji Pant Mehendale**—Maratha agent in General Medows's camp—137; 140; 168; 361; 406; 417.

B—*contd.*

**Badar-uz-zaman**—63; 64; troubles near Tipu's frontier 67, 67A; 149; 154; surrenders Dharwar 283; plundered by Maratha horse 293, 297; his release demanded by Governor General 457, 458; released 461.

**Bahadur Khan**—Kiladar of Bangalore—killed 282.

**Bana Bapu**—joins with a contingent 142; his operations 214; 308; 370; 375.

**Bangalore**—257, 267.

**Bapu Panse**—229.

**Behro Pant Mehendale**—negotiating the alliance with the English 29, 58, 63, 82, 93, 108; his services in the negotiation of the alliance appreciated by Governor General 119; presented a gold watch 127; compliments paid 134A; 135; entertained by Malet 156; his expectations from the company's Government 176; hopes held out to him of personal gratification 221.

**Bhonsle of Nagpur**—his contingent joins Haripant 397.

**Binny, Lieut.**—374.

**Boddam, R. H.**—Governor of Bombay, 15; 19; 21, 22.

**British policy**—5; 6; 7; solicitude for Maratha alliance 13, 14; hostility to French influence: offensive engagements declined 16; Anglo-Maratha alliance proposed 24, 25; growing friendliness for the Nizam 31; negotiations with the Nizam 43, 44; Maratha co-operation courted against Tipu 61, 63, 72, 116; anxiety for alliances against Tipu 89; 92; 104; policy towards the Nizam defined 113, 121, 125, 126A, 135; harmony between the two allies of the English essential 119, 150A.

B—*concl.*

**Burhan-ud-din**—135, his death 149-A.

**Byron, Capt.**—79; 98; captures vessels carrying supplies to Tipu 106; 109.

## C

**Campbell, Sir Archibald**—Governor of Madras—4; reports French intrigues with Tipu 5; 9; brings out the defensive nature of British policy 16; retires 35.

**Canapel, Monsr.**—28.

**Cannanore, Bibee of**—21; her hostile attitude to the English 95, 96; 103; 106; her punishment recommended 130; joins the English 153, surrenders 193.

**Chalmers, Lieut.**—his release insisted on by the Governor General 417, 419; released by Tipu 433; 436.

**Chel Naik Poligar**—3.

**Cherical, Raja of**—37A, 39; 99; 101; 103; 109; 130.

**Cherry, G. F.**—Persian Translator to Governor General—353; 381; 442; adjusts articles of the treaty of Seringapatam 450, 451, 455, 456, 456-A, 464, 478, 480, 484, 490.

**Chintaman Rao Patwardhan**—138.

**Cochin, Raja of**—52, 53; assures the English of his support in the war 98.

**Cockerell, Col.**—113; 114; 114A; 117; 121; 417.

**Conway, General.**—Appointed Governor General of the French establishments 8; 12; pacific policy towards the English 20.

## C—contd.

**Coorg, Raja of**—101; anxious to attach himself to the English 109; rejects Tipu's friendly advances 319; his valuable assistance to the Bombay army 429; complaints against him 452, 454, 462; 472; 484; 513.

**Cornwallis, Earl, Governor General.**—

Policy towards Tipu: solicitude for Maratha alliance 7, 11, 13-16, 18, 60; declines offensive engagements with native Powers 24; negotiations with the Nizam 43, 44; resents the attack on the Raja of Tranvancore by Tipu and invites Maratha co-operation 60; discourages Sindia's mediation in securing Maratha co-operation 75; consents to the employment of a British contingent with the Maratha army 84; inducements offered to the Nizam to commence operations 87; 89; declares war on Tipu; incites the Marathas to begin war 92; 94; 104; harmony between the two allies of the Co. deemed essential 119, 121; declines Tipu's overtures of peace 126, 126A; compliments Malet on the successful conclusion of the treaty 134; urges Malet to quicken the movements of the Maratha army 150; 153; his efforts to counteract the effects of the disaster of Satyamangalam and of Tipu's incursion into Coimbatore 159, 167; proceeds to the seat of war 169, 170; arrives at Madras 193; 194; resolves to penetrate the Balaghat by way of Bangalore 221; ascends the Mugly pass; desires Tejawant to join him with cavalry 222A, 227A, 227B; 231; 233; Kolar and Hoskote surrender 236; captures Bangalore 257; 264; assaults the fortress 267; asks Tejawant to join him expeditiously 273; 277; 278; his plan of campaign after the capture of Bangalore 279; details of the storming of Bangalore 282; effects junction with Tejawant's cavalry 291; determines to push on to Seringapatam 294; harassed by the enemy's horse 297; moves from Bangalore 307; commends the conduct of the Nizam's cavalry 307A; his plan of operations 311;

## C—concl'd.

complains of want of discipline in the Nizam's army 312; asks Tejawant to march back 320; arrives in the neighbourhood of Seringapatam 322; foiled in the attempt on Seringapatam: belated arrival of the Maratha army 325, 326A; his strategy for the next campaign 328, 332, 338; controversy regarding the disposition of the armies during the monsoon 332; denounces Raja Tejawant and demands his removal 341; 343; assents to the reception of Tipu's agent 345; 350; advises a temporary separation of the forces 348; Tipu's deputy refused admission 361; precautions for guarding the communications 365; failure of Appaji Ram's embassy 367; Nizam's minister urged to join expeditiously 369, 372; captures Nandidrug 381; reduces Savendrug 402; concerned at Bhau's failure to co-operate 406, 408, 409; reprimands Bhau 411; confers with the allies 417; demands the release of the garrison of Coimbatore as a preliminary 419; instructions to the Bombay army 422; 426; his embarrassment on account of Bhau's failure to co-operate 425; defeats the enemy and crosses over to the island 434, 436; articles of peace 442; conclusion of treaty 449; departs for Bengal 463; 471; urges on Tipu the fulfilment of the treaty 473-502; release of prisoners pressed 480; 491, 499; complimentary presents from Tipu 487; intends to return to Europe 499; 503-505; solicitous for the release of the young hostages 507; 509; 510; 511; 512.

**Cossigny, Monsr.**—8; 12; 20; 518.

**Cotiote—Raja of**—37A; 39; 99; 101; 103; 106; 109; 130.

**Coupland, Lieut.**—331.

## D

**Dajee Phadke**—366.



D—*contd.*

**Dalrymple, Capt.**—301; 389.

**Dara Jah [Mahabat Jang]**—150-A; 190; invests Kopbal 192, 198; 203; 207; 218; 220A; 282; 287; Kopbal reduced 295; 296; presents to English officers 301; 329.

**De Boigne**—523.

**De Fresne, Col.**—8; 226; 474.

**Dhondjee Wagh**—508.

**Doveton, Capt.**—466; deputed to accompany the hostages to Seringapatam 510; 511.

**Dow, Major**—his operations near Tellicherry 97; 101; 103; 107; 109.

**Duff, Colonel**—282; 361; 414.

## F

**Floyd, Colonel**—discomfited at Satyamangalam 159; succoured by Medows 160; marches to join Cornwallis 402.

**Frederick, Colonel**—Commandant of the Bombay Detachment acting with the Bhau—Abercromby's directions for his guidance 177; embarkation at Jaygarh 179; his difficulties 179; 181-83; 187; 191; arrives at Dharwar 195; engaged in the siege of Dharwar 205; 212; 214; 217; 221; 223; 234; 239; 250; death at Dharwar 255.

## G

**Ghulam Ali**—Tipu's ambassador to Constantinople—ill-treated 12; adjusts all points of dispute in the treaty 456-A, 463, 464, 469, 487, 493-4, 501.

## H

**Hafiz Farid-ud-din**—329; dispatched to Gurramconda 334; siege of Gurramconda 355; 365; 381; 389; taken prisoner 410.

**Haripant Phadke**—178; appointed to the command of the second Maratha army 182; 185; the route of his journey to the front 186; his appointment disliked by the Nizam 189; leaves for the front 193; his slow progress 201; 212; 221; 223; 226; 234; 239; 241; 244; halts at Gadwal 246; 250; 251; meeting with the Nizam and subsequent movements 251-A; 254; 255; 264; 266; 268; 270; meeting with Kennaway 272; alterations in his plan 275, 280; 283; 289; 290; proceeds by way of Sera and Raydrug 306; 308; effects junction with the Governor General at Seringapatam 325; 326; asked to keep open the Sera route 328; 330; 332; 338; 348; persuades the Governor General to receive Tipu's wakil in camp 345; circumstances of his meeting with the Governor General 353; delegate to the congress 355; 359; confers with the allies 361; secret correspondence with Tipu 366; rumours of his duplicity 375; 393; 406; rejects Tipu's overtures 417; his conduct praised by the Governor General 449.

**Hartley, Colonel**—96; carries succour to Travancore 98, his operations in Travancore 106-A; his victory over Tipu in Malabar 193.

**Hiern, Captain**—90; 160; 161; 165; 173.

**Holland John**—succeeds to the Governorship of Madras 35; 38; 45; 49; his conduct censured 84.

## I

**Imtiaz-ud-daula**—Nizam's nephew—his recall raises the suspicion of the Resident 309.

## K

**Karnool, Nawab of**—483; 494; 498; 499.

**Kelly, Major**—leads the assault on Bangalore 282.

**Kennaway, Sir John**—Resident at Hyderabad—78; 80; difference between him and Malet in the negotiation of the treaty of alliance 110; 117; 118; 125; 126-A; asked to keep a watch on the noblemen in the Nizam's Court for counteracting Tipu's designs 121; 135; communicates the Nizam's suspicion of Haripant and advises the Nizam to co-operate with the Maratha army 189; 194; proposes the appointment of a distinguished chief to the command of the army 209; 210; objects to Tejwant's appointment 213; 215; opposes the raising of the siege of Kopbal 218, furious at the Nizam's demurring to the junction of Tejwant's army with the Governor General 232; 266; urges Tejwant's advance 268; 270; meeting with Haripant Phadke 273; proceeds to the seat of war and presses the minister's advance 357; 358; 360; 362; 368; 374; 376; 378; 382; 388; 392; 396; junction with the allied army 440.

**Kennedy, Lieut.**—301.

**Knox, Captain**—98.

**Kolhapur, Raja of**—26; 61.

**Kopbal**—192; 295.

## L

**Lakshman Rao Phadke**—289-290; 298; 303; 304; 306; 309; 317; 353.

**Lal Khan**—33.

**Lally, Monsr.**—26; 30; 57; invests Cranganore 98; captures it 106-A.

## L—contd.

**Little, Captain** of the Bombay Detachment—his arrival near Sangameshwar 112; his initial difficulties 118; 120; crosses the ghat 122; arrives at Tasgaum: difference with Bhau about the ceremonial of interview 128; his movements 129; 131; 134; 143; meeting with the Bhau 136, 138; 141; 143; crosses the Kistna 147; an encounter near Dharwar 157; attack on Dharwar 171; his conduct praised 179; 188; his recovery 195; the detachment rewarded for its gallantry 330; storms Holihore 400; congratulated for his victory over Ali Reza near Shimoga 412; 415; 440; 447; rejoins the Bombay army 449.

## M

**Mahabat Jang**—See Dara Jah.

**Mahadaji Pant Behere**—179; 185; 417.

**Mahadji Sindia**—29; offers his mediation to secure co-operation of the Poona Court 74; his offer discouraged by the Governor General 75; 151; 211; 219; his arrival in the South dreaded 344; 351; Poona Court concerned over his resolution to visit Poona 358; 401; 449; 520, 523.

**Malabar Rajas**—declare allegiance to the English Company 103; 109; 130.

**Malet, Sir Charles**—14, 15; discusses Anglo-Maratha alliance 29; 31; 58; advises against the policy of inviting Maratha co-operation against Tipu 61; 63; 65; 66; the terms of the Poona Court for co-operation with the English 69; 73; 74; 77; 80; a hitch in his negotiation at Poona 82; 83; 85; 90; 91; 93; 100; 108; alarmed at the arrival of Tipu's agents in Poona and urges the Durbar to ratify the treaty 110; 115; 117; exchanges treaty of alliance with the Poona Court 118; 123;

M—*contd.***Malet, Sir Charles**—*contd.*

opposes general defensive arrangements with the Nizam 125; 127; objects to Tipu's agents in Poona 129; complimented on his successful negotiations 134; 135; 137; urges the Poona Minister to a prompt offensive 139; 144; the ratified treaty delivered 145; 146; 149; 160; 161; 163; remonstrates with the Darbar for delay 168; 178; 182; presses the Peshwa's taking the field 185; 186; 190; upholds Haripant's appointment to the command 193; 201; his scrutiny of Ali Reza's letter 204; 205; 212; 223; urges Haripant's rapid advance 234; 239; 244; 280; attributes the capitulation of Dharwar to the Governor General's success at Bangalore 283; 293; 300; disapproves Appaji Ram's arrival in Bhau's camp 302; 304; 308; denounces the intrigues of the allies 316; 318; 321; 324; 335; 339; 340; 341; 344; 345; discusses Governor General's plan of a congress of delegates 359; 366; 375; suspicious of the motives and intentions of the Poona darbar 379; 385; 393; 397; 403; 445.

**Malik Esau**—Nizam's officer—488; his conduct censured by Governor General, 495.

**Maxwell, Lieut. Colonel**—enters Mysore territory 164; junction effected with Medows 175.

**Medows, General**—appointed to the Government of Madras 62; 90; 92; 108; receives professions of friendship from Tipu 111; departs to join the army 117; 126; 126A; 127; 129; 135; captures Karur 136; his position distressed by the enemy 139; advances to Aravakurchi 144, and to Dharapuram 145; 147; reduces Palacatcherry 152; 153; 155; forced back by Tipu 158; 159; 160; 162; resumes the offensive 163; 165; reaches Caveripattam 175; 186; turns down Tipu's overtures 194; 195; 353; shoots himself 444; 446; 467.

M—*concl'd.*

**Meer Abul Kasim**—31; his mission to Calcutta 44; deputed to the main army 331; 334; 343; 347; 354; arrives in camp 361; 365; 367; 369; 417.

**Meer Alam**—See Meer Abul Kasim.

**Meer Kamar-ud-din**—1; 81; 88; 417; 419; 433.

**Meer Moyen-ud-din**—3.

**Mehedy Ali Khan**—Tipu's envoy—arrives on the Nizam's border 317; 324; 334; 337; returns without an interview with the Nizam 343; 344; 347; 352; 354; 360; 384.

**Mercier, M.**—Raymond's agent at Pondicherry—520; 521.

**Mohidin Ali Khan**—33.

**Montgomery, Major**—126-A; 131; 132; 150-A; 192; 198.

**Montigny, Monsr.**—9; 20; 26; 27.

**Monneron, Monsr.**—9.

**Moplas**—their attachment to Tipu 103; 106; 130.

**Morampont, Monsr.**—French adventurer—518-524.

**Muhammad Ali**—Tipu's deputy—433; 436.

**Muhammad Amin Arab**—194; 210; captures Sidhout 232; 237; 246; 258; 271; 292; 309A; 341; 392.

**Musgrave, General**—271.

## N

N—*contd.*

**Nana Fadnis**—his friendship sought by the English against Tipu 13; 14; 16; 24; 25; 29; jealous of the negotiations between the Company and the Nizam 43; 73; 74; a hitch in the negotiations of the alliance 82, 83; 93; warmly enters the alliance 108; 119; 135; 139; 146; 151; stops correspondence between Tipu and Rasta 156; equipping the grand army 166; 167; disavows intrigues with Tipu 182; 185; declines taking the Peshwa to the field 186; his secret illness 190; 191; 196; spirited reply to the Nizam 206A; objects to the growing friendliness between the Nizam and the English 211; advises Bhau and Haripant vigorous prosecution of the war 247; 255; proposes changes in Haripant's movements 280; dissatisfied with Haripant's slow progress 305; 317; 342; 373; 375; his precarious tenure of office 385; 387; 403; 523.

**Nazir Ali**—33.

**Nixon, Conductor**—301; 389.

**Nizam, the**—12; 16; 26; 27; his growing friendship with the English rouses Tipu's suspicion 31; 32; 34; the Poona Court's jealousy about the mission to Calcutta 43; friendship cemented with the Co. 44; 58; 61; 63; 72; 73-4; expresses readiness to co-operate in the war on Tipu 75; 77; 78; 80; asked to commence operations 87; progress of negotiations 89; 92; the weakness of his Government in relation to that of Poona 93; 94A; obstructs the co-operative alliance 102; 104; his military equipment inadequate 108; assured of safety by the English Government 113; 114; cavils about ratifying the treaty of alliance 117, 118; his policy directed to secure independence from the Marathas 119; 121; anxious to involve the English in a general defensive treaty 125; 126A; 135; 136; 139; 180; disapproves Hari-

**Nizam the**—*contd.*

ant's command 189; averse to co-operate with the Marathas 194; 196; 199; 201-2; 205; 207; his growing friendliness with the English evokes a representation from Nana Fadnis 211; 216; his intriguing character 218; 220; 223; 226; 227; directs Tejwant to join the Governor General with expedition 241; 243; 251A; his meeting with Haripant 254; fires a salute of guns on the fall of Bangalore 274; 276; 287; 294; a trophy presented to him by the Governor General 307-A; operations of his army, intrigues in the Darbar 309; his reply to Tipu's overtures 309A; 316; anxiety for his army distressed by the enemy 317; 321; sends reinforcements to the Governor General 331; charges of corruption against his officers; changes in the command of his army 334; 337; 343; 347; 352; 355; supports Sindia's visit to Poona 358; 360; equips another army 377; 389; 390; 430; 483; 484; 488; 492; his attempt to establish protectorate over Karnool 494; 498; 501; 502; 508; 514; 515; 517; 519-20, 523.

## O

**Oldham, Colonel**—306; 315.

## P

**Palmer, Major** 29; 151; 351; 449.

**Parashuram Bhau Patwardhan**—fomented troubles on Tipu's northern frontier 59; 67; 67A; appointed to conduct the army against Tipu 83; 85; 100; 108; his tardy advance 110; 117; 118; 128; 129; 131; 133; 135-37; his meeting with Capt. Little 138; 139; 141; 142; crossing the Krishna 143; 146; 147-8; invades Tipu's country 149; 150; 154; an encounter with the enemy 157; 158; 161; 166; an attack of the garrison

P—*contd.***Parashuram Bhau Patwardhan**—*contd.*

beaten back 171; 172; his future operations 185; reduces Gajendragarh 185; 190; siege of Dharwar progressing 195; 196; 201; a Maratha detachment surprised 202; 205; 206A; failure of Col. Frederick's attack 217; 223; 229; reinforced 230; 234; 244; 247A; 250; 261; 275, 280; Dharwar capitulates 283; attack on Badar-uz-Zaman 293, 297; 300; Tipu's wakil arrives in camp 302; moves from Dharwar 304; 305; 308; 309; refuses interview to Tipu's deputy 315; his progress 316; 317; the causes of his tardy progress analysed 318; reduces several strongholds 321; 322; 323; effects junction with the G. G. near Seringapatam 325; 326A; 330; 332; temporary separation of the forces recommended 348; 353; his position threatened by Tipu 361; 364; his activities in the N. W. quarter 366, 370, 373, 377; 385; 397; Holihonore stormed 400; fails to cooperate in G. G.'s plan of operations 401, 402, 403, 406, 408, 409; reduces Bankapur; defeats Ali Reza near Simoga 407; reprimanded by the G. G. 411; reduces Komsee and Anantpur 416; 425; 427; 429; 435; directs his march towards Seringapatam 439-441, 443; 447; returns northward 449; 493.

**Parashuram Pant**—Subahdar of Ratnagiri—receives Capt. Little at Sangameshwar, 112.

**Peshwa, the**—7; 24; 83; 94A; 134A; ratified treaty delivered 145; 148; his presence urged at the seat of war 155, 166, 178, 179, 182, 185, 201; the difficulties in the way of his taking the field 206A; 212; 219; congratulates the G. G. on the fall of Bangalore 293; 366; 373; excursion to Wai 375, 379, 380, 385, 393; 440, 484.

**Poona Govt.**—6; its alliance courted by the English 7, 13, 14, 16; 9, 11; 17, 18, 23-25; 26; 27; 32; 43; its position in the Co's alliance with the Nizam 44;

58; its co-operation invited in the war with Tipu 60, 61; advisability or otherwise of its co-operation discussed 61, 63; favours an alliance with the English 65, 68; terms of co-operation with the English 69; G. G.'s anxiety to close with its terms 72; different modes of its cooperation discussed 73, 74, 77; its accession to Anglo-Maratha alliance 78, 80; 84; 85; 86; 91; 92; agrees to accept armed British aid 93, 94A; ready to begin war 100; its want of alacrity commented 102; 108; arrival of Tipu's agents in Poona 110; wrangle over precedence of title in the treaty 115; 116; ratifies the treaty of alliance 117, 118; its jealousy of the Nizam's connection with the English 119; 123; 134; 135; urged to a prompt offensive 139; 145; hostilities commenced against Tipu 149; its reaction to Col. Floyd's discomfiture 160; Tipu's intrigues at Poona 165; tardy proceedings in the campaign 166; 168; the siege of Dharwar to be pressed 172, 174, 176; 178; equips another army under Haripant Phadke 179, 182, 185, 186; 206A; 209; 211; tardiness in the prosecution of war 212; 239; 285; 300; 318; 335; 339-41; its jealousy of the increasing power of the English 344; anxious about employing its cavalry near the enemy's centre 375; its attitude to the war 385; 440; 481; 482; 485; 501-2; 508.

**Portuguese, the**—72.

**Powney, Mr.**—98.

## Q

**Qurban Ali**—an informant—sentenced to death by Tipu 33.

## R

**Rallappa**—Zemindar—59; 67; 187.

**Ramba, Rao**—192.

R—*contd.*

**Rasta**—40; sympathies for Tipu's cause; obstructs the conclusion of the cooperative alliance 108; arrives in Poona accompanied by Tipu's agents 110; 123; 124; 127; 129; 135; his presence in Bhau's army objected to 150; 156; 161; 165; 185; 186; 187; 190; 91; 201; 205; 219; 342; the Resident invited to an entertainment 385; suspected to be secretly helping Tipu 393, 397.

**Raymond, Monsr.**—Frenchman in the Nizam's service—invests Gooty 362; joins Secunder Jah's party 384; his letters—(Section 10) 518–526.

**Read, Capt. Alexander**,—commandant of Amboor—282; 417.

**Read, Capt. Andrew**—takes over charge from Montgomery 198; prepares batteries against Kopbal 200; opens fire against the walls 203, 206, 207, 208; his slow progress 218C, 220, 225, 232, 241A, 246A, 251; reduces the fortress 295, 296; his gallantry commended 299; 301; 306; captures Bahadur Binda 309, 310; ordered to proceed to Ganjicota 313; 317; 329; 331; 336; 337; 343; 347; 355; 359; 376; attacks Gurramconda 389.

**Reza Beg**—395.

**Riddel, Capt.**—438.

**Ross, Lt. Hugh**—412, 415.

## S

**Sartorius, Major**—of the Bombay Detachment—195; 205; 275; 280; his conduct of the siege commended 283; 297; 300.

**Scott, Lieut.**—301; 389.

**Secunder Jah**—334, 346; 360; 369; 372; 374; 376; 378; 382; 383; 388A; 398; 412; 414; 417; joins G. G.'s Camp 425, 441; 579.

**Sher Khan**—reinforces Dharwar 149;

**Shore, Sir John**—G. G.—advises the Nizam's acquiescence in the return of the hostage princes 574; 515; restores the hostage princes 517.

MO-II Bk Ca 46—46

S—*concl.*

**Steuart, Lt.**—Asst. Resident at Hyderabad—216; his instructions 218; arrives in Tejwant's camp 222; 227A; 228; urges Tejwant to join G. G. with expedition 231, 233, 233A, 245, 248, 249, 251B, 252, 253, 256, 260, 262, 263, 265, 269; 323, returns to the Nizam 374; 382; 386; 388A, 391, 514.

**Stuart, Col.**—reduces Palacatcherry 152.

## T

**Tanjore**—118; 134; 144; 149; 173.

**Taylor, Robert**, Chief Factor of Tellicherry, 37; charged by Tipu of covertly assisting the Nairs 37A; denies the charge 39; 46; 96; 99; his attempts to rally the Malabar chiefs to his support 103; 105; 106; advises the reduction of Cannanore 130.

**Tejwant, Raja Baramal**—attacks Ganjicota 194; appointed to the command 'the Nizam's forces 210; his appointment objected to 213; 215; asked to effect junction with the G. G. 216; 218; 222; 222A, 227B; 228; his immediate junction with the G. G. urged 231, 232; backwardness in effecting junction 233, 233A and B; 235; 237; 240, 241, 243; begins marching towards Bangalore: a description of his cavalry 245; 248, 249, 251–53; 256–58, 260; asks for an English detachment to cover his forward move 262, 263, 263B, 264–68, 270; 271; 272–74; his conduct censured by the G. G. 277; 278; 281; 282; 284; his removal demanded for his cowardly conduct 287 288; effects junction with the G. G. 291; 296; 298; ill-equipped with provisions 307; his spirited action commended 307A; asked to put his cavalry in action 311; the G. G. embarrassed by want by discipline in his cavalry 312; 314; his army distressed for want of forage and grain 317; asked to march back with his cavalry 320; 325; 326A; suspected of secretly corresponding with

T—*contd.***Tejwant**—*contd.*

Tipu 334; denounced by the G. G. 341; 347; 352; 392.

**Tellicherry, Chief of**—See Taylor, Robert.

**Tipu Sultan**—his accession opposed by his troops 1, 2, 3, 4; intrigues with the French, 5, 7; sends an embassy to France 9, entertains French soldiers in service 10; 11; 12; proposals of Anglo-Maratha alliance directed against him 13, 14, 16; 17-20; 24, 25; his activities in Malabar 21, 23; 26-29; dissatisfied with the growing friendliness between the Nizam and the English 31, 32, 33-36; asked to restore Mount Delly 37; objects to the assistance rendered by the English to the fugitive Nairs 37A; his operations against the Nairs 38-42; 43; excluded from Anglo-Nizam alliance 44, failure of his mission to France 45; 46; 48, his activities in the direction of Tellicherry 49-51, his demands on the Raja of Travancore 52, 53; attacks Travancore lines 54; repulsed with losses 55-57; disturbances on his northern frontier 59; the attack on Travancore lines resented by the G. G. 60; 61; 64; 67; 70; 72; 79; despatches vakeels to Poona 80-81; renews attack on the Travancore lines 88; hostilities declared by the G. G. 90-92; carries by storm the lines 93A; 98; 106; his progress in Travancore country 106A; attempts to wean the Poona Govt. from the alliance with the English 108; friendly professions to Genl. Meadows 111; 123; his overtures declined by the G. G. 126, 126A, 127; breaks up his camp in Travancore 129; 135; 139; his agents dismissed by the Poona Durbar 145; 146; retreats from Coimbatore 147; reinforces his northern stations 148; hostilities commenced by the Marathas 149; 155; descends Gajar Hatty pass 157; forces back General Meadows 158; his success over Col. Floyd 160; 165; 167; intrigues at Poona 185; 186; his fresh overtures turned

T—*concl'd.*

down 194, 195; revolt of the zamindars 197; 201, 209; 214; overtures though the French 226; 238; 255; hanged the Kiladar of Bangalore 257; attempts to prevent the junction of the Nizam's cavalry with the G. G. 268; overtures to the Nizam 292; 297; 306; renews his advances 309; 326; 333, 341; intrigues to detach the Nizam 347; his vakeel admitted by the allies 350; shocking account of five European prisoners 356; opens negotiations for peace 405, 417, 419; denies the charge of breach of promise to the garrison of Coimbatore 423; anxiety for peace: releases Chalmers 433; his first line of defence destroyed 434; 436; asks for terms 437; articles of peace 442; makes the first payment 446; complains about the conduct of the retiring armies 450, 452; 454; backwardness in the fulfilment of the treaty 456A-500; pays another instalment 469, 485; complimentary presents to G. G. 487; resents Nizam's encroachment over Karnool 494, 496; 497; 500; 501; 503; 505; 508-510; 514; the treaty fulfilled in its details 515; 516; his sons restored 517.

**Thompson, Capt.**—400.**Tim Naik**—Polygar—3.

**Travancore, Raja of**—16; 18; 19; 21; 25; Tipu's demands on him 52, 53; lines attacked 54; 57; 60; 72; hostilities renewed by Tipu 88; 92; lines stormed by Tipu 93; the country panic stricken 98; 106A; 451; 456A; reclaims his districts from Tipu 460, 465; 473, 499.

**Tukoji Holkar**—523.

U

**Uhthoff, Joshua**—86; appointed paymaster to the Bombay detachment 110, 124; 131; 138; 377.

Y

**Yvon**—48, 217.

